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Abstract 
'FEEL THE PAIN' 
Death, Grief and Bereavement Counselling 
in the North East of England 
Arnar Arnason 
University of Durham 
Department of Anthropology 
This thesis is about death, grief and bereavement counselling in the North East of 
England. It is based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out over a period of three 
years. 
I have three main objectives in this thesis. Arguing that the anthropology of death 
has neglected grief, I seek to describe and explain how people in the North East 
of England experience grief; how they make sense of the death of their loved 
ones, and their own reactions to those deaths. Working with interviews with 
bereaved people and drawing upon work in narrative analysis about the 
importance of stories in how we think, interact and relate to other people, I focus 
especially on the stories that bereaved people tell in their grief. 
I seek to illuminate, too, how grief is managed in the North East. In particular, I 
focus on bereavement counselling which has, I suggest, assumed something of an 
authority over how people should grieve. Seeking inspiration from the 
anthropolo gy of emotion and the Foucauldian notions of discourse and 
'technologies of the self', I examine how grief is constituted in bereavement 
counselling both in training and practice. 
Finally, I compare how bereaved people experience grief with the construction of 
grief in bereavement counselling. In bereavement counselling the focus is upon 
the emotions the bereaved is experiencing in the present; grief is understood as an 
emotion that has its origin and location inside the individual mourner now. For 
bereaved people, grief is a part of their ongoing relationships and interactions with 
their loved ones, and other people around them, and as such it is a feature of the 
history of those relationships and interactions. The difference between the 
experiences of the bereaved and the workings of bereavement counselling IS 
explained by placing the latter in the context of modem govemmentality. 
Statement of Copyright 
"The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should 
be published without their prior written consent and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged". 
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Part I 
Just Remember ... 
1 
What's the Story? 
Chapter 1 
Introduction. What's the Story? 
This dissertation is about death, about grief and about bereavement counselling. 
This dissertation is about stories, knowledge, experience, emotions and power 
too. In being about these things, this dissertation has something to say about 
culture, social interactions and social relationships. It is based upon ethno graphic 
fieldwork carried out in the North East of England from 1994 to the present. 
I have three Inain objectives here. I want to try to understand how people in the 
North East of England experience grief, how they make sense of the death and of 
the lives of their dead ones, 1 and how they react to those deaths. Drawing upon 
the work of people like Jerome Bruner (1986) and Michael Carrithers (1992 and 
1995) about the importance of narratives in how we experience the past, plan the 
future and make sense of our interactions and relationships with other people, I 
focus especially on the stories, the narratives, that bereaved people tell in their 
grief. 
I hope to illuminate, too, some of the ways in which grief is now dealt with, 
managed, officially and publicly in the North East. In particular I am interested in 
bereavement counselling, a relatively new form of dealing with grief, one that is 
steadily and rapidly growing in importance and authority and one that 
increasingly, I will suggest, may come to colour the way in which people 
experience and evaluate their grief and their grieving. Bereavement counselling 
I I use the teIID dead ones here and sometimes in what follows instead of such teIIDs as dead 
relatives or loved ones. I do so because sometimes people grieve someone who was not a relative 
and sometimes they grieve someone whom they didn't love. 
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has assumed, or been offered, something of an authority in matters of grief, over 
what people should expect in grief, of how, indeed, they should grieve. In cases 
of national tragedies it is bereavement counsellors as much as priests or doctors 
who are called upon by the media to explain to people what is going on. 
Finally, I want to compare what bereaved people have told me about, and in their 
grief, with the construction of grief found in bereavement counselling, both its 
discourses and its practices. I shall suggest that while bereavement counselling's 
importance and authority may be growing, there are some fundamental 
discrepancies between its notions of grief and the experiences of the bereaved. 
For bereavement counselling death signals the end of the relationship between the 
deceased and the bereaved. Accordingly, in bereavement counselling the focus is 
upon the emotions of the client, the attention is directed towards whatever the 
bereaved person is experiencing in the present. For bereavement counselling grief 
is an emotion that has its origin and location inside the individual mourner in the 
present. For bereaved people, on the other hand, death signals a change but not 
the end of their relationship with the deceased. Accordingly, for the bereaved, 
grief is much more a part of their ongoing relationships and interactions with their 
dead ones, and those other people around them, and as such it is a feature of the 
history of those relationships and interactions. 
Later, I will talk at length about the power of stories. Perhaps the nature of this 
dissertation is best explained by telling you the story of how I came to write it. I 
came to the North East of England with my family in the autumn of 1993 to do 
my master's degree. Midway through I began to think about the possibility of 
doing a Ph.D. Sharing my thoughts with my supervisor he sent me home with the 
instructions to return the next day (this is how I tell the story now) with a suitable 
subject matter for a Ph.D. research. At home my wife suggested that I take up an 
earlier interest that had never come to anything and do some work on death. My 
supervisor accepted the idea with his usual enthusiasm and we immediately agreed 
that I would align this work with his interest in narratives and decided that I 
would consider the stories that bereaved people tell in their grief. 
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From the start I saw my work as falling within the anthropolo gy of death and as I 
started reading the anthropological literature on death it became evident, as a 
number of people have observed (see Fabian 1991 [1972], R. Rosaldo 1984 and 
1989, Kan 1992, Good 1994), that anthropologists interested in death have 
largely ignored the experiences of bereaved people, that they have indeed ignored 
grief. To try to describe and understand how people experience grief was to be 
the focus of my research, my contribution, I hoped, to the anthropology of death. 
Their stories would provide me with the key. 
Here I was of course, to some extent, encroaching upon the territory of the 
anthropology of emotion and my supervisor soon sent me away to read that 
literature. Reading the work of Michelle Rosaldo (1980 and 1984), of Unni 
Wikan (1987 and 1990), and of Lila Abu-Lughod (1986) and Catherine Lutz 
(1985a, 1985b, 1988; also Lutz and White 1986; Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990), I 
learnt that the radical distinction between thoughts and emotions may be a 
peculiarly Western view as may be the view that emotions are natural, physical 
reactions that reside exclusively in individual minds and individual bodies. 
Instead, I learnt that it may be fruitful to locate emotions in social interactions and 
social relationships and to probe such emotion terms as grief not for what they 
have to say about individual psychology but for 'the meanings such words acquire 
through their association with enduring patterns of social relationships and 
activity' (Rosaldo 1980:27). 
While this was going on, I was about to begin my efforts to get in touch with 
people who had been bereaved and with people involved in the business of death. 
I was introduced to a couple who were deeply involved in the running of a local 
branch of the biggest voluntary bereavement counselling organisation in the 
country, Cruse- Bereavement Care. The couple offered to take me to meetings 
with their local branch and from those meetings arose the opportunity to enrol on 
a course in bereavement counselling. The initial idea was simply that partaking in 
the course would provide me with access to people with whom it would be 
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valuable-for me to talk to. My supervisor then suggested that I ought to broaden 
my scope a little and consider bereavement counselling, and by some extension, 
counselling as such as part of my research. He pointed out something which I had 
noticed too, that counselling is or has become a very prominent feature of life in 
England. 
This coincided with further readings in the anthropology of emotions. In 
particular I became engrossed in Abu-Lughod and Lutz's (1990) claim that it is 
not enough to look at the role and place of emotions in social relationships and 
interactions, but that we can fruitfully treat the emotions as discourses in 
Foucault's sense and investigate how they are constituted as a separate knowable 
domain of reality, and how this constitution reflects and affects the distribution of 
power in society. This, I decided, would be the perspective from which I would 
view discourses about the emotions and grief within bereavement counselling. 
Having decided that I would look more closely at bereavement counselling as an 
institution and an activity, my supervisor suggested that I examined the literature 
on counselling. I also read the social science literature on counselling and 
psycholo gy, the classic work of Phillip Rieff (1966) and Christopher Lasch 
(1979), and the more recent work of Jeffrey Masson (1989). In particular though 
I read the work of Nikolas Rose (1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1992, 1994, 1996). Rose 
points out that social scientists like Rieff and Lasch, and indeed Masson too, have 
been influenced by the humanistic and sometimes vaguely Marxist liberalism of 
the 1960s and talk about psychotherapy and counselling as mystifying, repressive 
and hegemonic tools of oppression. These writers analyse the psychotherapeutic 
encounter as one based upon permanent imbalances of power, between the expert 
and the patient, wherein the therapist's agenda habitually overwrites the 
subjectivity of the client. They analyse psychotherapy more generally as means by 
which inherently social problems of class divisions and the unequal distribution of 
wealth and power are redefmed as essentially psychological problems of 
motivation and adjustment, a redefinition that makes impotent any attempts to 
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rectify the situation through political action and prescribes strictly individual visits 
to the therapist. 2 
What Rose points out, and what I discovered during my training, IS that 
psychotherapy or counselling does not work this way; not now anyway. 
Counsellors seek to help their clients to explore and express their subjectivities 
and through that lnake changes in their lives and many people fmd this extremely 
helpful. The bereavement counsellors that I came to train and work with - and I 
believe that goes for lnost counsellors working today - have taken on the key 
aspects of Carl Rogers's (1951) client- or person-centred therapy. In the 
counselling relationship they seek to downplay their own status as experts and aim 
'to start from', as more than one of them have put it to me, 'and stay with the 
reality of the client'. It is the client, these counsellors stress, who is 'the expert' 
for he knows his own experiences and his own problems. 
Still, power, influence, and effect are obviously there. Without them there would 
not be any use for counselling. Without them there would not be any counselling. 
In addition, counselling resides in a social and cultural context and social and 
cultural context, as I understand it and shall relate later in this introduction, 
always implies power. In order to illuminate these issues I resolved to follow 
Rose (1989a) in following Foucault (1978; 1977c) and his argument that modem 
forms of power are productive rather than repressive. Bereavement counselling is 
productive, I shall say, it produces, or helps the client to achieve, specific forms of 
subjectivity. This idea that counselling is productive is supported by the few 
genuinely anthropological studies that have been carried out on counselling 
(Hockey 1986 and 1990; Edgar 1997) who confrrm that counselling is a creative 
activity and counsellors often profoundly creative people. But the subjectivity 
produced in counselling has to be understood in the double sense that Foucault 
invested in the concept. For not only does bereavement counselling allow or help 
2 To me Rieff, Lasch, and Masson are following the very respectable lead established by Marx 
and Engels (Marx 1963) in their arguments against Hegel and the young Hegelians that 
alienation is a material, social reality and not an imbalance in Spirit's relationship with itself 
(see McLelland 1980). 
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people to have experiences that they might not otherwise have, but it is through 
those experiences that bereavement counselling has its effect, wields its power. 
In describing counselling in this way I have heeded another advice from Rose 
(1989a) that he in turn accepted from Foucault. Rose points out that while 
psychology and its more applied descendants trade in complex and profound 
notions about the self and about human nature, we, in our attempts to understand 
psychology should not start from its abstract speculation. Rather, Rose says, we 
should see psychology, or counselling in my case, as a set of local techniques and 
practices developed to meet quite specific practical problems. Anthropology, I 
would like to add, and participant-observation in particular is ideally suited to 
study psychology and counselling in this way. 
I attempt, then, to study counselling as techniques and practices developed to 
solve specific practical problems. For a while I thought about asking for 
permission to sit in on counselling seSSIOns and observe what goes on there. 
Rather quickly, though, I decided against this. My presence, I felt, would ruin any 
session, be against the interests of the client and the counsellor, and would not, as 
such, be a very good example of what I actually wanted to look at. Instead I talk 
here about the training courses which I undertook to become a voluntary 
bereavement counsellor. This, I suggest, is a good substitute for observing actual 
counselling in action, for in training we were being taught, in a very practical way, 
how to go about counselling. In addition, we would ourselves engage in pretend -
and sOlnetnnes not so pretend - counselling practices, taking up in turn the 
position of client, counsellor and observer. From these and from my own more 
recent experiences as a counsellor, I believe I can build a reasonable account of 
counselling itself. 
While I trained for the bereavement counselling I established contact with people 
of various professions who deal with death and grief in one way or another. I 
spoke with priests and funeral directors, superintendents at crematoria and 
graveyards, doctors, nurses and counsellors. What these people told me is 
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reflected in this dissertation. I also worked as a volunteer in a hospice for the 
terminally ill for over a year. I intended to ask for permission to make the hospice 
part of my thesis but decided against this. The reason was simply that 
bereavement counselling was assuming such an importance in my work that I felt 
that taking the hospice into account as well would leave very little room to do 
what I had originally intended to do, that is, to talk about the experiences of 
bereaved people. Instead I asked the hospice to help me contact bereaved people 
who might be willing to be interviewed by a fledgling anthropologist. With the 
help of the people at the hospice I arranged three interviews with people whose 
spouses had been 'guests', as they are called, at the hospice before they died. 
Needing more interviews I turned to my friends asking some of them if they knew 
someone who had been bereaved and who might be willing to be interviewed, or 
whether they would like to be interviewed themselves. By these means I arranged 
a further twelve interviews although not all of them are recorded here. 
Theoretical orientation: death, grief, story 
Death 
Anthropologists have from the very inception of their discipline been interested in 
death and its rituals and their place in human society and cultural evolution. 
Bloch and Parry (1982:6) have distinguished between cultural and sociological 
schools in the anthropology of death. The very frrst anthropologists, they point 
out, to pay any sustained attention to death focused largely upon mortuary 
symbolism and sought their material mostly in the classical sources of Greek and 
Roman civilisation. It was Bachofen who set the trend in 1858 (Bachofen 1967; 
see Bloch and Parry 1982:1) in his study of the symbolism manifested in the 
Dionysian and Orphic mystery cults. Bachofen pointed out the presence of eggs 
in some Classic tombs and to their significance as symbols of fertility. He noted 
that the eggs were painted half-black and half-white, symbolising the 'passage of . 
night and day and the rebirth of life after death' (Bloch and Parry 1982: 1). 
Adding a political dimension to what Bachofen regarded as largely a matter of 
cosmology Frazer (1963) wondered how killing could be a rite of fertility and 
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renewal. In particular, Frazer pondered the question of how the killing of divine 
kings could regenerate the fertility of the community (Bloch and Parry 1982:2; 
Huntington and Metcalf 1991 [1979]: 164). 
Bloch and Parry (1982:6; see Taylor 1989) point out that this early 
anthropological concern with mortuary symbolism gave way, early on in this 
century, to questions about the place of death in social organisation as 
anthropology in Europe swung towards the sociology of Durkheim. MyoId 
Professor of Anthropology at the University of Iceland, Haraldur Olafsson, never 
tired of stressing to his students the importance of Durkheim's central concern 
which he put something like this: 'How does society hang together?' In putting 
these questions, Durkheim made a radical distinction between the individual as a 
biolo gical organism with selflSh drives and the individual as a social person whose 
conscience is largely, if not totally, provided by his or her society (see Gisli 
Pilsson 1991; Ingold 1986). The relevance of this here, is that Durkheim's 
problematic of how the social order can be established, and maintained, 
presupposes as a problem for, and threat to, that social order the biological 
individuality of society's members, part of which is, it would seem, their mortality. 
According to Durkheimian sociology, death is a problem for society in two 
different ways. First, the death of one of its members disrupts the delicate 
network of social relationships that constitutes the society, threatening the social 
order this very network supports. Second, because society stamps its authority 
upon its members, a loss of even one of them threatens to undermine rather 
drastically, dramatically and decisively the claims to eternity upon which society's 
authority, according to Durkheimian orthodoxy, depends (see Durkheim 1965 
[1912]; Radcliffe-Brown 1922). 
How can this problem be met? How can this threat be neutralised? It was a 
favourite strategy of Durkheim and his followers, in some ways the defining 
project of their school of sociology, to show how thoroughly social seemingly 
biological and individual states, processes and events in fact are (see Bloch and 
Parry 1982; Carrithers 1985). Maurcel Mauss (1985 [1938]), for example, 
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attempted to show how what we take to belong most securely with ourselves, our 
awareness of ourselves as individuals, has in fact a long and complex social 
history (see Carrithers 1985; Cohen 1995). It was another of Durkheim's pupils, 
Robert Hertz, who took it upon himself to carry this project to death (Hertz 1960 
[1907]). Hertz focused his attention on the case of the Malayo-Polynesian 
speaking people of Indonesia. Drawing heavily upon Van Gennep' s (1960 
[1909]) notion of the three stages of rites of passage, Hertz's specific contribution 
was to show how, in societies where secondary burials are practised, a symbolic 
link is established between the state of the dead body, the fate of the soul of the 
deceased, and the status of the bereaved relatives. So, in the case of the Malayo-
Polynesian speaking people of Indonesia the total decomposition of the flesh 
marks the time when the bones can be interred with the bones of the ancestors, 
the lTIOment when the soul will be allowed entry into the land of the benevolent 
ancestral spirits, and the occasion when the bereaved are deemed clean of the 
ritual defilement they have suffered through their contact with death and are 
pennitted re-entry into everyday social life. 
Through his analysis Hertz was attempting to show how what we take to be the 
biological event of death is in fact a lengthy social process. In accordance with 
Durkheimian orthodoxy, Hertz states that the person who dies is not only a 
biolo gical organism, but a social person upon whom society has written its 
identity. Society needs this lengthy period of rituals to remove that identity and 
install it upon another of its members. It is the 'work' of society that has to be 
rescued and separated from the biological stuff upon which it was placed, in order 
that it can then be recycled within the group, maintaining the authority, stability 
and timelessness of the social order. Only when that task is fulfilled can the 
biological material upon which society works be discarded (see Bloch and Parry 
1982). Among the Malayo-Polynesian speaking people of Indonesia, Hertz points 
out, this mortuary treatment is only for certain people. Children who have not 
been initiated, slaves and foreigners are all buried quickly, quietly and only once. 
What these people have in common, Hertz adds, is that they are not members of 
the group, they are not part of the society. Correspondingly, society has not 
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performed upon them the work it has on its members and has, consequently, 
nothing to recoup. 
Here then, in the sociological tradition (see Bloch and Parry 1982:6), the 
analytical lens has largely been turned to how societies respond to and deal with 
death in order to minimise the disruption it can cause. The focus is largely upon 
those very pUblic, collective, rituals that death tends to set in motion, funerals and 
burials, for example. Durkheim (1965 [1912]) and Radcliffe-Brown (1964 [1922]) 
both attempted to show how collective the authority of society is re-asserted in 
funerals and Jack Goody (1962) and William Douglass (1969) have presented 
funerals as a tool to realign social relations severed by death by redistributing the 
rights and obligations that inhere in those relations, and by fmding new 
incumbents for the social positions and roles left empty by the deceased. 
More recently, Bloch and Parry (1982:6) have attempted to map out new lines in 
the anthropology of death by wedding together the concerns of both the cultural 
and the sociological schools. Their edited volume 'focuses on the significance of 
symbols of fertility and rebirth in funeral rituals' (Bloch and Parry 1982:1) and the 
authors are 'interested not only in the cultural logic of the kind of symbolism 
which preoccupied Frazer, but also ... in seeing this symbolism in relation to the 
organizational aspects of the society in which it occurs' (Bloch and Parry 1982:6). 
I think it fair to say, though, that the force of Bloch and Parry's drive is more 
sociological than cultural in that social organisation is called upon to explain the 
cultural logic rather than the other way around (see Metcalf and Huntington 1991 
[1979]:6). Bloch and Parry's decisive step, where they break with the 
Durkheimian orthodoxy, is in doing away with the personification of society of 
that orthodoxy according to which society is not simply superorganic, but a 
'superorganism' (Ingold 1986:227). So while Bloch and Parry share with the 
Durkheimians 'a concern with the social implications of mortuary practices,' they 
do not share their 'view of society as an entity acting for itself' (Bloch and Parry 
1982:6). But if society does not, as Bloch and Parry maintain, exist simply and 
unproblematic ally, then it and its authority must be created. And death, according 
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to Bloch and Parry, provides an excellent chance to carry out just such a creation. 
It is, they say, 'not so much a question of Hertz's [and Durkheim's] reified 
'society' responding to the 'sacrilege' of death, as of the mortuary rituals 
themselves being an occasion for creating that 'society' as an apparently external 
force' (Bloch and Parry 1982:6). Death is not so much a threat to society as an 
opportunity to set in motion the symbolic resources which can be mobilised to 
create that society. In this way Bloch and Parry demonstrate that death is not 
only destructive, as the Durkheimians would have it, but also profoundly creative 
(see Taylor 1989). 
Bloch and Parry's de-personification of society has some far reaching and 
dramatic consequence. If society is not 'an entity acting for itself' (Bloch and 
Parry 1982:6) then the mortuary rituals, the act of creating society, must be 
carried out by some of its members. This allows for the problematisation of how 
lTIOrtuary rites are set in motion, organised and carried out. It makes it possible to 
pose some genuinely political questions about precisely which members of society 
get involved in organising funerals, in what way and at what stages. Bloch and 
Parry advance the general idea that if death is associated with renewal of fertility 
'that which is renewed may either be the fecundity of people, or of animals and 
crops, or of all three. In most cases what would seem to be revitalised in funerary 
practices is that resource which is culturally conceived to be most essential to the 
reproduction of the social order' (Bloch and Parry 1982:7). They, though, largely 
base their theory on, and extend it to, societies based on traditional authority in 
Weber's sense (Weber 1978:212-250), where the social order is represented as 
being eternal, immutable and unquestionable. Going through a number of 
dichotomies - irreversible time v cyclical time, good death v bad death, life-giving 
fertility v polluting sexuality, men v women, order v chaos - Bloch and Parry 
(1982:38) argue that, so that the 'eternal, stable, life-giving element' of traditional 
authority 'can be constructed, it is antithetically contrasted with another order 
built up by reference to such notions as 'biology', 'individuality', 'flesh' and so 
on. Bloch and Parry argue that irreversible time, bad death, polluting sexuality, 
chaos. biology and individuality are, in societies ruled by traditional authority, 
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associated with women and conceived as essentially feminine, whereas good 
death, life-giving fertility, social order and eternity are associated with men, 
particularly male elders, and conceived of as essentially masculine. In this way 
burials amongst the Merina people of Madagascar, where authority resides with 
male elders, provide an opportunity to stress the impermanence and insignificance 
of individual human life, largely conceived as feminine, in face of the permanence, 
stability and eternity of the social body, largely conceived as masculine. They 
offer a chance to emphasise the life giving fertility of male authority against the 
life threatening pollution of female sexuality (Bloch and Parry 1982~ Bloch 
1982).3 
In sharp contrast to this stand the four Mrican hunter-gatherer societies - the 
Hadza, the Mbuti, the Baka, and the !Kung - considered by James Woodburn 
(1982). None of these societies is based on traditional authority. In fact, within 
theIn, authority is fleeting, vested in particular individuals, momentarily, and not in 
permanent social positions. They, fittingly, as Bloch and Parry (1982:7) observe, 
have no great concern with 'ensuring the continuity of the human group itself, or 
the replacement of its personnel.' There is no attempt among the four societies to 
translate death into rebirth for, 'the force of the analogy between death and rebirth 
is missing when you not only enter and leave the world naked, but remain naked 
while in it; where there is no transcendental authority to be created the dead can 
be left alone' (Bloch and Parry 1982:42; see Woodburn 1982). 
I fmd a lot of the work in the anthropology of death inspiring. In particular, my 
account has been influenced by the work of Bloch and Parry. I shall argue, as do 
they, that collective responses to death can be seen to be constitutive of society. 
More concretely I shall in the following chapters attempt to show the place and 
part of bereavement counselling in the social and political formation of England. 
Yet, for all their insights, I can't help feeling that there is something missing from 
3 It is somewhat ironic that Bloch and Parry's picture of societies based on traditional authority -
with its transcendence of the social over the individual and the biological - reproduces rather 
neatly Durkheim's vision of the fundamental character of society. It recalls, too, Geertz's (1973) 
description and analysis of Balinese society, a description for which Bloch (1977) took Geertz to 
task for exporting Durkheim into the field (see Ingold 1986:163~ Gell 1992). 
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the anthropolo gy of death. It is an old trick to criticise writers for not doing what 
they never set out to do. It is true that neither Durkheim nor Radcliffe-Brown , 
Hertz nor Bloch and Parry have set out to try to understand the individual 
experiences of bereavement. They did not intend to uncover the psychological 
Inechanisms of grief (see Fabian 1991 [1972]; R. Rosaldo 1984; Kan 1992; Good 
1994). In fact, the flow and force of the argument has been in the other direction. 
In their writings about death and the emotional responses it elicits, 
anthropologists have broadly followed the respectable lead of Durkheim, 
exemplified brilliantly in his Suicide (Durkheim 1952 [1897]; see Bloch and Parry 
1982:3), in establishing how seemingly autonomous, spontaneous, individual 
actions, such as suicide, often have their sources outside the individual and do in 
fact possess their own sociology which renders them not so much autonomous 
and spontaneous as obligatory, determined, and predictable. 
In his The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim (1965 [1912]) 
tackles grief - or the emotions associated with death - in the same vein. Durkheim 
(1965 [1912]:435-6) relates a death scene among the Warramunga of Australia 
reported by Spencer and Gillen: 
a piercing cry suddenly came from the camp: a man was dying there. At once, 
the whole company commenced to run as fast as they could, while most of 
them commenced to howl ... 'some of the men, scattered about here and there, 
sat down, bending their heads forward between their knees, while they wept 
and moaned ... Some of the women ... were lying prostrate on the body, while 
others were standing or kneeling around, digging the sharp ends of yam-sticks 
into the crown of their head, from which the blood streamed down over their 
faces, while all the time they kept up a loud, continuous wail. Many of the 
men, rushing up to the spot, threw themselves upon the body, from which the 
women arose when the men approached, until in a few minutes we could see 
nothing but a struggling mass of bodies all mixed up together. To one side, 
three men of the Thapungarti class ... sat down wailing loudly, with their backs 
to the dying man, and in a minute or two another man of the same class rushed 
on to the ground yelling and brandishing a stone knife. Reaching the camp, he 
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suddenly gashed both thighs deeply, cutting right across the muscles, and 
unable to stand, fell down into the middle of the group, from which he was 
dragged out after a time by three or four female relatives, who immediately 
applied their mouths to the gaping wounds while he lay exhausted on the 
ground.' The man did not actually die until late in the evening. As soon as he 
had given up his last breath, the same scene was re-enacted, only this time the 
wailing was still louder, and men and women, seized by a veritable frenzy, 
were rushing about cutting themselves with knives and sharp-pointed sticks, 
the women battering one another's heads with fighting clubs, no one attempting 
to ward off either cuts or blows (Durkheim 1965 [1912]:435-6; quoted in 
Huntington and Metcalf 1991 [1979]:48-9). 
Relating scenes of such intense emotions, it appears that the force and direction of 
Durkheim's argument can only be to demonstrate the unstructured, spontaneous, 
chaotic nature of grief. Durkheim stresses that the emotions associated with 
funeral rites are grief, sorrow and anger (Huntington and Metcalf 1991 
[1979]:50). He makes it clear, though, that their expression is not simply a matter 
of spontaneous outburst (Durkheim 1965 [1912]:446). It is natural for family 
members, Durkheim' states, to feel lessened and weakened in the face of the death 
of one of its members but what happens in the following public rituals, 'when 
sorrow leaps from mind to mind', is that other members of society feel moral 
pressure to align their behaviour with the state of the bereaved (see Huntington 
and Metcalf 1991 [1979]:51). So, Durkheim says, participation in funeral rituals 
is obligatory rather than voluntary and it serves to reaffirm the commitment to 
society, the subservience to its authority, that death may have lessened. For this 
purpose, Durkheim goes on and argues, it is important for society to harness and 
harvest the emotions that death may instigate. Here, he says, we can see that 
what appears as a perfectly spontaneous and even chaotic expression of emotions 
is in fact a 'minutely organized' affair (Huntington and Metcalf 1991 [1979]:51). 
Despite being 'seized by a veritable frenzy' the Warramunga are in fact, according 
to Durkheim, following a tight pattern. For the 'obligations of slashing one's 
thighs or burning one's abdomen are precisely determined by kinship (mother's 
brother and mother, respectively), (Huntington and Metcalf 1991 [1979]:51). 
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What appears originally as a spontaneous and chaotic outburst of private 
emotions is in fact both obligatory and precisely organised social and collective 
phenomena. 
Radcliffe-Brown (1922) later made similar observations about the Andaman 
islanders. One of the things that interested Radcliffe-Brown about the 
Andamanese was the custom of ceremonial weeping, when an Andamanese 'sits 
down and wails and howls and the tears stream down his or her face' (Radcliffe-
Brown 1922: 117). Weeping is, maybe not surprisingly, a conspicuous feature of 
Andamanese funerals but Radcliffe-Brown insists ceremonial weeping is not a 
voluntary expression of sadness, grief, or whatever other emotion we may 
associate with death. It is obligatory and controlled and it serves the purpose of 
affrrming the existence of social bonds between two or more persons. 
Participants at a funeral, then, may not feel the sentiments they express, but 
Radcliffe-Brown asserts that participation in the obligatory ritual 'will strengthen 
what positive feelings they do have and create such sentiments where they were 
previously absent' (Huntington and Metcalf 1991 [1979]:45). It is not the case, 
then, that grief gives rise to tears but rather the reverse. 'For Radcliffe-Brown, 
the sentiment does not create the act, but wailing at prescribed moments and in 
the prescribed manner creates within the wailer the proper sentiment' (Huntington 
and Metcalf 1991 [1979]:46; see Palgi and Abramovitch 1984). 
Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson (1976) take a radically different track. They agree 
with Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown in asserting that grief - 'the uneven, mental 
distress, emotional agitation, sadness, suffering, and related feelings caused by 
death' - is born of social interdependency. They point out that the ethnographic 
record shows that grief feelings are not unique to people in the West and observe 
that at the death of those we would now call 'the significant other', one generally 
experiences strong emotions and radical change in behavioural patterns (1976:1-
2). The emotions experienced, Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson say, may be 
sadness, anger, fear, anxiety, guilt, loneliness, numbness and general tension. 
Change in behaviour may involve loss of appetite and loss of weight, disruption of 
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work activities, loss of interest, decrease in sociality and disrupted sleep. They 
argue that if the bereaved are to return to a reasonably normal life they have to 
'work through the loss'. This involves accepting the loss, letting go of behaviour 
patterns that are no longer adaptive, dissipation of guilt, anger and other 
disruptive emotions, acquiring new behaviour patterns and establishing new social 
relationships (Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson 1976:6). 
While asserting that grief is universal Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson are careful 
to point out that different cultures will deal with grief differently. They pose the 
question: what is the role of cultural and social factors in the resolution, or not, of 
grief? In trying to elicit the effect of culture on emotions Rosenblatt, Walsh and 
Jackson (1976:2) distinguish between grief, 'the uneven, mental distress, 
emotional agitation, sadness, suffering, and related feelings caused by death'; 
bereavement, the period of time following death during which grief occurs and the 
state of experiencing grief; and mourning, the culturally prescribed acts that are 
usually performed when a death occurs. They contend that all adult grief is 
patterned by culture and that, conversely, cultural acts may be influenced by 
psychology and biology. 
Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson's basic aims are, then, to identify the needs, 
elTIotions, beliefs and problems in social relations that are fundamentally human in 
If' 
response to death; and to seek cross-cultural regularities in solutions to the 
problems a death creates (Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson 1976:4). The 
Durkheimian problematic was to show how seemingly spontaneous, individual 
feelings are in fact carefully created through obligatory social means and how 
they, once created, serve to reinforce the very society from which they stemmed. 
If grief is universal, it is universal because human society is. For Rosenblatt, 
Walsh and Jackson, on the contrary, grief is a natural, psychological reaction to 
death. Their problematic is to elicit how different cultures and societies deal with 
grief and the problems it causes for the individual and the social order. The fmal, 
ultimate question for them is, how successful, or not, are different societies in 
dealing with death? 
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This approach is predicated upon the assumption that grief can be separated from 
society, that it is a universal, psychological reaction, naturally and automatically 
triggered off by the death of a significant other, and that it has an existence 
outside culture. Superficially, this would seem to contrast rather sharply with the 
Durkheimian perspective where grief is presented as being social through and 
through, created as it is on the very ritual occasions that seemingly express it. 
The difference is though, I argue, only apparent. For Durkheim and Radcliffe-
Brown, no less than for Rosenblatt and his colleagues, grief is indeed a universal, 
biolo gical phenomenon. If for the former two grief is actually set in motion by 
ritual it is still, to them, the same emotion in Australia and in the Andamanese 
islands. It is clear, too, that to Bloch and Parry (1982) the very ability of funeral 
rituals to create society is predicated upon the strong emotions that they presume 
death to instigate. Yet, Bloch and Parry (1982) make little or no reference to 
how the people they speak of, think of or experience, the emotions associated 
with death. 
What I am driving at has been said often enough before. Johannes Fabian (1991 
[1972]), Renato Rosaldo (1984 and 1989), Sergie Kan (1992) and Byron Good 
(1994) have all observed that an understanding of grief is missing from the 
anthropolo gy of death. There are exceptions though. Loring Danforth (Danforth 
and Tsarias 1982) in discussing the death rituals of rural Greece devotes 
considerable time to the emotions associated with grief in Greece. He focuses in 
particular on the notion of ponos. Panos, Danforth tells us, is a complex of 
emotions that are 'an expression of the social bonds that tie people together. One 
feels ponos at a person's death because one enjoyed a close social relationship 
with him, and it is the panos that makes one want to continue this relationship 
after death' (Danforth and Tsarias 1982:141). Ponos must, according to local 
understanding, be dealt with in one way or another and the ultimate and fmal goal 
of grieving must be to rid oneself of it. This is to be achieved through repeated 
and often ritualised, expression of panos. Failure to do so, along with the 
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prolonged containment of panos can, or so the local people have it, cause serious 
illness (Danforth and Tsarias 1982:144). 
Danforth's interest was to elicit how people in rural Greece, and women in 
particular, seek to relieve their panos through various ritual means of exhumation, 
secondary burials, and stylised lamentations. Yet Danforth looks for his 
theoretical inspiration to Levi-Strauss and ultimately interprets these rituals as 
attempts to mediate between the structuralist binary opposition: life and death 
(1982:6). This does seem to render the emotional upheaval that characterises 
death in rural Greece rather cerebral. As the women folk told Danforth 
frequently, they entertain not just the possibility, but the almost certainty, that 
their ritual actions are but futile. They will lament, but then state immediately, 
that it was pointless and didn't get you anywhere (Danforth and Tsarias 1982: 12). 
They will lavish great care upon the graves of their loved ones but seem to 
believe, still, that their actions are futile, that death is in fact [mal (Danforth and 
Tsarias 1982: 140). 
Let me stress again, that for this lack of interest in grief there are some very sound 
reasons. In as much as anthropology is and remains a social discipline it must and 
will seek to uncover and emphasise the social aspects, or the social nature, of 
those areas of human life it endeavours to illuminate. Part of this project has been 
the Durkheimian attempt to establish how, what we here in the Western world, 
lnay take to be individual, spontaneous, psycho- or biologically grounded events, 
actions and emotions, are in fact collective and obligatory processes. 
This must remain an objective for anthropology, at least as I have been taught it 
and as I understand it. It is an objective from which I do not wish to depart here. 
Its relevance, if further argument is needed, is evident from the fact that it is an 
ally to anthropology's battle against ethnocentrism, showing up the social nature 
of those things that we take to be inherently natural. This is even more important 
for me doing, as I am, anthropology close to home and addressing the very 
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Western world in whose common sense may be the sources of the academic 
theories discussed here. 
Still, it seems somewhat inappropriate to me, given this subject matter, to ignore 
so carefully any questions of individual, personal experience, particularly that of 
the bereaved. The intensity of this experience is often acknowledged in the 
literature only for it then to be ignored. This seems to me to render the neat, 
sometimes brilliant, analyses of which the anthropology of death is so rich, rather 
hollow. Indeed it is relevant to point out here that these accounts are largely 
conspicuous for the absence of any 'natives' in them. Rarely, and this goes for 
Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown and their followers, and for Bloch and Parry and the 
contributors to their volume (Bloch and Parry eds. 1982) is any mention made of 
anything anyone 'on the ground' has said. 'The natives' are silent. Still, if 'the 
natives' are silent there is, of course, still a voice to be heard, the voice of the 
anthropologist. For as 'postmodern', 'poststructuralist', 'deconstructive', 'call it 
what you like' anthropology has repeatedly pointed out of late, ethnographies that 
assume the appearance of subjectless objectivity are inescapably infused with the 
subjectivity of the author. In this way Western ideas about death and grief seem 
to creep into the accounts of the anthropology of death, offered there, 
unexamined, to illuminate the death rituals of other people. 
Deborah Battaglia (1991) has suggested that it is important that there be some 
measure of congruence between the theories an anthropologist chooses to infuse 
her ethnographic descriptions with, and the character of the world view of those 
who are being described. And so there is another reason, I feel, why the approach 
of Durkheim, Bloch and Parry and those others is not appropriate here. For the 
world they describe is a world wherein death is most notable for the large and 
very visible public ceremonies it sets in motion, the purpose and effect of which 
luay well be to strengthen the social order. That is no longer so in the 
ethnographic context under consideration here (see Walter 1994; Hockey 1990; 
Barley 1989) where funerals are quite often an almost secretive and hurried affair, 
where questions about the social order are not so much not answered as never 
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really posed. What is stressed about death in Britain today is the experience of 
the bereaved and that flavour of the ethnography could not be captured and 
communicated by Durkheimian sociology. 
Let me stress, again, and make it absolutely clear that I seek here to write an 
account of grief that is simultaneously sensitive to individual experiences and 
sociologically informed. If so, then a lot must rest on how the 'social' is 
conceived. Over the last ten years or so, the previously dominant Durkheimian 
vision of society, and its counterpart, the individual, has come under sustained 
criticism (see for example Giddens 1979, 1984; Ingold 1986, 1990, 1993; Bloch 
and Parry 1982; Strathern 1988, 1990; Carrithers 1992; Gisli Palsson 1991). 
According to this vision society exists on a level over and above that of the 
individual human organisms that are its luembers. Society exists independently of 
these individuals, it is an entity sui generis, as the phrase goes. What is more it 
exists in opposition to its individual members, striving as it must - to preserve its 
own existence - to stamp its moral authority upon them to curb their anti-social, 
biological drives. 
As I mentioned earlier it constituted a very significant part of the Durkheimian 
sociolo gical project to establish how many of our most cherished private passions 
have in fact their source outside ourselves as individuals and in the collective 
consciousness of society. Durkheim's vision was of course part of his programme 
of establishing sociology as an independent field of academic, empirical study and 
it was, to a degree, put forward against Western individualism especially as that 
was represented by Herbert Spencer. Spencer maintained that society was 
nothing more than a collection of individuals who willingly entered into social 
relations because it was in their best interest. This vision would, of course, have 
rendered sociology superfluous as society would then appear to be explicable in 
terms of purely individual psychology. Against this Durkheim (1933 [1893]) 
argued that society exists over and above the individuals and that it provides them 
with their wills and interests. Yet, making of society a reified entity that acts on 
its own behalf constitutes nothing less than reintroducing individualism, if on a 
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higher level. 'Society', as a concept, after all, refers to people living together in a 
group, with their social relationships and their social interactions. By reifying 
society it comes to replace the individual as the source of all volition. The critical 
point is that this source, like the individual as his name suggests, cannot be 
divided. Society, the source of moral values, common conceptions, actions, ideas 
and emotions, is uniform, one and, maybe most importantly, coherent. What is 
thereby lost is the sense of the social as relational, interactive and negotiated. 
That loss is all the more profound if Foucault (see Barry, Osborne and Rose 
1996) is right in asserting that the idea of 'society' was only born with changes in 
governmental rationality and the advent of liberalism (I return to this particular 
issue in a later chapter). 
David Bidney (1953) would have referred to Durkheim's 'society' as a case of 
misplaced concretism. Society, he would have said is an abstraction, it cannot act 
on its own behalf. Yet, the apparent alternative, the picture wherein sovereign 
individuals are the source of their own actions, is one I do not endorse. Instead I 
follow, broadly, Carrithers (1992), Ingold (1986, 1990, 1993), Strathern (1988, 
1990) and Gfsli Palsson (1991) in arguing that we do not understand the social as 
a reified entity, but as the social relations that tie people together and constitute 
theln as social persons. The above, and maybe Ingold in particular, have argued 
that this allows us to dispense with the Durkheimian dichotomy between society 
and individual and to talk about the individual as constituted by her social 
relations and at the same time as occupying a unique place in the network of those 
relations. The case, then, is not that each and everyone of us stands alone, as it 
were, against that reified entity - the society - but that we are all caught up in a 
web of social relations and that these relations make us who we are. If we each 
occupy a unique place in a network of relations then, society cannot be an entity 
that speaks with one, unified voice (see Ingold 1993). Instead, we must conceive 
of society as constituted by different people, and their relations, who speak with a 
multiplicity of voices. This, may I suggest, holds the promise of allowing us to 
write an anthropolo gy of death that is sensitive to individual experiences, yet 
sociolo gically informed. This position is similar to that developed by Renato 
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Rosaldo (1984, 1989) on the 'positioned subject'. Rosaldo' s article (1984, partly 
reproduced in 1989) is particularly important for me, and I have deliberately 
delayed discussing it until now, as his main task is to address the anthropology of 
death. 
Rosaldo criticises his colleagues for having ignored grief by equating it with the 
rituals that death sets in motion. This, Rosaldo argues, is misleading in three very 
important ways. Firstly, he says, anthropologists have too often failed to make a 
distinction between emotion, say grief, and its expression. Persuaded by the belief 
that people ritualise and symbolise most elaborately those things that matter to 
them IllOst deeply anthropologists have taken death rites as a necessary and 
sufficient entrance point to grief. Focusing on the apparent obligatory nature of 
such customs as ceremonial weeping and self-mutilation, anthropologist have 
forgotten the grief, says Rosaldo. For while a funeral may be an occasion when 
the expression of grief is encouraged and sometimes demanded, Rosaldo says, the 
grief may still be genuine and felt and not simply triggered by the occasion for its 
expresSIon. 
Secondly, the focus on rituals suggests that, what bereavement counsellors would 
call 'the course of grief, can be equated with, analysed and understood as the 
course of mortuary rituals. Anthropologists have here predominantly analysed 
funerals as examples of van Gennep' s (1960 [1909]) rites of passage, with stages 
corresponding to his now classic phases of separation, liminality and reintegration. 
The assumption, or maybe it is an observation, here is that rituals have a kind of 
linear progression, a definite beginning, a middle bit, and an end, an end that is, to 
boot, often presented as a resolution. What Rosaldo points out is that this serves 
singularly badly as a model for grief. For grief, Rosaldo argues, does not possess 
such lineal, logical quality. It may not, in fact, have a very clear beginning, a very 
clear middle bit, and certainly not a very clear end, least of all an end that is also 
necessarily a resolution. If grief has an end, he continues, that most certainly will 
not correspond with the end of the funeral ritual. 
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Finally, Rosaldo says, this focus on rituals, with a certain lack of sensitivity 
toward their social context, fails to make any sort of distinction between the 
different experiences of the different people present at the funeral. It fails most 
glaringly to distinguish between those directly bereaved and those others who are 
present at the funeral - for whatever other reasons - as if the experiences of the 
two parties could and would be the same. Given Rosaldo' s notion of the 
positioned subject it follows, indeed, that, to him, everyone present at a funeral 
will have a sOlnewhat unique relationship with the deceased and that this will 
affect their particular experience of the ritual. 
In contrast to all this Rosaldo stresses, with recourse to his own experiences of 
the tragic death of his wife, that grief does not possess a neatly organised course. 
Rather, it is characterised by strong emotions that come and go often in no 
particular order. This leads Rosaldo to question what he sees as the 
anthropological orthodoxy that people symbolise and ritualise most extensively 
those aspects of their lives that matter most. Rosaldo relates how he spent years 
trying to understand the assertion of his Ilongot men friends that they hunt for the 
heads of their enemies because of the anger they feel, anger that is caused by 
grief. Rosaldo explains how he tried to understand this through Geertzian 'thick 
description' to no avail until he himself suffered the tragedy of his wife's death. 
Only then, when through his wife's death he had been repositioned as a subject, 
Rosaldo says, could he understand how grief can fill you with rage that may cause 
you to hunt heads. Grief, that is, may resist attempts to symbolise and ritualise it, 
but it has a pan-hulnan poignancy and force that allows those who have 
experienced it, to fmd resonance between his grief and that of Ilongot head-
hunters. 
Rosaldo's proposition is attractive. Yet, I must point out that this idea - that 
emotion, powerful emotion, can transcend the structures and strictures of society 
and culture - is a Western idea, and maybe a fairly recent one at that (see Lutz 
1988). It is an idea that has been influential in psychotherapy and counselling, not 
least the person-centred counselling of Carl Rogers (see Mearns and Thorne 
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1988). It is also a Western idea - although maybe not a peculiarly Western idea _ 
that only those who have suffered major traumas like bereavement can understand 
what it is like. Rosaldo's assertion that he can understand the nongots' grief 
because he shares with them the experience of loss is though clearly based upon a 
delicate selection process during which certain differences are weeded out in 
favour of a particular similarity. So Rosaldo and the nongots may share an 
experience of loss but obviously there are great social, cultural and economic 
differences between them that set them apart. There seems to be a subtle 
contradiction in Rosaldo' s argument here. On the one hand he seems to be saying 
that each grief is unique, born as it is of our - as 'positioned subjects' - particular 
relationship with the deceased. On the other hand he seems to be saying that he, 
through experiencing the death of his wife, can understand the grief of the 
Ilongots although his relationship with his wife was, presumably, different from 
those Ilongots have amongst themselves. It is interesting that while Rosaldo 
claims to have, through experience, gained the understanding of the Ilongot that 
had eluded his cultural analyses, there is no mention of the nongots feeling that 
they understand Rosaldo any better because of their shared loss. Rosaldo' s claim 
of understanding, that is, may be his understanding of the Ilongots rather than the 
Inutual understanding between him and the Ilongots. 
Then there is another unanswered question here. It may be commendable to 
emphasise the experience of grief, at the cost of ritual analysis, but, as Metcalf and 
Huntington (1991) assert, we still need to know why the nongots, in their grief, 
carefully behead their victims rather that chop them up into small pieces. We 
Inight want to know too why Rosaldo in his grief did not resort to such measures 
any more than most of his fellow Americans do? Metcalf and Huntington's 
observation echoes, of course, Durkheim's (1915) account of the Australian 
aborigines whose own bouts of grievous violence were carefully stipulated by 
social structure. To this, I imagine, Rosaldo might reply by saying that his aim is 
to understand the experience of grief rather than its different ritual expressions. 
But that, I would contend, seems to assume that we can talk about and 
understand grief without reference to the social, cultural and historical 
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environment in which we fmd it. Are we then forced to go back to Durkheim and 
his observation that society structures the way in which people experience and 
express their grief? I hope not and I think not. To show why I turn to the 
anthropology of emotion. 
Grief 
I have been busy announcing my intention to focus on grief. I have been even 
busier arguing that the anthropology of death has all but ignored grief. If so I am, 
in a way, addressing the anthropology of emotions no less than I am the 
anthropology of death. But what can anthropology say of the emotions? The 
emotions are after all universal, grounded in humanity's common biology. 
Anthropology, on the other hand, peddles in the relativity of different societies 
and cultures. Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990) have delineated three different 
strategies anthropologists have employed in dealing with the emotions.4 First they 
have 'essentialised' the emotions; second they have 'relativised' them; and thirdly 
they have 'contextualised' them (see Lutz and White 1986; Wikan 1990). Let me 
say something about each of them and set out my own position. 
Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990; see also Lutz 1988; Lutz and White 1986; Wikan 
1990 and 1993) say that the general Western view - both academic and lay - of 
the elnotions is characterised by drawing a radical distinction between thoughts on 
the one hand and emotions on the other. Thoughts are considered to be subject to 
the control of our rational faculties, emotions are not. Rather, they are portrayed 
as beyond our control, as psychological reactions that have their root and location 
deep within the individual, often subconscious, mind. On this basis, they continue 
(see also Lutz 1988 here), the emotions are either denigrated as ir- or maybe a-
rational, instinctual animal-like reactions; or they are glorified as the essence and 
expression of our tnle selves, as that which escapes the rationalising clutches of 
cold reason and the suffocating embrace of etiquette. Anthropologists, Abu-
Lughod and Lutz (1990) say, 'essentialise' the emotions when they extend this 
4 Abu-Lughod and Lutz do indeed differentiate between four different strategies here but I shall 
only discuss these three. 
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general Western VIew of the emotions to other peoples around the world. 
Essentialism implies, then, and assumes the universality of distinct emotions, their 
meanings and processes. Grief is grief, wherever you observe it, and so is any 
other emotion. Different people may have different names over the different 
emotions, they may be differently inclined to feel these emotions and different 
people may feel them for different reasons, but the emotion is the same (Abu-
Lughod and Lutz 1990; see Lutz and White 1986). It is clearly essentialism that 
inspires the work of Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson (1976) cited above. They 
assume the universality of 'grief feelings' and proceed to ask how well, or badly, 
different societies cope with those feelings. 
The assulnptions behind essentialism have been severely questioned by the so-
called 'cognitive revolution' in the philosophy of emotion (see Solomon 1976, 
1980, 1984; Rorty 1980; de Sousa 1980a, 1980b; Krist jan Kristjansson 1994). 
Philosophers have pointed out that essentialism proceeds as if the emotions are 
feelings, sensations, physiological, hormonal or chemical processes. What those 
who hold a cognitive view of the emotions have argued, to the contrary, is that 
the emotions are not sensations at all (see Solomon 1980 and 1976). They point 
out that our emotions seem to change with our opinions and our beliefs about the 
state of the world (Solomon 1980:254). I may be angry at John for stealing my 
car, but only as long as I believe John actually stole my car. When I learn that 
John didn't in fact steal my car I can no longer be angry at him for that particular 
offence, even though I might well drag up something else to be angry at him for. 
If, on the other hand, I felt toothache last night, my teeth ached, even though my 
dentist may uncover that the problem was in my jaws rather than in my teeth. The 
dentist's verdict doesn't change the fact that the pain I felt was in my teeth 
(Solomon 1980:254; Krist jan Kristjansson 1994:287-8). All this implies that 
emotions are not simply our natural responses to the things around us. 
Fundamentally, those who hold cognitivist views argue, emotions always have an 
intentional object (see Solomon 1980:254-6). Our emotions, that is, are always 
about something: I cannot be angry at John full stop. I can only be angry at him 
if I believe he has in some ways wronged me, for example stolen my car. My 
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sense of John's wrong-doing, in tum, is of course predicated upon the fact that 
stealing cars is generally thought offensive where John and I live. In this way our 
emotions are like judgements and indeed actions. They are not merely reflective 
of what goes on in the world, rather they are constitutive of what happens there. 
From this there follow two important implications. On the one hand this seems to 
indicate that our emotions are social in a significant way. Being angry assumes 
sOlnething about the state of the world, the people that populate it and my 
relationship with them. If our elnotions are, furthermore, not natural responses 
then we have to learn them. These two things - the social and the learnt - are of 
course the two cornerstones of the classic anthropolo gical deftnitions of culture 
(Ingold 1993). From here follows another rather important implication: that like 
culture our emotions change from place to place and from time to time. 
This is where the relativists enter the scene. They, not surprisingly, assert that 
different people from different cultures have different emotional lives. They 
proceed to describe these and the local understandings of emotional lives- the 
'ethnopsychologies' (Kirkpatrick and White eds. 1985) - that inform them. In this 
vein, Clifford Geertz (1973, 1983) has described the emotional lives - or the lack 
of it - of the people of Bali and Java. Jean Briggs (1970) offers a beautifully 
evocative tale of how her middle class American understanding of the importance 
of expressing your emotions set her on a collision course with her Utku Inuit 
foster father whose ideas are that adults must control their emotions. Fredrick 
Myers (1986) describes the relationship between self and land in Pintupi 
cosmology, and Michelle Rosaldo (1980; 1984) describes the struggle between 
'knowledge' and 'passion' among the Ilongots of the Philippines (see Abu-
Lughod and Lutz 1990:2-3). 
The relativists tend to ask about what culturally variable ideas about emotions 
imply for social relations (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990:3-4). The work of 
Michelle Rosaldo (1980, 1984) was influential here. Introducing and explaining 
her approach to the study of Ilongot elnotions, she (1980:27) announced that we 
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can learn about culturally salient events in Ilongot society by focusing not simply 
on the organisation of such events themselves, but by concentrating on the 
'emotional language' the Ilongots use in explaining these events and the 
significance they hold for them. Rosaldo added that in concentrating on 
'emotional language' her intentions were not to probe the possible uses these have 
for illuminating individual psychology but to uncover 'the meanings such words 
acquire through their associations with enduring patterns of social relationships 
and activity in Ilongot daily life' (Rosaldo 1980:27). She argued that order in 
Ilongot life is based on, not enduring social structures, but that 
emotionally oriented images and themes maintain for Ilongots a sense of 
consistency in things that people do, thereby permitting them to see over time 
that people act in more or less familiar ways for more or less well-known 
reasons. And these reasons, reflected in (as they are patterned by) the 
organization of the social world, lend an aura of continuity and coherence to 
the activities that they, in turn, explain (1980:27). 
Relativising the emotions IS, I believe, a vital move in the anthropology of 
emotions and one which informs my analysis in what follows in later chapters. 
There are three important steps here that bear retracing. First, by abandoning the 
belief in the universality of distinct emotions, their meaning and trajectories, the 
way is paved for a genuinely (socio-cultural) anthropological investigation into 
the place of emotions and their meanings in different societies. Second, by seeing 
the emotions not as intrapersonal processes but as social ones a link is established 
between the emotions, social life and culture. Third, by focusing on the emotions 
as part of everyday life and everyday talk, rather than simply the object of 
organised public rituals, they are elevated into a crucial issue in ethnographic 
descriptions, rather than a merely accidental one (see Abu-Lughod and Lutz 
1990:1; Wikan 1990:xvi, xxiv, 16-17). All three steps inform my accounts of how 
the bereaved experience the loss of their dead ones, and of how a bereavement 
counselling organisation thinks about, approaches and deals with grief. 
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Relativists like Rosaldo work with a conception of culture as a universe of 
meaning. Its strength is that it facilitates a detailed description of the 
ethnographic situation under scrutiny. Its weakness is that it may prevent the 
theorisation of the conditions under which that situation arose. I fmd it instructive 
to think of this in terms of Bourdieu's (1977:1-3) criticism of what he calls 
'subjectivism' - the phenomenological description of the experience of social 
actors - and its inability to account for the objective conditions that Inake those 
experiences possible. The same applies to relativism in the anthropology of 
emotion. It cannot explain the conditions that make those experiences possible. 
What we need to do, Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990:1) argue. is to 'contextualise' 
the emotions. 
In putting forward their arguments for contextualising the emotions Abu-Lughod 
and Lutz (1990:9) detail some of the shortcomings of the culture concept, 
shortcOlnings exposed by recent criticism within anthropology (for example 
Clifford and Marcus 1986, 1988; James, Hockey, Dawson 1997). Abu-Lughod 
and Lutz (1990:9) mention in particular the distinction between ideas and social 
practices that the culture concept tends to carry. With culture occupying the 
realm of ideas, they observe, social practices tend to get reduced to the execution 
of cultural plans. This, in turn, Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990:9) assert, fuels the 
anthropological temptation to ascribe to culture a large degree of coherence, 
uniformity, and stability, characteristics that postmodernism has portrayed as the 
creation of the anthropologist rather than as inherent in culture itself (see Clifford 
and Marcus eds. 1986). 
The response to this, in anthropology in general, has been a tum to the Marxist 
concept of 'ideology' and the Gramscian concept of 'hegemony' which have, in 
some quarters, come to replace the concept of culture. The problem with these 
two concepts, Abu-Lughod and Lutz argue (1990:9), is that in certain key ways 
they do not take us very far beyond the concept of culture they are supposed to 
replace. They tend to preserve the very distinction between ideas and practices, 
base and superstructure. Instead Abu-Lughod and Lutz argue for the Foucauldian 
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concept of 'discourse' as a replacement for culture in the anthropological study of 
emotions (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990:9). They claim that emotion cannot be 
understood without discourse, and that the most productive analytical strategy for 
the cross-cultural study of emotion is to examine discourses on emotion as social 
practices (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990:1). Discourse, in its Foucauldian sense, 
refers to social practices that systematically create the objects they speak of (Abu-
Lughod and Lutz 1990:9). This allows a focus not just on culturally specific talk 
about elllotions in different cultural settings, but on the constitution of emotion 
and the domain 'emotion' itself in situated speech practices (Abu-Lughod and 
Lutz 1990: 1). 
This project is clearly much more radical than the relativist project: it not only 
relativises our Western conceptions of the emotions but problematises the 
constitution of the domain of emotion itself within Western discourses. In line 
with this, one of the projects of contextualists could be to trace the genealogy of 
the domain of emotion itself within Western culture, or how the emotions came to 
be constituted as physiological processes, located within individual human beings 
that bolster our uniqueness and are seen to give us access to some inner truth 
about the self (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990:6). The contextual project seeks to 
link emotion talk to questions of power (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990:1-2). The 
political nature of emotion discourse can be explicated by reference to the ways in 
which women in the West are often depicted as more emotional than men (Lutz 
1990). In the West, Lutz argues, the emotional is compared with cognition and 
found wanting, just like the feminine is contrasted with the masculine and found 
wanting (Lutz 1990:69). Following Foucault, Lutz continues (1990:87) we can 
argue - contrary to what many psychotherapists would say - that women's alleged 
emotionality can be seen as not the repression of emotionality in men, but as the 
very creation of emotionality in women, and by that the creation of their 
subordination. 
This contextualising strategy is essential to my job. I focus on grief and how it is 
experienced by bereaved people. I focus on the meaning of grief in everyday life 
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and everyday ta1k, especially as that is embedded in the stories the bereaved tell. 
At the same time I shall attempt to describe how a voluntary bereavement 
counselling organisation approaches, thinks about and deals with bereavement and 
grief. I think that it is vital that we ask questions about how and why grief 
became cast the way it is cast within this organisation. I shall trace how 
bereavement was early on defmed as a largely economic and social disability for 
widows and their children and how it has later been rendered as an emotional 
trauma, equal for all the bereaved. I shall point out how this transformation took 
place at the same time as professionals from the Inental health sciences became 
ever more influential in the working of the organisation in question. 
The theoretical work of Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990), upon which I rely, has 
recently come under some criticism from Bruce Kapferer (1995; see also Csordas 
1994; Turner 1994; Lyon and Barbalet 1994). Kapferer (1995:147) argues that in 
asserting 'the crucial import of the cultural categories and the social constructions 
of emotion and emotional meaning' anthropologists 'disembody experience and 
locate it externally to the body in social and cultural defmitions of the emotions. 
They then in a parody of Descartes make the consciously reflected categories of 
the nature of experience, here the emotions, the form and content of the 
experience. In other words, thought determines being and action in the world!' 
Kapferer (1995: 147) favours experience but he is, I believe, too hasty in putting 
his preferences forward as though they were at odds with Abu-Lughod and Lutz's 
position. There is nothing in their approach that prevents in any way detailed 
attention to the experience of emotion. In fact their approach positively demands 
it. For, surely, it is only after such detailed description that meaningful questions 
about why people have the experiences that they have can be asked. There is, in a 
word, no necessary opposition between phenomenological descriptions and 
deconstructive theories. It is only by assuming, I believe, that experience can 
exist without the cultural, social, economic and political conditions that make it 
possible, or, conversely, that the conditions exist without any reference to 
experiencing subjects at all, that they may appear so opposed. We need then 
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some sort of focus that allows us to grasp simultaneously the experiences of 
people and the social and cultural conditions that make those experiences possible 
(see Bourdieu 1977: 1-3). I believe that stories, narratives, together with 
discourse and social practices provide such a focus. This is why: 
Story 
Narratives, or stories, have recently stirred up quite an interest in the academic 
world (see Packer 1991:64). This 'narrative turn' has found its expressions in 
history (Cronon 1992; White 1989), anthropology (Rosaldo 1989; Shuman 1986; 
Young 1987 and 1989; Carrithers 1992 and 1995; Machin 1995; Steedily 1994), 
psychology (Bruner 1986, 1987 and 1991; Rosenwald and Ochberg 1992; Sarbin 
1986), medicine (Kleinman 1988; Good 1994), psychiatry and psychoanalysis 
(Schafer 1992; Slavney and McHugh 1984; Spence 1982), and counselling (White 
and Epston 1990; Winsdale 1996). Partly, the reason for this seems to be that 
stories are, as Riessman (1993:2) argues, a 'ubiquitous part of everyday life'. We 
all, routinely, take part in conversations when someone relates in great detail the 
unfolding of particular events, how one thing lead to another, what those involved 
said and did, and what happened next (Riessman 1993:2). White (1989:1; in 
Riessman 1993:3) has stated that so 'natural is the impulse to narrate' that, as 
Riessman (1993:3) herself adds 'the form is almost inevitable for any report of 
how things happened.' Telling stories, Nelson (1989) maintains in her Narratives 
from the Crib, is one of the fITst forms of discourse we learn as children. Because 
of this Susan Chase (1995) has argued that listening to people's narratives, rather 
than asking them structured questions, allows anthropologists to get closer to 
how their informants experience things, to understand better the form their 
experience takes. 
In pointing out the importance of stories in the ways in which we think, Jerome 
Bruner (1986, 1987, 1990; see Carrithers 1992, 1995) talks about 'the narrative 
mode of thinking.' This he contrasts to the 'paradigmatic mode of thinking' 
which, he says, characterises such disciplines as mathematics, logic, philosophy 
and the physical sciences. The paradigmatic mode of thinking peddles in general 
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principles and natural laws and explains actions and events as examples of exactly 
such laws (Bruner 1986: 14; see Carrithers 1992:76). Narratives, on the other 
hand, deal not in generalities but particulars. They speak of particular events and 
particular characters, not general principles of human nature (see Carrithers 
1995:263, 266). The appeal of narratives is that generally human beings fmd 
themselves is particular situations, dealing with particular other human beings 
under particular circumstances. Theodor Sarbin (1986:8-9) observes, too, that 
people think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices according to narrative 
stnlctures. He cites psychological experiments to the effect that if you present a 
person with two or three pictures she will connect them to form a story that will 
reflect recognisable human sentiments, goals, purposes, valuations and 
judgelnents. Alisdair MacIntyre (1981: 197; see Sarbin 1986: 11) adds that 'in 
successfully identifying and understanding what someone else is doing we always 
move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set of narrative 
histories.' We do this, MacIntyre continues, 'because action itself has a basically 
historical character. It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and 
because we understand our lives in terms of narratives that we live out that the 
form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others. Stories 
are lived before they are told.' 
What is it then that makes stories so powerful, what is it about them that makes 
for all this academic interest? What exactly are narratives? Aristotle said in 
Poetics that a narrative has a beginning, a middle part and an end and there seems 
to be an agreement amongst scholars that sequence, movement, is the defming 
characteristic of narratives (Riessman 1993:17). Labov and Waletzky (1967:21) 
have argued that stories are a perpetual answer to the question 'what happened 
then?' The sequence that Labov and Waletzky see as necessary for narratives is, 
then, chronological. Or as the Gergens (Gergen and Gergen 1984: 174-5; see 
Gergen and Gergen 1986:25) have suggested: narratives provide coherence and 
connection between a set of discrete events by giving a sense of movement or 
direction through time. Young has argued that the sequence is consequential 
rather than chronological. An event causes another event in the narrative though 
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the links need not be strictly chronological (Young 1987; Young 1989; see 
Riessman 1993: 17). Other scholars have suggested that stories are organised 
around thematic sequencing, whereby a narrative is held together by a theme 
rather than time or causality as such (Riessman 1993:17) .. 
Gazing more intensely into the building blocks of narratives Labov (1972, 1982, 
Labov and Waltetzky 1967) has suggested that all narratives have formal 
properties, each of which fulftls a particular function. A perfect narrative, he 
suggests, has six elements: an abstract; an orientation in terms of time, place, 
situation and participants; action or simply sequence of events; evaluation or the 
significance and Ineaning of the action to the narrator and simultaneously the 
attitude of the narrator; a resolution or what was the [mal outcome; and a coda 
which returns the flow of the discourse to the present, the story having been 
fmished. Labov argues that using these structures narrators construct stories to 
make sense of their primary experience and interpret and evaluate the significance 
of passing events (see Riessman 1993:18-19). According to Kenneth Burke's 
(1945; see Bruner 1986: 17) dramatism, in contrast, narratives have to do with the 
vagaries of human motives, the vicissitudes of intention. Burke suggests that the 
'grammatical resources' that people use to 'tell persuasive tales are contained in a 
pentad of terms: act, scene, agent, agency, purpose' (Riessman 1993:19). A full 
explication of motives will then 'offer some kind of answer to these five questions: 
What was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how 
[s]he did it (agency), and why (purpose)' (Burke 1945:xv; cf. Riessman 1993:19). 
Taking his cue from Burke and his minimalist definition of story as dealing with 
the vicissitudes of intention Bruner (1986: 17-18) observes that there is some 
convincing psychological evidence for the irreducibility of 'causality' as a 'mental 
category' in the Kantian sense. He confesses to suspecting the same for 
'intention'. Making a similar point Carrithers (1992) refers to Daniel Dennett's 
(1987) notion of 'the intentional stance' and his speculation that there is an 
evolutionary advantage for human beings to ascribe to the things and beings 
around them intentions and deal with them in that way. Narratives do then, 
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Sarbin (1986:9) points out, organise not only episodes and events but actions and 
accounts of actions as well. Narratives' allow for the inclusion of actors' reasons 
for their acts, as well as the causes of happening.' Here Bruner (1986) makes a 
distinction between the 'landscape of action' and the 'landscape of 
consciousness' . In the landscape of action we see the unfolding of events as, to 
take Bruner up on his example, Oedipus kills a man and marries a woman. In the 
landscape of consciousness we see Oedipus originally unaware of the identity of 
these people, only later to fmd out that they were his father and his mother. So 
what we have are stories that depict events on the one hand and consciousness on 
the other. 
To understand the intentions and interactions of different people implies an 
understanding of characters and plots. This, Packer (1991 :65) says, is also the 
most straightforward approach to analysing stories: namely to unravel their 
organisation on the level of characters and plots. To Carrithers character is 'a 
notion which embodies the understandings of rights, obligations, expectations, 
propensities, attitudes and intentions in oneself and many different others'. Plot, 
furthermore, 'shows the consequences of these characteristics in a multifarious 
flow of actions' (1995:262). Plot encompasses 'what a character or characters 
did to, or about, or with, some other character or characters, for what reasons; 
how people's attitudes, beliefs, and intentions thereby changed, and what 
followed on from that' (Carrithers 1995:262). 
If narratives tell of people with idiosyncratic inclinations, propensities and 
personalities, then these people are at the same time occupants of particular social 
positions: they are fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, bosses and servants, 
friends and enemies, and as such they are surrounded with certain expectations as 
to their rights and duties, emotions and actions, expectations that exist not simply 
in individual minds but in the space between individuals. While narrators, then, 
tell of their personal experiences their narratives are no simple recounting of what 
happened. For narrators, in order to be listened to, taken heed of, understood, 
bring to their stories an acute sense of their, often imagined, audience. They bring 
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expectations as to what the audience will listen to, what the audience will expect, 
what the audience will understand. These reveal the sort of knowledge the 
storytellers have as more or less competent members of their society, these tell us 
about the surroundings in which the narrators fmd themselves. In line with this, 
narrativity has been characterised by Carrithers as the 'capacity to cognize not 
Inerely immediate relations between oneself and another, but many-sided human 
interactions carried out over a period of time' (1995:261-2; see Carrithers 
1991:310). It could be said, then, that human beings perceive any current action 
not as an example of some general principle but as an event 'within a large 
temporal envelope, and within that envelope they perceive any given action, not 
as a response to the immediate circumstances, or current mental state of 
interlocutor or oneself, but as part of an unfolding story' (Carrithers 1995:261-2). 
Allow me to recapture something here by pointing out the advantages it has -
when we are dealing with how people think, experience, relate and interact with 
each other - of talking in terms of narratives rather than culture. Firstly, 
narratives, as related above, entail the movement of events, they entail time and 
this they do in contrast to the rather entrenched view of culture as inherently 
stable if not unchangeable that has characterised a lot of anthropological thinking 
until recently (Carrithers 1992; Clifford and Marcus eds. 1986; but see Fox 1991). 
Secondly, narratives do contain characters, people, again in contrast to culture 
that lends itself easily to descriptions which are faceless and abstract. Barth 
(1992) and Hannerz (1993) have pointed out how inherently sociocentric the 
culture concept is, and Machin and Carrithers (1996) have detailed how 
anthropologists have been permitted to subsume different statements by different 
informants given at different times under a single, coherent culture. Narratives, in 
contrast, more often than not imply a narrator and, at least, a point and a 
perspective from which the story is told. Narratives, that is, make it easier for 
anthropologists to preserve the diversity of human lives and experiences. 
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Methods 
Broadly speaking, I can say that in carrying out the research upon which this 
thesis is built I have employed six different sorts of methods. First of all, I have 
participated in and observed - 'hung out' my supervisor calls it - local life from 
the autumn of 1993 till the present day. In particular, I have since early 1994 paid 
attention to issues to do with death, grief and bereavement counselling whenever 
these have come up in conversations that I have been privy to or in discussions in 
both the local and the national media. This has allowed me to form some general 
ideas about how people in England, and in the North East in particular, talk about 
death, grief and bereavement counselling. I use this material mostly in the chapter 
to follow, chapter two, but it also informs to some extent the discussion in the 
other chapters of the thesis. 
Second, I have interviewed people who have a direct professional relationship 
with death: priests and crematoria staff, funeral directors and hospice workers for 
example. These interviews were often arranged through a friend or an 
acquaintance although some I arranged myself. These interviews were rather 
informal. My aim was similar to that of keeping track of discussions in the media: 
to get a general idea about the views of some of those people most directly 
involved with death through their work. In conducting these interviews I did not 
prepare specific questions to ask but would give my interviewees a brief account 
of my research and then try to let them take the lead. These interviews were not 
tape-recorded but I would always note down the most crucial aspect of what I 
was being told. The results of these interviews are also mostly presented in the 
chapter to follow although they too have influenced the rest of the thesis. 
Thirdly, I have interviewed a number of counsellors and other people involved in 
bereavement counselling. These interviews were conducted in much the same 
way as the interviews described above although my aim here was more specifically 
to learn about the history and working of bereavement counselling and about the 
views of bereavement counsellors of death and grief. 
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That learning was augmented, fourthly, with at times vigorous correspondence 
with Cruse House and with other organisations involved in bereavement 
counselling and counselling more generally. My aim here, in addition to those 
above, was to learn about how counselling organisations generally and a particular 
bereavement counselling organisation specifically think about their work and how 
they present that work to the world. The result of this part of the research is most 
evident in chapters two and three. 
What I have to say about the teaching of bereavement counselling more 
specifically is based on more minutely focused participation and observation that 
took place during two training courses in bereavement counselling that I attended 
and subsequent training evenings that I now visit regularly. In a very real sense 
these were like the rituals anthropologists so often write about: relatively clearly 
Inarked events that all have something in common although each is unique too. I 
describe these training courses in detail in chapters four and five. 
Both of the courses that I attended were excellent, and they were excellent in the 
way in which the teaching expressed - almost embodied - what I believe to be the 
most important aspects of Cruse's work. Those aspects of Cruse's work, as 
expressed through the teaching, I aim to convey in chapters four and five. That 
aiIn has obviously informed my selection of material from my fieldnotes used in 
those chapters. In addition I hope to convey the general atmosphere that 
prevailed during the courses I attended, an atmosphere that was remarkably 
similar in both cases. 
For reasons of confidentiality I cannot reveal anything of personal nature about 
the training courses. The examples I provide are therefore stylised by me and not 
based directly on individuals I interacted with, but I believe that they reflect 
accurately what goes on in training. 
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Lastly, I conducted interviews with bereaved people. These interviews form the 
bulk of chapters six and seven. The interviews were formal. As I intended to 
subject the interviews to narrative analysis I asked my interviewees for their 
permission to use a tape-recorder. That permission was granted by all of them. 
The interviews were then transcribed, sometimes down to every 'uhm' and 'ah' 
they contained. 
I did not prepare any questions for these interviews. As my aim was to get close 
to my interviewees' experiences I believed (following Chase 1995) that it was 
most productive to try to allow the interviewees to tell their stories as much as 
possible. Some of the interviews were arranged by third parties, some of them I 
arranged myself with people I had become acquainted with. The selection process 
was, thus, conducted through the personal channels that anthropologists often 
use, rather than through the so-called objective methods favoured by those partial 
to statistical reliability. I freely admit that my 'sample' of interviewees has no 
statistical reliability: in fact it can not really be called a sample at all. But my aim 
here has not been to give a general picture of how people tell stories about their 
dead ones. Rather it has been to relate how a few individuals grapple with what 
can be called a general problem, a general concern: the death of their loved ones 
(see Geertz 1973). 
In either case I would start by telling my interviewee what I was researching and 
that I was interested in hearing about their experience. I did not have to say any 
more: all my interviewees took up that mantle eagerly and talked quite freely 
about their experiences. Of course I would sometimes ask questions during the 
interviews but those were questions that arose from the stories themselves and not 
questions that I had prepared beforehand. Still, my questions, and my 'uhms' and 
my 'ahs' will have affected the course of the interviews. My interventions were 
though generally aimed to encourage my interviewees to carryon telling whatever 
stories they were telling at the time. In chapter seven I reproduce a section of my 
interview with Hannah, transcribed to the last audible sound, to give some idea 
about the nature of these encounters. 
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Generally speaking, then, I tried to let the interviewees steer the flow of the 
interviews. There is, for example, little mention made of religious beliefs, less 
than one would expect from a thesis about death. The reason is simply that my 
interviewees did not make much of their religious beliefs in the interviews. Even 
those who stated that they were religious did not discuss it at any great length. 
Not all the interviews with bereaved people that I conducted are represented here. 
From the start of this research I have felt that I should aim to communicate the 
experiences of my interviewees as completely as possible (see Chase 1995). That 
sets rather strict limits as to the number of interviews that can be reported. I have 
chosen to discuss two interviews with elderly people, two with women in their 
forties and one with a woman in her late twenties. I chose to discuss these 
particular interviews because the stories they contain somehow grabbed me during 
the interviews themselves and during the subsequent transcribing of them. In 
form, though, these interviews are not different from other interviews that I 
conducted. 
My presence, my gender, my age, my status as a foreigner and a researcher 
affected the nature of my encounters. To the elderly interviewees I was a young 
man from a different country who would be largely unfamiliar with the 
circumstances that my interviewees had lived and grown up in. To my younger 
interviewees, it seemed, I would have more understanding of the general 
circumstances they had lived and grown up in although their own life stories in 
partiCUlar needed explaining. 
I suspect, but that is only a suspicion, that what was most important about me 
was the fact that I was a foreigner. I believe that that was my characteristic which 
was most important to my interviewees but also to the way in which I have 
interpreted my findings. It is then, maybe, right to reveal that I grew up in a small 
village in Northern Iceland. There everybody knew everybody else and when 
someone in the village died everybody heard the news the same day. Those most 
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directly bereaved would also be well known to everybody: as friends, family, 
colleagues or at least acquaintances. By the time I was ten a number of my 
friends and school-mates had lost not only a grandfather or a grandmother but a 
parent or a sibling. This gave death a certain familiarity. That familiarity may 
have been augmented by the compulsory reading, in school, of that most prized 
example of Icelandic literature: the Icelandic sagas. Not only are the sagas violent 
literature, replete with often the most brutal killings, many of them are also 
pervaded with a sense of fatalism according to which death is inescapable and 
even preordained. In addition, many of the people I grew up with are quite 
prepared to belief that they can maintain contact with their dead ones, either 
directly themselves or with the help of Inediums. A number of people from my 
family claim to have received communications from dead friends and relatives. 
I shall not say more about these methods here. Rather, I hope that the methods 
become evident in the context where I discuss the material they were used to 
obtain, where it is also best, I feel, to judge their merits and demerits. 
The Area 
The area in which this research is set, the North East of England, stretches from 
somewhat north of Newcastle-upon-Tyne down towards and a little bit beyond 
Middlesborough in the south. From east it extends from the North Sea coast west 
towards the Pennines. For the people in the North East the area and its people is 
quite clearly separate and different from the areas around it. For some 
considerable time after the Norman Conquest and beyond the Reformation it was 
indeed almost an independent kingdom ruled by the Bishops of Durham, the so-
called Prince Bishops. 
The observations that follow here on the North East are largely the perceptions of 
the people with whom I spoke rather than an objective account of the nature of 
the North East. As I will explain later, it is the way in which people make sense 
of themselves that I am working with here. 
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People in the North East do have quite a strong image of themselves as different 
frOln other people in England, particularly the people 'down South' as they call it. 
According to this image the people of the North East are largely ordinary, hard-
working, decent people who are down to earth, friendly and caring about other 
people. It was pointed out to me that when perfect strangers meet here at the bus 
stop, for example, they will start talking to each other as if they had known each 
other for a long time. This, it has frequently been pointed out to me, is different 
from the people down South who are largely, it was claimed, unconcerned about 
their fellow human beings, at least those outside their immediate circles of friends 
and faInily. Indeed, people in the North East see themselves as having, or at least 
having had, a very strong community spirit although many claim that it has now 
been eroded by changes in economic and social life. 
In explaining the character of the North East, the locals point out that for a long 
time the economics of the North East were largely based around coal mining and 
heavy industry, like ship building, that required the cooperation of many men 
carrying out physic~lly difficult tasks. Indeed, particularly as far as the coal 
mining is concerned, people often say that down the pits men depended upon each 
other for their safety and their lives and many of my friends locally link this 
feature with the sense of community that they see as having pervaded life in their 
younger days. Other friends link it to the 'macho' culture of the area, residues of 
which can still be found in my experience, according to which men are strong and 
assertive, work hard and stand together in the face of a common enemy, ready to 
take whatever comes their way without flinching. 
Another consequence of those economic arrangements was what some remember 
as a rather strict segregation between men and women whereby men were largely 
confmed to the world outside the home where they worked to provide for the 
family, and played, largely in the numerous working men's clubs in the area, once 
a week. Women, on the other hand, were confined to but in control of the home, 
largely taking care of the family's fmances, taking hold of their husband's earnings 
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immediately after the weekly payout. I have heard stories about how this 
segregation translated itself sometimes into ideas that married women should 
indeed not leave the home to go dancing with their husbands at the weekend, and 
how, in some places, only men would be expected and allowed to attend funerals. 
All this, or a lot of it, has changed now, people say. There is hardly any coal-
mining that goes on in the North East anymore and a lot of the heavy industries 
that characterised the area have now gone under. Not surprisingly as a 
consequence of this, unemployment has been very high in the North East although 
this has somewhat been mitigated by the investment in light, high-tech industry in 
the area by cOlnpanies frOin Japan, South Korea and Germany. The work they 
offer is different, not as arduous but requiring more skill. Indeed, it is often 
WOlnen rather than men that have been the recipients of these new jobs, in some 
cases entailing a fundamental shift in domestic arrangements whereby men now 
look after the house and the children, while the women work and provide for the 
family. 
I stress again that these observations are largely the perceptions of the people 
with whom I have spoken rather than an accurate scholarly account. What I am 
working with, what I am interested in, is the way in which people make sense of 
themselves. I am not concerned with establishing North Eastern culture for I, as 
will become clear, do not subscribe to such notions of culture as geographically 
rounded. In fact many of the people I spoke with, and interviewed, are not from 
the North East at all. What they do is that they live here, or at least lived here at 
the time, and this has of course always been the character of the North East. Like 
any other place people come to work and live here from all over the British Isles 
and now indeed, the world. This is particularly true of the small city wherein 
most of my work was carried out. This city has for centuries been an 
administrative and religious centre and it now sports a university too. Upon this 
spot in particular have converged people from far and wide. Yet the perceptions 
of the North East are important here because they are still the image that some 
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parts of the population have of themselves; for the others it is often the context 
against which they contrast themselves. 
This has particular relevance when it comes to talking about bereavement 
counselling as I shall discuss in later chapters. Many of the people involved in 
bereavement counselling are professional, middle class people that hail from 
outside the North East. Many, but by no means all, of the people who seek 
counselling are, on the other hand, working class, local people, used to manual 
work and, more recently maybe, unemployment. The former, of which I can 
speak more accurately, quite often have some particular ideas about their clients, 
ideas that seem to inform somewhat their practice and ideas which they base upon 
the knowledge that the clients are local people. So counsellors expect their clients 
to be decent hard working people, but they also expect them to be 'hard', to be 
used to cope without seeking too much help from outsiders. In particular they 
expect their clients to be somewhat reluctant to talk, to 'open up' and 'express 
their emotions' . 
The organisation of the thesis 
This dissertation is divided into three parts. In the chapter to follow, I discuss 
some of the work that has already been done on death and grief in modern Britain. 
My lnain purpose is the straightforward one of providing the research context into 
which this dissertation falls and to specify my particular ethnographic 
contribution. I do though have another aim, which is to give some sense of the 
attitudes towards death in which bereavement counselling sees itself as having 
been born. The idea here is that research into death and grief in Britain is not an 
isolated reflection upon social reality. Rather, such researches have been 
important in the making of interventions into death and grief, bereavement 
counselling for example. 
The second part of this thesis deals, then, with bereavement counselling. I start 
here by talking about the origin, history and organisation of Cruse - Bereavement 
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Care. The following two chapters then discuss and describe the training courses 
in bereavement counselling that I attended. The aim is to show how the 
techniques and practices of bereavement counselling are geared towards focusing 
the client's attention upon his emotions in the present. 
In the fmal part of the thesis, the last two chapters, I turn to the stories and the 
experiences of the bereaved. I want to show frrst how these stories inform the 
way in which bereaved people make sense of the lives and the deaths of their dead 
ones. I want to show how these stories are not simply about emotions in the 
present but about social relationships and social interactions. More than this I 
want to try and show how these stories are indeed themselves constitutive of 
social relationships and social interactions. 
Upon this hinges the contrast that I want to make between bereavement 
counselling on the one hand and the stories of the bereaved on the other. For the 
fonner, I shall attempt to show, social relationships end with death, leaving the 
survivor with memories and emotions that are part of his state of mind. For many 
bereaved people, on the other hand, relationships last long after death and are 
indeed kept alive and maintained through the very narratives they recounted to 
5 
me. 
5 The title for the ftrst part of the thesis is a part of a line from a Bob Dylan song 'Death is not 
the End' although that song is known to me in the Nick Cave and the Bad Seeds version, from 
the album Murder Ballads, released by Mute 1996. The title for the second part of the thesis, 
'The Kindness of Strangers' is another Nick Cave and the Bad Seeds' song, also from the 
Murder Ballads album. 'Stranger than Kindness', the title of the last part of the thesis, is the 
title of a song written by Anita Lane and Blixa Bargeld, from the Nick Cave and the Bad Seeds' 
album Your Funeral ... My Trial, released by Mute 1986. 
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Chapter 2 
'The Final Taboo?' 
Death and a (Short) Genealogy of Grief 
In the previous chapter I suggested that despite anthropology's long and intense 
interest in death anthropologists had largely ignored the subject of grief. I 
asserted that this was a regrettable omission and suggested that the reason might 
be found in the theoretical suppositions according to which anthropologists work 
and which tend to turn their gaze toward the public rituals by which a death is 
marked and away from the personal experiences that it instigates. This, I 
intimated, renders the anthropolo gy of death half irrelevant when dealing with the 
ethnographic context of the North East and, I venture to add, the rest of England 
where funerals and other collective commemorations do not hold the great 
significance in people's experiences of death that anthropologists would have us 
believe is the case in other places. I argued, too, that to understand death, in each 
case, we do need to understand the experiences that go with it, experiences that 
we can collectively call grief. I added that we need to understand grief both as a 
lived experience but also as a domain of experience that has been demarcated so 
that it can be described and acted upon. 
In pursuing these points I tum now to the question what is the character of death 
in England today? Death is a huge subject in the Western world (Simpson 1987). 
It is a subject where many diverse and competing disciplines meet, medicine and 
law, psychology and counselling, theology and sociology, anthropology and 
history, philosophy and literature to name but some. Death is a much traversed 
and contested territory where the claims of one party undermine those of other 
parties. Still the story of death that has emerged through this academic 
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competitive co-operation is surprisingly uniform, death has, over the last 80 years 
or so, become a taboo in English society. This story, almost invariably related 
with a sense of moral outrage, has now become entrenched in the public 
consciousness. Any programme in the media professing to address death, or its 
relatives, is invariably prefaced and introduced by words to the effect that it seeks 
to tackle the 'last taboo'. At the same time, though, scholars have started writing 
another chapter to this story, a chapter that suggests that death has lately 
experienced something of a 'revival' (see Walter 1991,1994; Winter 1997). 
In reviewing the literature on death in England my aim is of course to establish 
what has been written and what is known about death in England and where my 
own particular research fits in. Yet, I attempt not only that. What I seek to do is 
to treat the [mdings of scholars not simply as resources but as a 'topic' (Prior 
1997:71). Academics do not live in isolation and their work impinges upon the 
public from whom they in tum draw sustenance (see James, Hockey and Dawson 
1997). This is very clear here where the 'academic stories' of death fuel the 
attempts of some people, often the very same academics themselves, to rectify 
what they see as a mistreatment of the dying or the bereaved. On this foundation 
I then seek to write a short genealogy of grief as it appears in the grief studies 
literature. The aim is to illuminate how grief is constructed as a domain of 
description and intervention and how that construction is linked to the stories of 
death. In particular I shall attempt to show how the construction of grief is linked 
to the death as taboo thesis, for by depicting death as taboo the path is cleared for 
the bringing in of experts who can deal with the emotions that society does not 
want to deal with. The value of the experts' work, furthermore, is appreciated by 
the state that provides bereavement counselling with quite substantial financial 
support. 
First, though, what is the 'taboo thesis'? 
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'The pornography of death' 
In 1899 a certain Joseph Jacobs wrote an article, entitled enticingly 'The dying of 
death', in the Fortnightly Review where he lamented 'the practical disappearance 
of the thought of death as an influence directly bearing upon practical life' 
(1899:264; quoted in Walter 1994:1). In 1955 that splendid maverick of many 
things Geoffrey Gorer published an article in the Encounter entitled graphically 
'The pornography of death' where he belligerently declared that death had 
become a taboo in modem British society. 
In this article, and a later book (Gorer 1965) Gorer observed that at the death of 
his father, in 1915, his mother had to her support established rules about how a 
woman in her situation should conduct herself. There were 'widow's weeds', the 
mourning dress a widow was supposed to wear, specified to the delicate detail of 
the colour of the handkerchief. Magazines for ladies and books on etiquette spelt 
out how long a person should mourn depending on the relationship with the 
deceased. There were recommendations about what sort of places one could 
frequent in one's mourning, what sort of social events one could participate in, 
and what sort of people one could entertain. Correspondingly there were rules 
for those acquainted with the bereaved. How and when to express your 
sympathy, when it was suitable to pay a visit, how long one could stay, what kind 
of clothes one should wear on such an occasion. All this was spelt out in manuals 
on proper behaviour that were widely read and these rules, Gorer observed, were 
generally known and shared (Gorer 1965). 
When Gorer's brother died in the early 1950s all this had changed. The old rules 
no longer applied and that, Gorer observed, left his sister-in-law in a situation 
where she did not know how to conduct herself. Without the old rules she didn't 
know what she could and what she couldn't do. She didn't know what she 
should and shouldn't do. She didn't know what was expected of her. 
Simultaneously, Gorer says, the people around her did not know what was 
expected of them or how they should behave. Most tragically they didn't know 
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how to treat the grieving widow and so to save everyone from embarrassment she 
was left alone with her grief. 
Gorer asserted that things had gotten progressively worse and that in the 1960s 
the majority of the British people was 'without adequate guidance as to how to 
treat death and bereavement and without the social help in living through and 
coming to terms with the grief and mourning which are inevitable responses in 
human beings to the death of someone they have loved' (1965: 110; see Hockey 
1990:27). Gorer connected this to the, apparently contradictory, proliferation of 
images of horrible and fantastic death in the media, popular art and entertainment. 
He argued that death had become, and in fact replaced sex as, the ultimate taboo. 
While the Victorians had ignored and repressed sex, they were obsessed by death. 
We, Gorer observed, are obsessed by sex but we hide death and hide ourselves 
from it. The only way we seem to be able to face death, Gorer added, is through 
the fantastic and grotesque images of the media, that is with the same sort of 
perverse half-hearted, voyeuristic fascination that is the essence of pornography. 
Gorer's thesis has, at least until relatively recently, been generally accepted and 
refmed by a number of scholars. Gorer's most prominent successor is without 
doubt the French social historian Phillipe Aries (1974a, 1974b, 1981) whose 
Inagisterial studies map the changing attitudes toward death in the West from the 
Middle Ages to the present. The most important aspect of Aries's work here is 
the contrast he described between attitudes towards death at the beginning of the 
Middle Ages and the attitudes he contends are prevalent today. Aries argues that 
in the Middle Ages death was accepted as part of nature and of life. He terms the 
attitude to death present at the start of the said period 'tame'. The basic feature 
of 'tame death', Aries says, is that the dying person received a forewarning, an 
omen, announcing their impending death. This allowed them, says Aries, to 
prepare for their death by straightening out things with God and men, say their 
farewells and make sure that their business in this world, and as much as possible 
in the next, was taken care of. The most important thing about 'tame death'. 
Aries says, is that the dying person was in control over their death and deaths 
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when the dying person had managed to 'put their house in order' were considered 
good, whereas sudden, unannounced, deaths that did not allow for this 
preparation were considered bad. 
The contrast with the modern attitude to death which is 'wild', 'hidden' or 
'forbidden' is, says Aries, stark. Death, Aries says, is no longer accepted as part 
of life. On the contrary it provokes 'wild' horror and has to be 'hidden' from 
view or even 'forbidden'. Dying patients are kept in the dark about their 
impending fate, mourning relatives are forced to hide their sorrow and their grief 
from the rest of society and funerals are a hurried, uncomfortable and an 
embarrassing affair that has to be carried through and completed as quickly and as 
quietly as possible. 
Jenny Hockey (1990), writing on Experiences of Death, agrees with the general 
tabooist point that people in England today have a difficulty in talking about 
death. Hockey is an anthropologist and her book is based on fieldwork carried 
out in a hospice for the terminally ill, a residential home for the elderly, and of her 
experience as a bereavement counsellor. What Hockey reveals through her 
fieldwork is that the situation is more complex, more nuanced, than the idea of 
'taboo' successfully captures. 
Hockey's (1990:35) ann is to demonstrate 'that within this society... the 
boundary between the categories 'life' and 'death' is critical ... for members of 
Western societies it may raise disturbing questions about the very existence of 
meaning itself.' She (1990:36) argues that the 'maintenance of a boundary ... 
between life and death' is the 'prevailing strategy for the management of death 
within Western society.' Hockey details some of the strategies employed in this 
task and shows how they work in institutions, such as a residential home and a 
hospice, where death is routine. 
At the same time Hockey shows how the boundaries between 'life' and 'death' 
are constantly negotiated and risked in action. So, for example, she (1990:96-
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106) argues that the residential home, tellingly called Highfield House, strives to 
create the impression that it offers its residents a comfortable life of care. 
Carefully masking, when possible, the residents' slow, and sometimes not so slow, 
progression through deterioration and towards death the home contrives to hide 
its true purpose, the management of the [mal exit of people who have no place in 
society any longer. This true purpose can be discovered in the fact that before 
entering the home prospective residents have to give up for good their own 
hOlnes, they have to relinquish control over their possessions and their medicines 
and they have to accept the routinised daily regime of the home. All this is, of 
course, for good. The residents enter the home on the understanding that this is 
where they will spend the rest of their lives, that they will not leave the home alive 
except maybe to go the hospital to die. 
Against this the fiction of stability and permanence is achieved by various means 
and its works can be gauged from the keeping of record books. Here, care staff 
record the events of their shift, informing those who take over the next shift of 
what has happened in their absence. The names, or nicknames, of those individual 
residents whose condition has changed so much that it is deemed worthy of a 
mention are listed in the book explaining what has happened. For other residents 
the phrase "Remaining residents no change at the time of report" is used, written 
beneath the list of individual names. This phrase 'encompasses all those whose 
slow ageing still remains submerged within the institutional category, 'resident', 
says Hockey (1990:101), and by this a 'fictive sense of stability or permanence is 
thus imposed upon a gradually fading population.' 
Still, the residents appear to see through and constantly subvert the fiction of 
stability (Hockey 1990:124-8). This is revealed in the resident's sometimes bleak, 
sometimes humorous remarks. "What can you expect ... I won't live much 
longer", "You can be struck down in a moment", ''You can't turn the clock back" 
(Hockey 1990: 124) all communicate the residents' understanding of their 
impending fate. 'Seeing staff empty rubbish into plastic bags or sweep remnants 
of food from the floor onto a shovel, residents joke, saying: "You can put me in 
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there too" or 'Sweep me up too. You might as well.'" (Hockey 1990:125). What 
these reveal, Hockey (1990: 124) says is 'residents' awareness that life within 
Highfield House is transitory, that the timeless, repetitive routine of institutional 
care ilnposed upon them can create only an illusory sense of pennanence.' 
Together the 'tabooists', Gorer and Aries in particular, paint a picture of a society 
that hides death and hides itself away from death; a society that does not welcome 
bereaved people into its fold but condemns them to live alone with their grief. 
This contrasts darkly, the tabooists continue, with the 'pre-modem' period when 
Western societies were quite preoccupied with death and dying and when grief 
and bereavement were portrayed as part of life and dealt with by extensive public 
rituals (see Cannadine 1989:187). Up until this century - Gorer (1965) provides 
the First World War as a turning point - the tabooists say, people in the Western 
world were familiar with death; since then they have grown increasingly unfamiliar 
with it. 
But how accurate is this picture that has been painted by the 'tabooists'? While 
Hockey (1990) has demonstrated that although people in Britain may have 
difficulties in dealing with death the picture is a lot more complicated than talking 
simply of taboo would imply, the social historian David Cannadine (1989:187) 
suggests that this picture of the 19th century is excessively romanticised and that 
it rests upon unproved assumptions about the functional efficacy of elaborate 
funeral and mourning rituals. Cannadine (1989:190-1) suggests that it can be 
argued that the Victorian celebration of death was not a golden age of effective 
psychological support but a 'bonanza of commercial exploitation.' Death was 
usually horrific, prolonged and painful, and mourning rituals, rather than giving 
structure to people's grief, prevented them from getting on with their lives 
(Cannadine 1989:190-1). 
What about the present then? It is well documented that all through the Middle 
Ages and into the Victorian period people were constantly being given reminders 
of their inevitable and eventual death (see Daniell 1997; Litten 1991). The 
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thought of death seems to have been 'an influence bearing upon practical life' 
(Jacobs 1899:264; quoted in Walter 1994:1). A skeleton, personUying Death, 
tugging at the coat tail of a man or a woman as they went about their daily 
business was a common symbol (Walter 1994:9). What it signified was the 
understanding, based on only too frequent and bitter experience, that mortal 
illness could strike anyone without much warning, that 'death was capricious, 
determined only by the inscrutable will of the Lord' (Walter 1994:9). Death was 
seen as being part of the human condition, as we would now have it, the result of 
those fateful events in Eden, the outcome of the original sin. 
All this seems to have changed now. The inevitability of death, as people still take 
it, is not a prospect held up for contemplation in modem society, or so it would 
seem. Images of skeletons now warn people of the dangers of high voltage 
electricity rather than their inherent mortality. Indeed there does not appear to be 
an institution in modern society that sustains the kind of continued contemplation 
of death in the way that the church may have done before (see Daniell 1997). If 
this is so part of the reason would seem to lie with the scaling down of mortuary 
rituals that SeeiTIS to have taken place since Victorian times. Compared to earlier 
times and compared to other places, even the one where I come from, death 
rituals in Britain today appear, on balance, a strikingly Spartan affair (see Barley 
1989 and 1995; Hockey 1990; Walter 1990 and 1994; Litten 1991). Attendance 
appears to be low and usually restricted to very close friends and family. I have 
watched many a funeral procession, if it bears such a grand title, from the three 
churches in my immediate neighbourhood, and almost invariably those attending 
seem to fit into the two or three cars provided by the funeral director. 
Increasingly the service itself is held at the crematorium and on a number of 
occasions I have seen them arrive there, two, three, maybe four cars, twenty 
people at most come to see off the deceased. 
After the serVIce, I am told, it is more likely than not that the immediately 
bereaved will retire alone to their home unaccompanied by any other attendants 
from the funeral. Elizabeth Roberts (1989:205-6) reminds us that during the 19th 
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and early 20th century the bereaved were preoccupied with various rituals 
following the funeral. Funeral tea time, for example, was a time for family 
solidarity. Now, she contends, death has been taken over by the professionals. 
Death has become more private like family life, neighbours are not so much 
involved any lTIOre as they used to be and neither are children. There is, 
apparently, little now to publicly mark people's grief or measure the time since the 
death that aggrieved them occurred. Dress at funerals is customarily black or 
dark but after the funeral there is no telling from people's clothes that they have 
been bereft. Pat Jalland (1989: 180) believes that 19th century funeral customs 
met the psychological needs of the grieving. By providing defmite, known, and 
easily identifiable milestones they reduced the terror of death, she says, and 
structured the grieving process. This, again, is a frequently repeated opinion of 
those involved in the death business and with whom I have spoken. Almost 
verbatim they will recite Gorer's observations about how people no longer know 
how to treat the bereaved and how this results in mutual embarrassment and 
avoidance. They are countless the stories told me, by bereaved people but even 
more frequently by people involved in the care of the dying and the bereaved, of 
how friends, or people earlier deemed friends, would cross the street and pretend 
not to see them so as not to have to face the mourning person and embark them 
both upon a mutually embarrassing encounter. In the days of his mother, Gorer 
noted, mourning was expected to last months, sometimes years and even your 
whole life time. Now, there are no such provisions. 'People are expected to pull 
themselves together and carryon with life' quite a few of my informants told me 
when I asked them about how private companies and public institutions treat their 
staff when they are bereft. A lady I know was granted a week's 'compassionate 
leave' by her employer upon the death of her son, during which she could arrange 
and carry out the funeral. Later when her brother died she was allowed one day's 
absence to attend the funeral. Being responsible for arranging the funeral she had 
to use up some of her regular annual leave. 
In arguing that in Britain 'death' and 'life' are kept entirely separate Hockey 
(1990:36) argues that the home, 'the space where living takes place is seen to be 
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inappropriate as a space for dying.' Of about the roughly 600.000 people that die 
in Britain every year about two thirds die in institutions, hospitals of various sorts, 
residential homes for the elderly and, now, hospices (Hockey 1990). I have heard 
a number of stories of women, it always seems to be women, who, upon learning 
that their husbands were dying, demanded they be transported to the nearest 
hospital because they didn't want them to die in the house. The funeral directors 
in my area advertise themselves in the local papers as operating a 24hrs service. 
Some pride themselves on being able to answer your call within 30 minutes, 
immediately whisking away the mortal remains of your loved ones. 
It has been pointed out that hospitals where most deaths do occur are special 
institutions, built for a very specific purpose. Kubler-Ross (1970), Glasser and 
Strauss (1965, 1968), Sudnow (1967), Gerbner (1980) and Mauksch (1975) have 
all asserted that there is an interdependence between the ideology of the modem 
hospital, the reactions of the medical staff to death and the behaviour of the 
patient and his or her relatives (see Palgi and Abramovitch 1984:401-3). 
Mauksch (1975; see also Hockey 1990:68-9) pointed out specifically that 
hospitals are institutions whose very purpose it is to make people better and that, 
as such, in hospitals death must be the ultimate failure - hence the modern image 
of the dying man, tubes and wires extending out of his every orifice, connecting 
him with some sort of medical equipment or another, with doctors all around 
making frantic efforts of resuscitation whenever there are any signs that life is 
extinguishing (see Aries 1974a:87-90; Elias 1985). An institution that is 
systematically organised to make people better is left without means by which to 
make sense of death. When death happens, or is foreseen, this makes the job of 
the doctor and other medical staff in communicating with the dying and their 
families well nigh impossible. Kubler-Ross (1970), most famously, asserted how 
this ideolo gy could foster a conspiracy of silence whereby the dying patient was 
left alone with his - for it was predominantly men she talked to and spoke of -
fears, his anger and his grief, the doctor, the nurse, the patient and his family all 
unable to break the wall and face openly the impending fate. 
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Methods of disposal seem to suggest further that death is hidden. In Britain about 
70% of all dead bodies are cremated. That proportion is even higher in urban 
areas and especially amongst those who are of a Protestant background as the 
Catholic church's oppositions to cremations, only recently relaxed, still carries 
some weight with Catholics. Cremations were introduced and advocated around 
the turn of the century on economic and sanitary grounds. The so called 
'cremationists' argued that cremation removed the risk to public health posed by 
the proximity to dead bodies that burials foster. They added that continued 
reliance on burials WOUld, in due course, mean that all land, especially in crowded 
urban areas, would be used up for grave plots (see Leamy 1989). 'Save the land 
for the living' remains to this day the very utilitarian motto of the Cremation 
Society, as a crematorium superintendant told me. Since the mid-twentieth 
century cremations have enjoyed a spectacular expansion. This coincided broadly 
with a move during which responsibility for the disposal of dead bodies was 
shifted from parish churches to municipal local authorities and Peter Jupp (1993; 
see Walter 1994: 11) has argued that the expansion of cremations was to a large 
extent driven by local authorities in an effort to ease their fmancial and 
administrative problems as cremations are cheaper than burials. Aries says that 
the reason why cremations are so popular in Britain is that attempts have to be 
made to reduce to a minimum the inevitable operations necessary to dispose of 
the body. It is deemed essential in England, Aries continues, that nobody really 
notices that a death has occurred. Cremation is the most radical way of getting 
rid of the body and of forgetting the whole thing (Aries 1974a:90-1). Nigel 
Barley (1989:113-20) seems to agree. He points out that after cremation what 
remains of the body is carefully grinded in order to reduce whatever solid matter 
that may have survived to a fme powder. Jennifer Learny (1989:129) argues that 
underlying the sanitary and economic arguments of the cremationists was an 
'intense loathing for the physical remains of the dead' (1989:136). When I ask my 
friends why they want to be cremated rather than buried there is surely an element 
of this in their answer. They say that they don't like the idea of lying in the 
ground, being 'eaten by worms' as they would put it. Experts in the know about 
these things assure me that 'no worms live at the depth at which bodies are 
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buried. It's micro-organisms within our own bodies that eat us away. We rot 
from the inside as it were,' one of them told me. I'm not sure my friends would 
have found this picture more appealing. For other people I have spoken with, 
burial means a headstone and a grave, things that have to be cared for by their 
surviving relatives. These people claim to be reluctant to place such a burden 
upon their relatives and tie them down to a place, particularly now that people 
lTIOVe about so lTIuch. They feel that there need be no such physical reminders of 
their life, that all that is needed is for their loved ones to keep their memory alive 
(see Barley 1989:113-20). Some would mention that they did not want to 
provide their survivors with an obligation to remember and care for them, that if 
they were to be remembered and loved the desire to do so would have to arise 
within the survivors themselves. 
In multi-cultural, multi-religious Britain crematoria carry no obvious religious 
symbols and the decoration is deliberately non-specific to make sure that all 
denominations can feel at home there. Yet in the two crematoria I have seen 
there are defInite symbols that seemed to me, if not explicitly religious, very 
British in character. These were mainly pictures, photographs and paintings, of 
flowers and trees, lakes and rivers, hills and mountains, all seemingly depicting 
parts of the British landscape. Sometimes the mood of the pictures would be 
turbulent with storms brewing and waters flowing, more often though it was calm, 
still, reassuringly embodying the enduring essence of the British countryside. In 
this way they would resemble so many other pictures found in so many other 
institutions in Britain, schools and town halls, hospitals and hotels, libraries and 
restaurants. 
The layout of crematoria in Britain is to some extent determined by the creeds of 
effIcient operation, the guidelines of the Department of the Environment and, 
now, the European Union's decrees on the release of air pollutants. That is 
fItting, for inside, in the cellar where the actual operation takes place, crematoria 
are like factories. That is at least what they reminded me of in those two cases I 
have seen them. This is what they have reminded quite a few people who work in 
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the death study business and confessed to me that having earlier intended to have 
themselves cremated they had now, having seen how factory-like crematoria are, 
changed their minds (see Barley 1989). While most crematoria are owned and 
run by local authorities they are run like businesses in that they, like most things 
these days, have a fIXed yearly budget. This, obviously, means that in order to 
deal with the number of cremations likely to fall their way every year without 
having to extend operation time into labour expensive evenings and weekends, 
each service can only be allocated a certain amount of time and that funerals have 
to be fitted in with a time slot available at the crematorium (Walter 1994: 11). 
'Twenty lninutes just about, is what we allow,' a superintendent at a crematorium 
told me. In most cases, he continued, it was not a problem at all, 'not with the 
English, they are reserved and often want the whole thing over with as quickly as 
possible. ' There were people from some ethnic minorities that could cause a bit 
of a stir, the superintendent continued, in that their customs required more 
emotions to be shown more openly. They want to take their time and this can 
threaten to force the whole schedule out of joint. 'What we do now,' he 
announced to me, 'is that we tend to place these services at the end of the day, 
you see, that way they don't upset the whole pattern, causing delays for all the 
other services, and it doesn't matter if they run over a little bit.' 1 
If crematoria are largely run on the grounds of efficiency so too are cemeteries. 
Beginning in the middle of last century cemeteries have gradually been moved 
away from the centres of urban areas and towards their outskirts and the 
surrounding countryside. The original recommendations in this direction came 
from Chadwick's report and Loudon's treatise on cemetery management. Both 
advised that 'the chaos of burial in the rapidly expanding industrial towns be 
solved by constructing out-of-town cemeteries with rational layouts, clear number 
of graves, no re-use of graves, and (in Chadwick's report) only one grave per 
person' (Walter 1994:12). The ownership of cemeteries, simultaneously, passed 
1 The same superintendent told me that he saw it as the major function of his institution to help 
people with their bereavement, to provide for them 'a be~inning of the ~eving process,' as he 
said. He acknowledged that there was potentially a conflIct between the ume schedule of the 
crematorium and needs of the bereaved who might need more than the twenty minutes allowed 
them to get started on 'the grieving process'. 
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from the church to that of local authorities and, in few cases, private companies 
whose worry was the efficient, safe and descent disposal of a body that had to be 
disposed of, rather than the safeguarding of the soul's travels from this world to 
the next (see Prior 1989:chapter 5; compare Daniell 1997 for Middle Ages). The 
principle according to which the cemeteries are landscaped now are decency and 
efficiency, that no one be offended by the graves of other people and that it be 
quick and easy to look after them. So authorities, be they municipal or private 
companies, provide rules, regulations and recommendations as to the type of 
headstones relatives can erect upon the graves of their dead ones and what sort of 
lnemorabilia of other kinds they can dispose of there. Anything that will increase 
significantly the workload involved in looking after the cemetery is likely to be 
banned as well as anything that might upset other relatives whose dead ones are 
buried in the same cemetery. 
'A strange taboo' and 'the revival of death' 
The picture so far painted is of death as hidden away, as locked inside the private 
realm of the family and away from the domains of public display and public 
debate. Society, it would seem, deals with death with efficiency and decency but 
has also divested it of all meaning. Yet the taboo thesis, if in many ways 
convincing, is somewhat strange. As Walter (1991) has pointed out talk of death, 
dying, bereavement, hospices, is not so much prolific as endemic in British society 
today. Hardly a day passes without the subject being discussed on the television 
or the radio. Almost daily one of the newspapers, broadsheet or tabloid, will 
touch upon the matter in some form or another. The message in most of these is 
precisely this, that death is now hidden. The programmes are almost invariably 
introduced as 'facing the final taboo'.2 
2 That as well is the title of Nicci Gerrard's (1997) essay for the Waterstone's magazine Won 
the proliferation of writings about death, as if writers have not always written about death; 'what 
else is there to write about,' one of them said. 
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This is curious as Walter (1991) has pointed out. When Simpson amassed his 
bibliography of publications in English about death he commented that death 'is a 
very badly kept secret; such an unmentionable topic that there are over 650 books 
now in print asserting that we are ignoring the subject' (Simpson 1979:vii). Or as 
Walter (1991 :293) observes 'it is a strange taboo that is proclaimed by every 
pundit in the land, and when virtually no Sunday is without at least one newspaper 
discussing death, bereavement, hospices, or funerals.' 
Asking what is going on here, Walter recommends six amendments, or revisions, 
to the death as taboo thesis. The frrst amendment Walter (1991 :297-9) refers to 
as 'taboo plus coda'. It involves refming the taboo thesis along class and gender 
lines, allowing for the assertion that death became a taboo amongst, especially the 
male section of, the middle class after the First W o rId War but adding that as the 
hippie generation assumes central stage in society the middle class are now 
breaking out of the taboo though death may becoming a taboo amongst the 
working classes instead as their earlier established communities are being eroded. 
Secondly, Walter (1991:299-302) points out that death may be hidden rather than 
forbidden in modem society simply, as discussed above, as a result of how 
infrequently your average individual will have any experience of death. Thirdly, 
Walter (1991:302-3) points out that death may be a limited taboo in that it is not a 
taboo in modern society as such as much as it is a taboo amongst some key 
occupations within it as the medical professions and the mass media personnel. 
These two occupations, Walter suggests, have been invested with a lot of trust in 
interpreting for us the meaning of death, yet both have profound difficulties in 
dealing with it. 
Fourthly, Walter (1991:303-4) says that death may not be so much a taboo as 
caught between disparate frames of reference. He points out that there is little 
continuity between the public health frame that governs much of the funeral 
procedures, the theological frame of the service itself and the psychological frame 
according to which grief is largely understood these days. In this, Walter 
(1991:303) adds 'experience of death is typically postmodem, in that meaning has 
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become fragmented.' Death is not hidden or forbidden, we, in our postmodern 
condition, simply do not possess a coherent language to talk about it. Walter 
(1992:304-5) then points out that death may not only be a taboo in modern 
society but everywhere and always. Death denial may be, as Becker (1972) 
argued, universal. Finally, Walter (1991:305-6) points out that it may be 
necessary to operate here a distinction between individual and society. According 
to this perspective many 'traditional' societies struggle with death as their claims 
to authority are based upon intimations of eternity. These societies can be seen to 
deny death in that they will negate the individual death by subsuming it under the 
eternal cycle of society or nature (see also Bloch and Parry 1982). Modern 
society, on the other hand, can be said to be dealing very nicely with death, by 
elevating youth and by progress that delays death ever further. At the same time 
though, individuals in 'traditional' societies may receive the best support seeing 
that in those societies death calls for elaborate public rituals. The modern 
individual, dying or bereaved, may, on the other hand, be uniquely isolated seeing 
that he and intercourse with him is troublesome as he reminds us of our own 
mortality. 
Walter (1994) takes a step further and argues that whatever the merits of the 
taboo thesis death has now undergone something of a revival. He (1994:2) states 
that in this revival death is more and more not shaped by the 'dogmas of religion 
nor the institutionalised routines of medicine, but by dying, dead or bereaved 
individuals themselves.' Walter contends that we now live in 'a culture of 
individualism that values a unique life uniquely lived' and that in such a culture 
'the good death is now the death that we choose. The good funeral is the funeral 
that uniquely marks the passing of a unique individual, and psychological manuals 
that prescribed stages of grief for mourners to pass through are now being 
discarded for an awareness of the infinite individual variations in the way people 
grieve' (Walter 1994:2). 
Walter asserts that the roots of revival lie in a conflict between the modern, 
rational and bureaucratic medicine and the ever increasing individualism of our 
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times. He concedes that modem medicine has allowed ever greater control over 
death but that these achievements stem from medicine's bureaucratic and rational 
Inanner of operating and thus serve to deny what is most precious to us, our 
individuality (1994:22). Walter points out that 'modernity' - the period referred 
to in the death as taboo thesis - involves a fundamental split between the private 
and the public realms, 'between the world of work and reason and the world of 
family and emotion' and that this split is 'reflected in the modem way of death. 
Death has been stripped of its public spectacle and has become a private, family 
experience' (1994:23). Yet, at the same time, Walter continues, there exist 
numerous public discourses about death, in medicine, public health, life insurance, 
the management of crematoria and cemeteries and so on. These are though 
'impersonal and unrelated to the private experiences of individuals who are dying 
or bereaved ... private experience and public discourse do not tally.' There are then 
available public languages about death, death is not completely hidden, the 
problem is that they do not make sense of the private experiences of those 
individuals death touches (1994:23). 
It is from this contradiction between private experience and public discourses that 
the revival of death emanates; its aim is to bridge the gap. Revival, then, is an 
attempt to make private experiences of death part of the public discourses about 
death (Walter 1994:24). Walter contends that there are two strands to the revival 
of death, a late modem strand and a postmodern one (1994:39-44). The late 
modern strand is largely driven by experts and it seeks to replace medical control 
over death with a more psychological approach. Experts now understand the 
stages and the processes that dying and bereaved people go through, the needs 
they have at each stage and can thus help them on their journey toward an 
adequate resolution. So, the late modem revival links the private and the public 
but largely by controlling the private. For example in bereavement counselling, 
the trained expert, a representative of the public, acknowledges and legitimises the 
feelings of the bereaved while at the same time protecting the public from these 
feelings (Walter 1994:39-40). The postmodem revival, on the other hand, rejects 
the late modern exposures of neat stages and precise processes of dying or of 
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gnevrng. It acknowledges, encourages and celebrates what it takes to be the 
enormous variety in individual experiences of death and bereavement and 
demands that people be allowed to die and grieve in their own ways. So, the 
postmodern strand forces private feelings onto the public sphere not to be reined 
in by expert control but to be taken seriously in their own right. The fact that they 
are so diverse furthermore means that they cannot but fragment the public 
discourses and challenge the authority of the experts (Walter 1994:40-4). 
I shall later argue that while Walter may be right in asserting that there has been a 
postmodern revival of death that demands that people are allowed to die and 
grieve as they like, that this revival is itself not free from expert influence. Cruse, 
as I will discuss in following chapters, practises client-centred counselling, 
stipulates that the client is the expert and believes that each grief is a unique 
experience. Yet, Cruse operates on grief as an already established domain of 
experience, a domain that despite it variety can be known and intervened into. It 
also, an important point in chapter 5, fosters in its counsellors a sense of 
themselves as experts. 
So what is going on here? Is death a taboo or has it, or is it now, undergoing a 
revival? Allow me to begin considering these questions by going back to the 
taboo thesis and in particular to how its advocates have accounted for the 
historical movements that have turned death from an obsession into a taboo. 
Gorer observed that what had happened from the time his mother was widowed 
and to the tnne his sister-in-law was, were the two world wars, and it was during 
and due to them, he argued, that the more visible forms of mourning had 
vanished. The First World War in particular, Gorer wrote (1965:6), 
had created such an army of widows; it was no longer socially realistic for 
them all to act as though their emotional and sexual life were over for good, 
which was the underlying message of the ritual mourning. And with the 
underlying message, the ritual too went into discard. There was too, almost 
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certainly, a question of public morale; one should not show the face of grief to 
the boys home on leave from the trenches. 
In the years that followed, Gorer went on to argue, 'bereavement received 
increasingly little public expression, becoming an ever more carefully hidden and 
private experience' (Hockey 1990:44). Cannadine (1989:218-19) agrees with 
Gorer that the First World War was somewhat of a turning point. He argues that 
before it, though, the ostentation of mourning characteristic of the Victorian age 
was declining but that it declined even further as grief became more intense and 
widespread because of the mass bereavements of the war. Death became so 
ubiquitous and tragic, grief so common, that the Victorian rituals were 
recognised, not as unrealistic as Gorer would have it but as inadequate. Instead 
of taking this as evidence for a denial of death, Cannadine continues, we should 
pay attention to two different responses that the mass grief of the World War was 
Inet with. One is the construction of war memorials and the huge popular support 
that has remained for such memorials, the other the phenomenal rise in interest in 
spiritualism with people's attempts to contact their sons, husbands, lovers, 
brothers and fathers whose bodies were lost in the mass graves on the killing 
fields of the continent (also Winter 1997). 
Ivan Illich blames a more general process, the medicalisation of society, for having 
made death a taboo in modem times. In 1975 he observed, with his customary 
candour, that today 'the man best protected against setting the stage for his own 
dying is the sick person in critical condition. Society, acting through the medical 
system, decides when and after what indignities and mutilations he shall die. The 
medicalisation of society has brought the epoch of natural death to an end' 
(1975:149; see Hockey 1990:27; emphasis -aa.). Illich was here somewhat 
following Aries who had argued that with the privatisation of family life and the 
intensification of personal relationships, evident throughout last century, attitudes 
to death changed. People started to fear the death of their loved ones; 'thy 
death', as Aries calls it, became too horrible to contemplate and the impulse 
became to protect the dying. The control that the dying had wielded over their 
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own last moments was wrestled away from them by their loving families and 
handed over to the medical professions (Aries 1974a:65, 68). Aries went on to 
record how this trend has since intensified. During this century, he says, 'a new 
sentiment characteristic of modernity' takes root. One 'must avoid - no longer for 
the sake of the dying person, but for society's sake, for the sake of those close to 
the dying person - the unbearable emotion caused by the ugliness of dying and by 
the very presence of death in the midst of happy life' and the dying are to be 
transported as quickly as possible to hospitals and other such places to die away 
from the now too sensitive eyes of their relatives (Aries 1974a:87). Beier 
(1989:56) adds that the proximity with death offered in earlier times when people 
routinely died in their homes, prevented the mystification of illness and death and 
the alienation of the sufferers and the dying that she claims we fmd today. So 
people die in hospitals because we are too sensitive to have them die in our 
homes, yet by thus removing death from our lives we only increase our sensitivity 
to it (see Aries 1974a, 1974b, 1981). 
Roy Porter (1989) has documented how the medicalisation of death involved the 
death bed itself. Throughout the Middle Ages the most important person at the 
death scene, after the dying themselves that is, was the priest (Walter 1994:12; 
Daniell 1997). His job it was to administer to the dying the last rites, the fmal 
sacralnent, to give him or her the strength to meet death and to hopefully shorten 
their stay in purgatory. This all changed with the Reformation as Martin Luther 
refused to accept the reality of any sacrament other than those instigated by Christ 
himself, the baptism and the Lord's supper that is. It soon became a sign of 
Popisln, an offence likely to lead to arrest, to involve priests in acts of sacrament 
giving or praying over the bodies of the dying. The minister, Luther himself 
advised, should limit his work to getting the dying to talk about the gospel and to 
offer the prospective mourners pastoral care (Jorg Mosig 1997, personal 
communication). 
'The space' left vacated by the priest was, in the 18th century, filled by the 
lnedical doctor (Walter 1994:14; see Porter 1989). We may be so used to 
66 
The Final Taboo? 
modern medicine's ways of working that it bears reminding us that before this the 
role of the doctor had been very much subservient to that of the priest and the 
dying person. His job was principally to predict the hour of death so that the 
dying person could then take control and get his or her house in order before they 
went on to meet their Maker (Porter 1989:80-2; Walter 1994:12). What 
happened during the 18th century was that doctors started to linger around the 
death bed till beyond the moment of death. They would administer opium to ease 
the pain of the dying and, often they would conceal knowledge of the impending 
fate away from the dying man (Porter 1989:80-2; Walter 1994:14). Some of 
those involved in these events did not like the developing trend. A certain 
Thomas Sheridan lamented in the 1760s that doctors 'take care to conceal 
people's danger frOlTI them. So they are carried off, properly speaking, ... without 
being sensible of it' (Porter 1989:89). Porter (1989:89) agrees with Aries and 
believes that this 'medicalisation' of the death bed happened with full, if not 
explicit, agreement of the family of the dying. 
In argumg that underlying the sanitary and economIC arguments of the 
cremationists was an 'intense loathing for the physical remains of the dead' 
(1989: 136) Jennifer Learny (1989: 129) credits the reformers with instigating, 
around the mid-19th century the 'antecedents of the modern attitude of death 
denial.' Ruth Richardson (1989, and 1987) observes that, to understand the 
extraordinary energy directed towards the celebration of death by the Victorians 
we must understand and contemplate the alternative. That alternative was the 
paupers funeral whose cost was carried by the authorities and whose elaboration 
was none existent. Richardson points out that with the Anatomy act of 1832 it 
was legislated that the bodies of paupers, who could not afford their own funerals, 
could be sent for dissection by the so called anatomists at the newly established 
medical schools. Richardson recounts the terror and stigma associated with such 
a fate and the intense fear of its very possibility among the poor whose very lives 
were marred by the possibility that they might soon fall into the flock of the 
paupers. She argues that the elaborate Victorian celebrations of death must be 
seen in this context as carrying symbolic messages about status and worth and 
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cannot, simply, be explained as providing an admirable psychological support for 
the bereaved. 
Finally, in tracing the historical trajectory from 'my death' to 'thy death' to 
'hidden' or 'forbidden death' Aries (1974a and 1981) cited the developing 
sensibilities toward individual differences often attributed to the Renaissance 
(Burckhardt 1960) as instrumental. Claire Gittings (1984:7-9) has developed this 
thesis and argued that the rise of modern individualism is the principal reason for 
what she does not hesitate to call the modern denial of death. She says that the 
belief that each individual is unique and cannot be replaced lead people to hide 
away from death, because the prospect of both their own death and that of their 
loved ones became too painful to contemplate. Robert Blauner (1977 [1966]) has 
offered a kind of a sociological-cum-demographical explanation for this effect of 
individualism on attitudes toward death. He argues, citing the authority of Hertz 
(1960 [1907]), Durkheim (1965 [1912]), Radcliffe-Brown 1922) and Jack Goody 
(1960), that there will be a correlation between the social status and the social 
uses of the deceased on the one hand and the ceremonial pomp that they will be 
accorded after their death on the other. Blauner points out that the majority of 
those who die in the West today are old people who have already retired from 
their jobs, raised their children and in general made their contributions to society. 
Their current use to society, says Blauner, is negligible. Having already retired 
they leave no roles unfilled, no positions empty and, consequently, no need for 
any ceremony whereby they can be succeeded. This, Blauner concludes, is why 
death figures so little in the modern Western imagination. 
It is certainly true that in the North East the death of children and teenagers 
creates a lot more public commotion than does the death of older people. This is 
particularly so when the death was violent or accidental and thus doubly 
'unnatural' as some of my informants would call it. On those occasions the scene 
of the death or the home of the deceased will be flooded with flowers much like 
the steps of Kensington Palace were after the death of Princess Diana or the grass 
of Anfield Road was after the Hillsborough tragedy. 
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Bloch and Parry (1982) suggest, in an observation similar to Blauner's, that the 
reason why fertility symbols are, comparatively speaking, conspicuous in English 
funerals by their almost total absence is that here we do not have the intense 
emphasis upon the reproduction of society that is so prominent in societies based 
on traditional authority. On the contrary, here value is placed upon the unique 
individual and the most important part of the funeral, they say, is the recounting of 
that unique biography. One of the changes in funeral practices in England 
recently has indeed been the growing popularity of 'do-it-yourself funerals, 
particularly amongst the middle classes (see Walter 1994). Even if people do not 
go as far as 'do-it-yourself I am told that mourners have recently assumed greater 
freedom in expressing their grief during funeral services than they once had. That 
freedom will often be used to establish precisely the bio graphy and character of 
the deceased. But that freedom is also understood to be helpful to the bereaved. 
It is not only the individuality of the deceased but no less so the individuality of 
the bereaved that is important and it is here, I argue, that we have to look in order 
to uncover the political implications of death in England in line with Bloch and 
Parry's general theory. The political questions that Bloch and Parry raise are, I 
argue, best addressed in this ethnographic context by looking at practices like 
bereavement counselling and I shall in the remainder of this and the next three 
chapters attempt to illuminate the political implications of this practice. It bears 
mentioning here that many of the people involved in the death business that I 
spoke with, or sometimes heard of - crematoria staff, priests, funeral directors, 
nurses, doctors - stated that they saw the care of the dying and the bereaved as 
one of the most, if not the most, important aspects of their work. In explaining 
why this was so and how they would go about this part of their work, these 
people were clearly influenced by the death as taboo thesis and by the ideas of 
bereavement counselling and would sometimes even cite particular books from 
those fields to support their assertions. 
I am not going to take sides directly on the death as taboo debate. I seek a 
slightly different angle and what I want to assert is that the whole debate seems to 
69 
The Final Taboo? 
be predicated upon a 'naturalisation' of the notion of death (see Zeleski 1995) and 
carries with it the idea that while attitudes to death can change very dramatically 
death itself is a constant, fIXed thing. This channels the debate into measurements 
of how close or far away from death different attitudes at different times are. In 
the past people were close to death, in the modern era they were not, now they 
may be becoming so again. Death, itself, is natural. In this way, the death debate 
echoes anthropological discussions of kinship (Schneider 1968) and gender 
(Yanagasiko and Collier 1987). Yanagasiko and Collier (1987) point out that 
anthropological studies of both kinship and gender have tended to naturalise 
those things they supposedly sought to explain and have taken cultural differences 
to be no more than variations upon a common theme. The same, I argue, applies 
to death and instead of assuming that death is constant we have to talk of death 
itself as changing. And these changes in death are, I shall argue too, linked to 
changes in grief as an experience, as a cultural conception and as an expectation 
as to how people should behave. 
Gorer, people may remember, stated that the Victorians were obsessed with death 
but repressed sex and that we, modems, are obsessed by sex but deny death. In 
the first volume of his History of sexuality Foucault (1978:8-9) poses the 
question: was sex so repressed prior to the sixties revolution as we have been led 
to believe? He (1978:10) points out that our erstwhile liberators operate a 
conception of power as repressive. They argue, that is, that power works to hold 
back our natural instincts, sexuality for instance. Foucault himself argues for a 
view of power as creative rather than simply repressive and he argues that sex and 
sexuality are not natural facts repressed or acknowledged in distinct historical 
epochs as the case may be. Sexuality, he says, 'must not be thought of as a kind 
of a natural given which power tries to hold in check, or an obscure domain which 
knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the name that can be given to a 
historical construct' (Foucault 1978: 105). Our liberators, who would free a 
repressed natural instinct, are themselves simply writing a new chapter in the 
history of sexuality. 
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If we follow Foucault's line of argument death cannot be elevated as part of the 
human condition openly acknowledged to different degrees by different societies. 
We have to take the approach, the attitude, towards death evident in each case 
and examine it without any reference to death's, alleged, universality. Insisting 
upon the inextricable link between power and knowledge Foucault points out 
some of the professionals, the institutions and expert practices through which 
sexuality has been pro blematised , and he traces how sexuality has, roughly, left 
the domains of theology and religion to take up residence in those of psychology 
and psychoanalysis. Ironically, the same can be said about death and grief, they 
have likewise been transported from a realm of religion towards that of 
psychology, but that is not the main point. The main point is this, that we can 
now, I believe, understand more fully how and why it is that the death as taboo 
thesis is still so powerful and persuasive, its strength has not much to do with 
death, it has a momentum all of its own, fuelled by the energies of those experts 
who position themselves at particular vantage points where the view onto death is 
unhindered. The most important aspect of this story is that grief has now been 
established as a distinct domain of psychological and emotional life to which 
experts can turn their attention. 
Let me start tracing this history by mentioning two fundamental changes in the 
history of death that I have so far left untouched. I made the point earlier that all 
through the Middle Ages and even into the Victorian Age death seems to have 
been an 'influence directly bearing upon practical life' (Joseph Jacobs 1899:264; 
quoted in Walter 1994:1) and mortality was thought of as an inherent part of the 
human condition. This started to change as the Modem Age set in with the shift 
in what Foucault termed 'govemmentality' when the population appeared as the 
terrain supreme upon which government exercised its will, replacing earlier 
preoccupations with sovereignty. 'Govemmentality' conceives the tasks of rulers 
in terms of a calculated supervision and maximisation of the forces of society, or 
the population (Rose 1989b:4-6). It became, understandably, vital to this task to 
have some way of measuring and knowing what it is the population is up to and 
so statistics, the science of the state, were born (Hacking 1975; Prior 1989; Rose 
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1989b). Now, one of the things the people generally are up to is reproducing and 
dying. Evidently it was essential for the state to have some idea about the rate at 
which people were dying, their distribution within the population, and even the 
causes for their death. From 1837 every death in England had to be registered 
and the purpose of the registration was a systematic compilation of mortality 
statistics (Walter 1994:9). 
There are two consequences of this shift in interest worthy of emphasis here. 
Firstly the statistician was not interested in the death of the individual as an 
individual, as a soul whose passage to Heaven had to be guided. He, for these 
were all men, was interested in death in popUlations, in the distribution of death 
rate according to class and occupation, sex and social situation, age and origin. 
He was interested in the rise, or occasionally the fall, of the death rate within the 
population, in means by which that rate could be brought down even further and 
more permanently. Secondly the statistician was interested not in our inherent, if 
such it is, mortality, the fact, as people take it, that each of us will eventually die. 
His interest was more compressed, his time scale shorter. The statistician was 
interested in the death rate on such measurable basis as a year. From these, put 
together, he might then deduce that 5% of the male population between 40-50 
years old would, in anyone year, die. He might further predict that 75% of these 
would come from the lowest strata of society, that most of these would be city 
dwellers and so on. From being a certainty death increasingly came to be dealt 
with as a probability (see Walter 1994:9-10; Bauman 1992). 
Further to this was an intensification in the search for the causes of death. When 
registration started old age was an accepted and commonly registered cause of 
death. With time, mortality as such ceased to be an adequate cause and these 
became attached to specific diseases or malfunctions of the vital organs of the 
body (see Prior 1989; 1997). Today all deaths have to be registered and medical 
evidence of the cause of death must be provided when a death is registered. The 
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certificate is given by either the coroner3 or the doctor of the deceased. The 
doctor specifies as best he can what he believes to be the cause of death 
(Consumers' Association 1986:13). This must be a medical, physiological cause. 
That is, even if it was established that the deceased had been murdered by a stab 
wound, the cause recorded on the death certificate relates to a physiological event 
like heart failure. If the deceased is 'reasonably old' as one of my informants told 
me, and has a history of suffering from a potentially fatal disease, his or her doctor 
can, without further investigation, put that illness down on the death certificate as 
the cause of death. In certain other cases a post mortem may be ordered by the 
coroner to establish the cause of death. This he, or she, can do without the 
consent of the family of the deceased although the latter have the opportunity to 
contest the matter before the High Court if they feel inclined (Consumers' 
Association 1986:35). In any case a cause of death has to be provided when a 
death is registered. Only then will a death certificate be provided and a death 
certificate is needed for the funeral to go ahead and before the deceased's 
properties can be sorted out. 
Together these two things, death as a probability and the search for the causes of 
death, may have made it more difficult, more archaic, to contemplate humanity's 
mortality as such (Prior 1989:40; see Bauman 1992). But, as Lindsay Prior 
(1989) reminds us, this does not mean that our ideas of death and mortality are 
not social or cultural in essence. Prior suggests that the most important 
characteristic about death in the United Kingdom now, is a distinction that is 
made between natural and unnatural death. He (1989:47-50) argues that evidence 
for this distinction can be gauged from the coroner's brief. Deaths that must be 
reported to the coroner are when death was sudden and unexplained, occurred in 
suspicious circumstances, were caused by an accident, might have been caused by 
neglect, poisoning, drug abuse or abortion, when it was a suicide, if it occurred in 
3 The coroner is 'a qualified doctor or lawyer, sometimes both. He is paid by the local authority 
but is independent of both local and central government and is responsible only to the Crown. 
His duties include instituting inquiries regarding the finding of any gold or silver whose 
ownership is unknown in order to discover whether it is treasure trove and therefore belongs to 
the Crown. His main function, however, is to investigate any death which has been reported to 
him' (Consumers' Association 1986:32). 
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pnson or in police custody, took place during a surgical operation or before 
recovery from the effects of anaesthesia. Deaths that are attributed to industrial 
diseases or injuries suffered during military service must also be reported as these 
may entitle the survivors to compensations (Consumers' Association 1986:32-3). 
The coroner is obliged to hold an inquest4 'into every violent and unnatural death 
that is reported to him' (Consumers' Association 1986:36). The conclusion, or 
verdict, of an inquest can range from natural causes to suicide, industrial disease 
to unlawful killing, accidental death to open verdict (Consumers' Association 
1986:39). 
All this, says Prior (1989:47-50) is highly revealing about attitudes to death in the 
United Kingdom today. There is a clear tendency, he argues, to classify as natural 
those deaths that are attributable to diseases and as unnatural those where human 
agency, particularly if it can be described as 'violent', is more evident. This is 
significant, argues Prior, for it shows how in the United Kingdom death is either 
regarded as the consequence of natural events, diseases, or individual human 
actions resulting in accidents or unlawful killing. No space is given up to inherent 
mortality and no space is given to social structural influences on death. So, for 
example, no mention is made of the fact that diseases may be disproportionately 
present in certain social groups, that certain people have the means to access 
better medical care, that certain people have the means to feed, clothe and house 
themselves better than some other people, facts only too well documented since 
the 1980 publication of the 'Black report on health' which was itself 'semi-
suppressed' (Hockey 1990:73; Peter Phillimore 1996, personal communication). 
In relation to this Prior (1989:26) argues that while hospitals may foster the 
medicalisation of death, deaths happen in hospitals precisely because they are 
conceptualised as physiological, biological events. Current nosology, Prior points 
out, takes as its central frame of reference the human body and builds on, or in, it 
an anatomical geography of diseases whereby death can be located in anatomical 
4 'An inquest is an inquiry to determine who the deceased person was, and how, when and 
where that person died, and to establish the particulars that are required for the registration of 
the death' (Consumers' Association 1986:36). 
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sites. Scientific medicine constructs death as understandable to science precisely 
by locating the causes of death in the narrow field of the human body that, in the 
medical construction, has descended ever deeper into the human body (Prior 
1989:32-5). Death has now penetrated beyond the ma1functioning vital organ to 
reside in our, sometimes, faulty genetic make-up. 
The second point to make in connection with changes of death concerns religion. 
While John Bowker (1991) has recently reminded everyone that death did not 
constitute such a central concern for the origin and development of the world 
religions as scholars have long been prone to argue, death was a, if not the, 
cornerstone of Christianity in the Middle Ages. Christopher Daniell (1997) 
argues that Christianity pervaded all aspects of life in Britain in the Middle Ages 
till the advent of the Reformation and that an obsession with death constituted its 
most important aspect. In particular people were concerned with the fate of one's 
soul after death. Daniell (1997: chapter 1 particularly) provides a compendious 
list and a telling tale of all the things people would do to try and secure the safe 
passage of their soul toward Heaven. 
All this changed, surprisingly rapidly it seems, with the Reformation. What 
mattered in determining the fate of the soul, according to Protestantism, was the 
faith of the individual and his or her relationship with God. The priest and all the 
death bed rituals over which he had presided in the heydays of Catholicism were 
dramatically deemed irrelevant if not, more seriously, an evidence of idolatry. 
Walter (1994:14; quoting from Rowell 1974:82) cites John Knox's Genevan 
Service Book, of 1556, to the effect that 'the corps is reuerently brought to the 
graue ... with owte any further ceremonies, which beyng buriede the minister 
goethe to the church ... and maketh some comfortable exhortation to the people, 
touching deathe and resurrection.' The Scottish Book of Common Order, of 
1564, saying much the same thing added, though, with regard to the priest 'if he 
be present and required' (Walter 1994:14). This is, as Nigel Barley (1989:115) 
remarks of his Native Land, an indication of the distrust of ritual that exists in 
Britain today. Indeed, many of the people I have spoken to during my fieldwork 
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have, while in one sentence bemoaning the lack of 'proper funeral ritual,' as some 
would put it, in the next asserted their belief that what 'matters is how you feel,' 
not that 'you go through the rituals correctly'. There does seem to be in England 
a deep-seated distrust - a distrust that may to some extent be traced to the 
Reformation - of ritual and of the public display of powerful emotions. I could 
relate a number of stories from my fieldwork in support of this claim but let me 
only say that once I was sitting in a small room with ten young people. We could 
see across the road and into the house opposite where a young woman was 
crying, seemingly in some distress. I asked my companions - and I wonder now 
what that reaction says about me - if they thought that her distress, her emotion, 
was genuine. Yes they replied all and one. I asked them then what they would 
have said if the same woman had been stood in the street crying her eyes out like 
that. 'Genuine?' they asked, 'no'. Crying like that in the street they said she 
would have been 'putting it on' at least some of it. 
The historical trajectory has certainly not been uniform, there has not been a 
steady decline in ritual from the Reformation to the present day. The Victorian 
celebrations of death are now, of course, as legendary as they were elaborate (see 
Morley 1971; Cannadine 1981; Gorer 1965; Litten 1991). It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to trace that history but it is relevant to state that now the funeral 
service itself is usually short, twenty minutes if you are Anglo-Saxon the 
crematoria superintendent told me. Barley (1989: 111-15) suggests that the 
service is not coherent in its message, while Jon Davies (1994:33) argues that the 
current Church of England funeral liturgies seem to have lost their way as 
celebrations of death. The Order, he continues, has moments of considerable 
callousness, it provides for no follow up at specific times and it contains no formal 
post-funeral system of mourning. Davies (1994:30) adds that its central concern 
is to communicate and insist upon the 'deadness of the dead' (see Barley 
1989:116). 
At the same time religious ideas about the fate of our souls seem to have suffered 
an erosion of authority. In his sermon on the care of dying Luther advised 
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strongly against the peddling in the fear of death and the fate of the soul that had 
been the hallmark of earlier practice (Daniell 1997). He advocated instead 
pastoral care for the survivors and that the minister take this last opportunity to 
speak of the Gospels with the dying man (Jorg Mosig, personal communication; 
see Daniell 1997). More fundamental though, in the British context, may have 
been the death of purgatory in the decades following the Reformation. Ralph 
Houlbrooke (1989:36) has commented that the 'emotional consequences of the 
abolition of purgatory and curtailment of prayers for the dead constituted one of 
the great unchartable revolutions of English history.' He adds that the 
disappearance of purgatory could have made the prospect of suffering in the next 
world more remote and improbable, the idea of punishment in the hereafter less 
widely credible. People may have been ready to entertain the possibility that they 
and their loved ones would suffer for some limited time before entering Paradise, 
but few people would have believed themselves, or theirs, so bad as to deserve 
eternal damnation in hell (Houlbrooke 1989:36,41; see Davies 1994). 
The death of purgatory and the demise of hell spell certain, quite fundamental, 
changes in the nature of death. No longer signalling the moment when our lives 
are added up to be judged and our fate for all eternity determined, death certainly 
loses a lot of its earlier gravity. Walter (1994: 15) observes that 'without hell, 
death lost any spiritual risk, and became a medical and psychological affair.' 
Writing of the un-Reformed continent where purgatory and hell were still very 
much alive Aries (1981) contends that the shift from 'my death' to 'thy death' 
constituted a similar slip in concern from one for the fate of their own souls to 
worries about how they would manage when their loved ones died. 'Thy death 
came to be feared as much as my death, bereavement as much as my own demise' 
(Walter 1994: 15). The question became increasingly, especially during the 
Victorian age: how will I cope with the death of my loved ones. 'One person is 
absent, and the whole world is empty' (Aries 1981:472; quoted in Walter 
1994:15). 
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The point here is, frrstly, to emphasise, as did Aries and Prior, that changes in 
death are not a naturally happening historical trajectory but fuelled by all sorts of 
political concerns and struggles. Secondly I want to emphasis too how grief was 
separated from the relationships with the deceased and concerns for the fate of his 
or her soul. In this way grief was to emerge as an emotional or psychological state 
attributable to the individual human being. Here then, it awaits for me to attempt 
to establish how grief was to appear as a legitimate field of study and intervention. 
A genealogy of grief 
The systelnatic psychological study of grief is usually said to begin with Sigmund 
Freud's (1917) paper 'Mourning and melancholia' 5. Observing frrst that both 
mourning and melancholia are caused by the loss of a loved object (Parkes and 
Weiss 1983: 10) Freud was concerned with establishing the similarities and the 
differences between grief and clinical depression. He pointed out that mourning 
was characterised by painful dejection, a loss of interest and inhibitions to 
activities. Melancholia, on the other hand, is characterised by feelings of guilt, 
self-reproach and a lack of self-esteem (Stroebe and Stroebe 1987:23). In asking 
how these two are brought about Freud uses mourning to refer to the process by 
which libido, or sexual energy, is withdrawn from an object of love after, for 
example, the death of the loved one. Yet as nobody would, according to Freud, 
willingly relinquish a 'libido position' and abandon and let go of the loved object 
this may lead the mourning person to cling onto the object of love in an 
'hallucinatory wish psychosis'. That state will last, Freud continues, until the 
memories that bound the libido to the loved object have been 'brought up' and 
'hypercathected'. Then and only then is the 'ego once again free and uninhibited' 
(Parkes and Weiss 1983:2). 
This will usually happen successfully but when it doesn't melancholia will set it. 
Freud attributes melancholia to ego's ambivalence towards the lost person 
5 The German word Freud uses for mourning is Trauer which refers to both the experience and 
expression of grief. Melancholia seems to him to be synomous with depression (Stroebe and 
Stroebe 1987:8). 
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(Stroebe and Stroebe 1987:23), an ambivalence that it may be possible to manage 
while both parties to the relationship are alive but which the ego will tum on 
himself when the loved (or hated) object is lost (Vitebsky 1993). He points out 
that the words melancholic patients will use against themselves are words that 
always fit the love object more than the patient himself. Melancholia results from 
the 'withdrawal of libido from the object onto the ego, and the identification of 
the ego with the object'. Identifying with the loved object the ego can retain its 
connections with it despite, or even because of, all the ambivalence in the 
relationship. 'The patient can punish the love object through the illness without 
openly expressing hostility' (Parkes and Weiss 1983:10). 
Freud himself was quick to point out that his speculations were based on scant 
empiricallnaterial (Parkes and Weiss 1983: 10). The first systematic, empirical 
study of grief was carried out by Erich Lindemann and published in his article of 
1944 'Sytnptomatology and Management of Acute Grief. It has often (for 
example Stroebe and Stroebe 1987:8) been pointed out that grief can manifest 
itself in many, varied and often opposite ways. Lindemann's aim was to show 
that there exists a uniformity in the experiences that bereaved people undergo, an 
aim that lead Lindemann to describe grief as a 'definite syndrome with 
psychological and somatic symptomatology' (Lindemann 1944; quoted in Stroebe 
and Stroebe 1987:8). Lindemann's principal aim was, then, to describe the grief 
syndrome, to outline its normal course, and to try to make health professionals 
aware of the things they could do to help the bereaved to cope with their loss and 
resolve their grief. Lindemann is credited with identifying most of the 
characteristics of grief usually observed with those who have been recently 
bereaved (Stroebe and Stroebe 1987:9). The most striking of these are: 
somatic distress, (experienced as waves of discomfort including sighing 
respiration, lack of strength, and digestive symptoms), preoccupation with the 
image of the deceased, guilt feelings (self-accusations of negligence, exaggeration 
of small omissions), hostile reactions to others, and loss of patterns of activity 
(e.g., overtalkativeness, restl~sness, lack of zest, problems in social interaction), 
(Stroebe and Stroebe 1987:9). 
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Later researchers (for example Bowlby 1981; Click, Weiss and Parkes 1974; 
Gorer 1965; Parkes 1965; Worden 1991 [1982]) have largely 'confIrmed 
Lindemann's extrapolation of these factors as distinctive of grief and added a 
host of other symptoms (Stroebe and Stroebe 1987:9). Writers on grief now 
commonly offer lists and tables of those symptoms bereaved people may expect to 
experience and their carers may expect to have to deal with. Examples of these 
are given below. 
Lindemann was followed by a number of scholars like John Bowlby (1981), who 
linked experience of loss with the severing of attachment bonds, and, maybe most 
importantly Colin Murray Parkes (1965; 1986 [1972]). Parkes, building upon 
Bowlby's (1981) 'attachment theory' and focusing largely upon the loss of a 
partner, viewed grief as a transition from one state of being and one identity to 
another (1986[1972]:12). Parkes (1986[1972]:202), focusing on relating 
particular symptoms of grief with the overall, general course of grief, identifies 
seven features as the 'major aspects of many bereavement reactions'. These are: 
1. A process of realization, i.e., the way in which the bereaved moves from denial 
or avoidance of recognition of the loss towards acceptance. 
2. An alarm reaction - anxiety, restlessness, and the physiological 
accompaniments of fear. 
3. An urge to search for and to find the lost person in some form. 
4. Anger and guilt, including outbursts directed against those who press the 
bereaved person towards premature acceptance of the loss. 
5. Feelings of intemalloss of self or mutilation. 
6. Identification phenomena - the adoption of traits, mannerisms, or symptoms of 
the lost person, with or without a sense of that person's presence within the 
self. 
7. Pathological variants of grief, i.e., the reaction may be excessive and prolonged 
or inhibited and inclined to emerge in distorted form. 
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Implicit in Parkes account is a definite plot, a picture of grief as going through 
particular phases. Realising the loss the bereaved person becomes alarmed, 
searches for the lost person and upon not fmding her develops emotions of anger 
and guilt and so on. 
Researchers (for example Parkes 1965; Bowlby 1981) have pointed out that 
shock and disbelief are most typically found with the recently bereaved while 
depression may extend over a much longer period and abate only slowly over a 
period of months and sometimes years (Stroebe and Stroebe 1987:9). While 
acknowledging that there are wide individual variations in grief many researchers 
talk about phases or stages of grief for, as Stroebe and Stroebe (1987:9, 12-13) 
point out it is extremely helpful for the purpose of diagnosing pathological grief to 
view grief as running a phasic course, for it is otherwise difficult to determine 
whether a bereaved person is suffering from delayed, or absent, grief.' The 
number and nature of phases or stages of grief vary from researcher to researcher 
but Stroebe and Stroebe (1987: 13-16) identify the following which are fairly 
typical for the literature (see also Parkes 1965 and 1986[1972]; Worden 
1991[1982]): 
1. Numbness. The initial response to death is likely to one of shock, numbness and 
disbelief This will, often gradually, give way to 
2. Yearning and protest, a period of strong emotions and psychological distress as 
the awareness of the loss increases. Intense yearning for the lost person is 
accompanied with deep pining and an irresistible urge to search for her or him. 
Emotions of anger - directed inwards, to the deceased or anyone who might in 
some way be held responsible for the death - self-reproach and guilt are 
common too. Yearning then gives way to 
3. Despair as 'searching for the lost person is abandoned and the permanence and 
irrevocability of loss is recognized' (Stroebe and Stroebe 1987:14). Depression 
and apathy are common at this stage with doubts over the meaning and 
purpose of everything. Despair will, finally, in most cases be followed by 
4. Recovery and restitution when depression and hopelessness begin to give way 
to more positive feelings. 'The bereaved person starts to accept the changes in 
81 
The Final Taboo? 
him- or herself [ and come] to terms with the new identity, as widow( er). It 
implies the relinquishing of all hope that the lost spouse can be recovered [and] 
independence and initiative return '" attempts on the part of the bereaved to 
stand on their own feet and reject support should be regarded as part of the 
recovery process' (Stroebe and Stroebe 1987:15). 
It is nnportant to point out that the desire to describe the course of grief is not 
simply born of a scholarly interest. The aim is to understand through the 
description of 'normal' grief the characteristics of 'abnormal' grief (ibid.; Bowlby 
1986[1972]:7). Stroebe and Stroebe (1987:17) remark that 'morbid' or 
'patholo gical' grief are used 'to refer to grief reactions which show a marked 
deviation from the normal pattern and are associated with maladjustment and 
psychiatric problems.' There is a number of different terms in operation here used 
to designate the different kinds of 'abnormal', 'pathological', 'morbid' or 
'unusual' grief. 'Delayed grief refers, according to Stroebe and Stroebe 
(1987:19), to cases when normal or chronic grief occurs after a long delay 'during 
which the expression of grief is inhibited.' Parkes and Weiss (1983: 14) refer to 
'chronic grief, the indefInite prolongation of grief, as a 'morbid illness in which 
anxiety, tension, restlessness, and insomnia predominate, and self-reproachful 
ideas and angry outbursts are common.' 'Inhibited grief is characterised by the 
absence of those symptoms commonly associated with grief (Stroebe and Stroebe 
1987:19-20). 
Following Freud's early lead researchers have attempted to identify the factors 
that may contribute to the development of any form of 'abnormal' grief. Parkes 
and Weiss (1983) have distinguished between three different patterns or 
syndromes that may be involved here. Unexpected-grief syndrome (1983:92-6) 
describes losses that are both unexpected and untimely. It's characteristics are 'a 
reaction that includes difficulty in believing in the full reality of the loss, avoidance 
of confrontation with the loss, and feelings of self-reproach and despair' 
(1983:93). Ambivalent-grief syndrome follows from an ambivalent relationship 
that is often characterised by disagreements. The initial reaction to such a loss. 
according to Parkes and Weiss, is often relief without any need to grieve. That 
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state gives way though to experiences of pining and despair often with feelings of 
self-reproach (see Stroebe and Stroebe 1987:21). Chronic-grief syndrome 
follows, according to Parkes and Weiss, the end of a highly dependent 
relationship. Grief starts as soon as the relationship is over and lasts for an 
abnonnally long time. Helplessness is the main characteristic of this syndrome. 
Lyn Franchino (1989:42) lists the following factors as leading to unresolved grief: 
I.Past history: depressive illness; previous prolonged grief; childhood loss, lack of 
attachment. 
2. Nature of loss: multiple loss; socially unacceptable or unrecognised; lack of a 
body; horrifying or mismanaged death; either the deceased or the bereaved had 
a hand in the death. 
3. Personality of the bereaved: fear of appearing weak or out of control; 
reluctance to face negative feelings about the deceased; unwilling to relinquish 
the bond with the deceased; a need to take care of others; inability to face the 
loss. 
4. Relationship with the deceased: highly dependent; ambivalent; unfinished 
business. 
5. Social and family attitudes: towards the loss and grief; religious beliefs; family 
myths or secrets; unrecognised loss. 
6. Social circumstances: financial difficulties; lack of attachments or support; 
drug or alcohol abuse; responsibility for children; position in the family. 
7. Secondary gains: grief is used to control, punish or gain attention. 
Franchino (1989:42) adds the following signs of an unresolved grief: continuing 
denial that death has occurred; overactivity with no apparent sense of loss; 
inability to part with possessions of the deceased; a need to have surroundings 
remain unchanged. 
If one of the aims of describing 'normal' grief is to help understand 'abnormal' 
grief, another one is to provide a foundation upon which therapeutic intervention 
can be built (see Bowlby 1983[1972]:7-8; Parkes 1983[1972]). It is important to 
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point out that most of the important contributors to the understanding of grief are 
themselves involved in therapeutic grief work with extensive links to institutions 
involved in the care of the dying and the bereaved. Parkes had links with the 
Bethlem Royal and Maudsley Hospitals, the Tavistock Institute and Clinic, the 
Laboratory of Community Psychiatry of Harvard Medical School, and St 
Christopher's Hospice (Parkes 1983[1972]:9). He was later to work for Cruse -
Bereavement Care and is indeed Cruse's current president. Parkes had, in 
addition, grants from the Mental Health Research Fund, the Department of Health 
and Social Security, the US National Institute of Mental Health and the Tavistock 
Institute of Human Relations. 
So what should this intervention look like? William Worden (1991[1982]:35) 
defmes grief counselling as 'helping people facilitate uncomplicated, or normal, 
grief to a healthy completion of the tasks of grieving within a reasonable time 
frame' and grief therapy as 'those specialized techniques ... which are used to help 
people with abnormal or complicated grief reactions.' But what would those 
tasks and those techniques be? Freud asserted that until the memories that bound 
the libido to the loved object have been 'brought up' and 'hypercathected'. Then 
and only then is the 'ego once again free and uninhibited' (Parkes and Weiss 
1983:2). Lindemann (1979:234) described the 'grief work' as having to do with: 
the effort of reliving and working through in small quantities events which 
involved the now-deceased person and the survivor: the things one did together, 
the roles one had vis-a-vis each other ... Each item of this shared role has to be 
thought through, pained through, if you want, and gradually the question is 
raised, How can I do that with somebody else? And gradually the collection of 
activities which were put together in this unit with the person who has died can 
be torn asunder to be put to other people. 
Worden (1991[1982]) himself talks about the four tasks of grieving. The frrst of 
these is to accept the reality of the loss, the second to experience the pain of grief, 
the third to adjust to an environment without the deceased, and the fourth to 
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withdraw emotional energy from the dead person and investing it in another 
relationship. 
In writing a genealogy of grief one could, and maybe should, start by pointing out 
how and when certain characteristics enter, historically, the definition of grief, 
how the defmition changes and what aspects are left out (see Prior 1997). That 
resides just outside my reach here. What I want to emphasise fIrst is the 
insistence upon the uniformity of grief as 'a defmite syndrome with psychological 
and somatic symptomatology' in the words of Lindemann (1944). Parkes 
(1986[1972]:27) in identifying the stages of grief as numbness, pining and 
disorganisation, admits that each stage has its own characteristics and that there 
are considerable differences from one person to the next 'as regards both the 
duration and the form of each stage.' Still, he insists, 'there is a common pattern 
whose features can be observed without difficulty in nearly every case, and this 
justifies our regarding grief as a distinct psychological process.' (emphasis -aa.). 
This emphasis upon grief as a unified category justifies of course too the 
description of it and the intervention into it (see Prior 1997). Hence we have the 
description of grief in terms of symptoms that then allow for the identification of 
the condition that the symptoms stem from and for the intervention on the basis of 
those s)'lnptoms. Herein lies my second point, the energy expended in defming 
and refming the symptoms and causes of grief. The definitions and refmement do 
always operate upon the domain as already established and the task of describing 
grief in its individual variety becomes inexhaustible (see Foucault 1973[1963]). 
For grief here is described primarily as being a mental state attributable to the 
individual within whom the experiences of grief reside. Hence the goal of 
intervention from Freud to Worden is to free the ego of its ties with the deceased 
and allowing it to reinvest its emotions in another relationship. The supposition is 
that ego can, in actual fact, be free, and in particular free from the deceased. That 
relationship, the relationship with the dead, is over upon death and any claims by 
the bereaved to the contrary are treated as memories and, even, hallucinations on 
part of the bereaved. 
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In the next chapters I shall go on to illustrate how these goals are constructed and 
achieved :in bereavement counsell:ing practice. Later I shall go on and argue that 
these goals do not necessarily square with how the bereaved experience grief, for 
some of whom the relationship with the deceased cont:inues after death if in an 
altered form. Allow me here to emphasise how the construction of grief, and the 
intervention into it, feeds on the death as taboo thesis. For by depicting death as a 
taboo, and a taboo to boot that causes a lot of grief, the road is paved for the 
bringing in of experts who can deal with the emotions that society allegedly does 
not want to deal with and places outside its reach. In the following chapter I 
discuss specifically how Cruse uses the taboo thesis to legitimate its work. I shall 
go on to show in the next three chapters that while Cruse is client-centred in its 
work and open to the possibility that grief may take various different forms, that 
variety is mapped upon grief as an already established domain of experience and 
:intervention. In contrast to Walter (1994), I argue then that what he terms the 
post-modern revival of death is not free from the influence of experts. That even 
if Cruse is client-centred in its work it fosters a sense of its practitioners as having 
a knowledge and expertise beyond that of ordinary members of society. 
I can close the circle now by point:ing out the state and the statisticians that 
developed such interest :in mortality statistics have now acquired similar tastes for 
grief. Grief and its successful resolution is now 'recognised' as a part of the 
'health of the nation'. The web site of the Department of Health provides 
extensive :information and links with bereavement counselling organisations of 
various descriptions throughout the country, including Cruse. Furthermore, the 
government and its agencies and national businesses grant Cruse a figure of 
roughly £1,000,000 in a yearly grant. 
86 
Part II 
The Kindness of Strangers 
87 
The Creation of Cruse 
Chapter 3 
The Creation of Cruse, the Making of the Bereaved, 
the Making of the Counsellor 
Cruse Bereavement Care - X branch: 
• aims to give a service of the highest standard of counselling, information and 
social support to anyone who has been bereaved by death. 
• aims to offer training, support, information, and publications to those 
working to care for bereaved people. 
• aims to increase public awareness of the needs of bereaved people through 
education and information services. 
• is an organisation using trained volunteers supported by specialists in the 
fields of social work, welfare, and mental health. 
(Mission statement of a North Eastern local branch of Cruse 
Bereavement Care 1995) 
Cruse is a national, voluntary, bereavement care organisation that offers, as Cruse 
Headquarters put it in a publicity brochure, 'a comprehensive service of 
counselling by trained and selected people, advice on practical matters and 
opportunities for social support'. The headquarters, Cruse House, are an 
umbrella under which roughly 190 local Cruse branches all over Britain work. 
Local branches have autonomy in the running of their affairs but the policies and 
standards of work are issued by Cruse House in accordance with the decisions of 
the Annual General Meeting and of the Council of Cruse. These policies local 
branches have to follow or risk being closed down by the headquarters. In order 
to maintain their membership of Cruse local branches have to pay revenue to the 
headquarters. Bereavement counselling is arguably the most important aspect of 
Cruse's work, it is at least the most valued aspect of Cruse's work within those 
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two local branches I am acquainted with. In the last few years Cruse has been 
'standardising' its counselling practices and bringing them up to the levels that the 
British Association of Counselling demands if an activity is to be called 
counselling. Members of Cruse refer to this process as 'professionalisation'. 
In this chapter I seek to trace the trajectory by which the work of local Cruse 
branches has taken on the flavour and texture it now has. I relate briefly the 
origin and story of Cruse, its organisation on both national and local levels, how 
its aims and objectives are defmed and communicated to people outside the 
organisation, and how it reaches out to new members. I describe briefly the 
conception of grief that informs the work of Cruse. I describe the outline and 
basic organisation of the two training courses with Cruse that I have attended and 
the people that took part in them with me. I describe how we, the newcomers, 
were introduced to the work of Cruse, our 'initiation' into the organisation. From 
these descriptions I move on to the way in which Cruse legitimises and justifies its 
work. Glancing back towards last chapter I describe how during introductory 
evenings the 'death as taboo' thesis is used for this purpose and how that thesis is 
tied in with an account of the history of Cruse that seeks to portray Cruse as 
answering the needs of the bereaved that the alleged taboo on death produces. 
Looking forward to the following two chapters, I relate how the 'death as taboo' 
thesis is resisted by certain members of Cruse, who seek to portray their work as 
more productive and universal than as meeting needs created by a particular 
taboo. 
First though I must say something about counselling. 
Counselling: the 'talking cure' 
Counselling, according to a publicity brochure from the British Association for 
Counselling, aims 'to provide an opportunity for a client to work towards living in 
a more satisfying and resourceful way' (see McLeod 1993: 1 for a similar 
formulation). It is 'voluntarily and deliberately undertaken by counsellor and 
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client', the brochure continues, and 'is different from other forms of helping.' 
Counselling is usually based upon a contract between the counsellor and the client 
and before it starts 'the counsellor clarifies with the client the basis on which 
counselling is to be given, including method, duration, fees and confidentiality; 
changes can subsequently be made only with the agreement of the client.' In 
counselling, too, 'the right of the client to make his or her own decisions is 
respected.' 
In a similar leaflet from a counselling service prospective clients are informed that: 
counselling provides you with an opportunity to explore how you can live in a 
more satisfying way. More specifically, you may feel the need to work out 
what to do about difficulties you are currently facing, or sort through 
distresSing feelings - such as grief, anger, anxiety or embarrassment - which 
may have been bottled up and are causing a lot of pain, or to deal with a 
general sense of dissatisfaction with life, perhaps characterised by feelings of 
purposelessness, frustration or despair. Counselling is about exploring any of 
these various aspects of your life and your thoughts and feelings concerned 
with them. Reflecting upon your experience in a secure environment - quite 
apart from friends and family - allows you the opportunity to understand more 
deeply what is concerning you and to work towards resolving your difficulties 
so you find relief from troublesome or distressing feelings. 
Ray Woolfe, Windy Dryden and David Charles-Edwards (1989:8) distinguish 
between counselling and psychotherapy on the following grounds: therapy aims at 
personality changes but counselling is an attempt to help the client to utilise his 
own resources; therapy is for people who are fundamentally disturbed but 
counselling is for people who are healthy but facing temporary life problems; 
therapists are occupied by the internal world of the client, the counsellor with 
helping the client resolving external issues which are producing problems. 
Nicholas Tyndall (1993: 10-12) observes that we can think of counselling either as 
a relationship or as an activity. If we think of counselling as a relationship what 
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we see is something resembling the formal version of neighbours' chat. On this 
view counselling is a normal caring human response and the counsellor's main 
resources are her qualities of warmth, perception and intuition, and her ability to 
be deeply involved with a client and yet somewhat detached from him. What the 
client, in this view, needs is 'a positive attachment to someone else, a secure base 
from where to explore other possibilities of being' (Tyndall 1993:12). If we think 
of counselling as an activity, and focus upon what counsellors do, it tends to 
appear lTIOre specialised. Counselling can then be described in terms of the 
personal skills and relational tools that counsellors master in their training and 
habitually employ as part of their job. John McLeod (1993:2) observes, in a 
similar fashion, that we can understand counselling as involving either action, or 
exploration and understanding. On this basis we can describe the aims of 
counselling as: taking control over feelings and actions, problem-solving, 
psycholo gical education, acquisition of social skills, cognitive change, behaviour 
change, systemic change, empowerment, restitution, insight, self-awareness, 
becoming aware of thoughts and feelings, self-acceptance, individuation, 
enlightenment (McLeod 1993:6). Most of these are aims that, as I will later 
show, Cruse aspires, to in its work. 
While you can fmd a bewilderingly wide variety of different approaches to 
counselling, a variety to some extent, no doubt, fuelled by the need to market a 
distinctive product (see McLeod 1993:4), it is generally recognised that we can 
talk of three core counselling theories: psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioural, and 
humanistic (McLeod 1993:4; Woolfe, Dryden and Charles-Edwards 1989:7). 
Psychodynamic approaches arise from the work of Sigmund Freud and his 
followers (Woolfe, Dryden and Charles-Edwards 1989:7-9). The main 
characteristics of psychodynamic approaches are: the assumption that the client's 
pro blems will stem from experiences and unresolved tensions rooted in childhood; 
that the client will not be consciously aware of the true nature of his problems and 
the motivations behind his actions; and the use in therapeutic sessions of such 
techniques as dream analysis, interpretation and transference. The aim of these 
techniques is to help the client to achieve insight into the true nature of his 
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problems and his actions. This insight is not simply an intellectual exercise though 
for understanding is thought to bring about the release of emotional tension 
associated with repressed memories in a movement that Freud referred to as 
'catharsis' (McLeod 1993:23, 26). 
The cognitive-behavioural approaches in counselling have their origin in the more 
applied branches of mainstream academic psychology (Woolfe, Dryden and 
Charles-Edwards 1989:7). The main features of the cognitive-behavioural 
approaches are: an emphasis upon viewing the client's distress as stemming from 
solvable problems; an emphasis on changing the behaviour of clients; a close 
attention to the cognitive processes through which people control their behaviour; 
and a respect for scientific methods and values (McLeod 1993:45). 
Humanistic approaches in counselling have been developed by the fusion of the 
1950's and 1960's humanistic movement in psychology and of the Californian 
personal growth movement. A key figure here is the American psycholo gist Carl 
Rogers who can largely be credited with enshrining the meaning of the word 
'counselling' as we now know it (Tyndall 1993:6). Rogers's 'non-directive', that 
later became 'client-centred' and now 'person-centred', approach to counselling is 
arguably the most encompassing of all humanistic therapies. Indeed it can be 
argued that Rogers's construction of the therapeutic relationship and of the ethics 
of counselling are the basis of all counselling today (see Bond 1998). 
Cruse follows a largely Rogerian approach to counselling. Person-centred 
counselling emphasises the centrality of, what it takes to be, the human capacity 
for creativity, growth and choice and it sees the person as striving to fulfil two 
basic needs: the need for self-actualisation and the need to be loved by others 
(McLeod 1993:62, 67; Mearns and Thorne 1988:6-7). In order to understand this 
process, person-centred counselling works with a number of core concepts. By 
'self-concept', first then, person-centred counselling refers to those areas of our 
experience of which we could say 'I am'. It contends that there will normally be 
'congruence' between our words, actions and feelings. Where there is a 
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disjunction between feelings and the capacity for awareness of them, a state of 
'incongruence' is said to exist (McLeod 1993:67). 'The organismic self are 
those essential resources that we have as human beings. Person-centred 
counselling maintains that the individual can rely upon these resources to provide 
him with trustworthy messages about how to think, feel and act, and that if left to 
itself the organismic self knows what it needs (Mearns and Thorne 1988:6-7). 
Unfortunately, because we need the love of others they set some of the 
'conditions of worth' by which we are accepted (McLeod 1993:68; Mearns and 
Thorne 1988:8). Here a conflict can arise about what should be the 'locus of 
evaluation'. Individuals can be guided by external sets of attitudes, by other 
people's values or they can listen to their own 'internal feelings', the 'organismic 
valuing process' (McLeod 1993:68). Disturbance occurs when the self-concept 
of the individual is in conflict with his organismic self, when he is, in effect, 
striving to be someone he is not (Mearns and Thorne 1988:11; McLeod 1993:68). 
The person-centred counsellor believes that 'each individual has the potential to 
become a unique and beautiful creation' (Mearns and Thorne 1988: 13), a 'fully 
functioning individual', as Ro gers called it, who is able to experience all his 
feelings, is not afraid of any of those feelings, is the sifter of his own 'evidence' 
but open to 'evidence' from others, completely engaged in the process of being 
and becoming himself and lives completely in this moment. The fully functioning 
individual is congruent, able to use feelings to guide actions and is autonomous 
rather than dependent (McLeod 1993:69). When the individual is not fully 
functioning and seeks counselling it is the responsibility of the counsellor to create 
'conditions for growth' (Mearns and Thorne 1988: 14). There are three primary 
conditions for growth in person-centred counselling. The fIrst of these is 
'congruence'. The person-centred counsellor should strive to be congruent, to be 
herself, in sessions for this conveys the message to the client that it is desirable to 
be oneself (Mearns and Thorne 1988:14). The counsellor should, secondly, treat 
the client with 'unconditional positive regard', value him for who he is and can 
become. This will allow the client to feel more safe to change. Thirdly the 
counsellor aims to achieve 'empathy' with the client that allows him to track and 
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sense accurately the feelings and personal meanings of the client. The counsellor, 
that is, aims to see 'the world like the client sees it' (Mearns and Thorne 
1988: 15), to enter the client's 'internal frame of reference' (McLeod 1993:70) 
and to communicate this understanding to the client. The therapeutic relationship 
is at the heart of person-centred counselling (McLeod 1993:70). A healthy 
therapeutic relationship is seen to involve a counsellor that is open about her 
purposes and responsible to the client but not for him. The counsellor will not 
manipulate the client but is willing to be manipulated by him. She does not 
profess to know what is good for the client and is not concerned about success. 
The counsellor is clear about what she is willing to offer the client at every stage. 
She is committed to the client and willing to fight for and invest in the relationship 
without becoming attached to the client or make the client attached to her. The 
counsellor desires the client's freedom to be himself (Mearns and Thorne 
1988:34; see McLeod 1993:70). 
Person-centred counsellors describe therapeutic change as a greater openness to 
experience. McLeod (1993 :73-4) talks of seven stages here which he describes 
like this: In the beginning the client will be rigid in thinking and feeling, he will be 
impersonal and detached and be reluctant to use first person pronouns. He will 
talk about 'external events', 'feelings and personal meanings are not "owned'" 
(McLeod 1993:73). Gradually, the client will start to express himself more freely 
about non-self topics. Peelings will be described but not owned. The client will 
intellectualise his feelings and describe his behaviour rather than his feelings. 
Approaching the third stage the client will start describing personal reactions to 
external events. He will describe himself to some extent, talk about past feelings 
and begin to recognise the contradictions in his past experience. Then the client 
will start describing feelings and personal experiences and begin to experience 
current feelings. Inner life will be described but not purposefully explored. 
Arriving at the futh stage the client will start expressing present feelings. He will 
'own' his feelings and show more accuracy in differentiating between different 
feelings and meanings. He is ready to explore intentionally his problems in a 
personal way, based upon the processing of feelings rather than reasoning. After 
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that the client will develop a sense of an 'inner referent' with a life of its own. 
The open expression of feelings is accompanied with a physiological loosening. 
The client speaks in the present tense or offers a vivid description of the past. 
Finally the client will be able to experience his feelings with immediacy and 
richness. He will be able to speak fluently about his feelings in the present tense. 
To achieve these aims person-centred counsellors will employ techniques intended 
to focus the client's experience. McLeod (1993:75-6) breaks these techniques 
down into the following components. First the counsellor and the client take an 
inventory of what is going on inside the client. They locate the client's felt sense 
of the problem and fmd a word or an image that fits that sense. That should 
instigate a felt shift in the problem, a subtle movement or a 'flood of physical 
relief. The client then has to accept what has emerged and fmally stop and go 
through the process again. 
In 1993 the Department of Employment estimated that there were about 2.5 
million people in the UK who use counselling, in the widest sense of the word, as 
a major part of their jobs (Bond 1998:23). In 1992 it was estimated that some 
290,000 people dispense services as voluntary counsellors and that over 8,000 
people gain a living from counselling (Julie Janes Associates 1992; reference from 
Bond 1998:23). 'The numbers of people involved and volume of economic 
activity suggests', Bond (1998:23-4) observes, that counselling is 'sometimes 
quite appropriately referred to as an industry.' The British Association for 
Counselling has over 13,500 individual members and over 800 organisational 
members. The Association is dedicated to the advancement of counselling and it 
has, increasingly so in recent years, been responsible for setting up codes of ethics 
and practice in counselling. BAC has established a complaints procedure to 
protect the rights of clients. BAC has been instrumental in government initiatives 
to define competencies in counselling. A range of accreditation and recognition 
schemes have been developed and codes and guidelines on counselling, 
supervision, training and the use of counselling skills written down. A national 
register of counsellors has been launched (Bond 1998:24). 
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Membership of BAC is voluntary and its codes and guidelines only apply to 
members. During the 1990s measures have gradually been implemented to make 
the title 'counselling' statutory so that anyone or any organisation who wants call 
himself or his work 'counselling' now has to abide by BAC codes. This 
represents a step in the movement towards greater 'professionalisation' in 
counselling. When counselling came to Britain it was largely through voluntary 
organisations like Relate and Cruse (Tyndall 1993:6). The difference between 
voluntary and professional work is important in counselling and it is in Cruse too 
as the history of the organisation, to which I now turn, reveals. 
A history of Cruse 
Cruse began in an unusual way. Like most people, I knew little of widows and 
their children [ ... ] In 1958 I was recovering from serious illness. I had also 
taken up meditation - today a fashionable technique of enlightenment, but in 
those days somewhat original. I worked fIrst under the Maharishi and later 
with John Bennett, author of The Dramatic Universe and many other books, 
and who brought to Britain a meditation technique started in Indonesia. One 
day I joined our group disturbed by the words of Kurt Hahn, the well-known 
educationalist, who had left Nazi Germany to re-start his work in France. 
Later he founded Gordonstoun, the now-famous Scottish school. He was 
lecturing on the radio when I heard him. 'Compassion in Europe is dead.' His 
words deeply shocked me. As a Quaker, a pacifIst and erstwhile social worker 
I was involved in so much. I knew we were emotionally dried-up by war, 
battered by every kind of shock, not least the horror of the holocaust and 
Hiroshima. War has its price. What then had I to do about it? If compassion 
was dead how could it live again? Suddenly I heard the words - 'Do something 
for widows'. I was astonished. 
Margaret Torrie My Years with Cruse (1987: 1-2). 
So, Margaret Torrie, the founder of Cruse, describes the ongm of her 
organisation. After receiving her 'call' (Torrie 1987: 10; see above) Torrie 
advertised in her local' papers and invited widows to come and meet her in the 
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Citizens' Advice Bureau, Richmond, Surrey, where Torrie was working as a 
volunteer. To this frrst meeting the widows brought with them stories of 
inconsolable and uncontrollable children, pensions, jobs, exploitation, poverty, 
housing, landlords, repairs, loneliness and lack of support. The meetings became 
regular and Torrie arranged for friends of hers to come along and provide the 
widows with help in the matters they had raised at the frrst meeting. Torrie 
herself offered her own house as temporary offices, she used her own training as a 
secretary to keep that office running and her experience as a social worker to 
organise group work with the widows. A 'Panel of Experts' was established 
consisting of Torrie's friends to ensure that the advice given would be as sound as 
possible in all those areas that the widows had mentioned. The 'experts' would 
attend the weekly meetings and counsel the widows on 'pension matters, housing 
and house maintenance, insurance, mortgaging, child management, budgeting, 
work difficulties, discipline' (Torrie 1987:4). 
The press caught wind of Torrie's work and a result of the publicity was that 
letters 'from all over the country flooded in to our home' (Torrie 1987:5). 
Margaret Torrie launched a newsletter with practical support for widows and 
steps were taken to form a national organisation. At a meeting in 1959 it was 
decided that Cruse should establish itself as a registered company and a charity. 
Amongst the aims and objectives set at this point were: 
1. The relief of poverty, suffering and distress among widows and their 
dependants. 
2. To undertake research into the special problems of widowhood and into 
methods of alleviating the suffering therefrom and to publish the results of such 
research. 
3. Providing facilities for recreation and leisure time occupations for widows. 
4. To collect and publish information about the social services and other matters 
that are of benefit and assistance to widows. 
5. To establish a panel of counsellors to visit widows and advising and aSSisting 
them. 
6. To compile a register of work available for widows. 
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7. To alleviate the isolation and loneliness of widows by assisting in forming 
Cruse clubs and local groups of widows around the country. 
8. To assist in providing holidays for widows who could not afford them. 
(Torrie 1987: 11-12). 
Following these developments the frrst annual meeting of Cruse's directors was 
held. Central concerns at the meeting were measures to guarantee the fmancial 
well-being of the fledgling organisation - a problem that has proved perennial _ 
steps toward establishing more permanent headquarters for Cruse, and the hiring 
of office help to deal with the growing volume of correspondence. An emphasis 
was placed upon establishing an All-Party Parliamentary group to lobby on behalf 
of the organisation and its charges, the widows of Britain. (Torrie 1987: 12-13). 
In the following years questionnaires were sent out to widows, reports were 
assembled and sent to members of Parliament in an effort to have laws that were 
unfavourable to widows changed. Local Cruse branches were set up and 
strengthened. Slowly the fmancial situation of Cruse improved. In 1974 the 
Government allocated Cruse a three year grant of £23.000 a year, intended to 
cover the administrative costs of the organisation over that period and to cover 
the salaries and expenses of a national organiser. Cruse selected Derek Nuttall for 
the job of national organiser. He had been a pastor of the Church of God in 
Aberfan, the Welsh mining village that became the focus of national attention 
when, in 1972, a slag heap fell from the mountain overlooking the village, buried 
the village school and killed over 100 children and teachers. 1 The job of the 
national organiser involved travelling around the country, advising local branches 
on practice and organisation and helping setting up branches in areas where none 
were as yet established. At that time, too, Cruse bought a house in Richmond, 
since known as Cruse House, that till this day serves as headquarters for the 
organisation. 
1 Some of my infonnants from bereavement counselling did actually mention the Aberfan 
tragedy as the one event that convinced the British nation that bereaved people might need 
counselling. Ironically, the people of Aberfan did refuse most offers of help of that nature, 
preferring as they did to deal with the tragedy themselves. 
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In the late 1980s Cruse underwent a fundamental change when its remit was 
redefmed. At frrst widowers, and then all those bereaved by death, were taken on 
as potential clients. The transition was not easy and was not achieved without 
argument. Margaret Torrie herself (1987: 120) while choosing her words carefully 
seems to think that something was lost when Cruse was extended to reach to 
more groups than widows alone. In the 'Foreword' to To rrie , s book, Baroness 
Lena Jeger, former MP and in her time Cruse's staunchest supporter in 
Parliament, states explicitly that 'Cruse needs to keep its special identity as a 
haven for the widowed and their children' (Jeger 1987:xiii). 
The years following the transition saw a rapid expansion that, again, stretched 
Cruse's fmancial capacity to the limit. By 1990 Cruse was in dire straits, 
practically bankrupt, and major changes were made in the personnel at the top of 
the organisation. Professional people from the management and marketing 
sectors were brought in and the fmancial situation sorted out. By now Cruse's 
fmancial situation is said to be sound and Cruse is established as a truly national 
institution. It is one of the national charities that receive a yearly grant from the 
Government. Her Majesty the Queen is Cruse's Royal Patron, contributing to its 
running by, for example, holding flower shows in the gardens of Windsor Castle, 
the profits of which go to Cruse. Other prominent patrons include the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, Dr George Carey, the Chief Rabbi, Dr Jonathan Sacks, and Cicely 
Saunders, the founder of St Christopher's Hospice and the Hospice movement. 
Cruse's president is Colin Murray Parkes who for 25 years or since the 
publication of his book Bereavement has been Britain's leading authority on 
2 bereavement. 
The organisation and work of Cruse 
There are now over 190 Cruse branches all over Britain. The organisation of 
Cruse can be described as follows. At the top is the national council of Cruse 
2 This infonnation was gathered in 1996 and some of the details may and will have changed. 
The point is that Cruse's standing appears now firm and it has the support of the people in the 
top echelons of British society. 
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Bereavement Care. This is responsible for Cruse policy in such matters as the 
standards of counselling, supervision and training. The national council is elected 
at the annual general meeting. Each branch of Cruse has the right to send a 
representative to the annual meeting. Below the national council are regional 
committees, for example the Northern Regional Committee. The regional 
committee is served by a regional officer. She is a paid worker whose job it is to 
implement the policies of the regional committee. Below the regional councils are 
the local branches. At the top of each of them is the management committee. It 
is manned by the branch's chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and treasurer. Its 
function is, roughly, to develop a strategic plan to meet the needs of the branch 
and to implement national and regional policy; to develop and review the policy 
with regard to its particular local context and conditions; to co-ordinate the work 
of its subcommittees and oversee the implementation of their efforts; and to set 
and balance the budget. The local branch will hold an annual general meeting to 
which all members are invited and at which they are entitled to vote. 
Each local branch may have a certain number of subcommittees. Most branches 
would have at least three: the counselling and training subcommittee, the fund 
raising subcommittee, and the social subcommittee. The counselling and training 
subcommittee will have responsibilities to support and provide training for 
counsellors in the form of occasional courses and on-going monthly training 
meetings; it will recruit and train new counsellors and group workers; it will offer 
training for supervisors; and it will ensure that its counsellors and supervisors 
work according to the standards and the policy of the national organisation and 
the local branch. The fund raising subcommittee will be responsible for coming 
up with a fund raising strategy that meets the needs of the budget. The social 
subcommittee will have the role of organising entertainment, outings and social 
events for the social group organised for the bereaved and to ensure the provision 
of friendship and support for bereaved people. 
In many ways the most important person within each Cruse branch is the referral 
secretary. The referral secretary, as the title indicates, receives all the referrals 
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that come to the branch. They will include information about the name of the 
bereaved person, gender and age, relationship with the deceased, how long ago 
bereavement occurred and the circumstances of the death. At her disposal the 
referral secretary has a list of all the counsellors with her local branch. This 
indicates their current counselling load and how much they have declared 
themselves able to take on, their counselling preferences, if any, and whether they 
consider themselves unable to deal with certain types of clients or bereavements. 
From this the secretary can decide which counsellors could possibly take on which 
clients and contact the said counsellor. 
All those who counsel for Cruse do so as volunteers. About every other year, or 
as need in each case dictates, Cruse branches will hold courses on 'aspects of 
bereavement'. The aim of these courses is to educate the public about grief, to 
raise some money and to start training those who are interested in becoming 
Cruse counsellors. The courses are usually run on one evening a week basis and 
last nine weeks during which various aspects of bereavement are covered and 
participants introduced to some basic counselling skills. At the end of this course 
those who are interested in joining their local branch as counsellors have to 
undergo a selection process and an interview through which those in charge of 
counselling within the branch in question determine the suitability of the candidate 
as a counsellor. Those who are selected have to undergo another course, usually 
focusing on counselling skills more than bereavement as such. This course usually 
takes place over a weekend from Friday night to Sunday afternoon. After the 
course finishes prospective counsellors are taken on as probation counsellors. 
All those who counsel for Cruse have to attend a monthly training meeting and a 
monthly supervision session. At the training session are, or should be, present all 
those currently counselling for the branch. The training involves work on issues 
related to bereavement and exercises in counselling skills. Supervision is 
sOlnetimes on a one-to-one supervisor-counsellor basis and sometimes on a group 
basis. In supervision counsellors bring in any concerns or problems they may be 
having, in general or with some particular clients, share them with their supervisor 
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and others, discuss them and, possibly, receIve some advice. Supervisors are 
experienced counsellors who should have received further training in supervision. 
In some cases they are professional counsellors though their work for Cruse is 
usually voluntary. 
As I will explain later Cruse has recently decided to bring its standards of 
counselling up to the levels approved by the British Association for Counselling. 
To become an accredited Cruse counsellor you have to have done sixty hours of 
face to face counselling and have received twenty hours of supervision. 
Supervision is calculated on the amount of time the supervisor spends with each 
individual counsellor. So, in those cases where supervision takes place in groups, 
the time allocated is divided up by the number of participating counsellors to [md 
out the amount of time that can be registered as allocated to each. To become an 
accredited counsellor can take more than two years. 
It is now a policy in some branches that a contract is drawn up between the 
counsellor and the Cruse branch. According to that contract the branch will 
undertake to do something like the following: 
1. consult with the counsellor before referring a client to her 
2. provide the counsellor with access to material on bereavement 
3. provide the counsellor with regular supervision 
4. provide regular on-going training sessions 
5. reimburse the counsellor for expenses incurred on Cruse business 
6. provide means through which the counsellor can resolve any difficulties that 
may arise and which cannot be resolved through supervision. 
The branch, on the other hand, will expect counsellors to do something like the 
following: 
1. contact clients referred to them within three working days to make the ftrst 
appointment and carry an ID card to be produced on request 
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2. respect clients' rights to confidentiality in accordance with the branch's policy 
in the matter 
3. keep notes of all counselling sessions and the expenses incurred 
4. notify the referral secretary of completion of counselling 
5. attend regular supervision sessions 
6. attend at least two thirds of on-going training sessions 
7. work within Cruse UK and branch policies and standards of counselling 
8. to hand in all records and case notes when she resigns. 
It is recommended that new counsellors do not take on more than one client 
during the initial phase of their probationary period. Mer that it is considered 
appropriate if the caseload does not exceed three clients at any time. Counselling 
appointments may be held in the client's home if that is convenient for both client 
and counsellor. It is stressed, though, that the effectiveness of counselling 
sessions may be compromised by the presence of family members or friends and 
some clients do not want their friends and family to know that they are receiving 
counselling. In either case the counsellor will be expected to stress that it is 
important for her to have a private consultation with the client and make 
arrangements suitable for all. Local branches will normally have access to 
counselling rooms in cases when the client's home is not, for whatever reason, a 
suitable meeting ground. 
It is recommended that appointments last one hour with the possible exception of 
the very frrst one which may last longer. Counsellors are encouraged to keep the 
session quite strictly to the hour as this reinforces the sense that the encounter is a 
counselling session and not a social occasion of another sort and maintains the 
focus on the matters for which the client sought counselling in the frrst place. The 
frequency of appointments should be determined according to the extent of 
support needed by the client. One appointment a week is customarily deemed 
appropriate in most cases although sessions will often become less frequent as 
counselling goes on. Counsellors are encouraged to 'contract' a number of 
sessions with the client at the start of the counselling relationship - six sessions 
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seems a common suggestion. The idea is that this will keep the focus on the 
counselling that needs to be done and the relationship within the boundaries of 
counselling and prevent it from spilling into friendship, and for 'dependency' to 
develop between the counsellor and the client. 
Counsellors are forbidden to accept money from clients for their counselling. 
Instead, they should advise clients to make a donation to Cruse if clients express 
wishes to make contributions towards the cost of the services they are receiving. 
Counsellors should keep a record of the expenses they have had to meet in their 
work for Cruse. This the counsellor can either claim from or donate to the 
branch. In either case it allows the branch to keep an accurate assessment of the 
cost of its counselling operation. Counsellors have a duty to keep a record of 
their meetings with clients. These are kind of 'case notes' kept by the counsellor 
about the state and progress of his client. The counsellor must take these notes 
along to his supervision sessions where he must discuss his clients with his 
supervisor. SOine branches require counsellors to fill out a so-called 'counselling 
statistic' form. This allows for the easy registration of complex and detailed 
personal information about the client, her age, gender, ethnic background and 
religion, her relationship with the deceased and the circumstances of the death. 
Interestingly there is no mention of class, employment or occupation on this form. 
Counsellors are advised to hand write or type their notes and not to word process 
them. The reason for this is that word processed documents and information are 
subject to the Information Act and counsellors may be instructed to submit these 
in a court of law. In particular, it seems, Cruse counsellors may be asked to 
appear at inquests into the suicides of their clients and if notes were covered by 
the information law they would be forced to submit those to the court. The 
importance of this is that counsellors are expected to maintain strict 
confidentiality about their clients. The purpose of the confidentiality policy is to 
provide clients with safety and pnvacy. All of their interaction with the 
organisation should be kept in confidence and not divulged to anyone without the 
informed and freely given consent of the client. There are exceptions to this rule. 
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In certain circumstances it can be unlawful not to reveal information about clients. 
Counsellors may be summoned to appear as witnesses before a court of law and 
therein instructed to answer questions concerning their client. If a Cruse 
counsellor believes, after careful consideration and consultation with a supervisor 
when that is possible, that a client may be in imminent risk of committing suicide, 
or may pose a serious danger to others, then the counsellor is allowed and even 
required to break confidentiality. Cases have been brought against Cruse workers 
for failing to do this and current policy is that counsellors inform the police or the 
client's doctor if the client is deemed to be a threat to himself or others. The 
counsellor may also consider breaking confidentiality if he suspects that the client 
carries a serious mental illness, illness that may in fact prevent the client from 
seeking the help he needs. Similarly, disclosure of information is pennitted if the 
client reveals evidence of serious criminal offence, particularly child abuse. 
Breaking confidentiality should, though, only be made when senior personnel in 
the branch have been consulted, provided that was possible. 
Clients are channelled to counsellors through the referral system. According to 
Cruse policy clients ,will normally refer themselves. If referral is from a third party 
this must be with the full and frank consent of the prospective client. It is quite 
common that doctors, priests, social services and even probation or coroner's 
officers refer their patients, parishioners and clients to Cruse. People involved 
with Cruse say that instances of government agencies referring their clients to 
Cruse are on the increase. The reason seems to be the government policy of care 
in the community, the closure of mental hospitals, and the, by now perennial, 
fISCal crisis of the welfare state. Government agencies fmd Cruse an acceptable 
and responsible way of meeting their own very strict budgets while offering - or 
having Cruse offer - their clients the services they require and may be entitled to. 
The problem with this, from Cruse's point of view, is that while these clients will 
be bereaved some of them may have additional problems for which Cruse and its 
counsellors are not equipped to deal with. Counsellors have told me how they 
got referred clients from social services who had, admittedly, suffered recent 
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bereavement but who were also suffering from fairly acute psychosis that, the 
counsellors felt, required professional psychiatric help. 
Every Cruse branch will have a telephone number through which potential clients 
can contact the branch. This number is guarded by the referral secretary and it is 
a matter of policy that all referrals go through the secretary. So if a counsellor or 
a member of Cruse receives inquiries about counselling from a friend or a relative, 
these must be passed on to the secretary and the interested party referred to her. 
This allows for the rationalised and organised referral of clients to counsellors. 
As discussed earlier the referral secretary possesses a list of all the counsellors 
affiliated with her local branch which specifies their current counselling load and 
how much they have declared themselves able to take on. From this the secretary 
can decide which counsellors are able to take on which clients. Normally the 
secretary would not allocate a counsellor a new client without consulting the 
counsellor's supervisor fITst. The supervisor should know about the counsellor's 
abilities to deal with different sort of clients and different kinds of bereavements. 
The supervisor should know how the counsellor is handling her caseload and if 
she is having particular difficulties. The referral system is like the counselling 
service directed by branch and national guidelines and the secretary is now in 
some branches expected to strike up a contract with the branch. 
All counsellors and the referral secretary should have a supervisor. According to 
Cruse policy, supervision sessions should take place at least once every month. 
Apart from that supervisors are expected to meet regularly amongst themselves, 
as least three times a year, to monitor the supervision process. It is considered 
reasonable that each supervisor has about four counsellors under her supervision. 
It is recommended that supervisors work with different counsellors every two to 
three years so that counsellors will acquire a wide range of supervision 
expenence. Supervision is directed by branch and national guidelines and 
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supervisors are expected to have a contract with their branch and with their 
counsellors.3 
Apart from counselling, local Cruse branches are likely to provide one, and 
sometimes more, of the following services: drop-in centres, bereavement support 
groups and friendship groups. It is not compulsory for local branches to provide 
a drop-in centre but it is a means by which members of the public can fmd out 
about Cruse and its services: counselling, social support groups, leaflets, 
literature, training courses and so on and how to access any of those. It is 
expected that those using the drop-in centre will be mainly bereaved people or 
friends and relatives of bereaved people who want to make contact with Cruse. A 
bereavement support group is considered an integral part of the work of a Cruse 
branch. In cases where resources are scarce Cruse headquarters advise that a 
bereavement support group be set up rather than a drop-in centre or a friendship 
group. Along with one to one counselling, providing a bereavement support 
group is stipulated by Cruse headquarters as the basic service which all Cruse 
branches should strive to offer. The purpose of a bereavement support group is 
to create a safe environment in which someone, who has become isolated because 
of a bereavement, can fmd supportive surroundings in which to regain his social 
confidence and competence, make new friends, and begin to take the fIrst steps 
back to a life in the wider society. A bereavement support group is not intended 
to be a long-term solution, that is, it is not expected and not encouraged that 
members will continue to attend for many years after their bereavement. The 
support group may also be an opportunity for those who have been bereaved to 
offer support and encouragement to those more recently bereaved. Those less 
recently bereaved can thus have a chance to give back something of what they 
have themselves received. Still, the group should always be appropriate for 
'fragile' grieving people, an environment in which they can take these fIrst 
tentative steps back toward 'normal' life. The emphasis within the group must 
always be on the needs of new participants, those most recently bereaved. 
3 Examples of these and the standards that they are expected to meet are reproduced in appendix 
1. 
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A Cruse friendship group, [mally, offers opportunities for people to support the 
work of their local branch and at the same time maintain social contact with those 
they have met in bereavement support groups. Other participants may actually 
have received counselling and may wish to join a group that alleviates the more 
long term effects of bereavement on their lives, isolation and loneliness for 
instance. The friendship group might in addition assist in fund raising activities 
and provide help, support and promotion for Cruse work in general. Those 
attending a friendship group will in this way benefit from social contact but can 
also contribute to the activities and future of their local branch and those it serves 
in the community.4 
Bereavement counselling and professionalisation 
It is noticeable from Margaret Torrie's account, related above, just how practical 
the concerns of those involved in Cruse were in the beginning. The eight aims 
and objectives identified in 1959 have to do mostly with the relief of poverty and 
the organisation of holidays for widows. From early on there was, though, 
another stream to Cruse's work. Torrie (1987:2-3) remarks of her [rrst meeting 
with the widows, that only after the practical work, 'did we enter the more private 
area of grief and loss. One thing was clear. They needed to talk and I needed to 
listen.' Torrie seems to have conceived of Cruse's work as falling into these two, 
distinct, areas, practical help on the one hand and emotional support on the other. 
Reflecting upon the situation in the early 1960s Torrie (in 1987:39) observes that 
the 'map of need already seemed clear and its extent limitless. To combine a 
sensitive understanding of loss with imaginative and practical help was the 
challenge ahead of us.' 
4 Cruse points out that there is considerable variation and confusion over the use of these terms 
drop-in centre, bereavement support group and friendship group. What in one branch is called a 
drop-in centre may be referred to as bereavement support group in another one. In fact, in the 
case that I am most familiar with what amounted to a bereavement support group as Cruse 
specifies it was referred to as a drop-in by those working there and those frequenting the place. 
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Torrie's husband, Dr Alfred Torrie, was a consultant psychiatrist who had worked 
at the Tavistock Institute that also housed John Bowlby, the author of attachment 
theory, and Colin Murray Parkes the now leading authority on bereavement and 
the current President of Cruse. Dr Torrie, as his wife invariably refers to him in 
her book, offered his expertise and with his guidance Cruse looked beyond the 
practical matters and went 'deeper, discussing grief, loss and loneliness' (Torrie 
1987:4). By the late 1960s Dr Torrie began advocating that a training scheme for 
counsellors with the local Cruse branches would be set up and that this be 
recognised as a national plan. Dr Torrie went on to train the fITst five counsellors 
who soon began counselling the bereaved in their homes (Torrie 1987:73, 75). 
It seems clear from Margaret Torrie's account that while the early emphasis on 
practical matters arose from her meetings with widows the idea and impetus for 
counselling came from Dr Torrie. The work of the Tavistock Institute in those 
years was largely psychodynamic in nature. Cruse itself has no particular 
theoretical perspective in this regard, leaving that to the individual local branch 
and even the individual counsellor, but an information leaflet sent to me by Cruse 
House refers to Murray Parkes on phases of grief and Worden on the tasks of 
grief as illuminating about the grief process which I related in last chapter. Cruse 
advocates a person-centred in approach in counselling, emphasising that the client 
should be in charge of the counselling session and the counselling relationship. 
According to Cruse the counsellor is there to support and help the client and not 
to determine the course of the bereavement. Each individual grief is unique, and 
the client is the 'expert' as far as Cruse is concemed.5 
As Cruse extended its remit, according to a decision of the Annual General 
Meeting in 1986, to cover not just widows but all those bereaved by death the 
importance of counselling in Cruse's work increased. During the 1990s there was 
a general movement in counselling to increase standards in counselling and in 
January 1996 Cruse headquarters implemented a policy for minimum standards of 
counselling to which all local Cruse branches must now adhere, as related above. 
5 These are points that I shall return to at length later in the thesis. 
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The standards that come into full effect in 1998, specify the training and 
supervision anyone must receive before becoming a Cruse counsellor. It spells 
out the number of hours a probationary counsellor must have worked and the 
amount of supervision she must have received before she can be accredited as a 
Cruse counsellor. It lists how supervision should be carried out and how new 
clients should be met. It describes how to run a drop-in centre for the bereaved 
and specifies that local branches monitor the extent to which they manage to 
adhere to these standards by giving out evaluation questionnaires to training 
counsellors, counsellors on supervisioil, and clients, wherein they can give their 
verdict on the quality of the training and the service they receive (examples of 
these forms are given in the appendix). 
The standards that Cruse counsellors are now expected to achieve are those 
specified by the British Association of Counselling as the minimum standards that 
anyone must reach before they can call themselves counsellors. The policy has 
met with certain resistance in some local quarters. Many counsellors expressed to 
Ine their opposition, pointing out that they are volunteers who are now being 
asked to perform as if they were professional counsellors. If they are to be 
brought up to counselling standards this requires of them investing much more 
time in their work with Cruse, more time than some of them are, or so they told 
me, ready to sacrifice. At the same time their work gets transported, in the minds 
of some of those I have spoken to, from the realm of voluntary charity work to 
that of professional work. The difference is that, in the latter realm people are 
rewarded by being paid and voluntary counsellors who are being asked to brush 
up their skills to the level of professional counsellors feel that they are being asked 
to step over into a different realm, without being compensated or rewarded for it 
in the way that is inherent to that realm. 
Some other Cruse counsellors seem to feel that their skills and qualities are being 
denigrated, called into question, by standardisation. They talk about what is 
happening in terms of what might be termed, though they did not term it so, as 
'appropriation' or 'dispossession of their skills' (see Simpson 1997a on these 
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terms). They feel that the work they have done so far is being judged inadequate; 
that all their sacrifices in terms of time and effort are being rejected. Some of 
them will tum this into an argument concerning the nature of bereavement 
counselling and what it is that the bereaved need more than anything else. 
V oluntary counsellors fmding themselves and their abilities threatened and 
questioned by plans of 'professionalisation' often argue that the bereaved do not 
need professional help in the form of counselling, but human and humane support 
in the form of an attentive and sympathetic ear. They present professional 
counselling as something for people who are essentially unwell, unhealthy, but 
argue that bereavement is a 'natural human response to death' and as such does 
not warrant professional intervention, though it may require genuinely and 
generally human care: the kind of care that normally exudes from normal, caring 
human beings. This was indeed the position of some delegates at Cruse's Annual 
General Meeting in 1997 where the standardisation came under some criticism 
(Cruse Bulletin, September 1997: 1). 
Certain local branches have not been too keen either on this drive towards 
standardisation. In some cases the opposition was more against the way in which 
Cruse House implemented the policy, without adequate consultation many people 
felt, rather than against the policy as such (Cruse Bulletin, September 1997: 1). 
Still, people involved in one branch told me that they had been so opposed to the 
lnove that they considered seriously not adopting the new policy even though that 
would mean that the branch would have to leave Cruse. Of course, their 
objections were many and varied, but some of them mentioned in particular, the 
quality of atmosphere in local branches that the changes bring. Before the 
changes, they say, Cruse was a homely club with 'the relaxed ambience that exists 
between friends, because that is what those involved were,' as one man put it to 
me. Now, in answering demands from headquarters, Cruse must be run like a 
business organisation, with 'standards and procedures,' as the same man 
continued, that cannot foster the friendly atmosphere of before. Today people 
have to evaluate and monitor the performances of each other, adding to the 
relationship between fellow Cruse members an element that is in essence alien to 
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friendship. The branch did not leave Cruse, not yet at least and what tipped the 
balance, as far as I could make out, was the name Cruse itself that seems so 
established that to let go of it would probably have spelt the end of this particular 
local group. That was at least, or so I was told, the reason why they fmally 
decided to adopt the policy of Cruse despite what appeared to be widespread 
opposition to it. 
Opposition to the new policy is not universal though. Some counsellors I have 
spoken to welcome the changes with enthusiasm. They point out the reason 
behind these changes is to guarantee the quality of the service that Cruse provides 
but what they see in them is also an opportunity for themselves to excel and even 
forge a new career in counselling. This seems to have been influential in Cruse's 
decision to adopt the standards set by BAC. Cruse could have carried out its 
work as normal without adopting BAC standards with the only exception that it 
would have had to drop 'counselling' as a term to describe that part of its work. 
Yet 'counselling' has achieved such prominence and there are so many people 
involved in Cruse now that have vested interests in being able to describe their 
work as 'counselling' that Cruse's hands were as good as tied in the matter. That 
is the view of most of the people from the field that I have spoken with about the 
matter. 
The recruitment of new counsellors 
Every two years or so local branches of Cruse will hold courses on 'aspects of 
grief and bereavement counselling'. The explicit aim of these courses may be to 
enlighten the public about death and grief but an implicit aim, and one that is 
freely and jovially acknowledged, is to fmd people to recruit as volunteers for 
Cruse. Having decided to stage a course on bereavement counselling these do 
need to be advertised. This is done through various channels that reflect the sort 
of circles that local Cruse branches move in. The course will sometimes be 
advertised in a local newspaper, in the newsletter of the diocese and in the 
newsletters of the various parishes in the district, where these exist. In some 
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places there exists a network of those in the locality involved in what can be called 
'charitable community work'. These networks will sometimes, again, have their 
own newsletters and a bereavement course will be announced in that medium. 
In my experience, though, not many people seem to learn of the course through 
those means, or those who do have already heard of the coming course through 
other channels. More important seem to be the announcements put up in such 
places as parish halls, city halls, community centres, public libraries, hospitals, 
hospices, and local centres of adult and further education, all places where I did 
encounter or heard of advertisements of this sort. The announcements I saw 
were, to put it bluntly, amateurish in appearance; plain pieces of paper on which 
had been hand-written, or typed, the relevant details. They would pale in 
comparison to the more ambitious and professional posters, advertising the 
summer visits of migrating circuses, magicians or exhibitions to the area, that are 
also to be found in these particular locales. Still Cruse announcements are in a 
way curiously well targeted. They appear in the very places most frequented by 
those who would be most interested in doing a course like this, and by the very 
people Cruse would be interested in recruiting. These are the people who take an 
active interest in the affairs of their community and are already engaged in the 
mostly charitable activities that take place in the community establishments where 
the course is likely to be announced. Here, word of mouth assumes great 
importance as well. 'We who do voluntary work in the area, we all know each 
other,' one woman who works for Cruse told me. There is in fact quite a limited 
number of people that is involved in voluntary community service and even when 
these numbers are not so small there are well established and conducive links 
between them that allow for easy communication. 
The people who enrol on a Cruse course are not all looking for the same thing. 
Many of them are looking for some charitable work simply to occupy their time, 
others are looking to put something back into the community from which they 
sprang. Some come out of interest in bereavement as such, others because it is 
very directly relevant for their work. Some, and maybe most, come for a mixture 
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of all these reasons. To this I might add that many of these people join the course 
simply because they have reached that stage in their lives, or because they have 
suffered serious loss fairly recently, or they may know someone who has suffered. 
They Inay think that the grief these losses instigated might have been dealt with in 
some ways more satisfactorily than the case actually was. This may have planted 
within them a wish to learn more about loss and grief, something they, then, think 
Cruse can teach them about. 
Apart from these there is another, and somewhat different group of people who 
go on a Cruse course. Announcements about forthcoming Cruse courses are 
spread through some workplaces like hospitals, old people's homes, and 
departments of social services. The result of this is that a considerable number of 
nurses, matrons of old people's hOlnes and even the odd doctor, enrols on a Cruse 
course each time round. Local social services do have considerable interest in 
being informed about grief and how to deal with it. Social services have 
themselves to deal with bereaved people on many occasions and it is not 
uncommon that someone from the local office will take part in a bereavement 
course. N ow this group of people has a slightly different reason for going on a 
course like this than the people mentioned before. What they seem to want, more 
specifically, are the knowledge and the skills that will help them in their present 
profession; a profession that often brings them face to face with the dying and the 
bereaved. Apart from nurses and doctors, clergymen sometimes do take part in 
these courses. There were no funeral directors on my courses but two women 
who work for funeral directors were there and offered their job as a reason for 
coming along. 
Let me mention here one more group of people who come and take part in Cruse 
courses. Local centres of adult and continuing education in many cases offer 
courses on counselling. These will fmd amongst their students people who, for 
one reason or another, are trying to forge for themselves a career in counselling. 
These students hear of Cruse courses at college and they enrol because this offers 
them a chance to get more training in counselling. What is of particular 
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importance here is the fact that if you are taken on as a counsellor with Cruse you 
do your counselling under supervision and you require a certain number of 
supervised sessions to qualify for registration as a counsellor with the British 
Association for Counselling, as I mentioned above. 
The training courses 
About thirty people attended each of the two courses on bereavement counselling 
that I participated in. Most of them were over thirty, working, professional 
people, and by far most of them were women. This predominance of women may 
reflect the prevalent association made in British, and perhaps Western, culture, 
between women and the caring professions. 6 In the North East, I was frequently 
told, it is usually the women who look after the well-being and health of the 
family. They stay with the children when they are ill, they take the children to the 
doctor when that is needed and they even deal with the doctor on behalf of their 
husbands.7 This imbalance between the sexes causes some concern in local Cruse 
branches. Those in charge of local branches have ambitions to be able to meet the 
needs and requests of their clients and offer counsellors with as much variety of 
background and experience as possible. This is because clients will often ask for a 
counsellor with whom they share some important characteristics - having suffered 
a similar sort of bereavement for example - and while it appears that women are 
generally more acceptable as counsellors than men, some men - especially those 
who people locally would refer to as 'elderly gentlemen' - seem more comfortable 
to receive counselling from another man. A friend of mine from the field was for 
a while the only male counsellor with his local branch and he found himself beset 
with requests for appointments. 
6 When counsellors are represented in dramas on the telly, for example Dangerfield on BBCl or 
this life on BBC2, they are much more often women than men. Some of the people I spoke to 
about counselling, both people involved in counselling in one way or another but more members 
of the general public, said that they would prefer to be counselled by women. They explained 
that they believed women to be more caring, sympathetic and understanding than men, 
especially regarding 'emotional issues' as one of my friends put it. 
7 This is somewhat changing, I was also told, with the demise of the heavy industries that once 
dominated the North East more men have found themselves out of work while their wives have 
often found it easier to find work in the light and services industries that have come to replace 
them. More men now stay at home and look after the family. 
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On either of the two courses I did only four of the participants were male, myself 
included. These came from quite diverse backgrounds. One was an ambulance 
driver in his fIfties, another a newly retired teacher in his fIfties, one retired 
teacher in his seventies, a former personnel manager, and a quality consultant. Of 
the women one was a middle aged matron of a local old people's home whose 
extensive dealings with death and grief had prompted her to do the course in the 
hope that she might afterwards be better equipped to help both her charges and 
their relatives. Another three were presently engaged in a counselling course at 
their local colleges and wanted to add bereavement counselling to their experience 
and growing expertise. Another one was a young teacher who had had enough of 
the strains of her profession and wanted to use the bereavement counselling 
course as an opportunity to possibly change careers. There was one social 
worker there, a doctor and a few nurses. There was a young woman who had just 
fmished her university degree and was considering counselling as a future career. 
One woman participant was married to a funeral director. Yet another one was a 
student of psychology who was already involved in the work of Cruse as a 
member of the governing committee. One participant was a veterinary nurse who 
sought the course to acquire better understanding of bereavement and skills in 
helping the bereaved. 
Courses on bereavement counselling are 'facilitated', 'organised', or 'taught' by 
trained, educated and experienced counsellors who are members of Cruse and are, 
or have been, involved in the workings of a local branch.s Though 'teachers' may 
thus be responsible for most of the teaching on their courses they will call on 
'experts' in particular fields to lecture on their particular subjects. A religious 
education teacher or a minister may thus be called upon to lecture on 'religious 
and cultural aspects of death and bereavement'; a psychiatrist may be called upon 
8 I use the tenns 'teachers' to refer to the people who were in charge of the two courses I 
attended. This is my imposition, during the courses they would simply be referred to by their 
first names by everyone involved though, when necessary, their job would be termed 
'facilitating'. The reason I call them 'teachers' is to distinguish them clearly from the other 
people involved in facilitating different aspects of the courses, the people who made us coffee, 
for example. 
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to talk about 'special considerations in grief or even 'abnormal grief; social 
workers who specialise in working with children may be called upon to talk about 
'grief in children'; and midwives with counselling training may be enrolled to talk 
about 'loss through miscarriage'. 
Apart from all the above there is a number of other people involved in each night 
of the course. Three or four counsellors who have already undergone a similar 
course, are present while the teaching takes place and they mix in with the 
participants of the course. In this way they can take part in the exercises and 
support the trainees. A further two or three are waiting outside the teaching 
room ready to offer 'counselling' to anyone who feels the need for it, in case any 
of the issues discussed during the course 'open up some areas for any of the 
participants' as it would be put by the organisers of the course. There is usually a 
woman, or two, responsible for preparing the coffee and tea offered to all present 
half way through the night. These women do not necessarily take part in the 
course as such and they may not be counsellors with Cruse but they are often 
involved in the care giving capacity of handing out coffee at drop-in centres and 
the like. 
Both of the courses I attended took place in the evening of weekdays, once a 
week, running from about 7 0' clock till about 9 0' clock. The courses ran for nine 
weeks. Each night was usually organised around a particular theme on the subject 
of death and grief. These included the following: introduction to Cruse; grief 
through suicide; grief in children; religious and cultural aspects in bereavement; 
grief, loss and attachment; abnormal grief; how to manage endings - all of which 
were on offer on both the courses I attended - and: grief and family systems; 
sexual issues in bereavement; how counsellors can look after themselves and 
avoid 'bum out'; terminal illness; loss of a child; loss of a partner - issues 
addressed on either of the two courses I attended. 
On the very fIrst night of the courses one of the organisers or a leading member of 
the local branch would welcome everyone to the course. Then the outline of the 
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coming course was gIven, who would be commg to give which talks, what 
subjects were to be covered and so on. Then the team that carried the course was 
introduced; the teachers, the counsellors who were present, the leaders of the 
local branch, the coffee ladies, and their role within the organisation and on the 
course explained. Then we, the participants on the course, were made to get to 
know each other. This is thought important, as the teachers explained because on 
a course like this people will learn a lot about themselves and the course may 
'bring up issues relating to the losses' they themselves have suffered and 'open up 
old wounds'. In order to be able to do the course profitably participants have to 
feel able to discuss these difficult issues 'openly' and that is only possible in 'the 
safe environment' provided by the company of people you know and trust, we 
were told. 
The importance of this was captured in the 'ground rules' and 'rules of 
confidentiality' that were established at the very beginning of the courses, written 
down on a big piece of paper and would from then on always hang on the wall 
when we met. For the environment to be safe anything 'personal' said during the 
course must remain confidential we were told. Furthermore, whatever anyone 
participant said had to be treated sensitively and with respect. At the same time, 
what anyone participant said had to be open to discussion by the other 
participants who must be allowed to meet a story by a story, an argument by an 
argument. 9 The rules themselves were remarkably similar in the two courses I 
attended and were roughly these: 
1. confidentiality: we cannot talk about the things members of the group may 
disclose outside the group. These are private. 
2. no interrupt.ing: when someone is talking we do not interrupt them even if we 
do not agree with what they are saying. 
3. thus, we are to respect each others' views even if they are not in accordance 
with the views we hold. 
4. we shall avoid criticising others for what they say even if we disagree. 
9 I deal extensively with these exercises in the next two chapters. 
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5. we are to challenge each other constructively and to value each member of the 
group. 
These rules would become the basis upon which our interactions during training 
were based. 
Cruse, counselling and grief 
In the last chapter I spent some time discussing the 'death as taboo' thesis. I 
pointed out how the taboo thesis strategically supports intervention in grief in the 
form of listening to the bereaved, in the form of counselling that is. I pointed out 
too how scholars writing on grief and bereavement counselling frequently 
subscribe to and publish the taboo thesis. Similarly in her book on her years with 
Cruse Margaret Torrie (1987) makes much of the difficulties and even opposition 
she and her organisation faced early on in their work. She repeatedly cites the 
taboo that, reportedly, surrounds death as the reason for this. As a consequence, 
she says of herself and her colleagues in 'every department of the work, we were 
pioneering' (Torrie 1987:39). 
On the opening nights of the two courses that I attended we were introduced to 
the work of Cruse. On one of the courses we were treated to two narratives. 
The fIrst one concerned attitudes towards death, dying and bereavement in British 
society and this was in fact a rather faithful rendition of the 'death as taboo' 
thesis. The second narrative related the story of Cruse in a form similar to that 
presented by Torrie herself and which I quoted earlier in this chapter. Allow me 
now to look at each story in tum. I quote from my fieldnotes: 
Mr Hatfield asked rhetorically 'is help needed with death?' He said that prior 
to World War II people had lived in stable communities and that families had 
not been scattered all over the country as they are today. People had support 
from their kith and kin. Death was part of the daily life of people and not 
hidden as it is today. Most people, she continued, were Christians and religion 
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was strong. Now, on the other hand, people think that all problems can be 
solved, and should be solved. Children survive to become adults and live full 
and robust lives. Silence surrounds the dying and the bereaved as people are 
not used to them. People cross the street when they meet the bereaved ... 
(Fieldnotes) . 
This story is what Kenneth and Mary Gergen (1986) call 'regressive'. It has the 
basic structure of a tragedy: once things were fme and now they are not. It 
speaks of how close to death people were once upon a time and how they knew 
how to cope with it. It speaks of how close people were to each other when 
falnilies lived in the same community for generations, offering each other readily 
available support and understanding. It speaks of the authority Christianity used 
to hold, of the ways in which it helped people understand the world in which they 
lived and offered hope in the face of even the deepest despair. This is contrasted 
to how distant death is from every ordinary person today; to the way in which 
families are now scattered all over the country so that people spend their lives in 
the company of relative strangers from whom the same support and understanding 
cannot be expected; and to the now almost total collapse of the authority of 
Christianity and thus the collapse of the hope it once offered. 
It is relatively easy, I suppose, to speculate how the purpose of this 'story of the 
fall' is to pinpoint an unfulfilled need and so provide a legitimisation for the 
activities of Cruse. The interesting thing about it is that it does so in a particular 
way. This story, it seems to me, speaks to the sensibilities and the sensitivities of 
the volunteers - the very people whose services are being sought. These are the 
people who are already involved in charity work and for whom, or so it seemed to 
me from my interactions with them, the idea of a 'community' is important; the 
suggestion of a lack of community speaking immediately of dysfunctional, asocial 
individuals, on the path to crime, destitution and destruction. 
It is important here how this 'regressive story' is followed by another 
'progressive' one, the story of Cruse. Allow me to quote again from the same 
fieldnotes: 
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Mr Hatfield introduCed us to the history and aim of Cruse. He said that the 
first thing about Cruse is the name. Some think it is an acronym, he said, 
though no one knows what it stands for. Then again it is not spelt like Cruise, 
Mr Hatfield added humorously, and the idea is not that going on a cruise is 
going to solve all our problems, lovely though that thought might be ... 
(Fieldnotes). 
Mr Hatfield explained that the name Cruse derives from the Bible, 1 Kings 17 :6-
16, and the story of the widow and her son. They had fallen upon hard times, Mr 
Hatfield continued, and the widow resolved that they would eat their last meal 
together and then die. Along came a traveller and the widow invited him to dine 
with them despite their lack of everything. The meal fmished the traveller went on 
his way and the widow and her son prepared themselves for their last moments 
together. But their generosity was rewarded and an angel came to the widow and 
promised her that they would never want for anything, that there would always be 
enough meal for bread and enough oil in her cruse. 
Having explained the story Mr Hatfield related how the name came to Margaret 
Torrie as she was listening to the radio one day and heard the story related 
there. to To me, in a flight of wild anthropological imagination, this felt like a 
Inyth. It felt as though I was being introduced into a secret society. We were 
being let in on how the name Cruse came about and what it actually means. 
Most, if not all, of us had previously no idea of either and neither do most 
Inembers of the general public according to what people in Cruse say. Making us 
privy to this story, to the true meaning of the name Cruse, seemed to me like an 
initiation into a society to which most did not have access. tI 
10 This is bow Torrie (1986:5) explains bow the name Cruse was cbosen. 'Our organisation now 
needed a name. 'Nothing to do with widows - we bate the name,' said the members. Tben came 
another well-timed event. I switcbed on the radio to bear a reading of the Widow's Cruse story. 
'How about Cruse?' I wondered and mentioned it to the group somewbat tentatively. After all 
we were not a religious organisation. 'Wby yes! That's marvellous,' they said - 'A widowed 
mother and ber cbild and a miracle of belp.' We all liked it. So we became Cruse .. .' 
11 On both the courses I did those wbo introduced us to Cruse expressed the opinion that Cruse 
was a rather unfortunate name and one they wisbed to cbange. One of them, a man involved in 
the running of Cruse nationally as well as locally, explained that the name was obscure, 'people 
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Mr Hatfield went on to relate the story of the origin of Cruse told by Margaret 
Torrie as I quoted earlier in this chapter. There are a few extremely interesting 
facets to this story that I want to dwell on here for a while. Notice fIrst that 
Torrie construes her reason for starting work with widows as 'a call' (1987:10). 
By this she gives her work a semi-divine origin, an origin that cannot be 
questioned and is not tied in with Torrie's own personal ambitions. The nature of 
'the call' is further strengthened by drawing upon religious literary forms deeply 
entrenched within Western culture. Note how Torrie carefully crafts out her own 
individuality, her separateness from the general public, relating details that do not 
necessarily have anything to do with the origin of Cruse but which give her the 
status of a prophet (see Leach 1987). 'In 1958,' Torrie says, 'I was recovering 
from serious illness. I had also taken up meditation - today a fashionable 
technique of enlightenment, but in those days somewhat original' (1986:1). The 
illness is a kind of a Richmond rendition of the forty days in the wilderness, the 
meditation like a Surrey substitute for the baptism in Jordan. Together they made 
Torrie receptive to 'the call'. 
Having thus related the origin of Cruse Mr Hatfield explained how Cruse has 
prospered and come to meet the needs of progressively more people. In the 
beginning it was a social club for widows, later it added men to its fold and now 
Cruse will offer bereavement counselling to anyone who seeks it. There are three 
things about these stories that I want to emphasise here. First, placing the 
pro gressive story of Cruse after the regressive story of how death has become 
taboo reinforces the sought after understanding that Cruse arose to meet a real 
need and that it has done so successfully as evidenced by its steady growth. 
Secondly, Cruse is presented as one organisation with one history, the story is so 
related that people will understand that the Cruse today is the Cruse Margaret 
don't know the meaning of the word and they do not associate it with bereavement counselling, ' 
he said. 'It makes it difficult to advertise the work of Cruse and to get its message across to the 
public at large.' 
The other one was a volunteer, an official at her member of a local Cruse branch and she said 
the reason she wanted to change Cruse's name was its Christian connotations that gave the 
impression that Cruse was in fact a religious organisation. 
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Torrie formed almost forty years ago. While all the difficulties Cruse has faced 
are acknowledged, and even emphasised, the story is presented as smoothly 
progressive. No questions about Cruse's identity and challenges to it by its 
changing clientele are aired. Finally, again, Cruse's story is related as progressive. 
It is not only that Cruse's extending remit is emphasised but similarly its move 
towards increasing professionalism. So Cruse is portrayed as starting as an 
amateurish social club for widows, where each provided support and friendship 
for others. This is sharply contrasted with the counselling that is currently 
provided by Cruse and what is asserted is that this attention to the psychological 
needs of the bereaved is somehow more refmed, more enlightened, than the 
previous emphasis on support and friendship. It is implied that Cruse has 
reco gnised that apart from the rather mundane need for support and human 
contact bereaved people will experience emotional and psychological turbulence 
that they will have to work through: a work that may require specific counselling 
help rather than friendship and support.12 
I want to end this chapter by going back to the stories of death and the stories of 
Cruse. They are important in order to understand how Cruse thinks of its work 
and presents it to newcomers. It is interesting that on both occasions that I 
witnessed the stories of death and Cruse these were told by lay persons that had 
risen to prominence in their local branches. From my discussions and interviews 
with professional counsellors who work for Cruse, I believe that they hold slightly 
different views. From what I was told it seems to me that they would rather not 
tell a story like this. They are, to begin with, not willing to idealise the past like 
this, pointing out that the close-knit families of the past were often tightly and 
tyrannically controlled families and that close-knit families may often have greater 
problems in dealing with grief than scattered ones. They point out that 'clients' 
may not have the opportunity to say everything they want to say in the presence 
of their family. More than one counsellor has told me that people may be held 
12 This goes for the introductory night. During one of the training meetings we had later, it was 
almost accidentally mentioned that things were maybe not quite alright at Cruse headquarters. 
This caused some commotion amongst the now new counsellors and they asked about the details 
of the story. Those proved difficult to come by as we were told that this was 'a long story'. 
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together and not be allowed to 'fall apart' by their family. They added that they 
thought that many bereaved people need precisely this: to fall apart so that they 
could put themselves together again. 13 
Professional counsellors are, moreover, not ready to present counselling as purely 
'negative' as it were, as if its role was simply to make up for what is lacking in the 
community. The 'story of the fall' suggests that the need for counselling is in fact 
a failure, a failure of society and a failure of the individuals and the families who 
are in need. Professional counsellors like to present their work as more 
'productive', as helping people and allowing them not only to cope with the loss 
they have suffered, but to take the opportunity and change their lives, 'to grow', 
as they sometimes put it. There is another issue here. The regressive story 
suggests that the need for bereavement counselling is a historical, cultural and a 
contingent phenomenon, a need specific to this era and this society. This, of 
course, places rather strict limits on the remit of bereavement counselling, 
restricting its operations to these particular times when the community itself has 
lost its ability to cope on its own. This version, again, professional counsellors try 
and resist, suggesting to the contrary that it is only now that people have realised 
their need to 'deal with grief, that only recently have people in fact been allowed 
to grieve. This story indicates, then, that bereavement counselling answers a 
universal human need. 
How Cruse thinks about counselling and how it thinks about and intervenes into 
grief are subject matters of the next two chapters. I shall relate those issues 
through describing how we, the would-be counsellors, were trained and taught 
during the courses that I attended. 
13 I shall have opportunity to explain this metaphor, 'falling apart', and others like it in the next 
two chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
The Games We Play. 
Counselling Skills and the Creation of Subjectivity 
I arrived for the bereavement counselling training course just before seven last 
night. The hospice is an old country house and the front room is full of 
people, thirty or so, and buzzing with the noise of incessant chattering. It 
smells of flowers and perfumes, some sweet, some spicy. On the walls hang 
pictures of more flowers, trees, birds, gardens and English country churches. 
In the corner is a kind of a sitting room space with a few chairs neatly placed 
around three or four small coffee tables. On the tables are some glossy 
magazines, Gardener's World, Angling News, Country Living, or something 
like that, and some local newspapers. Soon we are, almost mysteriously, 
directed to the room on the left, 'the upper lounge' I hear someone call it. 
There, the chairs, an odd assortment of armchairs and stools, have been 
arranged in about five concentric half circles around a flip chart pad standing 
just by the bay window that looks over the extensive grounds, very beautiful 
now in the spring. By the flip chart two women are standing, the teachers of 
our course, as it turns out. 
As people seemed to be inside the room, sat down and quiet, one of the 
teachers, stood up and welcomed everyone to the course. She then gave a 
brief outline of the course. She said that part of the course was getting to 
know our own reactions to loss and grief. The teacher said that we would 
need 'a safe environment' in order to do this and that for this we'd have to get 
to know each other well. The teacher continued that what we are doing can 
always 'stir up things for us' and that, therefore, there are always people 
around if we wanted to talk. She said that we can cry if we want to, 'but you 
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don't need to,' she added laughing. After this the teacher asked us to do an 
exercise 'to get to know each other'. The teacher asked us to turn to the 
person sitting next to us and ask them about themselves and their reason for 
doing this course and then vice-versa. Sitting next to me was Bob, who I had 
met briefly as we gathered for the course, and I turned to him with a quizzical 
look on my face 'shall we?' Bob, similarly lOOking puzzled, agreed to partner 
me. We turned in our chairs to face each other turning our backs to the 
people at our sides as if to exclude them from our conversations. Sitting like 
that I asked him to tell me about himself. Bob told me, in his thick 
Glaswegian accent, the obvious, that he was from Scotland but had been 
'down here' for thirty odd years. He added that he was married with two 
children and that he was now, having been made redundant twice, a self-
employed quality consultant. He said he was dOing an evening course in 
counselling at college and that he hoped to use that in his job and that that 
was the reason he'd come on the course. I told Bob about myself. 
Next, the teacher, raising her voice over the hubbub of conversations, asked 
us to meet up with another group of two and introduce our partner to them. 
People look around hesitantly for someone to pair up with. Me and Bob 
linked up with Delia and Georgina who were sitting on our left hand side. 
'Do we know what we are doing?' Bob asks. Delia and Georgina do and 
Delia starts by telling us 'this is Georgina ... ' As it turns out they have both 
trained as bereavement counsellors and have done this course before. They 
are here to help out. Their introductions take a remarkably similar form to 
that which Bob had given me and I had given Bob: marital status, number of 
children, place of origin, occupation, hobbies even, reason for doing the 
course. After Georgina has then introduced Delia I introduce Bob and he, in 
turn, me. (Fieldnotes). 
Having in the last chapter discussed the history and organisation of Cruse and 
described the two training courses that I attended my aim in this and the next 
chapter is to examine more carefully how Cruse thinks about and intervenes into 
grief. I examine, too, how that thinking and intervention is expressed in Cruse 
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training and how people are taught and trained to become Cruse counsellors. 
Cruse does incorporate a wide variety of ideas about the nature and course of 
grief. Still, Cruse stresses that grief is a natural reaction to death, that each 
individual experience of grief is unique, and that the bereaved should be given the 
opportunity, by Cruse counsellors if need be, to talk and express their emotions. 
The success of that intervention, in tum, is seen to rest upon the 'counselling 
relationship' and upon the skills that the counsellor has mastered. 
Throughout my rendition of the two training courses I did, which fills this chapter 
and the next - the two have to be read very much together - my account is 
informed by ideas from the anthropology of emotion and the anthropology of the 
person, from Foucault's notion of subjectivity and its links to power, about the 
situated nature of learning and about narratives. In the following chapter I shall 
bring these points together to show how according to Cruse, the most important 
part of grief is the bereaved person's emotions in the present. I shall argue that 
this conception has a particular relationship with the establishment of Cruse 
counsellors as 'experts' and that as such they are part of the current 
govemmentality in Britain by which the government seeks to govern its citizens 
through their own subjectivities, their own wishes and demands, their own 
freedom. 
Here, though, I want to talk about the counselling relationship, counselling skills, 
and the creation of SUbjectivity. 
'Knowing you, knowing me,.1 Power and subjectivity 
Social scientists, historians and other academics from related disciplines have had 
a long standing interest in psychology, psychotherapy and counselling.2 Not 
surprisingly a lot of this literature has been critical of the counselling enterprise. It 
has sought to analyse and criticise the moral entrepreneurship of professional 
1 The song is Abba's, of course. 
2 I will generally use counselling as a shorthand in what follows here. 
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groups; the medical- and psychologicalisation of social problems; the extension of 
social control into the privacy of the family and personal life; the ideological 
nature of the knowledge claims of psychology; the social interests of 
psychologists themselves; and so in general pointed out how the psychological 
sciences serve to legitimate the current system of social domination (see Rose 
1989b:3-4). So, the argument continues, counselling is implicated in the 
maintenance of the very social system that produces the problems for which its 
clients have sought counselling. Counselling works with the social system to 
repress the needs and wishes of its clients and to impose its own ideas and 
understandings upon their experience (see Rose 1989b:215-16). 
In line with this Jeffrey Masson (1989:24) has argued, with his trademark moral 
outrage, that the 'structure of psychotherapy is such that no matter how kindly a 
person is, when that person becomes a therapist, he or she is engaged in acts that 
are bound to diminish the dignity, autonomy, and freedom of the person who 
comes for help.' He (1989:25) points out how, by turning 'sexually absurd' 
traumas into fantasies Freud established the maxim that the therapist knows better 
than the client. The therapist, Masson (1989:44) continues, will acknowledge that 
he can't change society, or the client's past but that what he can offer is 
understanding, 'implying that this understanding is internal.' Christopher Lasch 
(1979) saw the rise of therapeutic culture as a turning away from the intense 
political engagement of the sixties and criticised it as 'narcissistic' (see Rose 
1989b:215). Lasch argued that the preoccupation with the self - that he takes to 
be characteristic of psychotherapy - originated from the devastation of our private 
lives instigated by the advance of bureaucracy (see Rose 1989b:216). 
'Bureaucracy', he argued (1979: 13-14), 'transforms collective grievances into 
personal problems amenable to therapeutic intervention'. And Philip Rieff (1966), 
in lamenting The Triumph of the Therapeutic, claims that: 
The therapy of all therapies is not to attach oneself exclusively to any 
particular therapy, so that no illusion may survive of some end beyond an 
intensely private sense of well-being to be generated in the living of life itself. 
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That a sense of well-being has become the end, rather than a by-product of 
striving after superior communal end, announces a fundamental change of 
focus in the entire cast of our culture - toward a human condition about which 
there will be nothing further to say in terms of the old style of despair and 
hope. 
These are dangers that experienced counsellors are well aware of (see McLeod 
1993:5) and strive ceaselessly to avert. In fact the picture presented by the social 
critics does not accurately reflect what goes on in bereavement counselling, not at 
least as it is practised within Cruse. Cruse has adopted the person-centred 
approach of Carl Rogers - which professes a stringent anti-expertise ethos - and 
emphasises that each experience of grief is unique and that it is the client's 
experience that is the most important part of counselling. Cruse, and much of the 
counselling profession, does indeed actively downplay its own power. Now it is 
not necessary, or helpful for analysis, to accept counselling's representation of 
itself but I want to point out three places where I believe the critics of counselling 
have gone wrong. 
First, while the social critics have rightly pointed to power of counselling they 
have failed to describe how that power is wielded in actual practice. Secondly, 
they assume that the subjectivity of counselling's clients exists before they enter 
counselling (see Rose 1989b:3-4) during which it gets overwritten by the rules 
and regulations of society. In this the critics employ the same dichotomy between 
society and individual that has plagued the anthropology of death, and the social 
sciences in general, a dichotomy that, ironically, is popular in counselling itself too 
(see for example Moore 1993:31). Unavoidably, then, the critics of counselling 
operate a notion of power as essentially 'oppressive' and create a picture of 
counselling as a social mechanism that suppresses the subjectivity and freedom of 
its individual clients. This picture is at odds with the one drawn up by the few 
truly anthropological studies of counselling and therapy that exist - essentially the 
work of Jenny Hockey (1986; 1990) and lain Edgar (1997) - which stress the very 
creative nature of counselling. In Cruse, in fact, the subjectivity of the counsellor 
is 'suppressed' to engage more fully the subjectivity of the client. In this, I 
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believe, bereavement counselling conforms to Nikolas Rose's (1989b:217) 
assertion that power in counselling is not negative but positive and productive as 
Foucault (1979) suggested of the modem form of power and government in 
general. But what it produces, I shan argue, is the very subjectivity of its clients. 
Allow me to explain by going back to my fieldnotes: 
We had our first meeting on the training course for bereavement counsellors-
to-be last nighe. We meet in the doctor's surgery where I had the meeting 
with the Cruse people last month. The clinical smell of sterilised instruments 
has now been overtaken by the sweet odour of pine from the almost solid 
liquid that the cleaning lady evidently uses to wash the floor. On a table in 
the corner are the customary magazines that inhabit such waiting rooms, 
Hello and Cosmopolitan, Practical Parenting and Good Housekeeping ... 
There are about thirty of us sitting together in the clinic. We sit in a big circle 
so that we can all see each other. It's already dark outside. Well, it has been 
dark since six ... The teacher of the course, Judy, standing by the flip chart 
pad in the far end of the room, asks us to turn to the person sitting next to us 
and ask them about themselves and what their day was like. She says to take 
about five minutes and then to do it the other way 'round. After that, she 
adds, would we introduce our partner to the group and try and say what they 
are feeling. I turn to Margaret who is sitting next to me. I know Margaret 
already and know that she has been a bereavement counsellor for some time 
now. I ask her how her day was. She replies that she is just back to college 
now in the autumn and that she feels there is too much to do right now, she 
feels 'overwhelmed' with the work at college and everything else she has to 
do. I listen. Margaret then asks me what sort of day I had. I reply that it had 
been a very long day, with the teaching I had to do and then the long journey 
to the course. After ten minutes the teacher beckons us back into the big 
circle and asks us to introduce our partner, how their day was and what they 
are feeling. When my turn comes I look down and say to the group: This is 
Margaret. Margaret is already a bereavement counsellor. She is just back to 
college after the summer break and feels quite 'overwhelmed' with all the 
work she has to do. Afterwards I thought I had been quite good in managing 
3 This is from the first training course that I attended. 
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to distil Margaret's worries into the feeling of being overwhelmed. 
(Fieldnotes) . 
Games like this, and the one discussed at the very beginning of this chapter, were 
a prominent feature of the training courses that I attended. The declared purpose 
of playing the games was, as the course leaders would explain, to help us to get to 
know each other, and ourselves. Courses like these, we were told, could 'open 
up areas of experience for us to do with grief and loss' and that we could only 
'explore' those in 'a safe environment' where we 'know and trust each other'. 
The importance placed upon participants knowing each other can been seen from 
the fact that on both the courses that I attended we were, upon entering for the 
very fITst night, led to a table in the corner and asked to write our name on a 
sticker and stick it on our chest for everyone to see. We were supposed to wear 
these stickers during subsequent training evenings but as the courses went on 
people would forget their stickers more frequently as their names became 
common knowledge. This did not cause much concern, but still became the target 
of the odd comment. I, for one, was sometimes applauded for remembering my 
sticker, even after everyone else had forgotten theirs. 
Still, introductions can take many forms and the form they took in these games is 
important. What stands out is how we were asked to introduce ourselves to each 
other on a one-to-one basis, to be begin with, and then taking up in turns the 
positions of a speaker and a listener. As speakers we were being asked to take up 
the position of a client and were asked to relate not simply factual information 
about our circumstances but to disclose our feelings and our reasons for coming 
on a course like this. We were encouraged to imbue our introductions with our 
emotions. As a listener we were enjoined to take up the position of the counsellor 
to give our 'client' the opportunity to talk and to try and understand, and be able 
to reproduce, the emotions of our 'clients'. 
The relationship between the counsellor and the client here is very much in 
keeping with the client -centred tradition. Later on in the courses we would 
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engage in some pretend counselling where we would counsel each other in about 
5 to 10 minutes sessions. During those exercises we would be encouraged to be 
client-centred, to listen to the 'client' and try not to impose our own ideas upon 
the 'client's' experience. What the counsellor seeks, moreover, is the client's 
subjectivity, his emotions and desires, needs and wishes. But if the classic social 
scientific account of counselling as repressing the client's subjectivity is 
misleading neither can we assume, I contend, that the sUbjectivities of its clients' 
exist before counselling as bereavement counselling would seem to claim. Rather 
the subjectivities of the client are produced through counselling. 
Let me try to explain this by going back, somewhat, to the image of the recently 
bereaved with which bereavement counselling operates. In a publicity leaflet that 
Cruse sent me on one of my many requests for information Parkes's (1986 
[1975]) phases of grief are reproduced and the first three rendered as: 
'Shock: Numbness, disbelief, feeling 'cocooned' ... ' 
'Separation and pain: Grief breaks over in waves of distress, intense yearning, 
pining, feelings of emptiness. Feels as if 'tom apart' or as if the dead 
person has been 'tom away' ... 
Despair: Depression (moods), difficulties with concentration, anger, guilt, 
irritability, anxiety, restlessness, extreme sadness.' 
In a leaflet from Cruse Bereavement Line, a telephone helpline, it says: 'The death 
of someone we love is a shattering experience.' Margaret Torrie (1987:17), the 
founder of Cruse, says of the widows she worked with 'I was shocked at the 
singular helplessness of the widows. They appeared to be trapped in a situation 
they were powerless to relieve.' Lyn Franchino (1989) whose handbook for 
trainees, Bereavement and Counselling, was used on one the courses I attended 
says (1989:9) that bereavement 'by death usually results in practical, material and 
emotional losses which affect an individual's perception of the past, present and 
future. Hopes and plans will most certainly be altered. All of these changes leave 
a grieving person feeling vulnerable and perhaps, inadequate ... Initially most 
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people experience a period of shock and disbelief during which they may feel 
weak, numb, cold, or 'in a fog'. This may be accompanied by confusion and/or 
emotional outbursts along with swallowing, the sensation of having a lump in the 
chest or throat, fatigue, breathlessness and a dry mouth.' Franchino (1989:17-18) 
reproduces the story of Caroline whose son, Andrew, died: 'The fIrst days, even 
the fITst few weeks, I was cocooned, protected. Everyone was with me ... I did as 
I was told, 'Eat your dinner now Caroline. Have a bath now Caroline. Go to bed 
and sleep now Caroline'. I did it all because I was utterly devoid and incapable of 
doing anything for myself.' In Cruse's Annual Review for 1996/97 the Director, 
Rosemary Pearce quotes from a letter by man whose wife had died of cancer: 
'When she died ... I was completely drained. The sense of loss and despair was so 
strong then and over the next few weeks that I did not know where I would 
survive, or even wanted to. There just didn't seem any point in continuing with 
my life any more.' 
So the emphasis in all these accounts is on the bereaved as lacking power, as 
being overwhelmed by potent and negative feelings, unable to 'hold' or 'pull 
themselves together:. During training we the trainees were told, warned almost, 
that our clients would be 'fragile', 'vulnerable', 'in pieces', 'falling apart'. They 
were, that is, established as lacking, as it were, in subjectivity. At the same time 
though their state is in these same accounts established as being 'natural', their 
state of being before they enter counselling or come into contact with Cruse. I 
described in the introduction how the anthropology of the emotions stresses 
precisely the opposite: how the emotions are not part of our internal landscape 
but are created and maintained through social practices and discourses. In 
accordance with this we have to see the 'naturalisation' of the emotions in Cruse 
here as a discursive effect in itself. The effect it has is to legitimate Cruse's 
interventions and downplay the possibility that Cruse might itself create the 
problems for which its clients seek counselling. To downplay the political import 
of its work is important to Cruse as will become evident in the remainder of this 
chapter and the next. 
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Given all this, how then, can the bereaved be helped and what should they be 
helped to achieve? On the back of Cruse's Annual Review for 1996/97 there is 
the following quote: 
'About three months after the funeral, the 
pain and loneliness really hit me. I desperately 
needed to talk and Cruse was a lifeline. 
They listened, they understood, they 
helped me to find my way through.' 
In the same review, Rosemary Pearce quotes from another letter, this time by a 
widow who says 'Cruse was a stepping stone and for me it proved to be just that. 
I gained confidence and remain very grateful.' Pearce herself says in her 
'Message from the director' that 'Cruse is about supporting people during the 
turmoil of their bereavement, but also about helping them to rebuild their lives and 
fmd a way forward again.' Murray Parkes, on the same leaflet from Cruse 
mentioned earlier, posits as the two latter phases of grief: 'Acceptance: 
Intellectual acceptance long before emotional acceptance. Mood swings, 
depression. Resolution and Reorganisation: New patterns of life are established. 
Eventually able to recall memories of the deceased without being overwhelmed by 
sadness or other emotions. Ready to reinvest in the world.' Worden's (1991) 
tasks- of mourning are here as well, the last two being: 'To adjust to an 
environment in which the deceased is missing. To withdraw emotional energy 
from the dead person and invest it in life.' Franchino (1989: 10) describes the fmal 
stage of grief, reintegration, by saying that at 'first it is barely perceptible, with 
brief moments of humour, achievement or satisfaction. Slowly the good times 
begin to outweigh the bad. There is a growing interest in outside activities and 
other people. Life gradually becomes enjoyable sometimes exciting, again. The 
bereaved person assumes increasing responsibility for him/herself and is able to 
accept living without the loved one.' Some of the people that I met in the course 
of my fieldwork talk about bereavement as an opportunity to 'grow personally'. 
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The leaders of the two training courses that I attended were not so optimistic. 
We might, they said, hope for our clients to 'learn to live with the loss.' 
So, how can the bereaved 'learn to live with the loss' and how might we, the 
counsellors-to-be, hope to help them? Cruse 'continues to exist', the organisation 
explains in another information leaflet, because there is 'a need for someone to 
listen when the grieving person needs to talk; a need for a safe place where 
feelings can be expressed; a need for assurance that what is going on is all part of 
grieving. ' During one of the training evenings on one of the courses I attended, 
the teacher asked us to think about what the bereaved might need and relate those 
to her. We were, as usual, sat in a circle and the leader was standing by the flip 
chart at the far end of the room. As people starting calling out the leader would 
write their suggestions on the chart. 'Support,' one of us offered, 'comfort' said 
another and both were written upon the chart.4 After a number of contributions 
the leader added a few more and told us that we might expect that the bereaved 
will need, in addition to support and comfort, someone who can give them 
information about practical things that they have to do. Someone who is ready to 
listen to them and share their memories, their frustrations, anger, guilt, 
resentment, and their joys and their triumphs. In particular, our teacher said, the 
bereaved may need someone who is ready to listen to them tell the same story 
again and again, in a way a friend or a relative may not be. An outsider may also 
be better, she added, someone who does not know the story already but can 
approach it with an open mind. The bereaved need someone who is ready to 
accept their difficult feelings and 'hold' them, someone who is able to not tell the 
bereaved that everything is 'OK because it isn't.' The bereaved need someone 
who will not expect them to follow a particular pattern and can accept that 
different people will grieve in different ways. The bereaved need someone who 
respects their dignity and self respect (see Franchino 1989: 11 for a very similar 
formulation). Most of all, we were frequently told, the bereaved need to talk, to 
express their feelings, they need someone who is ready to listen to them. 
4 This was a frequently used teaching technique on both of the courses that I attended and I 
describe and analyse it in detail in the following chapter. 
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'The skills we need' 
For us the counsellors to be able to help the bereaved in this way we would need, 
we were told that evening and often later, to master and possess certain skills. It 
is another drawback on the existing social scientific account of counselling and 
psychotherapy that it deals with the two in terms of the ideas, about the 'self for 
example, that inform them, rather than the practices that they carry out (see Rose 
1989b, 1989a, 1996). But as Rose (l989a), following Foucault, has pointed out 
forcefully, the history of psychology, and its close kin, is not so much 
characterised and driven by idle reflections upon the nature of the psyche, but by 
the localised interventions into the workings of that 'psyche'. The skills and the 
practices that people employ in counselling are important, at least as important as 
their ideas about 'psychology'. 
It was explained to us that Cruse practises person-centred counselling and that 
Rogers' three core conditions of 'congruence', 'unconditional positive regard', 
and 'empathic understanding' were at the heart of Cruse counselling (see Mearns 
and Thorne 1988). Congruence was explained to us as the counsellor's ability, 
and duty, to be honest, 'to be herself,' as one of our teachers put it, 'in the 
counselling relationship and in the counselling session.' We were given two 
reasons for why congruence is important. First, clients have to be able to trust 
their counsellor and they can only do so if they fmd the counsellor to be honest. 
Clients would soon fmd out if the counsellor was not being honest and dishonesty 
could ruin the counselling relationship. Second, if counsellors are congruent it 
has the additional advantage to convey the message to the client that it is 'OK to 
be yourself. From the perspective of person-centred counselling that is clearly 
extremely important as the locus of evaluation should be the self rather than 
others, as I mentioned in the preceding chapter. 
Unconditional positive regard was explained to us as meaning that we should 
accept the client for who they are. It was stressed to us that we must not be 
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'fazed' by any of the stories the clients might tell, no matter how terrible they 
might be. 'Y ou have to keep face,' one of the teachers once put it to us, 'you 
have to show the client that you can take on their stories and bear them.' By this 
the client is, hopefully, made to understand that his experiences and his emotions 
are bearable, no matter how devastating they seem, so that the client can 'pull 
through in the end.' In addition, unconditional positive regard carries here the 
Salne messages as congruence that it is all right to be whoever the client is, that it 
is all right to be yourself. There can be a conflict between congruence and 
unconditional positive regard. Counsellors will fmd, we were told, that they do 
not like all their clients, sometimes for what would appear to be trivial reasons. 
Should the counsellor then be congruent and communicate this dislike to the client 
or would notthat threaten to undermine the client's self-esteem? The advice we 
were given was to attempt to be aware of our dislikes and the reasons for those. 
This would make it easier for us to overcome them. If we found that they still 
prevented us from working with certain clients we would have to take heed of 
that. 
'Empathic understanding', our teacher would put it 'involves trying to enter the 
client's frame of reference.' It is like 'stepping into another person's shoes and 
seeing the world through their eyes without losing touch with one's own world.' 
It has to be an on-going activity, a continuous effort, whereby the counsellor 
attempts to lay aside her own way of experiencing, perceiving, and understanding 
reality and tries to 'sense' and respond to the experiences and perceptions of the 
client. 'It is not sympathy that people want or need,' we were frequently told, 
'what we try to offer them instead is empathy, understanding.' Empathy helps the 
client to feel that he is understood and understandable. This, it was stressed over 
and over again, is particularly important in the case of bereaved clients because 
when death is such a taboo the bereaved have to suffer so much and so often in 
isolation and silence. Not knowing what to expect in their grief they may be 
overtaken by all sorts of 'weird' feelings - anger and resentment for example - that 
they can in no way square with their expectations of bereavement and which may 
lead them to fear that they are in fact 'going 'round the bend.' If the counsellor 
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can communicate to the client that he understands the client's feelings she 
simultaneously sends him the message that his feelings are understandable and 
normal, that he is in fact not alone in feeling what he is feeling and that he may not 
be going around the bend after all. Empathic understanding, that is, is the 
counsellor's way to seek to normalise the client's experience. It would sometimes 
be pointed out to me that research suggests that empathy correlates with effective 
counselling (see Mearns and Thorne 1988:46) and added that empathy is 
important because it encourages the client to 'explore' his emotions further and 
'deeper'. That is, if the client can feel that his more straightforward and 
'superficial' emotions are understood and accepted, he will feel more inclined to 
'dig deeper', to look for those emotions that are more problematic and that lie 
'buried deeper inside' him. 
But what other skills does the counsellor need? It was emphasised again and 
again to us that grief is 'messy', as they sometimes put it, that it cannot be 
represented as a neat linear process, and that each grief is individual. Still, 
bereavement counselling was sometimes presented as involving three stages, each 
of which has its own particular tasks that again require particular skills. The first 
stage of bereavement counselling is that of opening and initial assessment and 
during that stage four tasks should be accomplished. Upon meeting the client for 
the frrst time, and during the subsequent one or two sessions, the counsellor has 
frrstly to set the scene. What this involves primarily is to establish a contract 
between the counsellor and the client according to which they will meet for a 
specified number of times and with a certain frequency. The counsellor must also 
try to explain to the client the nature of counselling and make the client aware of 
the nature of their relationship. In particular the counsellor should make it clear 
that the client should be in charge of the sessions adding that she, the counsellor, 
is not a friend but a professional and that the sessions should be focused on 
working on the client's issues. The counsellor must ensure the client about 
Cruse's rules regarding confidentiality and such like. Secondly, the counsellor 
must establish rapport with the client, make the client feel that the counsellor is 
dedicated to trying to understand the client. The counsellor must show 'empathy' 
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and try and 'enter the client's frame of reference' and she must also show the 
client 'unconditional positive regard' and communicate to the client the feeling 
that he is valued. Thirdly, the counsellor and the client must attempt to create a 
'safe environment' in which the client can 'explore' the issues and emotions that 
concern him. The basic building blocks of a safe environment are those of 
honesty and trust. The counsellor must then be 'congruent' and convince the 
client of her honesty and trustworthiness. Finally, the counsellor must at this 
stage gather the history of the client, his relationship to the deceased, the 
circumstances surrounding the death, and what has followed after that. 
There are a number of skills that the counsellor will have to use during this initial 
stage. The counsellor must be able to deal and cope with the feelings that the 
client expresses and the events he relates. The counsellor must know herself, 
what affects her and if she is particularly sensitive to any particular issues. It is 
important here that the counsellor is willing to accept supervision and knows how 
to 'off-load' and relax. All these are matters that were dealt with extensively 
during our training courses and later at the on-going training meetings. In 
particular we were encouraged to be attentive to those issues that affect us 
personally the most and to express our feelings with regard to them. As 
mentioned in last chapter counsellors are given the opportunity to state their 
counselling preferences and those areas, if any, with which they do not want to 
work. During small group and counselling exercises we had the opportunity to 
discuss matters that touched us specifically in an attempt to understand the origin 
and the nature of their impact upon us. Similarly, we were encouraged to identify 
and be mindful of the things we do to relax and we would regularly do exercises 
with that precise content. 'Bum-out', we were told during training, is an 
occupational hazard that haunts counsellors. The etiology of 'burn-out' as it was 
explained to us looks somewhat like this: the counsellor is not able to distinguish 
between herself and her life on the one hand and her work as counsellor on the 
other. She takes on herself too much of the distress and painful emotions of her 
clients and is not able to deal with these in supervision and so off-load them to 
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someone else. Gradually the stress becomes too much and the counsellor is 
forced to stop counselling. 
In addition to being able to look after herself, the counsellor has to be able to 'get 
the client talking' as it were and to start making that talk focused. Here the 
counsellor needs skills like 'active listening and attending', 'staying with the 
feeling', 'open-ended questioning', 'paraphrasing', 'reflecting feeling and 
experience', 'clarification', 'summarising' and 'identifying main problems'. We 
were often told that 'active listening' is the most important part of our work and 
that with that alone we would be assured of doing our clients no harm and 
probably considerable good. Explaining what exactly this meant remained more 
difficult. We would be told that basically active listening represents a continuous 
attempt to 'really listen to what the client is saying' without ever jumping to 
conclusions based upon our own expectations. Active listening achieves three 
things. It establishes the client's experience, and not the authority of the 
counsellor, as the most important part of the counselling session. Secondly, it 
allows the client to express his emotions. Thirdly, active listening allows the 
counsellor to acquaint herself with the history of her client. To achieve this the 
counsellor relies on clarification and summarising. Clarification refers specifically 
to the task of making clear certain aspects of the client's story. So, for example, a 
client will frequently populate his account of events by a large number of 
characters the exact relationship of which with the client or the deceased may be 
somewhat less than obvious. At an appropriate moment, when there is a 'lull in 
the flow of the story', was one piece of advice I received, the counsellor may 
want to clarify who precisely is who. This is often done in conjunction with 
sUlnmarising. Again, when there is a lull in a long story the counsellor may grab 
the opportunity to summarise what the client has said so far. As with clarification, 
this allows the counsellor to get to grips with the exact evolution of the story and, 
when the need for that becomes evident, gives the client the opportunity to put 
the counsellor right. In addition, summarising may encourage the client to assess 
the story he has told, its nature and its consequences. 
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The same goes for the ability to ask open-ended questions and the skills of 
paraphrasing and reflecting. Open-ended questions, we were told, involve asking 
things like 'I wonder what that felt like?' The significance of these is best 
observed through the contrast with closed questions. The latter require, as it 
were, a specific answer. They limit extensively the range of possible answers the 
client has at his disposal. By that they force upon him a certain way of 
experiencing which may well in fact be alien to the client. Open-ended questions, 
on the contrary, allow the client to phrase his answers the way he feels most 
appropriate, encouraging him to seek, and hopefully fmd, the words that best 
describe his own experience. 
By paraphrasing the counsellor 'returns', in a slightly altered form, to the client 
some significant aspect of what the client has said. The client may, in relating a 
particular series of events, indicate strongly that he felt distressed without actually 
putting that word, distress, upon it. The counsellor can return this to the client 
with the words 'you say that this happened, and then that happened and it was 
distressing' . Paraphrasing again demonstrates to the client that the counsellor is 
'actively listening' and paying attention to what the client is saying. At the same 
time, paraphrasing allows the client to look again at what he has said, 'hold it up 
to view', as one teacher put it, reflect upon it and evaluate it. 
Reflecting feeling and expenence involves 'picking up' the feelings and 
experiences that the client communicates and 'turning them back to the client'. It 
differs from paraphrasing in that the counsellor attempts to phrase her 
communication in a way similar to that communicated by the client. The client 
may relate a story to the counsellor with the comment 'It was very sad.' The 
counsellor will pick this up and reflect it back to the client saying something of the 
sort: 'You say it was 'very sad', can you tell me more about that?' In telling us 
this our teachers would invariably change their voice and put an emphasis on 
'very sad' indicating simultaneously that they were quoting someone and that it 
was important. Reflecting, too, demonstrates powerfully to the client that the 
counsellor is listening. In addition it has the advantage of 'staying with the 
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client's words', as it was once put to us, and avoids the danger of the counsellor 
putting words into the client's mouth and appropriating his experience. In 
addition to reflecting feelings counsellors should at this stage try to 'stay with the 
feeling'. When the client comments that he felt 'sad' the counsellor reflects this to 
the client and tries to keep the feeling 'in the frame', using various techniques, like 
paraphrasing and reflecting, to encourage the client to 'explore' the meaning, and 
exact experience, to him of feeling 'sad'. This encourages the client to actively 
reflect upon his experiences and his feelings, their origin, nature and 
consequences. This gives the counsellor and the client a chance to identify those 
areas in which they may want to exhort most of their efforts. This, in tum, takes 
the counselling process into its second stage. 
The second stage is that of grief work and on-going assessment. The tasks facing 
the client and the counsellor here are challenges that 'take us deeper into grief, as 
one teacher once told us, than those of the frrst stage. What this involves is for 
the counsellor to assist the client in 'working through the pain of grief. The 
counsellor should encourage the client to 'actually feel the pain of grief in their 
body', to 'sense the sadness', to 'suffer the loss'. This is deemed important for 
the bereaved person in 'coming to terms with' and 'accepting' what has 
happened. We were told that 'difficult emotions' might stand in the way of this 
and that part of our job here would be to address questions of, for example and in 
particular, anger and guilt. It was stressed that many bereaved people feel intense 
and powerful anger over what has happened, anger that may be directed towards 
everyone and anyone, God, doctors and, most problematically, the deceased 
himself. The problem with that, we were told, is that anger is not an acceptable 
part of bereavement, it is an emotion that the bereft are in no way prepared for. 
Confounded by the taboo on death the grieving would have no preparation as to 
what they will feel and anger is not an emotion that they would associate with 
grief. People therefore often suppress their anger, we were told, and feel guilty 
over feeling angry. This may blend in with a guilt over the death as many 
bereaved people feel gUilty because they think that they are in some ways 
responsible for the death, 'I knew it, something was wrong, if only I had insisted 
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he went to the doctor' an elderly widow may say of her heart-attack victim 
husband. These feelings of anger and guilt, we were told, have to be 
acknowledged, confronted and expressed, otherwise they will simply 'linger on'. 
Feelings of anger and guilt may be part of what many bereaved people experience 
as having 'unfmished businesses' with the deceased. Another task presented to us 
at this stage was that to address and hopefully fmish these businesses. Again, we 
were told, this might be achieved by encouraging the client to reco gnise his 
feelings, to experience and express them. That, we were told, might be necessary 
if the bereaved person is to be able 'to let go' fully of the deceased and emotions 
that have not been 'worked through' which may cause the bereaved to 'hang 
onto' the deceased. Another task presented to us here is to address the bereaved 
person's possible dependence on the dead person. It was pointed out to us that 
continued dependence can restrict the life of the grieving person and cause her to 
carryon behaving as if the deceased person were still alive. Behind these 
observations there seemed to be a sense of it being somehow not normal, not 
healthy, not quite dignified for people to carryon, for long at least, as if the 
deceased was still alive. It would be like people were not willing or ready to take 
charge of their own lives. Sometimes it was implied that the elderly might be 
excused for continuing their lives as they had lived them with their partners for a 
life time, but that younger people should - and that we should encourage them, to 
take hold of their lives and try to live them as they want to. This could be done, 
we were told, by trying to establish, clarify and determine the choices that the 
bereaved person has. This could refer to mundane matters like what to have for 
tea on Saturday nights, and bigger decisions like whether to move out of and sell 
the house 'he bought and you never liked'. We were also told to be mindful of 
the possibility that the client may transfer any dependency needs away from the 
deceased person and onto the counsellor. This the counsellor must discourage 
and counteract because, as it was explained, the nature of the counselling 
relationship is such that it must end and the final aim is that the client can stand 
without the help of the counsellor. 
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To meet and successfully accomplish these tasks, we were told, we would need to 
possess all the skills identified before. In addition counsellors should be able to 
'probe', 'challenge' and 'confront' their clients. To 'probe', 'challenge', or 
'confront' clients requires the counsellor to take a more active role than the use of 
the skills mentioned previously allow. When explaining to us how 'probing', 
'challenging' and 'confronting' works our teachers told us that in counselling 
sessions counsellors can pick up all sorts of things about the client, his feelings 
and experiences, without the client having expressed them. We might have 
'hunches', 'ideas', 'suspicions', 'clues' about where the client was coming from 
or going to, clues which the client may not have articulated or even be aware of 
himself. A counsellor may, for example we were told, 'pick up' a lot of anger 
from a client even as the client does not express this anger or cannot 'place it' 
anywhere. The counsellor may see signs that the anger is in fact directed towards 
the client's dead husband even though the client has not said anything to that 
effect herself. The counsellor may pick up on these 'clues' and 'probe' by asking 
the client if she is angry and against whom the anger is directed. The counsellor 
may then 'challenge' the client more directly by asking, for example: 'Are you 
angry with your husband?' The counsellor may even 'confront' the client more 
directly by saying straight out: 'You are angry with your husband?' 
Probes, challenges and confrontations, we were told, are very powerful and 
potentially dangerous tools. If a challenge is 'spot on' it can be very fruitful and 
open up for the client and the counselling relationship new and previously not 
'explored' 'dimensions'. Here precisely might lie the emotions and the 'issues', 
the 'anger', the 'guilt', the 'resentments' that can keep the client 'stuck' and 
prevent him from 'moving on'. If it fails - and be that because the counsellor is 
wrong or because the client is not 'ready' to acknowledge the counsellors 
suggestion - it can set the counselling relationship back a long way. Accordingly 
probes, challenges and confrontation were presented as somewhat of a preserve 
for the more experienced counsellors and we the newcomers would be advised to 
be careful in using these skills. In particular it was recommended that they were 
not appropriate tools early on in any counselling relationship, that it was only 
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once trust and honesty and rapport had been established between the counsellor 
and the client and a 'safe environment' built, that counsellors could start 
challenging and confronting clients. 
We were sometimes told that during counselling clients might become aware of 
'issues and emotions' that they did not know they were struggling with. A 
possible interpretation of this - and one that would be favoured in the 
anthropology of eillotion for example - is that the issues and emotions in question 
are emergent in the very interactions between counsellor and client. But the 
counsellors that I have spoken with emphasise that the issues and emotions that 
come to the fore during counselling were already there within the client, 'deeply' 
buried, before counselling started. The emphasis on 'depth' here serves to negate 
the possibility that the counsellor may be responsible for creating the client's 
subjectivity. This is also why the counsellor has to listen 'actively'. On the face 
of it the emphasis on 'active listening' would seem to contradict, possibly at least, 
the non-interventionist ideology of Cruse. If the client is to express his emotions 
why would not simply listening be enough? Because it is only by listening actively 
that the issues that do remain 'buried deep inside' the client can be uncovered and 
brought to the surface. Torrie (1987:13), herself, in her book comments of 
Cruse's work: 'Uncovering the needs of widowed families was clearly going to 
lead to a very considerable task.' 
To challenge successfully the counsellor may have to disclose relevant aspects of 
herself to the client. 'Self-disclosure' involves the counsellor letting on to the 
client what she is feeling in order to try and help the client become more aware of 
his own feelings. Here the counsellor may often resort to her own experience, in 
particular if that is in one way or another similar to that of the client. This is not 
unlikely as Cruse clients will often ask for, and get, counsellors who have suffered 
losses similar to those that the client has. A widow may be counselling another 
widow and at some point in the relationship disclose how she felt about some 
particular aspect of her husband's death that seems relevant to what the client is 
relating at that moment. Disclosure is recognised as powerful because counsellors 
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may, in rummaging through their own history, be able to articulate and fmd words 
and metaphors for feelings which the client is having difficulties in expressing and 
thus dealing with. Again, though, we would be warned to be careful about self-
disclosure. On one hand, it can make the client feel that the counsellor is 
appropriating the client's experience and subsuming it under her own. On the 
other, if disclosures become too frequent, it can leave the client feeling that it is 
the counsellor who is the most important person in the relationship and not the 
client. 
Apart from these skills the counsellor must at this stage be able to identify 
changes that the client is undergoing and any problems that may remain. The 
counsellor must be able to evaluate the 'progress' that the client is making and 
this in turn requires detailed knowledge of what can be expected in bereavement 
and what the signs are for 'complicated' or 'abnormal', as some would call it, 
grief. 5 Finally, the counsellor must have the ability to help the client in identifying 
the coping skills that are within the client's reach and at his disposal. This may be 
anything ranging from visiting the neighbours to visiting the gravestone, from 
working on the allotment to writing poetry. What this identifying of coping skills 
is intended to achieve is to encourage the client to greater independence. The 
client, that is, should be encouraged to face his dependency needs, acknowledge 
those but try to overcome them through the use of coping skills. 
If this work is successful the 'counselling process' should move onto the third 
stage, 'coming through'. The tasks here, we were told, are to help the client 
'accept the reality of and come to terms with the loss', to 'say good-bye' to the 
deceased person and 'move on'. Here the bereaved person has to 'withdraw 
emotional investment' from the dead person and 're-invent it in new relationships' 
as we were told. The client has to be encouraged to make plans for the future and 
to resume active involvement in life. The hope is, we were told, that the client 
may so achieve independence and that the counsellor can leave the client as a 
person capable of standing on his own two feet and ready to carryon with his life. 
5 I shall have more to say about Cruse's ideas about grief in next chapter. 
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For this, we were told, the counsellor will have to rely upon all the skills that have 
come in useful for her so far. In addition, she must be willing and able to review 
the pro gress made. She must be ready to reduce the frequency of visits and to 
know how and when to terminate the counselling relationship. Before that she 
lnust prepare the client for the end of counselling and share with him feelings 
about that. 
Some of the skills - paraphrasing, reflecting, summarising, clarifying, challenging _ 
would be demonstrated to us by our teachers in exercises of short counselling 
sessions. One of them would act as the counsellor, the other as the client and the 
counsellor would use every opportunity to demonstrate the skills in question. 
Sometimes we would be asked to identify the skills used and to comment upon 
the performance of the counsellor. Afterwards we would do our own 'pretend 
counselling'. Usually we would be divided into groups of three and take turn in 
acting as a client, a counsellor and an observer. The client would present a real or 
a made up problem to the counsellor who would try and exercise those skills 
appropriate to the situation. The observer would follow proceedings and provide 
the counsellor with. feedback concerning his or her performance. These were 
exercises that we did frequently during the two courses I attended and during the 
on-going training sessions that go on all year round. It was part of the evaluation 
process before we were taken on as probation counsellors that we did exercises 
like these observed by the course leaders. 
I am not able6 to recount here the contents of the exercises I was involved in but 
some of them proved quite powerful. The 'clients' would become quite upset and 
agitated and some of them broke down crying. To give a sense of this I relate a 
fictional exercise from my fieldnotes that in form and content could have been 
real. I wrote it after we had done this type of exercises on the training course. 
Sue and I sat down faCing each other. Between us but somewhat further back 
was Ann, there to 'observe' and 'feed back' to me on my 'counselling'. I 
6 As what was disclosed in these 'pretend counselling' sessions is a personal matter I can not 
describe the contents of these sessions. What is important here is the fonn they took. 
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asked Sue if she was OK, if she was ready to start. She nodded her head. 1 
hesitated a bit, waited for her to start but then asked: 'Sue, what do you want 
to talk about today?' She smiled but then became serious. 'I want to talk 
about when we went on holiday with the family two years ago. Two years 
ago 1 think it was, yes we'd just had our youngest one. We'd, I'd, been very 
busy and felt very tired and we decided we'd go away to a summer camp for 
two weeks to relax.' Sue hesitated for a bit and I, who had restricted my 
contributions so far to nodding my head, said 'yeah'. Sue continued, 'only 1 
found it very difficult to relax,' 'why?' 1 intercepted as she hesitated 
momentarily again. 'I don't quite know, what happened was that the day after 
we arrived I lost the car keys. I still don't quite know what happened but my 
husband was angry because it was the only set and it meant that we were 
stuck in the camp and couldn't go on some outings that he'd planned.' 'And 
you,' I came in, 'how did you feel?' 'I was angry at my husband for not 
having brought another set of keys, for leaving the spare keys at home.' She 
stopped. 'You were angry yo~ said,' 1 trailed off, 'yes,' Sue said, drawing on 
the's', 'but 1 also felt responsible,' 'responsible?' I said, 'yes, for losing the 
keys. 1 did feel very responsible.' Here Sue trailed off and there was silence 
for a moment. Then 1 said 'you said before that you'd just had a new baby 
when this was, 1 wonder if there was any link there?' Sue thought about this 
for a while, then said 'yes. I did feel very kind of overloaded with 
responsibilities with the new baby. My husband was very busy with his work 
and I was left alone with looking after the new baby in addition to our older 
two .. .' (Fieldnotes). 
From this account we can see my attempts at engaging Sue's subjectivity, to 
encourage her to express her emotions and experience. I would 'reflect' and 
'paraphrase', 'ask' and 'probe' in my attempts to get Sue to examine her own 
mind, to focus on her emotions. Though our turns at counselling would only last 
between five and ten minutes they gave us a clear indication of just how 
exhausting an endeavour counselling is. Active listening is not easy to specify, it 
is equally hard to practice. Afterwards when we would gather together the whole 
group to discuss our exercises in terms of what we did well and what not so well, 
there were generally three areas with which people seemed to struggle. Many 
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mentioned that they found it difficult to listen actively while at the same time 
having to think about what to say to the client. They said that they would either 
lose track of what the client was saying while they were thinking about what they 
should say, or that they would not know what to say when the client came to a 
halt because they had been listening too carefully. Others said that they found it 
very difficult to decide if and when to enter the flow of the client's story to 
exercise their skills. They said they realised that they had to make a contribution 
at some point but they felt that, during our pretend counselling, they might have 
actually disrupted the client's flow, halted his expression and done him a 
disservice. Finally some would mention that they were never sure when to 
'lnerely' reflect and paraphrase and when actually to challenge a client. 
Nodding their heads understandingly our mentors tried to give us answers to these 
concerns. They said that with time and practice we would fmd it easier to listen 
and think about our own response at the same time. They added that even if we 
did not hear everything the client said it didn't really matter as much as we might 
expect. We could always admit that we had not heard what the client said and ask 
him to repeat if we thought that what we missed was something vital. They said 
that the same applied to our contributions, that with time and practice we would 
acquire a sense of when it was appropriate to reflect, paraphrase and so on. The 
teachers suggested that we be conservative and quiet and let the client talk when 
he was in good flow. Finally, they recommended that we go easy on the 
challenging. They said that it was a difficult and dangerous thing to use and that 
we should be careful with it. They added that in some ways challenging was not a 
required or an appropriate technique to use in our work. They said that they 
thought that most of our clients came seeking support, understanding and 
someone to listen to them. They were not looking for some 'personal growth' or 
'developing their inner psyche' or anything like that and did not require to be 
challenged very much. 
This sounds somewhat different from what we had been told earlier when our 
tasks were presented as much more organised and programmatic. Having told us 
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that challenging our clients was probably not terribly appropriate or useful, our 
mentors stressed that 'actively listening' was the most important bit of our work. 
We were repeatedly told that if we did that we were guaranteed to do 'no harm 
and probably quite some good. ' Later this suggestion was somewhat 
supplemented by instructions as to what we should listen for and focus on. Focus 
on three things, we were told: 'feelings', 'self (the client) and the 'present'. It 
was explained to us that many people would have a tendency to talk about other 
people and how they are doing, about the past, and about feelings in a kind of a 
'cognised, detached way'. Our job, we were told, was to try and get the client to 
talk about himself rather than other people, to talk about hllnself in the present, 
and not about the past, and to actually talk about, acknowledge and feel his 
feelings rather than talk about, for example, his actions. 'I wonder what that feels 
like for you?' is the defining question, we were told. 
Like the social critics of counselling, Cruse stresses that the subjectivity of its 
clients pre-exists the counselling encounter itself. I hope that I have shown that 
this is not the case. The subjectivity of clients who are being counselled is created 
through the counselling itself. That is the very import of the skills that we as 
trainees were enjoined to master. The point of reflecting, paraphrasing, 
challenging, pro bing, listening actively is to encourage the client to express his 
emotions and to uncover the issues that lie buried inside hlln. As Rose 
(1989b:240) argues: 'In the act of speaking, through the obligation to produce 
words that are true to an inner reality, through the self-examination that precedes 
and accompanies speech, one becomes a subject for oneself.' 
The receptive body 
I am consclOUS of the fact that my descriptions so far have been thoroughly 
logocentric. This is in keeping with how counselling has been presented in the 
social scientific literature where counselling appears as an utterly cerebral activity 
with disembodied voices exchanging words like characters in a late Beckett play. 
Rieff (1966), Lasch (1979), Masson (1989) and even Rose (1989b) in their critical 
150 
The Games We Play 
expositions of psychotherapy and counselling proceed as if the two constitute only 
a meeting of minds. 
That is not quite accurate. It became obvious from our training sessions that 
counselling is an intensely physical activity. Our exhaustion after pretend 
counselling exercises was a very physical exhaustion. During training we would 
be encouraged to look for signs of clients' feelings in the tortuous movements of 
their faces and the convulsions of their body, and we would be alerted to the fact 
that our counselling bodies would send unmistakable signals to our clients about 
our commitment to them. In pretend counselling exercises we would be 
encouraged to strike poses, to assume what I want to term 'the receptive body', a 
body that invites the client to talk but does not force him to do so, a body that 
communicates to our clients our commitment to 'listen actively' to them. 
Our fITst real introduction to the physical side of counselling was carried out when 
our two teachers did an exercise in reading body language. They sat half facing 
each other and half facing us, the participants on the course. One of them closed 
her eyes and, as we were told, imagined some sequence of events that she had 
participated in or witnessed. The other teacher followed her movements and 
afterwards would relate to us all what emotions she had picked up from the body 
language. We added our comments and the teacher who had done the imagining 
without disclosing precisely what she had been 'going through' told us what 
emotions she had experienced. After that we did the same, two against two, one 
imagining, the other observing and trying to read the body language, and then the 
other way around. In between the observer would let out what he had seen and 
the other would explain what he had been feeling and even what he had been 
imagining. 
On this particular occasion7 I joined up with a young woman. Sitting there facing 
each other she closed her eyes first and started on her 'journey' while I watched, 
trying to read the movements of her face. Initially, as her facial muscles slackened 
7 The example, again, is fictional but could, in both fonn and content, be real. 
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and relaxed her face became motionless, almost expressionless, except for the 
incessant dancing of the eyes behind her closed lids. She looked like she was 
asleep. Slowly, imperceptibly, her mouth starting moving, then her cheeks. She 
pressed her eyelids together and frowned. This went on for some time, the 
movement of her eyes sometimes quickening, sometimes dying down. Then she 
opened her eyes and I told her that I thought she had looked very calm in the 
beginning, except for the movement of the eyes. I said that I thought I could pick 
up some tension in the movement around her mouth and the frowning of the 
forehead. I said I thought that whatever was happening it was happening at a 
great pace and that it was not pleasant. There had been, I thought, fear or anxiety 
in her face. My partner told me that she had imagined something that had 
happened to her when she was young and she had been chased by a group of 
children and that, indeed, she had experienced fear and anxiety, but also some 
anger and even a strange sense of excitement. 
The exercises finished, we would gather together the whole group and discuss our 
performances. From the discussions it surfaced how certain physical signs are 
wedded to certain emotions or states of mind. The most general principle, the 
Inost abstract rule, seems to be that, unless they are strictly censored, internal 
disturbances get translated upon the surface of our bodies so that any strong 
feelings will leave their traces in our faces and in the movements of our muscles. 
As we were discussing our exercises people seemed to agree that a relaxed body 
posture was a sign of something pleasant going on behind their closed eyes. In 
particular if the face was 'calm', as one participant put it, the facial muscles 
relaxed, that was a sign that the events experienced were pleasant, or at least not 
unpleasant. Conversely, if the face was not 'calm' its muscles contorted that was 
a sure sign that the experience being relived in the mind was not pleasant. Similar 
interpretations would be put upon such signs as twisting of fmgers, tapping of 
feet, wringing of hands, folding and unfolding of arms, all taken to signify 
discomfort, unpleasantness, 'difficult experiences' as some would have it. What 
the whole process highlighted, though, was just how problematic it can be to 
ascribe defmite, precise emotions to the rather more obvious contortions of the 
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body. So while people would agree that rapid movements of the limbs were in 
general an indication of anxiety, stress, even fear, there was not such a general 
agreement about the meaning of facial movements, if that contortion spelt pain, 
that sadness, this fear, that hurt. Interestingly what would be termed 'positive' 
emotions seemed easier to decipher, or maybe it was simply that there wasn't the 
SaIne tendency to distinguish between them and defme them as there appeared to 
be with the more 'negative' ones listed above. Our teachers would acknowledge 
this difficulty and said that the most important thing was not whether we were 
absolutely right, precise and accurate about the emotions we picked up from our 
clients and reflected back to them. Rather, it was that we picked up unstated 
feelings and communicated them to our client which was for them an opportunity 
to reflect upon that feeling and consider how well, or not, it matched their own 
emotional states. 
The bodily aspect of counselling is not restricted to the client. Bereavement 
counsellors, especially the women, are extremely tactile people. When the 
training courses I attended started, the people who organised them, the people 
who knew each other already, would hug and kiss upon seeing each other for the 
evenings' meetings. As time wore on and we the participants got to know each 
other some of the female participants on the courses had taken up the habit which 
they would continue as our courses fmished and the regular training took over. 
Yet, 'touch' has a very peculiar place in bereavement counselling. We would be 
told that it was a very natural tendency to touch, hold the hand of, or lay your 
arms around someone who is in distress, someone who is, for example, crying. It 
is, we were told, a mark of your concern, your sympathy. Still, they would add, 
touching a client is maybe not necessarily to be recommended. Touching may be 
risky because the client may ascribe to it sexual overtures and land the counsellors 
in trouble over issues of sexual harassment. Touching may also undermine the 
counsellor's attempts to establish and clarify the nature of the counselling 
relationship. Touching is something that friends and family do, and what people 
who stand in a professional relationships akin to that of a lawyer and a client do 
not do. Most importantly, though, touching someone when they are crying may 
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m fact send all the wrong signals. Touching may be a sign to the client that they 
should 'pull themselves together' and stop crying. That is absolutely counter to 
the very aim of bereavement counselling and does nothing, we were told, but to 
enforce the messages that many bereaved people receive from friends, relatives 
and indeed everyone around them, that it was about time the tears stopped now. 
In training we would regularly do exercises wherem we were encouraged to strike 
poses and assume what I want to call 'the receptive body'. One day during the 
second course I attended we were introduced to what the teachers called SOLER , 
techniques, they said, to communicate to the client our 'basic attendmg'. SOLER 
refers to the body postures we were encouraged to adopt in order to invite the 
client to talk. SOLER signifies acceptance and empathy, we were told, but they 
are not mtended to 'force' the client to talk. We were encouraged to adopt 
SOLER positions at the beginning of counselling sessions in the future. 
In explainmg the SOLER positions to us our teachers said that S refers to facing 
the person you are listening to Squarely. To bring home the point of this we were 
made to do an exerc,ise that involved us, the trainees, lining up in two rows facing 
each other so that each and everyone of us was facing one other person. The 
teachers then asked us to move in as close as we could get. When we were 
literally m each others faces they asked us how this felt and all the people 
answered without exception 'horrible'. Then they asked us to move apart m 
order to fmd the distance with which we were both comfortable. This varied from 
couple to couple and our teachers pointed out this fact, saying that during 
counselling we would have to fmd out what distance was comfortable to both us 
and the client. They added that in counselling counsellor and client should face 
each other. They said that it was probably best if the two did not face each other 
directly so that their fields of vision would not overlap completely. This, they 
added, would force the counsellor and the client to look at each other all the time 
and that may not necessarily be beneficial as it puts too much pressure on the 
client to talk. 
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0, they continued, is to adopt an Open position. The open position means what it 
says, to adopt it you do not cross your legs, you do not fold your arms on your 
chest and, in general, you do not 'cuddle up in yourself'. The importance of this, 
it was explained, is that the open position signals to the client that you are 
listening and, crucially, 'taking in' what he is saying. It suggests, moreover, we 
were told, that you can in fact 'take in' and 'handle' whatever the client is saying. 
It suggest that you accept the client and what he has to say is not too much for 
you and therefore, by iInplication, this should not necessarily be too much for him. 
The closed position, on the other hand, sends the clear message that you are not 
interested in what the client is saying. Not interested, the teachers continued, or 
that you cannot take it in. By 'curling up into yourself' you refuse to 'absorb' it, 
it 'bounces off you and 'hits the client back in the face', telling him that what he 
has to say is too 'unbearable' for you and, therefore, anyone to take on. 
L is to Lean towards the person you are listening to. What is involved here, we 
were told, is that you move the upper part of your body a little bit forward, 
slightly towards the person you are listening to, especially when he is talking. 
This signals that you are actively listening to what the client is saying, attending to 
the messages he is communicating. 
E is for offering good eye contact. The teachers explained that we should always 
'offer' the client eye contact but never 'force' it upon her. Here the position of 
the chairs while counselling is important. We were advised that we should not 
arrange the chairs so that they were directly opposite each other but slightly off-
centre from each other. This way, the teachers explained, the client can easily 
have contact with the counsellors eyes, they are always there on 'offer', but she 
can also inconspicuously look away and decline the 'offer' of eye contact if she so 
feels. One of the teachers explained that research suggests it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to talk and look someone constantly in the eyes at the same time. She 
added that looking into someone's eyes after you have finished your turn in the 
conversation is a cue to them that it is 'their turn'. She added that while 
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counsellors should always 'offer' eye contact it was perfectly acceptable for us to 
look away while we search for 'our words'. 
R, fmally, stands for Remain Relatively Relaxed. Assume a 'relaxed position', our 
teachers said, don't clench your fISts, don't shake your legs about and do let your 
shoulders drop. To adopt a relaxed position, it was explained to us, is important 
because it indicates that we are in fact relaxed with the situation, that we are 
cOlnfortable and 'accept' the client and what he has to say. Tension signals 
discomfort, discomfort that the client can all too easily ascribe to his presence. 
The importance and the uses of assuming the receptive body was reinforced to us 
through numerous counselling exercises. We would now be encouraged to 
practice not only basic counselling skills, to 'listen actively' and focus on 'self, 
elnotion, and the present', but to adopt the bodily postures of the SOLER. To 
give a sense of this I relate another account from my fieldnotes composed the 
evening after we had done the exercises on our training course. 
As I and Kate sat down 1 took care to move my chair a little bit so that it 
faced Kate's chair more or less directly, but not quite. I took a couple of deep 
breaths and made sure my shoulders were relaxed, my arms were not folded 
and my legs straight. Leaning forward slightly 1 asked Kate' are you ready?' 
'Yes', she said and I asked her 'what do you want to talk about?' Kate kept 
her arms folded, her legs crossed. She said slowly, looking away as she 
looked for her words: 'Last night, I'd had a very busy, stressful day and I 
wanted to relax with a couple of gin and tonics. Only, when 1 was going to 
get the gin it was gone.' Kate stopped for a moment and 1 asked 'how did that 
make you feel?' leaning slightly more forward as I did so. 'Angry', Kate said 
looking me in the eyes. 'Angry?' I asked again leaning forward as 1 put the 
question and offering eye contact all the time. Kate looked away and shifted 
her legs before she continued. 'I knew my son had taken the bottle,' she said, 
'without telling me, he was at home from the university over the weekend.' 
Kate trailed off again, looked at me and then at her hands. 'So,' I said once 
more moving forward in my chair but eyes wandering as I continued 'you 
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were at home last night and you wanted to 'relax' with some gin and tonic 
only to find out that your son had taken the gin bottle which made you 
'angry'?' 1 looked at Kate. 'Yes,' she said, 'my son had been at home over 
the weekend and 1 like that but he kind of expects me to do a lot for him when 
he's at home. And he doesn't ask.' Kate looked at me and I nodded my head, 
adding a 'uhm'. 'And that makes you angry?' 1 asked. 'Yes, it irritates me,' 
Kate answered. 'I mean I don't really mind doing things for him, or him 
taking the gin, it's just 1 think he could ask, not take it for granted.' Kate 
stopped again, looked at me, then at her hands, unfolded her arms and then 
folded them again. 1 noticed that her shoulders were perched. 'How,' 1 said 
after some hesitation 'does it make you feel to be angry with your son?' 
While formulating the question I'd looked a way, in putting it to Kate 1 turned 
to her again, opening my arms out slightly. Kate hesitated. Then she said 
'well, it's not nice. 1 mean I know he misses his dad and all, but so do 1'. 
There were tears in her eyes. 
Bourdieu (1977), in an attempt to move beyond the dichotomies of subjectivism 
and objectivism, has emphasised the importance of how people 'embody' their 
cultural ideas and social norms. Bourdieu's (1977) concept of the 'habitus' refers 
to the habitual, enduring bodily postures and movements that people, mostly 
unconsciously, adopt as part of their upbringing and social position. It is worth 
pointing out here that while most bereavement counsellors are of the middle 
classes, many of their clients are of working class origin. This is important 
because the 'receptive body' is essentially a middle class body, a body whose 
movements and contours have been mastered and refined (I return to this issue in 
the following chapter). 
Having added the receptive body to our repertoire our counselling skills took on a 
different dimension. The counselling skills, the reflecting, paraphrasing, and 
challenging are of course in themselves bodily (see Gisli PcHsson 1994) but they 
seemed to come together in the receptive body. Reflecting becomes somehow 
more 'natural' when it is accompanied by facing the client squarely, with a 
relaxed, open body, leaning forward offering eye contact. Through repeated 
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practices assuming the SOLER positions becomes 'natural', or 'habitual', too in 
the sense that we the trainees seemed to adopt them without assuming them. I 
was reminded of this recently. Having now started counselling myself I found 
Inyself suddenly in the middle of a counselling session realising that I had, 
unintentionally, leaned forward in the open position offering my client eye 
contact. 
What is the significance of all this? Counsellors I spoke with said that before a 
counselling session they would always try 'to gather themselves together'. They 
described how they would try to sit still, close their eyes and attempt to 'empty 
their mind' of all her concerns. After that, they said, they would assume the 
SOLER positions. The counsellors said that through all this they strove to 
becOlne like a 'still pond' in which the client could examine his own reflection. 
'Why not a mirror then?' I asked. 'Because,' one of them said 'the reflection 
Inustn't be perfect.' She explained that for the reflection to be useful something 
had to be added. The 'ripples on even a still pond' add something to the 
reflection that 'allow' the client to see himself in a different light. Here, I suggest, 
the counsellor and the client meet in body, as it were. For the ideas and 
understanding that inform how counsellors read their clients' bodies are the same 
ideas and ideals that they try and attain before and during counselling. Twisted 
and tortured bodies reflect troubled emotions, relaxed bodies reflect relaxed inner 
life. And so if a relaxed body is the posture the counsellor should aim to reach in 
order to best help her client, at the same time it is the aim that the client should 
strive to reach. All the time the relaxed body of the counsellor is the image that 
she offers the client to measure his progress against. 
Shifting the burden: The counselling relationship 
So is the counsellor a pond in which the client can examine his reflection? It is 
interesting to think of this metaphor in terms of the spatial relationships that it 
represents. Recall the classic picture of psychoanalysis where the patient lies on a 
couch with the analyst sitting in an arm chair behind and out of the view of the 
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client. According to the pond metaphor the client would bend over the 
counsellor, searching in the ripples the contours of his image. The metaphor is 
not quite accurate, as may be clear from the discussion above. In counselling the 
client and the counsellor sit on the same level more or less facing each other. 
These spatial arrangements represent presumed differences in power. In 
psychoanalysis the analyst is very much in charge, in counselling the client should 
be in charge. The person-centred approach, and Cruse perhaps in particular, 
advocate an anti-expertise ethos stressing, as I will detail in the following chapter, 
that 'the client is the expert.' The point was brought home to us in various 
exercises, pretend counselling and in the introductions, I related before. I 
reproduce the account from my fieldnotes from earlier on: 
I turn to Margaret who is sitting next to me. I know Margaret already and 
know that she has been a bereavement counsellor for some time now. I ask 
her how her day was. She replies that she is just back to college now in the 
autumn and that she feels there is too much to do right now, she feels 
'overwhelmed' with the work at college and everything else she has to do. I 
listen. Margaret then asks me what sort of day I had. I reply that it had been 
a very long day, with the teaching I had to do and then the long journey to the 
course. 
Here we were enjoined to take, in turns, up the positions of a counsellor and a 
client, bringing forcefully home the point how short a distance is between the two. 
Having disclosed ourselves to our partner we were expected to work the same on 
them. 'What was your day like?' we were to ask them, giving them the 
opportunity to elaborate upon what or how they were feeling. So the counsellor 
is to invite the client to dwell on and discuss their feelings, the events that have 
befallen them and what those meant to the clients. But if the counselling 
relationship is not supposed to be hierarchical, not at least in favour of the 
counsellor, we were still told that it should be professional. It was stressed again 
and again that counselling is not like friendship or family relationship, but 
professional like that of a doctor and a patient. Most importantly the counselling 
relationship has an explicit aim and it is, even if often longstanding, temporary. 
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In training we were told repeatedly, in accordance with the client-centred 
approach (see Mearns and Thorne 1988), that a good counselling relationship is 
instrumental to counselling success. That relationship should be based on trust 
and honesty sOlnetimes expressed in the phrase that the counselling relationship 
had to be a 'safe environment' for the client to 'explore' his emotions in. The 
building blocks of that 'environment' are the three core conditions of congruence, 
unconditional positive regard, and empathy. These we have to offer the client, we 
were told, all the time. Now anthropologists have, since Marcel Mauss' (1990 
[1950]) classic account of The Gift, pointed out the importance of exchange in the 
establishment and maintenance of social relationships and it can be asked here: 
what does the client offer the counsellor then? Another observation from the 
anthropolo gy of exchange is that every society has its rules about what can be 
exchanged for what (see Agnar Helgason and Gisli Palsson 1997). Even here in 
the West where such a generalised medium of exchange as money operates, there 
are still certain things that cannot be exchanged for money, neither morally nor 
legally. In Cruse counselling, clients cannot reward their counsellors by, say, 
sexual favours, by becoming their friends, by offering to do the garden or the 
shopping for them. At least, the counsellor would be expected to turn those 
offers down, firmly. 
In professional counselling practice clients pay, perhaps amongst other things, 
money. Cruse counsellors though do not get paid for their work, and so what do 
they get? In answering this allow me to go back once more to the introductions 
exercise I did with Margaret. It is important here that after we had had our goes 
on 'each other' our disclosures were then repeated in front of the whole group. 
There is something mildly disturbing about having your, if not too intimate, 
feelings about the sort of day you've had repeated in front of a group of thirty 
virtual strangers who are all watching you. You feel, or so I did, intensely self-
conscious on an occasion like this. But if the experience was slightly disturbing it 
was also quite powerful. It was powerful because of the enlarged audience, 
because that audience was similarly being exposed, and because of the reactions 
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to those exposures. 'Thank you for sharing this,' the course leader would say, 
indicating that your feelings were both valid and valuable. Here was of course a 
lTIodel for us depicting how we, too, should treat our future clients' feelings as 
valid and valuable. Simultaneously the future behaviour of our client, their 
groping for the meaning of their emotions, was being normalised. If we did it 
during our introductions so why not they. 
If it was disturbing to have yourself thus revealed in front of a group of complete 
strangers, it was even more unnerving to have to disclose the feelings of others to 
the same group of the same strangers. There was a feeling that your incipient 
counselling skills were, prematurely, on display here. So I felt anyway and so did 
at least some of the other participants who I spoke to later during our coffee 
break. Still, this was not the biggest worry, as these same participants confrrmed 
to me. What they felt most intensely was the weight of responsibility of having to 
introduce someone, represent someone and their feelings, in front of the whole 
group. 'Was I being truthful to Margaret's feelings? Did I represent her in the 
way she would have represented herself? Did I grasp what she was telling me?' 
So I mused and ~orried in my mind and in my fieldnotes later, reflecting 
retrospectively on my experience and my performance. In the same vern 
participants on the course could be heard, once the exercise was completed, 
asking their partners 'was this OK?' 
What we were being treated to, what was, secretly almost, being instilled in us, 
was an early appreciation of the enormous responsibility that counsellors have, 
according to counsellors themselves, towards their clients. It is the frrst task of 
the counsellor, we would be told later and over and over again, and, in a way their 
primary responsibility, to get to know their clients. Counsellors must always try 
and understand their clients. Simultaneously this sense of responsibility is tinged 
with a feeling of privilege of having been made privy to such intimate details. I 
certainly felt, warmly, trusted when Margaret was willing to reveal to me her 
sense of being 'overwhelmed'. Other participants on the two courses would 
communicate to me similar feelings of privilege having performed exercises like 
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the one described above. During training we were constantly encouraged to feel 
and acknowledge this sense of privilege. 'Thank you for sharing this,' the course 
leaders would say when someone had made a contribution of the personal kind. 
This we were encouraged to do later to our own clients. And this, at last, is what 
the client offers the counsellor: the privilege to share in his deepest emotions and 
thoughts. 
There is, imaginably, something perverse about this practice in as much as it 
construes the client as the giver and the counsellor as the receiver in this 
exchange. This, though, would be to misconceive the matter. Acknowledging the 
sense of privilege of being made privy to such intimate matters works to establish 
the nature of the relationship between the client and the counsellor precisely as 
Cruse wants it to be constructed. The counsellor is present here not as the 
authoritative dispenser of expertise, for the reception of which the client should be 
thankful, but as, more or less I suppose, any ordinary individual who should feel 
privileged for having been trusted with very intimate details of personal life. The 
client, likewise, is not presented as a weak, confused, disabled individual without 
authority, but exactly as the expert in his own matters, as someone who has 
something valuable to give and for whose gifts the counsellor should be thankful. 
This too seems to reinforce the sense of equality that Cruse seeks to create in the 
counselling relationship. As anthropologists have, again since Mauss (1990 
[1950]) pointed out, exchange is a medium through which hierarchy and 
inequality in relationships, or the lack there of, can be expressed. Construing the 
contributions and offerings of the client as valuable seems to prevent the 
relationship from becoming asymmetrical in favour of the counsellor. 
Yet, this construction of the counselling relationship as sliding in favour of the 
client is deeply ambivalent. It is after all the counsellor who sets the rules of the 
counselling engagement in the fIrst place. These we were encouraged to establish 
at the very start of the counselling relationship, to set down the nature of the 
relationship, the nature and duration of the counselling encounter itself and so on. 
While counsellors may be encouraged to let the client be in control of the 
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counselling sessions, the nature of the relationship is defmed and determined by 
the counsellor. 
At the same time, though, Cruse seems to think about this series of exchanges in a 
different way. Talk of us, the counsellors, having to be able to 'take', 'hold', 
'handle' and 'bear' our clients' stories was reinforced by references to the clients' 
having to 'get things off their chest', 'let it all out', 'tell their story again and 
again', 'share the pain' and so on. What this suggests is an image of an exchange 
whereby the client attempts, if only partially and temporarily, to shift some of his 
burden onto the counsellor. It is recognised that sometimes the 'burden' may 
become too much for counsellors to bear in which case counsellors may suffer 
'burn-out'. To counteract this counsellors have supervision wherein they, in turn, 
have the chance to shift their 'burden' onto the supervisor. In my experience as a 
counsellor Cruse supervision is infused with the same person-centredness as 
Cruse counselling. Yet in the Cruse literature, as I related in the last chapter, the 
jo b of the supervisor is described in exceedingly professional terms and the 
supervisor established as a figure of authority. If the counsellor listens to the 
client in an attempt to establish where the client is 'coming from', the supervisor 
is entrusted to actually 'give the counsellor advice' to 'direct' her in her work, to 
dispense his expert knowledge for her benefit. The difference is striking but can 
be explained by the different places the two occupy in the line of exchange. While 
the counsellor stands in the middle and can shift his 'burden' onto the supervisor, 
the supervisor stands at the end and can in fact not shift her 'burden' anywhere. 
But the supervisor has the expert knowledge to 'deal' with the 'burden' and 
'work through' the issues that are there bundled together. 
Subjectivities 
While the foregoing account of the link between subjectivity, counselling and 
power, may have indicated that clients enter counselling devoid of any subjectivity 
themselves, that is of course not the case. Clients enter counselling tangled in 
their various relationships with other people, burdened by their own histories, the 
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very things that make up subjectivity. Their relationships, their histories and, 
hence, their subjectivities are as different, I suspect, as those of my interviewees 
whose stories I relate in chapters 6 and 7. Neither, of course, does bereavement 
counselling spell the end of clients' subjectivities, as if these were completely 
taken over by counselling. 
But to track the subjectivites of clients before, through and after counselling 
would have required a Ph.D. research on its own. It would also, I believe, have 
required me to sit in on counselling sessions, which I deemed both unethical and 
impractical as I explained in the introduction. My more modest aim here, 
particularly in this chapter and the next, is to try to show the potentially 
transformative work of bereavement counselling, and, in chapters 6 and 7, to 
indicate how that may be at odds with the experiences of bereaved people. 
While I did not, for both ethical and practical reasons, observe any counselling 
sessions I have some, though limited, experience of working as a counsellor 
Inyself, and I have collected many accounts by counsellors of counselling sessions 
and counselling relationships. While all counselling sessions and all counselling 
relationships are, no doubt, different, there appears from the accounts that I have 
collected something of a pattern. In the beginning of a counselling relationship, 
during the fITst few sessions when the counsellor is busy earning the client's trust, 
the client will often be busy with telling the story of his bereavement. Counsellors 
think that it is important that they pay heed to those stories because, they say, the 
client will feel a need to tell the story so that he can all the better make sense of it 
himself; and because it gives the counsellor the chance to get the picture of the 
client's various involvements with other people that may be affecting his grief. 
Mter that though, counsellors will start to try to move the counselling more 
towards the feelings of the client, using the various counselling techniques 
described in this chapter and the next. Counsellors feel, according to what they 
told me and according to the training I myself received, that it is usually not 
enough for the client to tell their story, that the exploration of emotions is 
iInportant too. Counsellors have told me that they sometimes have clients that 
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seem to have become 'stuck' in their own story, which they repeat, without much 
alteration, session after session. The same counsellors have told me that this is an 
issue that they would bring up during supervision. While Cruse, in accordance 
with its client-centered approach, acknowledges that some clients may have no 
other need than to tell their story, and while it is respectful of clients' possible 
resistance to exploring emotions, supervisors will usually, according to what I 
have been told, recommend that the counsellor at least try to help the client to 
focus on his or her feelings. I suspect that the emphasis on this has increased in 
recent years and some counsellors have told me that they are doing this earlier in 
their counselling relationships than they used to. The reason is that some local 
branches have now, due to increasing demand for counselling, set up - a 
negotiable - limit of six sessions for each client. 
If clients may resist exploring their emotions by sticking to their stories, 
bereavement counselling itself has recently acknowledged that some clients may 
have needs other than those best met by exploring their emotions. While I argue 
in this thesis that bereavement counselling teaches that death severs the bond 
between the deceased and the bereaved, and that the focus of counselling tends to 
be upon the emotions of the bereaved, it is right to point out that bereavement 
counselling is not uniform in this regard. In particular, recent years have seen an 
increased interest in the 'continuing bond' between the deceased and the bereaved 
as evidenced in a book of that title edited by Klass, Silverman and Nickman 
(1996). Kathy Hunt (1998) has, moreover, argued recently that grief can be 
located not iust inside the individual mourner, but in fact everywhere. These ideas 
are though still, I feel justified in saying (see Walter 1996), a concern of a 
minority within bereavement counselling. Cruse, my principal example, is very 
much concerned with exploring clients' feelings and teaches that at death the bond 
between the living and the dead is, if not over, so fundamentally altered that it 
might as well be. During my training as bereavement counsellor we were 
repeatedly encouraged to help the client to focus on 'emotion-self-present' as it 
would be put and were made to do exercises in pretend counselling for exactly 
that purpose. In addition to this, it can be mentioned, that Worden's (1991) book 
165 
The Games We Play 
on grief counselling was frequently described during training as 'Cruse's Bible'. 
According to Worden the 'tasks of mourning' involve severing the bond between 
the living and the dead, and experiencing and expressing the emotional pain that 
bereavement causes. 
I began this chapter by suggesting that in counselling the client's subjectivity(ies) 
is, far from being suppressed as the social scientific treatment of counselling so far 
has suggested, engaged, encouraged, and actively sought. I have described the 
skills and the relationships that we the counsellors were, through training, 
enjoined to master in order for us to help our clients. The exercises of 
introductions and endings are indicative of how we were encouraged to help our 
clients to impose 'meaning' onto an otherwise chaotic world. They speak of how 
we were encouraged to help the client to uncover his own subjectivity by focusing 
upon self, emotions and the present. In doing this my account has been influenced 
by Foucault's (1978) notion of power as productive and of Rose's (l989b) 
application of Foucault's ideas. While the notion that power is productive, rather 
than oppressive, is fruitful it is also slightly misleading, I believe. For in 
producing certain subjectivities certain other subjectivities that could have been 
produced are, in a sense, suppressed. In bereavement counselling, that is, the 
relationship between subjectivity and power is even more complex than Foucault's 
notion allows us to gather. How and why are questions pursued in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Experts of the Ordinary:1 
Grief, Confabulation, and Communities of Practice 
'A guided tour' 
It is a glorious evening in early June. There are about thirty of us gathered 
together in the hospice for the bereavement counselling course. This is the 
sixth time we meet, gathering together in what they call 'the upper lounge' 
where we sit, in oddly assembled arm chairs, presents to the hospice from 
charitable local businesses, in four or five irregular semi-circles that have their 
centre in the flip pad by which are stood our two teachers. One of whom now 
continues. To help us to get to know what happens to people with loss, our 
teacher says, she invites us to do 'a guided tour'. She emphaSises 'guided 
tour' with the kind of voice the guy who does all the voice overs on the movie 
trailers uses when he wants to get people suitably perplexed, mystified and 
curious, curious enough to come and see the movie. She asks us all to close 
our eyes and imagine that we are in a huge shopping centre. We have just done 
all our shopping and are taking it to our car in the car park when we find out 
that we have lost our car keys. She asks: 'What do you feel?' The people 
around me obediently close their eyes and so do I. I find myself in the 
Metrocentre and notice on my left hand side the cafe, where I once enjoyed a 
1 Experts of the ordinary is a wilful corruption of two of Nikolas Rose's (1989b:244-5) phrases. 
In constructing a four part typology of psychotherapists, or counsellors, Rose talks about 'experts 
of the mundane' and 'experts of fmitude'. The former, according to Rose, help people to deal 
with such, yes, mundane matters as debts and payments, housing and domestic responsibilities. 
The latter, on the other hand, help people come to terms with the very questions of the meaning 
of life as it were, death and its consequences. Experts of the ordinary carries an argument that 
should become evident in what follows, namely that Cruse's conception of grief is a dedicated 
attempt to construe death and bereavement as natural, ordinary events and processes. The 
chapter is an attempt to describe how Cruse's teaching captures this understanding and the 
consequences it bas regarding the counsellors' relationship with their clients. 
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rather nice cup of coffee filled to the brim with stiffly whipped cream. That is 
all I feel now, a distinct longing for coffee. I open my eyes and look around me 
and see that the other members of the group have kept their eyes closed. Some 
of them are sitting perfectly still while others wring their hands rather 
anxiously. Some of them hold their heads up high as if they are looking into 
the distance, others bow their heads as if they are staring into their navels. 
(Fieldnotes) . 
Introduction 
Cruse advocates and employs in its work a number of different theories about the 
course of bereavement, the nature of grief and the needs of mourners. These 
theories Cruse has adopted from the world of academia, mostly from the field of 
psycholo gy and they are variously called upon as explanations, justifications, 
legitimisation for Cruse's work during training and supervision. Still, as I detailed 
somewhat in the last chapter, these theories are not the most telling aspect of 
Cruse's approach to grief, not at least that of those members of Cruse who have 
been IllOSt involved ,and responsible for my own training. Their approach to grief 
says firstly that grief is an 'ordinary, natural experience' instigated by what is an 
inescapable fact of life: 'loss'; and secondly that each grief is a unique and 
individual experience, something that we all go through in our own way. In 
addition to this Cruse adheres to the person centred approach to counselling 
instigated by Carl Ro gers. But if you assert that each grief is unique how do you 
then go about counselling people in bereavement? And how, indeed, does one 
train and motivate people to carry out such counselling? I shall argue that this is 
achieved by grounding a sense of individual differences in the experiences of the 
trainees themselves, in a process that can be termed 'situated learning' (Lave and 
Wenger 1991); and through 'confabulation' (Carrithers 1995) giving these a 
narrative structure that offers a sense of direction and coherence. Along the way, 
I shall continue, you invite them to join what Jean Lave (Lave and Wenger 1991) 
calls 'communities of practice'. In discussing and analysing how these matters are 
negotiated I focus on the 'guided tour' to show how during it, and similar 
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exerCISes, we were enjoined to assume different positions both along the 
counselling relationship and in the end allowed to become experts of the ordinary. 
Gathering to gether the ethno graphy related here and in last chapter and by using 
insights from the anthropology of emotion, the anthropology of the person and 
Foucault's (1988) notion of 'technologies of the self' I shall attempt to show how 
Cruse's work draws sustenance from what can be called (see Kirckpatrick and 
White 1985) an English 'ethnopsychology' of the emotions and the person to 
focus its work upon the self, emotion and the present. I shall attempt to show 
how this bereavement counselling seeks to return the bereaved individual back to 
the state prescribed as 'normal' in English 'ethnopsychology' and bereavement 
counselling. 
I shall argue, [mally, that bereavement counselling is an example of what Foucault 
(1988) calls 'technologies of the self'. I argue too that as such it is part of the 
governmentality of contemporary Britain that seeks to govern its individuals 
through their desires, wants and wishes. Such a governmentality, I conclude, 
requires that the self be laid open, its terrain chartered, through such technologies 
as, for example, bereavement counselling. 
First, though, what are the theories upon which Cruse draws but at the same time 
defines its work against? 
Loss: the stages, faces and tasks of grief 
On the second evening on one of the training courses our teacher told us that 
tonight she was going to talk about 'loss'. Our teacher stood by a flip chart at the 
further end of the room. We, the trainees, sat in an almost perfect circle around 
her. Looking at us she began by saying that everything, every experience, life 
simply, is loss, involves loss. Looking at the flip chart and then back at us she 
asked us to give examples of different types of losses. We were slightly perplexed 
and coy. The experienced counsellors who were there with us clearly knew what 
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was going on and one of them replied 'loss of job'. 'Loss of job,' the teacher 
repeated, 'thank you Julia,' and wrote job on the flip pad chart. 'Y ou can lose 
power,' someone else added and the teacher wrote that on the flip pad. Slowly 
people were getting the hang of this and so more people offered examples of 
losses. Some people were bolder than others and had more than one suggestion 
to make, some did not suggest anything. The suggestions were written up in 
orderly rows and bold, large letters on the flip pad, something like this for all of us 
to see: 
job parts of the body 
power will to live 
self-esteem dignity 
confidence status 
appetite purpose 
home smell 
pets taste 
possessions 
An exercise like this, whereby the ideas and the experiences of the participants 
were actively sought were a feature of the two courses that I undertook and of 
the regular training that I now attend. The exercises would be followed by a 
short, or sometimes a long, talk by one of the teachers and this night was no 
exception. Our teacher sat down and started by saying that academics now agree 
that grief is a 'natural reaction to loss'. She continued that there are many 
different theories about the course and nature of grief and explained how earlier 
theories tended to conceive of grief as composed of phases or stages through 
which, more or less, all bereaved people would have to go. Our teacher added 
that the most famous stage model in the death business was probably that put 
forward by Elizabeth Kubler-Ross (1970) in her by now almost legendary On 
Death and Dying. There Kubler-Ross postulated that those dying of terminal 
illness will go through five emotional stages. Upon receiving diagnosis they will, 
Kubler-Ross argued, go through a denial and refuse to accept the verdict they 
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have been handed. When the patient begins to accept the diagnosis denial gives 
way to anger as the patient begins to question why he has been handed this cruel 
fate. As anger subsides bargaining begins during which the patient may attempt 
to strike deals with God or whoever, promising whatever in return for a cure or 
maybe a bit more time. But as bargaining is seen not to work the stage is set for 
depression to move in. Depression, but only in some cases Kubler-Ross was 
careful to point out, gives way to acceptance, a peace of mind in face of what is 
to come (see Walter 1994:70-1). 
Our teacher told us that Kubler-Ross's stage model had been hugely influential 
and had indeed been adapted to the emotional process of mourning as well as that 
of the dying (see Walter 1994:78). Our teacher continued that Colin Murray 
Parkes who is now the president of Cruse, she added, and a leading authority on 
grief, set out three stages through which the grieving process passes. Parkes, our 
teacher said, says that grief starts with numbness which then gives place to pining 
which then leads to disorganisation and despair, and it is only after the stage of 
disorganisation that recovery, or reintegration occurs (see Parkes 1986[1972]:27; 
Walter 1994:78). 
Our teacher continued by saying that many people now doubted the neat linear, 
stages theories of grief. She said that many people felt that grief was so complex 
and the experience of it so individual that the notion of stages could not possibly 
capture that variety. 2 She said that many people in Cruse like Worden's (1991) 
notion of the tasks of grieving.3 She explained that the ftrst task of grieving, 
2 Our teachers are not alone in their opposition to stage models of grief. Herman Feifel, who 
back in 1959 with his edited volume on The Meaning of Death did a lot to establish the study of 
death as a respectable subject in America, says in 1988: 'We should beware of promulgating a 
coercive orthodoxy of how to mourn' (Feifel 1988:3). Feifel explains that in 'the last analysis, 
an 'appropriate' mourning is one that is acceptable to or tolerated by the mourner, not one so 
designated by either the helping professions, significant others, or the community. Individual 
differences and respect for personhood must be our principal guides' (Feifel 1988:3). Feifer s 
paper was published in Bereavement Care, 'an international journal for those who help 
bereaved people', as it says on the cover, that is published by Cruse, one of which present editors 
is Colin Murray Parkes, and that would be presented, along with a selection of grief therapy 
books, on a table during our monthly training meetings with Cruse. 
3 Worden was frequently referred to during training. On at least one occasion his book was 
called 'The Bible of Cruse'. 
171 
Experts of the Ordinary 
according to Worden (cf Worden 1991:10-18), is to 'accept the reality of loss'. 
Worden suggests that there are three varieties of 'not believing'. The bereaved 
person can deny the fact of loss by not accepting that the deceased is dead. 
Certain external circumstances can encourage this, for example if the dead body is 
not recovered, or, even, if the dead body is not viewed by the bereaved person. 
But even if the bereaved accepts the fact of loss she can deny the meaning of loss. 
She can deny the impact of the loss, downplay the importance of her relationship 
with the dead person and ignore the effects that the cessation of that relationship 
has. Finally, the bereaved person can deny that death is irreversible. While 
taking on board the fact that the deceased has died and the mearting of this, the 
bereaved may still hold out the eventuality that the death is not final and 
irreversible, that sometimes, somewhere they will indeed meet again. 
Our teacher stressed that there is a difference between 'intellectual and emotional 
acceptance' (see Worden 1991:12). She said that people can accept the reality of 
loss and in all of their outward behaviour show that they have understood and 
accepted that fact without actually feeling any of the feelings that are associated 
with grief. Here, she continued, we encounter Worden's second task of grieving, 
that of 'working through the pain of grief. She said that it is important that 
people actually experience the pain of grief, that they 'feel the pain' only in that 
way will the loss become 'really real', only that way can the bereaved 'emotionally 
accept the loss'. Having 'worked through the pain of grief, our teacher 
continued, the bereaved person can set upon task three, 'adjusting to an 
environment in which the deceased is missing'. She said that when we are talking 
about long lasting relationships like marriage, for example, people's identity can 
be so intimately bound up with that of the deceased that death is not just a loss of 
a 'significant other' but also a loss of a 'sense of self. If the bereaved person can 
'adjust to the new environment', our teacher continued, the bereaved person can 
tackle task number four and 'emotionally relocate the deceased and move on with 
life', and 'invest in new relationships'. This would involve, we were told, fmding 
a place for the dead that does not exclude others, being able to keep alive the 
memory of the dead person without that coming between the bereaved person and 
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any other persons she might want to establish relationships with. The teacher 
continued by saying that Worden (cf. 1991:9-10) maintains that it is necessary for 
the bereaved person to carry out the tasks of mourning following a loss in order 
to re-establish 'normality' or 'equilibrium'. Mourning, says Worden, is not 
complete until these tasks have been completed and incomplete mourning can 
impair 'further growth and development'. The characteristic of Worden's theory 
that most attracted our teacher is the idea that grief is constituted by 'tasks'. The 
attraction, she continued, is that this idea of grief does not render the bereaved 
person as hopelessly helpless. On the contrary she is to some extent made 
responsible for completing the tasks that lie before her. This view, the teacher 
concluded, sits well with the client -centredness that is the basis of Cruse's work. 
Standing up, our teacher said that this was possibly also the weakness of 
Worden's theory. Many bereaved people, she said, seem to be 'consumed' by 
their grief and not really able to carry out the tasks that Worden would prescribe 
them. 
The last theory of grief that we were introduced to at this stage is the work of a 
certain Ramsey (my subsequent attempts to fmd references to Ramsey's work 
have failed). Our teacher says that Ramsey splits grief up into different 
constitutive components and she invites us to offer contributions from our own 
expenence. Explaining these our teacher said fITst there is 'shock' which 
involves 'de-personalisation' a feeling that 'you are not there', that this is 'not 
happening to you'. She said that shock happens in the beginning of bereavement 
and will manifest itself as something that is best described as 'inappropriate 
behaviour,' a 'kind of a lack of tact.' It may involve pain, dumbness and a dream-
like state of consciousness. Because of this people in shock may need physical 
comforting which gives them a kind of 'connection with the world again'. Shock, 
our teacher continued, may mean that people do things as if automatically, 
without really 'being there' . 
The next component is 'denial'. The teacher explained that 'denial has a 'defence 
function' that lasts for short periods. 'Denial', makes it possible for people to do 
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all the things that they have to do after someone has died. It involves, our teacher 
added, acting as if the dead person was still alive and can entail visual and 
auditory hallucinations. 'Disorganisation,' our teacher continued, is the third 
component. It involves loss of memory, lack of concentration and 'hypercare of 
control.' That is replaced by 'anxiety' which might involve 'panic attacks' and 
'feelings of vulnerability'. The next component is 'guilt' and our teacher 
explained that gUilt is often found when the relationship between the grieving 
person and the deceased had been ambivalent. Often the 'anger' that the bereaved 
feels towards the deceased in such relationships is 'turned inwards on themselves 
where it turns into guilt.' Our teacher said that we could approach these issues of 
'guilt' by applying 'reality tests' to the bereaved. We could 'go through what 
actually happened' with them and help them to 'explore if their feelings match the 
facts'. Our teacher added that bereaved people often develop a distorted picture 
of the world and that we, as counsellors, can help people to think through 'a new 
view of the world.' She added that research shows that those 'who lack a sense 
of the world' may develop post traumatic stress disorder. 
The sixth component of grief is 'anger' which can involve either 'irritability' or 
'frank anger'. 'Irritability', our teacher explained, is 'suppressed anger' and it 
comes out haphazardly and can be directed at all and sundry. 'Frank anger' is 
aimed at someone specific that is in some ways connected with the death, 
sometimes the deceased her- or himself. 'Anger' may sound entirely 
unreasonable, our teacher continued, but 'feelings are always valid, they are never 
wrong. ' They do need to be 'worked on and expressed, that's therapeutic.' To 
'keep feelings down adds to the pressure,' she added. The teacher asked us to 
think about the 'primitive threat that babies feel,' when they experience strong 
emotions like anger and how words don't seem to work in consoling them but 
holding them tight sometimes does. She said that it was like we were showing the 
baby that we have 'a space inside us to take the anger,' that we can 'hold the 
strong feeling that the baby cannot control and give it back to them, we can 
actually hold their feelings for them and show them that the anger is not going to 
rip them apart.' 
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'Depression,' is the seventh component of grief. Depression can be 'anger turned 
inside.' Our teacher said that as it was not acceptable in this society to feel angry 
towards the dead, which is exactly what many bereaved people feel, you are not 
allowed to express and feel your anger and so bereaved people often tum 'their 
anger' inside, towards themselves where it takes the form of depression. 
'Depression', she added, involves also the things that we most readily associate 
with grief: sorrow, pining, sadness, helplessness, hopelessness, and waves of 
'psychic pain' which, Jackie explained, is a particular kind of pain that is 
'simultaneously physical and emotional'. 
The eighth component of grief is 'resolution and acceptance' which is 
characterised by 'absence of denial'. It means that we are able to 'say good-bye 
to the dead person without having to forget.' This is followed by 'reintegration'. 
At this point, our teacher said, we have 'emotional energy to reinvest' in other 
relationships. According to this view, Jackie continued, we can only reintegrate 
once we have 'dealt with all the other components of grief.' If people establish 
new relationships to.o soon 'they will have to keep their feelings down,' feelings 
that are bound up with their earlier relationship with the dead person. But 'these 
feelings' , she concluded, 'they catch up with them, you have to deal with them.' 
These different theories of grief were used during training to explain the nature of 
grief and the needs of mourners. In that way they were also used as a 
legitimisation of Cruse's work. The different theories have different advantages. 
Worden's tasks of mourning conform to Cruse's ethos in that they constitute the 
bereaved person as the agent in their own grieving. Ramsey's notion of the 
'components' of grief has the different advantage that it allows an understanding 
of grief that can be simultaneously individual and universal. In any individual grief 
we can then fmd different components without having to look for all the possible 
components that might be there. Together these theories do depict a path along 
which counsellors can expect the bereaved to travel. 
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Yet the aim is, of course, not academic but to help people in their bereavement. 
Accordingly we were treated to discussion about the 'determinants of the 
outcome of grief, or 'risk factors in bereavement.' Our teacher said that while 
she was not favourable towards views that grief is at any time, or in any form, 
'abnormal' or 'pathological,' she felt that we had to be open minded about the 
fact that some bereavements are more 'difficult' than others and that some 
bereaved people might require more specialist help than what we could offer 
them. Our teacher said that the 'determinants of the outcome of bereavement' 
included things like: childhood experiences, especially the losses of significant 
others; later experiences, again especially the losses of significant others; previous 
mental illness; life crises prior to the bereavement; relationship with the deceased, 
the strength of the attachment, the security of the attachment, the degree of 
reliance either way between the bereaved and the deceased, and the intensity of 
ambivalence in the relationship; and mode of death, timeliness, previous warnings, 
preparation for bereavement and need to hide feelings that the bereaved person 
lnay have felt during the illness of the deceased. Also important, our teacher 
added, were these characteristics of the bereaved: sex, age, personality, things like 
grief proneness and inhibition of feelings; socio-economic status; nationality; 
religion; cultural and familial factors influencing expression of grief. To these 
could be added: social support or isolation; secondary stresses, like loss of 
income, if moving house became necessary and so on; and emergent life 
opportunities, if people had the chance to keep their options open and 'develop 
into new directions.' 
Rose (l989b) has commented that psychological intervention depends upon a 
distinction being made between the 'normal' and the 'abnormal', between what 
requires intervention and what not. The theories mentioned do, undeniably, 
depict a particular picture of the human being, of what is healthy and what not for 
such a being. Interestingly, if not surprisingly, the values expressed through this 
distinction are those extolled by counselling too. It is good to be able to 
experience and express your emotions. It is good to be autonomous, to be able, 
that is, to sever your relationships with other people and build new ones. Existing 
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relationships should be built upon to become equal and transparent, rather than 
dependent or ambivalent. The model for such relationships is the counselling 
relationship itself, wherein the authority of the counsellor is actively downplayed, 
where the dangers of dependency are constantly averted, where emotional 
confusion is diverted by drawing up a contract between counsellor and client 
where the exact nature of the relationship is defined. 
These theories - both those that describe 'normal' grief and the others that 
describe 'abnormal' grief - are used as guidance in Cruse's work. Sometimes 
during training we would be divided into a number of small groups, four or five 
together, given a piece of paper containing a description of 'a case' of 
bereavement and asked to identify the probable components of grief involved, the 
tasks of mourning, and the possible determinants of the outcome of the 
bereavement. Here is a case a group of mine was once given: 
Bill's story 
Following the death of his wife after a long illness, Bill's G.P. has suggested to 
him that it might be helpful to see a Cruse counsellor. Bill does not see that 
this is necessary. He's fine. He thinks he is coping, as he knew he WOUld, 
without needing help from others. His work hasn't suffered. He missed one 
day from work for the funeral. He takes care of the home too. He cooks a 
meal every night and drives his teenage children around for their activities. Bill 
knows he must be very tired, but he's too busy to notice. He hasn't had a 
'proper talk' to anyone for months, and he's really quite glad about that. Bill 
lost his father when he was thirteen. It was one of those things. His mother 
had coped very well. He remembers her breaking down only once. He and his 
sister got on with living. All that happened a long time ago. He never really 
thinks about it. 
There were four of us in my group, two men and two women. We were all new 
to counselling as we were quick to confess as we sat down together around the 
table with Bill's story in front of us. It took us a while to get going, no one of us 
was quite sure about what was expected of us, none of us was ready to take 
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charge. Someone had the idea of consulting their notes from the week before and 
gradually we got into our stride. Joan said4 'well I wonder if the fact that his wife 
died after a long illness makes a difference. She will have been ill for quite some 
time and required a lot of care.' 'Shall we write this down,' Paul asked, 'an 
antecedent that may have made his grief more difficult?, 'You do that Paul, you 
write it down,' Sue said before adding 'there is the earlier loss as well like.' 
'Uhm,' I said, 'it seems to suggest that he hadn't dealt with the death of his 
father.' 'Yes,' Joan added, 'and the way in which his mother coped seems to 
have kind of set the standard for his own coping.' 'Or not coping,' Sue 
intervened, 'I wonder if you think about this in terms of Worden which tasks Bill 
has completed.' 'Well,' David said making a break from his ferocious writing 
'can you say that he has even started, has he,' David looked at his notes, 
'accepted the reality of the loss?' 'Well,' I said, 'he seems to have adjusted to life 
without his wife, is that task three?' 'Uhm,' Joan said, 'maybe, but not tasks one 
and two.' 'Yes,' Sue added, 'and the children are also a burden like, that's one of 
the things.' 'Feelings,' Joan said, 'he doesn't express his feelings, he's happy not 
to talk.' 
It was at this moment that our teacher beckoned us back into the main group. 
Standing by the flip chart she asked the groups to read out the stories they had 
dealt with and tell everybody what they had made of them. The groups had their 
goes one after another recounting the observations they had made on the basis of 
Worden, Ramsey and the others that Jackie had mentioned. These Jackie wrote 
on the flip chart like 'does not express feelings,' 'depression,' 'anger,' 'guilt'. 
Afterwards Jackie told us of Worden's position that mourning ends when the 
bereaved person can 'reinvest in new relationships', and of other theories that 
suggest that mourning ends when the grieving person no longer has any need to 
'reactivate the representation of the dead person with exaggerated intensity in the 
course of daily life'; or when the mourning person can think and talk of the 
4 The names and the account here somewhat fictional. I couldn't record the whole episode as 
accurately as I pretend to be able to recount it here. But while I'm putting words in people's 
mouths these are words that would not be out of place there. 
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deceased without being 'consumed with pain'. Jackie stressed that Cruse was 
rather against any medical metaphors of grief that suggest that grief is like a 
disease from which you can 'recover'. It is not like that, she said. What we can 
hope for is to help people 'to learn to live with the loss'. Jackie added that she 
was not really comfortable with such notions as 'abnormal' and 'pathological' 
grief. She said that the bereaved will generally 'do what they need to do'. She 
added that it was still important for us to be able to recognise 'problematic' or 
'complicated' grief. She added that Worden (cf. 1991:75-7) talks of the following 
as 'clues' that can indicate 'complicated' grief. If the client cannot speak of the 
dead person without intense and fresh grief or if minor events, the kind of 
setbacks everybody suffers in daily life, trigger intense grief that can point to 
complicated grief. If the bereaved person is unwilling to move, alter or dispose of 
the material possessions that belonged to the dead person or if the grieving person 
has a compulsion to imitate the deceased may also point to complicated grief. 
That the bereaved person makes special, unexpected changes to her life, excludes 
friends and family for example, or if the bereaved person shows self-destructive 
impulses or phobia about illnesses may also be clues to complicated grief. Jackie 
concluded by saying that Worden suggests that the goal of counselling when 
dealing with complicated grief is to resolve the conflicts of separation and to 
facilitate the completion of the grief tasks. In order to achieve this the counselling 
has to attempt to bring about 'the experiencing' of those thoughts and feelings 
that the bereaved person has been avoiding. 
'A guided tour', again 
Issues of complicated grief would not receive much discussion during training. 
While acknowledging that its counsellors must be able to recognise particular 
complications in grief or if there are any 'underlying personality disorders' so that 
the assistance of more specialised professionals can be sought, Cruse sees its 
constituency as 'normal' grief. The two most outstanding features of grief as 
portrayed to us by our teachers are that it is 'ordinary', the natural result of a 
natural event, and that each individual grief is 'unique', that each bereaved person 
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will have different needs, different experiences and do different things. I return to 
the 'guided tour' with which I started this chapter to explain how these two 
features of grief were made visible to us during training. At the same time - I 
shall attempt to demonstrate - they were and had to be made visible to us in such 
a way that they did not appear simply as individual experiences but experiences 
that we could expect to observe later in our future clients. I return to my 
fieldnotes where I left them at the beginning of the chapter. 
After a few moments the members of the group start to open their eyes. There 
is a moment of reflective silence and then, slowly, hesitantly, someone says 'I 
feel sheer panic.' The teacher writes sheer panic on the flip pad. 'Anger' 
someone else says; 'I have palpitations' someone adds and so the members of 
the group start describing their feelings in no particular order often talking two 
at the time. Sometimes these descriptions take the form of one word, 
sometimes they are longer descriptions as if people are looking for the right 
word. In those cases the leader will come to their rescue offering her 
suggestions and each description, each feeling, is translated into a word or a 
phrase that gets written on the flip pad. I turn my attention to the flip pad and 
write down what has been given manifestation there. The feelings people 
mentioned at this stage, as written on the flip pad, ares: 
sheer panic anger 
palpitations 
sinking feeling in the stomach 
hot bewilderment 
jumble of thoughts 
frustration vulnerable 
guilt fear 
tracking what's happened like breaking glass 
5 Things written on the nip pad are here conveyed in bold letters. What was written on the flip 
pad, at this stage, was more jumbled than I have managed to convey here with words scattered 
allover the place. This is important, I believe, as I will explain later. 
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The teacher then asks us to go a bit further, beyond the initial 'shock', and 
imagine what we'd feel then. Again the people around me close their eyes. I 
close mine and now I can feel something of a panic rise in my chest. After a 
few moments people start to open their eyes again and, as before, they relate 
what they had experienced. This often takes the form of little stories as when 
someone says 'I went through my pockets again not believing that I had lost the 
keys. ' Again the descriptions are distilled into a word or a phrase and written 
on the flip pad: 
disbelief 
stupid wondering where I might have lost them 
wondering if to get help fatigue sick 
shock shallow breaths helpless 
embarrassed and getting red in the face 
tense 
isolated 'oh what the hell will my husband say' 
longing to find them 
burdened with all the shopping 
sweat 
lost wondering if identification was with the keys and 
worried in case thinking I was going through a bad dream 
angry towards others if the keys had been stolen 
wondering if the car was still there 
The teacher asked us to close our eyes again and go a little bit further. 'You 
are still in the shopping centre,' she said, 'and you have realised that the keys 
are lost: what do you feel?' Once more people close their eyes. I open my eyes 
and watch those around me. There is a pained expression on some faces, some 
hands are kneading as if in anxiety, heads bowed in introspection. Then, after a 
couple of minutes, people open their eyes, look up at the flip pad and start, 
without prompting from the teacher, describing their feelings. 'I feel isolated,' 
says one. 'I'm still in shock but now I want to do something,' says another 
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one. And so they go on, one after the other. These are the feelings that people 
describe, as translated to the pad by our teacher: 
isolated still in shock but wanting to do something 
looking for a security man shaking all over 
weary mentally retracing my steps 
checking the car if the keys were there 
realisation it's actually happening 
guilty for spoiling a good day 
sense of urgency to form a plan of action 
would cry if I would phone home 
still wouldn't believe I lost them swearing and words coming out of 
my mouth accepting 
wondering about other people's reactions 
planning what to do next 
phone theAA 
Once more the teacher asks us to continue a bit further and imagine what we'd 
feel then. Going through the same routine again people close their eyes and 
bow their heads, turning back to the story and what is 'going on inside them.' 
Returning, people open their eyes and raise their heads to face the flip pad. 'I 
have started to retrace some of my steps,' someone volunteers. 'I've found the 
car and phoned my husband,' another one relates. And so on. This is what 
people describe, as transferred to the flip pad: 
start retracing some of my steps 
started to calm down 
found the car and phoned the husband 
go for coffee or something stronger restless 
give myself a strong talking saying 'pull yourself together' 
really cross at not having made a contingency plan 
resignation 
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'Now,' the teacher asked us smiling broadly, 'are people ready to stop at this 
point or do you want to check your car keys?' (Fieldnotes). 
Confabulation, situated learning and 'the journey through grief' 
The 'guided tour' can be analysed in terms of Lave and Wenger's (1991) notion 
of 'situated learning'. They advanced the notion of 'situated learning' to capture 
two aspects of learning she claims are often overlooked in education theory. 
Firstly, 'situated learning' stresses how learning is not an individual solitary 
activity but enmeshed in a field of social relationships. It emphasises how, 
through these relationships and in addition to the disembodied knowledge 
conveyed to them through the more formal channels of education, apprentices 
pick up skills, values and attitudes that are essential for the job they are training 
for. Secondly, situated learning emphasises how effective teaching can be 
achieved by encouraging the activities of apprentices in a 'community of practice'. 
Another way to look at the 'guided tour' is through Carrithers' (1995) notion of 
'confabulation'. To 'confabulate' (Carrithers 1995:275) commonly means to chat 
together, with a hint of gossiping or story-telling. To this, Carrithers (1995:275) 
suggests there be added a further implication, that of making together, or 
'confabrication' so that confabulation becomes the co-operative making of 
something through the telling of stories. The' guided tour', in this sense, offered 
us an opportunity to 'confabulate' an account of loss and the experience of grief 
that follows. The account is clearly a story in that it contains a plot (Bruner 1986; 
Packer 1991), if a short one. It may be useful here to employ Bruner's (1986; but 
see Carrithers 1991; 1992:77-8) idea that stories can be divided into 'landscapes 
of action' and 'landscapes of consciousness'. Here the 'landscape of action or 
events' was provided by the teacher, the 'landscape of consciousness' we, the 
apprentices as Lave (1991) would have it, provided ourselves, enjoined as we 
were to map our experiences onto the set of events that was related to us. 
Through this our 'loss' and the reactions it provoked was made to appear 
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ordinary to us. Through the 'guided tour' we were made aware of the sensations, 
of the strong feelings associated with loss. By separating the two landscapes of 
action and consciousness we were also made forcefully aware of the individual 
nature of grief. At anyone point along the story when we were asked to reveal 
our landscape of consciousness quite a wide variety of experiences was reported: 
from 'anger' and 'sheer panic' to 'palpitations'; from 'a sinking feeling in the 
stomach' to 'a jumble of thoughts' each of which would be accepted and written 
upon the flip pad by our teacher. If my reaction was 'sheer panic' I was also 
Inade aware of the fact that the person sat next to me was feeling 'hot' and the 
one in front of Ine was 'bewildered'. 
Yet we were not each and everyone of us simply being given permission to 
express our idiosyncratic emotions aroused by the loss of our car keys. We were 
there together as a group sat in front of our teacher and the flip chart, and while 
each and everyone one of us travelled alone behind their closed eyes, together we 
created the story of our journey. As the landscape of action and the landscapes of 
consciousness met what was formed was a story in which our reactions to loss 
were made visible as ordinary and as individually variable and unique. Still, the 
picture that emerged was a collective picture in which we could all share. We 
could share it, partly, because we had all co-operated in creating it. Our 
experiences might have been different but we were together in our diversity; grief 
is natural and normal, yet individual and unique. 
While Cruse may be suspicious of stage theories of grief these, do possess a 
defmite advantage. They map a clear path along which the bereaved travel, with 
an identifiable beginning and a clear end. This conception has the advantage of 
making the work of the counsellor more manageable which in tum may make it 
easier to motivate counsellors and trainees. In addition to this Cruse's work itself 
is constructed with a clear beginning and a clear end. It starts with death and it 
ends when the client is capable of leaving the counselling relationship. It is maybe 
not surprising then that the understanding of grief that was presented to us shares 
many of the same characteristics as stage theories of grief. Ramsay's conception 
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of the components of grief, that I described before, maps a clear path from shock 
and denial through disorganisation, anxiety, anger, guilt, depression, resignation 
and reorganisation. Worden's four tasks of grieving, listed in 'Cruse's bible': 
accepting the reality of loss, working through the pain of grief, readjusting to an 
environment where the deceased is missing and reinvesting in new relationships, 
similarly seems to depict a road, all be it a twisted and a tortured one, down which 
the mourning travel. 
Even our own contributions to the 'guided tour' seem to possess the same 
character, moving as they do from 'sheer panic' and 'anger', for example, through 
'disbelief, 'sense of urgency to form a plan of action' to 'found the car and 
phoned the husband' and 'resignation'. Indeed it was noticeable how many of the 
things that the participants on the course related were the same or similar to those 
that are to be found on the lists compiled by for example Worden (1991). That, 
again, is maybe not surprising. The structure and logic of both Ramsey's and 
Worden's theories and of our 'guided tour' is clearly narrative and it is a 
distinguishing feature of stories that they depict a movement in time and give 
direction to a series of seemingly static events (Riessman 1993). Stories allow 
people to 'perceive any current action within a large temporal envelope, and 
within that envelope they can perceive any given action, not only as a response to 
the immediate circumstances ... but also as part of an unfolding story' (Carrithers 
1995:262, emphasis -aa.). In this way our experiences were given meaning, shape 
and direction by being tied to the events of the shopping trip. The initial shock of 
discovering that the car keys were lost gave way to anger and frustration as the 
realisation of the loss set in, which in tum gave way to emerging plans of some 
sort of action. 
Indeed two of the most prominent metaphors in training are of grief as a 'process' 
and as 'a journey' - a metaphor that has through the centuries been used to 
d~scribe death (Lakoff and Johnson 1989). Both of these metaphors seem to 
indicate both a beginning and an end to grief. A further indication for this can be 
found from the attitude towards medicine and alcohol found in bereavement 
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counselling. As I have mentioned before it is still a common practice for doctors 
to prescribe tranquillisers to grieving persons who seek their advice. The 
bereavement counsellors that I know are dead against this practice. They point 
out that drugs cannot substitute for providing an environment where the grieving 
person can express her emotions and that prescriptions only serve to delay or 
divert the grieving process. Bereavement counsellors are not alone in their belief. 
The British National Formulary (1994) and the Committee on Safety of Medicines 
(1988) advise doctors against using tranquillisers in bereavement arguing that 
their use may 'inhibit progress through the grieving process' (Warner and King 
1997:14-15). Apparently there is not much research evidence to back up these 
concerns (see Osterweis, Solomon and Green (eds.) 1984:270; Warner and King 
1997:14-15) but one can see the reasoning behind them. Indeed if the bereaved 
person has to accept the reality of loss and work through her emotions - 'feel the 
pain' - tranquillisers, by defmition almost, are going to get in the way by dulling 
the senses. The same is said of alcohol which bereavement counsellors, it seems, 
do not recommend as a remedy to bereavement and which they similarly present 
as getting in the way of grief running its proper course (see Ross 1996). 
Persons and emotions 
Recalling what was said about Cruse's ideas about the counselling process in the 
last chapter, a picture may start to emerge of the images by which Cruse makes 
sense of its clients and of its work. These images centre around the person and 
the emotions. 
Ever since Mauss' (1985 [1938]) classic study anthropologists have been deeply 
interested in the nature of personhood in different societies (see Carrithers 1985; 
Cohen 1995; Cohen and Rapport (eds.) 1995). Almost invariably anthropologists 
have described the common-sense Western conception of the person as, in the 
words of Clifford Geertz (1983:59), 'a bounded, unique, more or less integrated 
Inotivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, 
judgement, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively 
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both agamst other such wholes and against its social and natural background.' 
This notion of the person is frequently contrasted with ideas found in non-
Western societies where persons are often described as less coherent and more 
dependent upon relationships with others than is the case, according to these 
descriptions, in the West. Geertz (1973) argues that the Western notion of the 
person fmds its negation in Bali where a de-personal notion of the person is linked 
to a de-temporalised notion of time; and Ohnuki-Tierney (1987) asserts that in 
Japan the person is inconceivable without reference to relationships with other 
such persons, to take but two examples. James Carrier (1995) believes that the 
image of the person in the West, as a stable and coherent entity, may be an 
example of Occidentalism. Jonathan Spencer (1997:694), in contrast, argues that 
in anthropolo gy 'there has been agreement that the same people may hold 
different senses of personhood, sometimes stressing the person as the evanescent 
centre of a network of exchanges and relationships, at other times stressing a 
more familiar sense of the person as a robustly bounded individual.' Spencer 
continues that this 'suggests a potentially fruitful area for ethnographic inquiry: in 
what contexts, for example, do 'individualistic' ideas of personhood predominate 
and in what contexts are they downplayed or denied? When is the self most easily 
viewed as stable and enduring, and when is it better understood as a temporary 
product of an idiosyncratic history?' 
Spencer's suggestions can be fruitfully applied to look at the notion of the person 
that informs Cruse's work. In it there is a tension between the person as, on the 
one hand, autonomous and, on the other, as relational and contingent, a tension 
that may be a characteristic of the English conception of the person more 
generally (see Strathern 1988, 1992a and 1992b; and Simpson 1994, 1997b, 
1997c). Firstly, in Cruse's notion of the client as 'expert in himself' is contained 
the Cartesian (Nagel 1987:chapter 3) belief that the individual knows his own 
mind in a way that no one else can. At the same time though Cruse counsellors 
make use of the Freudian insights that we may be subject to ways of thinking, 
feeling and behaving that we incorporated in childhood and of which we may be 
unaware and over which we may have no control. In discussing Ben's story, the 
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one I related before, with our teacher and in front of the group she suggested that 
Ben might inadvertently have learnt his way of coping from his mother and that 
this might be preventing him from 'coming to terms with his loss'. 
Secondly, there is a tension in Cruse's conception between the person as an 
individual and as a being tied to other people through what Bowlby (1981) calls 
'attachment bonds'. According to this picture people are normally 'functioning 
individuals' but, upon suffering loss, are thrown into the ravine of grief, wherein 
they become the plaything of the forces of emotions, only, hopefully, to reappear 
again in calm waters as independent, autonomous individuals. This thinking is 
evident from the pictures of the course of grief that we the trainees were 
introduced to. When explaining Ramsey's notion of the components of grief our 
teacher said that shock involves 'de-personalisation', a feeling that 'you are not 
there' which manifests itself in 'inappropriate behaviour', a 'lack of tact'. Denial 
entails 'visual and auditory hallucinations', while disorganisation involves a 'loss 
of memory and lack of concentration'. Anxiety entails 'panic attacks and feelings 
of vulnerability and being overwhelmed' and the bereaved can be 'consumed by 
guilt and anger' before they succumb to depression through which they may 
[mally achieve 'resolution and reintegration and reinvest in new relationships'. 
During our 'guided tour' we experienced 'sheer panic', 'bewilderment', 'jumble 
of thoughts', 'vulnerable', 'isolated', 'lost', and 'resignation'. The trajectory that 
is thus established speaks of a state of control and autonomy that is lost and then, 
hopefully, regained. In this way Cruse's trajectory of grief inadvertently 
resembles van Gennep's (1960 [1909]) classic analysis of rites of passage where 
grief takes the place of liminality. Parkes (1992) talks of grief as a period of 
transition through which the bereaved individual has to shed his former identity 
and take up a new one. A number of our teachers commented that the bereaved 
may 'need to fall apart' in order then to put themselves together again. 'To fall 
apart' is, of course, only one of many similar metaphors, like 'fall to pieces', 
'break down', 'being shattered' that similarly convey this sense of loss of 
personhood and are frequently employed in talk of the bereaved. 
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This may be the place to draw attention to some of the language that is commonly 
employed in bereavement counselling. It is interesting that our 'guided tour' 
involved not death but the loss of car keys. While I believe that it would have 
been seen to be less than appropriate to ask us to imagine the death of someone 
close to us asking us to think of something seemingly so trivial and so undramatic 
as the loss of our car keys reinforced again the understanding that grief is an 
ordinary experience, as I detailed above, and it, implicitly, encouraged us to view 
death and its consequences as part of a larger category, loss. Now loss is of 
course used to refer to the fmancial fortunes of both companies and individuals 
but the comparison only starts there. Where it gets interesting is when the talk 
turns, as it does in Worden's (1991) four tasks of grieving and as it sometimes 
would during training, to the need to 'withdraw emotional investment in the 
deceased', and 'reinvest in new relationships'. The individual here takes on the 
shape of a business whose well-being is subject to 'sound investments', to 
withdrawing (emotional) capital from those investments that are making a loss 
and turning them to those that are making a profit. A residue, I believe, of this 
thinking can be found in the emphasis that is placed upon too much dependency 
as a source of potentially complicated grief. Now I never heard anyone actually 
talk about someone having a need to 'diversify' their emotional investments, like a 
big COlTIpany too reliant on one source of income or a small country too reliant on 
one source of export might be said to need to 'diversify', but I have heard 
bereavement counsellors say that people who have many and 'diverse' 
relationships, as opposed to few and dependent ones, are less suspect to 
complicated grief. On one occaslOn some of the experienced counsellors 
expressed their strong disapproval of what has been a fairly common practice 
amongst the poorer social classes in the North East, for the youngest child to stay 
at hOlTIe indefmite1y and look after their parents. This, they said, was to deny the 
child the opportunity to live their own life, to establish their independence, and 
could have disastrous consequences once the parents passed away and the child 
was left with what? Nothing. 
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To return to Spencer (1997), counselling is the context in which the person is 
thought of as less than the stable and coherent entity that s/he was before, and 
hopefully after, grief strikes. The former feeds the need to justify and legitimise 
counselling as an activity and provides it with an area upon which to work and an 
aim to achieve. That the aim is the autonomous individual is understandable to 
the extent that this is the dominant conception of the person in post-Thatcher 
Britain. Paul Heelas and Paul Morris (1992:1-2) point out that since 1979 
Conservative Governments - and one might add that the new Labour Government 
has continued this project - have been engaged in constructing a 'New England' 
of enterprise that is free, prosperous and secure. In doing this the Government 
attempted to give individuals more control over their lives and extolled the virtues 
of autonomy, self-reliance and self-respect. Lord Young of Graffham (1992:29), 
one of the architects of the 'enterprise culture' observes that the 'basis of the 
enterprise culture lies with the restoration of the age of the individual. Individuals 
must be given the scope to develop their skills, take on responsibility, and use 
their personal initiative. It is built on the 'liberation of the enterprise of the 
individual', the virtues of 'responsibilities, initiative, competitiveness, risk-taking, 
industrious effort' (Young 1992:32-3). So counselling may attempt to restore 
individuals to the very state successive British governments have tried to bring 
into being. David Marquand (1992:65) points out that the relationship is mutual. 
He argues that the rhetoric of enterprise - the rhetoric of choice, freedom, 
individuality, initiative - appealed because it struck chords that the romantic 
revolution of the sixties - of which the growth of humanistic counselling was a 
part - had brought into existence. 
How exactly is this transformation to be achieved? How can a person who has 
fallen apart put herself together again? To answer that I need to look at the 
conception of the emotions that Cruse employs. Now, if anthropologists have had 
a long interest in the person their interest in the emotions is more recent (see Lutz 
and White 1986). But the anthropologies of emotion and person share one thing: 
both operate a West against the Rest dichotomy. It has been pointed out by a 
number of scholars (see Lutz and White 1986; Lutz 1990; Lutz 1988; Wikan 
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1990; Wikan 1993; Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990; M. Rosaldo 1984; Solomon 
1984) that the Western common-sense makes a radical distinction between 
thought and emotions. Thought, in this scheme of things, is conscious and wilful 
action, subjected to the principles of reason. The emotions, on the other hand, are 
gut reactions, our unwilled and unconscious natural responses to external 
stimulus. Lutz (1988 and 1990) has pointed out that the distinction between 
thought and emotion carries with it certain forms of evaluations. According to 
these, Lutz argues, thought, the expression of our rationality and our humanity, is 
customarily ranked higher than the emotions, the residue of our animality. She 
shows how reason, in turn, is associated with the public arena of politics and 
business and emotions with the private arena of home and domesticity (see Lloyd 
1983). Lutz points out how politics and business are expected to be run on 
rational principles and how arguments in public debates frequently get cast aside 
on the grounds of them being emotional. She (1990) argues further that the 
association commonly made in the West between women and emotionality is not 
so much an observation of objective reality as part of the subjugation of women 
socially through casting them as less rational than men. These evaluations, Lutz 
(1988) continues, co-exist with others whereby thought is denigrated as cold, 
calculated and impersonal and the emotions celebrated as the index of our true 
selves. To rationalise one's emotions, for example, is castigated as being unable 
to take the emotions as they are and having to fmd for them a rational 
explanation. Solomon (1976; 1984), furthermore, has advanced what he calls the 
'hydraulic theory of emotion' to cover both the Western common-sense view of 
and the academic theories of the emotions. According to the hydraulic theory our 
emotions are contained within our bodies like water in a kettle. When our 
emotions grow stronger they resemble the boiling water and, like it, the pressure 
they exert upon on our body and soul grows. This pressure has to be released or 
it will damage our health and well-being and we release it by expressing our 
emotions. In fact, the theory continues, if we do not fmd an appropriate outlet for 
our emotions they will fmd their own way out, a way that may be highly 
inappropriate and dangerously destructive. 
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The observations of both Lutz and Solomon are applicable to Cruse's view of the 
emotions, although, I contend, the picture is a bit more complicated than the one 
those two present. It is undeniable that Cruse subscribes to a 'hydraulic theory of 
the emotions'. So much is evident from the way in which Cruse counsellors 
describe the emotions associated with grief. These are frequently said to be 
'strong', 'forceful', 'powerful', 'wild' and even 'raw'. In the metaphorical 
landscape of the English language these are adjectives applicable to robust 
characters who are not restrained by the conventions of culture and society but 
also to the weather, animals and the natural forces more generally. Accordingly, 
Cruse thinks that if these emotions are not 'worked through' and 'dealt with' they 
can assume such force that they cause people to 'fall apart', 'explode', 'break 
down' and so on. 
But what does this 'work through' amount to? Let me point out here, frrst of all, 
that like Lutz describes, Cruse places enormous value on the emotions. 'Feelings 
are never wrong' we were told more often than once and it is the emotions that 
we were encouraged and trained to focus upon. People who can experience and 
express their emotions are deemed less likely to suffer complications in their grief 
and our teachers seemed to agree with Rogers (see Mearns and Thorne 1988) that 
the 'fully functioning individual' is one that can fearlessly experience and express 
all his rich emotional life. It is the character of this experience and expression that 
is crucial. Cruse believes that attachment bonds are maintained by the exchange 
of emotions. These may be 'positive' emotions like love and affection, or these 
may be 'negative' like hatred and anger, but attachment bonds are predicated 
upon the exchange of emotions. This may be relatively troublefree as long as both 
parties to the relationship are alive but what happens with death is that the 
survivor is left alone with his emotions towards the dead person without the 
customary means through which to express those emotions. Again, that may be, 
but not necessarily, relatively troublefree if the relationship was a good one and 
the emotions that the survivor is left with are those emotions that English society 
allows people to express towards the deceased. But if the relationship was not a 
good one and the emotions the survivor is left with are, say, hate, anger and guilt, 
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emotions that it is difficult to express about the dead then trouble can ensue. Add 
to this what Cruse takes to be the traditional 'emotional reserve' of the English, 
the one that commends people for maintaining a 'stiff upper lip' in the face of 
adversity, and the bereaved person seems ever more likely to 'internalise' and 
'suppress' his emotions rather than experiencing and expressing them. This can 
lead the 'hydraulics of emotions' to overheat and either make the bereaved person 
'fall apart' or seek an inappropriate outlet for his emotions in, perhaps, violence. 
Or, this can throw the whole 'internal life' of the bereaved person into turmoil, a 
whirlpool of thoughts and emotions. What can happen here is that one emotion 
turns into another emotion when, for example, anger towards the deceased turns, 
when unacknowledged, into guilt for feeling the anger, which, in time, turns into 
self-hate and depression. This is why it is so important, to Cruse, to 'work on' 
and 'deal with' the emotions. Here the counsellor should, then, assist his client in 
focusing upon the emotions, to actually experience and express them and not to 
internalise and suppress them. First though, the counsellor must assist the client 
in sorting out which emotions he is actually experiencing. This indeed is the very 
iInport of lnuch of the counsellor's work, the subject of a lot of our exercises 
during training. 'Clarification', 'reflection', 'paraphrasing' and 'mirroring', skills 
mentioned in the last chapter, are all about this, helping the client to identify and 
understand what it is he is feeling. The purpose is, again, not simply to express 
the feelings identified, rather the emotions have to be identified in order that their 
causal history can be established. That is why it is important, in bereavement 
counselling, to distinguish between, say, anger and gUilt and help the client realise 
which one of the feelings it is he is feeling, or both as the case may be. There was 
surprising, but implicit, emphasis on this during training. We did numerous 
exercises when we were asked to name an emotion that we might experience on a 
particular occasion or associate with certain circumstances. Our contributions 
would, as always, be, written on the flip pad. Many of them seemed, to me, to be 
little less than a variation on the same theme. But the import is to identify clearly 
and as precisely as possible what the client is feeling and that is not simply to be 
done in order for the client to express that precise feeling. Rather, once the client 
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knows that he is angry rather than feeling guilty he can start, with the help of the 
counsellor, to try and uncover why it is that he feels angry. 
While the counsellor should encourage the expression of all those emotions that 
the client is experiencing, she should encourage the client also to 'explore' the 
origin and nature of those emotions. Through this, for example, the client may 
fmd out that his previously 'unplaced anger' has its origin in the limited support of 
his children upon the death of his wife. Or, guilt may be exposed as anger 
towards the deceased that has gone unexpressed. So, it is not enough for the 
client to simply express his emotions. He has to 'explore' and 'examine' their 
origin and their nature as well, to see if they are 'properly his' or not. Through 
'working on', 'working through' and 'dealing with' his emotions the client can 
turn from 'raw' emotions to, if not 'cooked' (Levi-Strauss 1970), then emotions 
that are his. So instead of the 'intense, strong' emotions that characterise early 
grief and threaten to 'consume' him the client can, hopefully, leave counselling 
able to experience and express 'his' - and they are 'his and he not theirs' one 
counsellor put it - emotions in a way that does not threaten to 'consume' him and 
'tear him apart' . 
Spaces and places 
Spatial metaphors are prevalent in bereavement counselling. Some of these are 
part of everyday language like for example when relationships are characterised 
by the distance between the two parties to it, as either close or distant. It is the 
understanding in bereavement counselling that the ending of a close relationship is 
more traumatic than the ending of a distant one and the distance is, as we are 
talking metaphors, measured in 'emotional' rather than geographical terms so that 
personal involvement is what is important rather than the proximity of people's 
living quarters. There is observable a certain ambiguity as to which relationships 
are understood to entail emotional closeness and as to the manner in which these 
relations are established. The crux of the matter is the juxtaposition of choice and 
necessity that seems so important in the English kinship system as it now stands 
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(see Strathern 1988, 1992a, and 1992b; Simpson 1994, 1997b, and 1997c). Some 
counsellors would tell me, what is indeed a basic assumption in John Bowlby's 
(1981) attachment theory, that some relationships - that between mother and child 
for example - are always 'close' in that the end of them will necessarily entail a 
profound emotional turmoil. Yet, in bereavement counselling what matters are 
people's emotions and their freely chosen relationships in which people have 
invested their emotions and not those obligatory ones into which people are born 
and they, possibly, maintain out of a sense of duty. 
Just as relationships can be close or distant so emotions, and 'issues', a word 
quite often used during our training, can be 'deep' or 'shallow' or 'superficial'. 
'Deep feelings' are in bereavement counselling considered more important and 
more profound than those that circle around the surface. 'Strong, powerful', 
emotions are usually understood as being 'deep', especially if they are recognised 
as being difficult or complex with a complicated trajectory like guilt which may in 
fact be anger turned inwards. 'Deep' indicates also that the emotion or issue in 
question resides outside the client's awareness even as it exerts profound 
influence upon his thinking, feeling and behaviour. 'Deep issues' require 'a safe 
environment' in which the client can 'explore' them and 'check' the 'paths' that 
are open to him to follow in his search for changes in his life. But the idea of 
'deep' issues and emotions also serves to stress the understanding that what client 
and counsellor deal with in counselling are the subjectivity of the client rather than 
concerns that are brought there by the counsellor or created in the interaction of 
the two. The idea of 'depth', that is, serves to stress the claim to an absence of 
intervention that is essential to counselling as it is practised by Cruse. 
Correlated with images of 'depth' is the idea that people have 'a space within 
them', a phrase I heard on a number of occasions, wherein their deep feelings are 
located. Here counselling becomes a 'journey' into 'the space within' 'to explore' 
the feelings that reside there. In counselling the self 'journeys' inside itself to 
discover there 'the issues and the feelings' that 'lie buried deep inside it' and bring 
those to the 'surface' where they can be 'faced'. Together, these point to the 
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prevalence of visual metaphors in bereavement counselling, like they are, 
according to Stoller (1989) prevalent in the Western world in general. The 
imagery, to add a visual metaphor myself, is all about making that which lies 
within the client visible in one way or another, that the 'issues' and the 'emotions' 
can be 'untangled', laid out and held up to view, to be there and then 'explored' 
and seen for what they really are. Here visual imagery comes into action with talk 
of helping the client to identify, 'layout' and 'map' the paths between which he 
can choose and down which he can possibly travel. The counsellor, that is, tries 
to help to make the client's choices visible so that the client can compare them 
and pick the one he prefers. 
Authority, expertise and communities of practice 
So what, [mally, is the import of the spatial metaphors? I believe it has to do with 
questions of authority and expertise: in a word how Cruse justifies and legitimises 
its work. Recall that Cruse advocates a stringent person-centred approach 
according to which the client is the expert and the counsellor is, well what? It is 
paramount to Cruse that its counsellors do not take charge of their counselling 
sessions and relationships. What then do counsellors do, what use are they? 
Spatial metaphors, I suggest, help Cruse to legitimise its activities without 
presenting its counsellors as directive. Spatial metaphors allow the client to be 
portrayed as the person most directly responsible for the 'exploration' of the 
issues that concern him while the counsellor can be represented as 'standing 
beside the client' This matter is complex and to attempt to make it clearer allow 
me to tum, once again, to my fieldnotes, and the 'guided tour' with the 
participants looking through their pockets to make sure their car keys were there. 
People nod their assurances laughingly, though some of them can be seen 
patting their pockets. The teacher asks what we notice in the things that we 
have mentioned and the things that we have gone through. There is silence for 
a moment during which nothing is to be heard except the rustle of paper as the 
teacher removes the first page of the flip pad and reveals another one white, 
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virginal and clean behind it. Someone says quietly 'chaos' only to be followed 
by someone stating more assertively: 'there seems to be a wide range of 
feelings involved.' 'Everyone seems to be going at a different speed,' adds the 
third one and so on. Slowly these get translated to the flip pad, a bit more 
orderly this time than before, the teacher sometimes asking people to explain 
better what they mean, sometimes offering her own interpretations in order to 
find the right word, the right phrase to describe what was being contributed. 
This is written on the flip pad after the suggestions of the participants: 
chaos 
range of feelings sensations and thoughts 
everyone at different speed 
some feelings come back 
some feelings common to lots of people 
range of intensity 
different reactions from different people 
final acceptance 
distortion of time 
(Fieldnotes) . 
Mer this the teacher gave us a short talk, during which she effectively repeated 
what we had said before. 
Allow me to recapitulate: the important aspect of the' guided tour' was how it put 
us the trainees on par with our future clients. We were, in effect, taking our 
clients' seats and doing the same things that our clients would be doing in front of 
us later. Similarly our teacher here takes the place of the counsellor, the seat that 
we were later to fill. This exercise thus, initially, put us the trainees on par with 
the public, as it were, and placed us in the same category as any other 'ordinary' 
person who may have suffered loss. We were made to instigate within ourselves 
and experience processes of a similar kind to those supposedly experienced by any 
other person suffering loss. At the same time, though, we were made to exercise 
on ourselves the sort of intense analysis that you fmd in counselling sessions. Not 
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only were we made to close our eyes and imagine events that would allow us to 
experience our own reactions to loss more intensely, but we were also made to 
pay particularly close attention to this experience, to dissect it and divide it up 
into its components and give those names, to communicate those to the other 
participants. 
It is here that the importance of the flip pad as more than a simple pedago gic aid 
becomes apparent. The flip pad did, as I mentioned earlier, provide the main 
focus in the rooms in which we did our training and our teachers would sit or 
stand around it much of the time. Our attention was usually quite heavily fIXed 
upon the flip pad and during the 'guided tour' it served to materialise the 
participants's reactions to loss, to make their feelings and thoughts tangible, 
visible, observable, 'real'. It is not that everybody should be able to read 
everything that is written on the pad that is important - for as the exercise went 
along the writing became increasingly illegible as the words ran into one big 
jumble - but more the act of writing itself. For this fIXes what has been 
experienced and carries with it a kind of legitimisation of the expressed reactions; 
that they were written down indicates that they were worth writing down. At the 
same time the act of writing fixes the participants' attention on the very word 
being written and encourages the participants to reflect on the experience, being 
expressed. Though we moved, at this stage, quickly from one word to the next, 
this in a way resembles what happens in counselling sessions. There the 
counsellor will pick up certain words, some of the emotions, expressed by the 
client and 'paraphrase' or 'reflect' these back to the client, inviting him to explore 
and analyse them further. 
The next stage when the leader asked us, the participants, to reflect upon the 
reactions we ourselves had communicated, asking: 'What do you notice in this?' 
signified a change in the nature of the exercise. Here people were being asked to 
abstract from the jumble of words, the armoury of emotions, to distil from them 
patterns in all the d1fferent reactions mentioned. Earlier people would recount 
feelings and thoughts such as 'panic', 'sinking feeling in the stomach', now people 
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remark upon the range of feelings expressed, the range of intensity, that 'different 
people travel at different speeds'. Here we were being asked to act more like 
counsellors, reflecting, in this case, on 'our own' experiences. They are assuming 
a little bit of expertise on psycholo gical processes, they exhibit the ability to 
extract from diverse experiences some things that these different experiences have 
mcommon. 
This was followed by the little speech delivered by our teacher and what was 
important about it was how closely it built upon, and in that way 'authorised', the 
reflections offered by the participants themselves. The teacher did not really offer 
much that had not already been mentioned by the participants. What matters is 
that the teacher was, to us, a figure of authority whose talk gave our observations 
the legitimating stamp of authority. What matters, here, is not that the teacher 
repeated much of what we had said, but that she had the authority to do so. It is 
hers to pronounce on matters like these. At the same time she holds out to us an 
invitation to join the 'community of practice' (Lave and Wenger 1991; see Gisli 
Palsson 1994; Simpson 1997a) of which she is a member. The 'guided tour' was 
the beginning of our 'legitimate peripheral participation' (Lave and Wenger 
1991). The teacher was an example of what we might all become, experts, all be 
that experts of the ordinary. 
At the same time a link is fostered through the exercise between authority and 
abstraction. It is at the time when our observations tum from the concrete - like 
'panic' - to the more abstract - 'everybody travels at different speed' - that the 
teacher enters the scene. Through her little talk she legitimises our observations 
and lends them her authority. So while Cruse emphasises and even celebrates the 
experience of the individual, abstract knowledge seemingly has the respect of 
authority. In this way Cruse's understanding of grief resembles the form of 
knowledge uncovered by Foucault (1973 [1963]) in his archaeology of medical 
perception; a knowledge that is both 'individualising' and 'totalising' (see Gordon 
1991; Rose 1989a). If that form of knowledge was characteristic of modernist 
regimes, 'postmodern govemmentalities' are, according to Rose (1992:159), 
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characterised by the fact that all shades of political opinion agree that citizens 
should be active, that 'democratic government must engage the self-activating 
capacities of individuals.' The technologies for doing so, Rose continues, do not 
have therr origin in the state as such but still make it possible 'to govern in an 
advanced liberal way, providing a plethora of indrrect mechanisms that can 
translate the goals of political, social and economic authorities into the choices 
and commitments of individuals.' The reverse holds true too, I would add, and 
this requrres efforts to engage people in expressing therr subjectivities. The 
current government has made it a priority to govern through the demands and 
desrres, the wishes and the wants of the population, and matters of policy are now 
routinely run through public advisory committees and focus groups intended to 
engage the subjectivities of the population. 
Technologies of the self: subjectivity and subjection 
So what is the importance of the way in which Cruse thinks about grief? Andrew 
Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (1996:8-9) have observed that 
according to Foucault it was only with the emergence of liberalism that it was 
possible for a domain of 'society' to be born. What lay behind this emergence 
was the idea that to govern too much was not to govern at all; that government 
had to deal with a complex and independent reality with its own laws and 
mechanisms of disturbance - that is society. The social sciences were, according 
to Foucault, born as the means to understand this reality in order that it could be 
controlled. 
Barbara Cruikshank (1993:331) rephrases Foucault (1983) to the effect that: 
Democratic government, even self-government, depends upon the ability of the 
citizens to recognize, isolate and act upon their own subjectivity, to be 
governors of their selves. The ability of the citizen to generate a politically 
able self depends upon technologies of subjectivity and citizenship which link 
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personal goals and desires to social order and stability, which link power to 
subjectivity . 
The human psyche, Rose (l989b:7), observes, has become a possible domain for 
systematic government in the pursuit of political ends. The 'new vocabularies 
provided by the sciences of the psyche enable the aspirations of government to be 
articulated in terms of the knowledgeable management of the depths of the human 
soul.' Government, that is, requires knowledge (Rose 1989b:6). If to govern a 
population one needs to isolate it as a proper sector of reality (see Rose 1989b:4-
6) to govern the self one needs to isolate that, and its different mental states, as a 
separate sector of reality. 
In bereavement counselling, I have tried to show, the focus is upon the self, the 
subjectivity of the bereaved person. The skills that we the trainees were enjoined 
to attain and then employ all had as their impetus the ever refmed attention to 
what was going on inside the client. 'I wonder what that feels like?' is the 
operative question in bereavement counselling. The practice fmds its material 
expression in that in bereavement counselling the counsellor should see the client 
alone, to isolate him from his social surroundings so that his attention can be 
focused exclusively upon himself. Seating arrangements with the counsellor more 
or less facing the client serve the same purpose of returning the client's story back 
to himself so that from it can be abstracted the emotions that therein lie, the forces 
of his subjectivity. Even the contours of the receptive body invite and entice the 
client to delve ever 'deeper' into his soul to 'uncover' there the emotions and the 
issues that have remained beyond his awareness and his control so that these can 
be brought to the 'surface' and 'worked through'. If 'society is nowhere if not in 
the body' (Taylor 1996:202), as the social sciences would now teach us, the 
counsellor again here is a model for the client. He can experience all his emotions 
without them 'tearing him apart', he can understand them and control them, bring 
them to the 'surface' and 'work them through'. He is, that is, effectively 
transparent, and hence knowable, manageable. 
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In this, bereavement counselling is an example of what Foucault (1988:18) calls 
'technolo gies of the self, 'which permit individuals to effect by their own means 
or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and 
souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order 
to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality'; 
technolo gies that seek to transform the self s way of thinking, feeling and 
behaving. In this it is an example too of what Foucault terms 'governmentality', 
government at a distance, the 'practices and relations of power that operate well 
beyond the state,' (Cruikshank 1994:32). Counselling is a 'conduct of conduct', 
government at a distance, one of the technologies of 'acting upon the actions of 
others' (Cruikshank 1994:32). Foucault (1983:220; in Cruikshank 1994:32) says 
that 'what defmes a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does 
not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions, on 
existing actions or on those which may arise in the present of the future.' 'This 
mode of government', Cruikshank (1994:32) continues 'links the subjectivity of 
individuals to their subjection'. Rose (1989b:4-6) has pointed out, furthermore, 
to the important role of the 'expert' in modem forms of government, that seek 
according to scientific principles to maximise the power of the population. Torrie 
(for example 1987:5, 18, 32), in her book on the history of Cruse, emphasises the 
importance of expertise, as opposed to simply self-help, in Cruse's work. 
Now, our expertise is maybe not that we know so much about grief, but that we 
know that we know little but possess the capabilities to get the clients to express 
their own emotions. Here our expertise is linked to both the 'death as taboo' 
story and the notion that the English are emotionally reserved. In the face of 
taboo we offer the bereaved a rare opportunity to express their emotions, in the 
face of their timidity, we possess the skills that allow them to express themselves. 
The effects of bereavement counselling are, then, what Foucault (1977 c) would 
term 'disciplinary' too. Through helping clients to experience and express their 
emotions it produces maybe not 'docile bodies' but stable ones, bodies that are 
not subjected to the violent attacks of unacknowledged emotions, but that can 
experience these emotions without losing control. 
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So, here may be the right time to allow the Government proper to enter the scene. 
As I related in chapter 3, Cruse receives roughly £1,000,000 in grants from the 
government, governmental institutions and national businesses every year. In 
more detail, it is roughly £180,000 from the Department of Health, £60,000 from 
the Scottish, Wales and Northern Ireland Offices, and £500,000 from local 
governmental authorities. The government, both the previous and the present 
one, believes, as its rhetoric on divorce and unemployment suggests, that 
individual happiness is instrumental to the health and wealth of the nation. It 
seems to reckon too that dealing with grief, like Cruse arguably does, IS 
instrumental in maintaining the well-being and happiness of its citizens. The 
Government recognises, or believes, that unhappiness, like that possibly borne of 
grief, causes crimes, that depression causes absence from work and is less than 
conducive to consumption. The grants to Cruse are provided under 'Section 64' 
that aims to tap into the experience and expertise of the voluntary sector to 
promote the health and well-being of individuals and the community (this 
information is based on telephone interviews with Department of Health 
personnel). In a radjo talk given in 1960 Torrie described the work of Cruse thus: 
'it is a work of rehabilitation. It calls for men and women of compassion and it 
has endless possibilities of development. We would like to see this great army of 
women [widows] become a powerhouse of service and giving in this country - not 
a forgotten, unwanted group, relegated to a position of economic struggle, 
frustration and loneliness' (Torrie 1987:26). 
Spencer (1997) rruses the question of why we in the West, at least those 
sympathetic to psychotherapies, believe that self-knowledge is good. To answer 
this I want to go back to chapter 2 and the observations of both Foucault (1983) 
and Hacking (1975) of how changes in the modes of government established the 
population as the terrain of government, whereby the most effect control over it 
was to be achieved by the use of statistics, the science of the state. Through the 
application of statistics the actions of the population were to be made visible, 
calculable and manageable. The self was like the last unknown territory: now 
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being made visible through the technologies of, for example, bereavement 
counselling, and through that visibility, manageable. 
The next two chapters constitute a different part of this dissertation and deal with 
the experiences of the bereaved, particularly as those are expressed in stories. I 
shall contrast these, implicitly, to the image of the bereaved employed in 
bereavement counselling. 
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'All the Stories Will Come Out,.1 
Narrating Character and Emotion 
Hannah2 
Old Stories Will Come Out 
By the end of the week [Hannah is about to cry] Jonah was still with us and the 
doctor came in and he said [Hannah is laughing now] 'I apologise,' he says 'I 
didn't think your father3 would last as long as this' you know [ ... ] and he ... 
went for another week ... and the doctor said to '" to me after he says 'he had 
such a strong heart' which 1 can not understand after the dreadful treatment 
that he went through as a younger man [ ... ] and something 1 ... will never 
forget [ ... ] the doctor got all the family together and he said: 'He bore his pain 
with great dignity' . 
1 The line is from a song by Nick Cave, 'Lay me Low' from the album Let Love in, released by 
Mute in 1994. 
2 A few notes on transcription are in order. The way 1 transcribe follows more or less Chase 
(1995:23, n.6). Transcripts record non-linguistic sounds which provide information on 
communicative intention. Change in intonation and other environmental sounds are indicated in 
brackets ([ J). These include also my interpretations. Emphasis is indicated by italics. Three 
full stops mark a pause or a break off in the monologue. If speakers talk simultaneously slashes 
( II ) are put around the words that overlap. Punctuation is used sparingly. Quotation marks 
show when the interviewee is reporting her own or someone else's speech or thought. An 
ellipsis in brackets ([ ... J) indicates that something has been omitted from the transcript. My own 
contributions are sometimes omitted without notice to save space (see Potter 1996). I am 
referred to in the text as aa. 
3 The doctor is talking about Hannah's husband, Jonah. He says 'father' because he is 
addressing Hannah and Jonah's children who were present when the exchanges took place and 
had in fact been specifically summoned the previous week to be by their father's side as he was 
dying. 
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Introduction 
I have in the last two chapters described in some detail the workings of 
bereavement counselling in North East England. I related how bereavement 
counselling focuses upon 'self-emotion-now' in order to achieve 'the 
reconstitution of an autonomous individual who can in large measure leave the 
deceased behind and form new attachments' (Walter 1996:7). I detailed how this 
is achieved by performing 'emotion work', 'the working through and resolution of 
feelings' (Walter 1996:7) -- anger, guilt, depression, sadness and so on. 
In this part, comprising of two chapters, I tum to the experiences of the bereaved. 
My primary task is to describe the ways in which my interviewees talk about their 
grief during our interviews. Building upon work in narrative analysis (see 
Riesman 1993) and seeking inspiration from the anthropology of emotion (see 
Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990) I focus in particular on the stories that the bereaved 
told me. By doing so, I hope to address both bereavement counselling and the 
anthropology of death. 
In addressing bereavement counselling I start with a suggestion of Walter's 
(1996) that typically the bereaved do not necessarily want to perform 'emotion 
work' but to talk about and construct a 'durable biography' of the deceased. This 
allows me to use the stories of the bereaved to interrogate the focus on self-
emotion-now that bereavement counselling proposes. During the course of this 
chapter I shall show that the bereaved do not make the same distinction between 
self-emotion-now and other-thoughtlaction-history that is made in bereavement 
counselling. For many of the bereaved, I argue, grief is part of the history of their 
relationship with the deceased, and in fact requires the telling of that history. 
This, I suggest, is indicative of the extent of intervention that bereavement 
counselling operates, and of the link between abstraction and authority (see 
Chapter 5) found in bereavement counselling. 
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In the following chapter I shall take this issue a step further. Here, I want to 
discuss the more fundamental assumption that the relationship between the 
bereaved and the deceased ends with death. I try to show how, for at least some 
of the bereaved, stories are a means through which they keep the flow of 
emotions between themselves and the deceased running and thus maintain their 
relationship with the dead. 
In doing this I make certain assumptions that may be questionable. I assume that 
the interviews I carried out are to some extent comparable to a counselling 
session. In carrying out the interviews I, like a counsellor, did not approach my 
interviewees with set questions of my own, allowing them rather to steer the 
course of the interview. Unlike the counsellor, though, I did not employ the 
techniques of reflection, clarification and so on. As a consequence my 
interviewees spent their time telling their stories rather than clarifying their 
emotions. In my experience, this is what typically happens in counselling sessions 
when clients are not interrupted, that is, they tell stories. My experience is borne 
out by that of other counsellors who have confrrmed my impressions. In fact, we 
were often told during training that one of the things bereaved people need is to 
tell their stories again and again. Sometimes it would be added that in order for 
them to make any progress their attention has to be focused upon how they 'are 
feeling now' . 
I also assume that the stories that my interviewees told me endure beyond our 
interviews. This is important as it speaks of the place of these stories in the lives 
of my interviewees. I believe I am justified in making this assumption as my 
interviewees would often refer to instances when they have told other people 
parts of these stories, and because many of the stories I relate are clearly 
rehearsed; they have been thought about and possibly told many times before even 
if their precise form and meaning changes with each time they are brought to the 
fore. 
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Throughout these last two chapters, I seek to address, implicitly more than 
explicitly, the anthropology of death. In the introduction I complained that the 
anthropology of death has paid scant attention to the experiences of the bereaved, 
arguing that this was because it had operated a dichotomy between society and 
the individual. I contrasted the classic anthropological understanding of grief, the 
understanding associated with Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown, which stresses 
how grief is socially produced and determined, with the ideas of Renato Rosaldo 
to whom grief is a pan-human experience which all who have suffered can 
understand. Both approaches, I concluded, are insufficient and here I shall follow 
Carrithers (1992 and 1995), Chase (1995) and Lampert (1994) and show that 
focus on the stories of the bereaved can allow us to build an understanding of 
grief that is sociologically informed yet sensitive to individual experiences. 
Anthropologists interested in death, I argue, can and should pay attention to the 
experiences of the bereaved. 
Bereavement, biography, story 
Walter (1996) has recently criticised 'the clinical lore' (Wortman and Silver 1989) 
of bereavement counselling with its emphasis upon 'emotion work', the working 
through of troublesome emotions. In contrast to this, Walter proposes a more 
sociological model of grief. He says that survivors typically want to talk about 
the deceased and to talk about them with others that knew them. Together, 
Walter argues, the survivors construct a story that places the dead within their 
lives, a story that can endure through time. The purpose of grief, Walter 
continues, 'is therefore the construction of a durable biography that enables the 
living to integrate the memory of the dead into their ongoing lives; the process by 
which this is achieved is principally conversation with others who knew the 
deceased' (Walter 1996:7). Walter suggests that this kind of grief process is 
particularly necessary in a late modem society whose members must because of 
their detachment from stable social networks and established traditions constantly 
recreate their identity (Walter 1996:14-15). 
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I believe that Walter presents a way of understanding what bereaved people do 
that bereavement counselling has ignored. Yet I think we need to take three 
further steps here. We need to emphasise more that the 'durable biography' 
which the bereaved construct of the deceased is a creative achievement, a story 
rather than a history. We need to stress that in constructing a bio graphy of the 
deceased the bereaved simultaneously create a story of themselves and their 
relationship with the deceased. Finally, we need to be mindful of how the 
biography of the deceased inevitably draws upon and answers to cultural 
expectations about how lives should be lived (see Rosenwald and Ochberg 
1992:2). I believe that we should talk about the narratives, the stories, of the 
bereaved, rather than the biography of the deceased. But what then are narratives 
and why narratives rather than biography? 
White (1989: 1; in Riessman 1993:3) states that so 'natural is the impulse to 
narrate' that, as Riessman (1993:3) adds, 'the [narrative] form is almost inevitable 
for any report of how things happened.' Telling stories, Nelson (1989) maintains 
in her Narratives from the Crib, is one of the frrst forms of discourse we learn as 
children. Jerome Bruner (1986) argues that what he calls 'the narrative mode of 
thinking' is part of the human condition. Theodore Sarbin (1986:8-9) adds that 
people think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices according to narrative 
structures. He cites psychological experiments to the effect that if you present a 
person with two or three pictures she will connect them to form a story that will, 
furthermore, reflect recognisable human sentiments, goals, purposes, valuations 
and judgements. 
But why would people think in stories and what exactly characterises thinking in 
stories? There seems to be an agreement amongst scholars that sequence, or 
movement, is a necessary characteristic of narratives (Riessman 1993: 17). Labov 
and Waletzky (1967:21) have argued that stories are a perpetual answer to the 
question 'what happened then?' The sequence that Labov and Waletzky see in 
narratives is, then, chronological. Gergen and Gergen (1984: 174-5; see also 
Gergen and Gergen 1986:25) similarly suggest that narratives provide coherence 
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between a set of discrete events by giving a sense of direction through time. 
Others have suggested that stories are organised around a thematic sequencing, 
whereby a narrative is held together by a theme rather than by time or causality 
(Riess man 1993: 17). 
Stories, it would appear, organise a series of events by creating some sort of 
relationship between them. Still, for stories to be as powerful as researchers 
claim, there must be something more to them. Sarbin (1986:9) makes the point 
that narratives not only organise episodes and actions, but accounts of actions as 
well. Narratives, that is, 'allow for the inclusion of actors' reasons for their acts, 
as well as the causes of happening.' Here Bruner (1986) makes a distinction 
between the 'landscape of action' and the 'landscape of consciousness'. In the 
landscape of action we see the unfolding of events as when, to take Bruner's 
example, Oedipus kills a man and marries a woman. In the landscape of 
consciousness we see Oedipus originally unaware of the identity of these people, 
only later to fmd out that they were his father and his mother. So what we have 
are stories that depict events on the one hand and consciousness on the other. In 
line with this, Packer (1991 :65) argues that the most straightforward approach to 
analysing stories is to unravel their organisation on the level of characters and 
plots. Colloquially to call someone a 'character' may be to emphasise his 
individuality. But to Carrithers (1995:262), character is 'a notion which embodies 
the understandings of rights, obligations, expectations, propensities, attitudes and 
intentions in oneself and many different others ... ' Character, in this conception, 
transcends the distinction between society and the individual, emphasising that we 
are all simultaneously particular human beings and occupants of more general 
social positions like father or husband. Our characteristics are always both 
idiosyncratic and general. 
Plot, according to Carrithers, 'shows the consequences of these characteristics in 
a lTIultifarious flow of actions.' Plot encompasses 'what a character or characters 
did to, or about, or with, some other character or characters, for what reasons; 
how people's attitudes, beliefs, and intentions thereby changed, and what 
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followed on from that' (Carrithers 1995:262). Narrativity has been characterised 
by Carrithers as the 'capacity to co gnize not merely immediate relations between 
oneself and another, but many-sided human interactions carried out over a period 
of time' (1995:261-2; see Carrithers 1991:310). It could be said, then, that 
human beings perceive any current action not as an example of some general 
principle but as an event 'within a large temporal envelope, and within that 
envelope they perceive any given action, not as a response to the immediate 
circumstances, or current mental state of interlocutor or oneself, but as part of an 
unfolding story' (Carrithers 1995:261-2). Alisdair MacIntyre (1981:197; see 
Sarbin 1986: 11) argues that 'in successfully identifying and understanding what 
someone else is doing we always move towards placing a particular episode in the 
context of a set of narrative histories.' We do this, MacIntyre continues, 'because 
action itself has a basically historical character. It is because we all live out 
narratives in our lives and because we understand our lives in terms of narratives 
that we live out that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the 
actions of others. Stories are lived before they are told'. 
Whereas bereavement counselling seeks to focus its clients' attention upon self-
elTIotion-now, I believe that for the bereaved their grief is part of the history of 
their relationship with the deceased and indeed with other people around them. In 
talking about the dead, I think the bereaved are not so much constructing a 
'durable biography' (Walter 1996) as telling a story that establishes the character 
of the dead and the character of the living; a story whose plot reflects and shapes 
the relationship between the bereaved and the deceased and colours the grief of 
the former. To explain in more detail why I believe this I shall now tum to my 
interviewees. 
Hannah, again 
Hannah is a woman in her late seventies who lives in a small North Eastern town. 
She was born in the North East and here she met her husband, Jonah, married and 
had her three children. Jonah was in the Army during the Second World War and 
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fought in the Far East. He was captured by the Japanese and was a prisoner of 
war in Burma. He was away for five years. When Jonah returned from the war 
the family moved to Australia and lived there for a few years. When they returned 
to England they left behind in Australia their oldest son, Ronald, then a young 
man starting his own family. Hannah and Jonah settled in the South East. There 
the younger children reached adulthood, found their partners, married and raised 
their own families. When Jonah retired he and Hannah moved back to the North 
East. That was Jonah's wish. 'It's like this with the people from the North East,' 
Hannah told me, 'they always want to return there.' Three years ago Jonah 
developed lung cancer. He died within a year. N ow Hannah lives alone in the 
little bungalow she and Jonah bought for themselves. The bungalow is on a new 
estate of houses built especially for the elderly. On a big sign the developer 
confidently declares the flats luxurious. In the living room Hannah shows me the 
safety button hanging on the wall that allows her to alert the warden on the estate 
should she need any help. On the opposite wall hang the photographs of her 
family. 
'You can't erase it [The Second World War] from your memory 
... there's so much attached to it all' 
When Jonah died two years ago Hannah was, in a way, not losing him for the first 
time. Only a few years after they got married Jonah joined the army, was sent to 
the Far East where he was captured by the Japanese. Jonah suffered terrible 
treatment at the hands of his Japanese captors and this played a major part in 
Hannah's understanding of their subsequent life, for when Jonah came back he 
was a changed man. This is how Hannah describes Jonah when they were 
'courting' , as she calls it. 
How I met my husband, my mother and father they were publicans, hotels, you 
know [ ... ] we were in the Duke of Madeira [not the real name], all right? So 
we had moved there and this young lad came in one day for a drink, you see, 
and [Hannah laughs] at frrst, you know, I sort of took no notice but he said he 
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had 'seen this new girl riding down the street on a bicycle' and he thought 
'she's a bit of all right,' you see, so he [Hannah laughs even more], I need to be 
quite frank with you and he came in for a pint and it slowly blossomed from 
there, right, so we got together and we were married. 
Compare this man with the Jonah who returned from the war. 'He was,' says 
Hannah, 'ah ... almost peculiar,' adding, 'when you think of three and a half years 
in a prison camp'. There were a number of symptoms of the change Jonah had 
undergone: it took him a while to re-establish relations with his children, to get 
used to 'normal family life', and he could not work for a full year after he 
returned. These effects became evident during the weeks and months after Jonah 
returned but Hannah expresses her realisation that all was not well with an 
account of the day of the home coming. She says: 
And then they left the ship [that had brought Jonah and his comrades to 
Britain] and they came by train ... obviously the North East Coaster that comes 
into Newcastle Central Station. So we went to meet him there [ ... ] and I went 
to put me arms around him [Hannah makes a dramatic pause] hands went up: 
'Not, not, not,' [Hannah raises her arms] no, he didn't want that at all [her 
voice drops] ... their minds must have been in a terrible, have you still got this 
[she points to the tape recorder and we both laugh] oh gosh, their minds must 
have been in a terrible state [her voice drops], mustn't it after that [ ... ] 
The story of the return, as Hannah tells it, is clearly a very important part of the 
unfolding of the most remarkable events that make up Jonah's life; his marriage to 
Hannah, his departure to the army, his imprisonment, his homecoming and so on. 
It is a part of what Linde (1993) refers to as 'a life story'. At the same time the 
story works on a much more detailed level. Here the events depicted include 
Jonah's travels with the North East Coaster, Hannah's trip to go and meet him 
and, crucially, her attempts to put her arms around him. The power of the story is 
located in the subsequent disjunction between the landscape of action and the 
landscape of consciousness. The events related follow logically from the plot of 
the story until we come to Jonah's reactions to Hannah's attempts to hug him. 
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Jonah's reactions make us wonder about his character, a wonder that Hannah 
shares as she continues, 'their minds must have been in a terrible state'. The 
importance of the whole series of events here is underscored by the drama that 
Hannah infuses into her account: the disparity between the plot of a story of a 
homecoming and Jonah's actions culminating in the raised arms and the 'not, not, 
not'. The considerable detail that Hannah incorporates into her account of 
Jonah's return is noteworthy, too. Even in the abridged passage I quote she spells 
out that Jonah was travelling on the North East Coaster, that she went to meet 
him at Newcastle Central Station and the way he raised his arms when she sought 
to hug him. The incorporation of this kind of detail is important. It makes the 
account more vivid, gives it a real life quality and underscores further the 
importance of the events related (see Potter 1996). 
The story of the return thus establishes just how real and dramatic were the 
changes in Jonah's character but it also leaves the listener with a set of questions 
in his mind: What exactly did the war experience spell for Jonah? How did it 
affect his personality? 
Later on in the interview Hannah tells me of one of their many visits to the 
doctors after Jonah had been taken ill. She says: 
And he had a lung stroke, but I must tell you, when we used to go to the 
doctors or anywhere I used to have to go with me husband and sit alongside 
him, he used to say 'you have to come in with me because I forget what he's 
said as soon as I walk out of the door' which was, that was one of the things 
going back to being a prisoner. He'd lost a bit of confidence into the bargain 
and he used to be looking for his words, you know ... I used to prompt him, I 
used to think 'oh'. So we both went in you know to this doctor's ... 
Hannah supports this account with another story. At some point, soon after the 
end of the war, Hannah and Jonah went to a tropical disease hospital in London. 
After seeing Jonah, Hannah says, the doctor there asked her: 
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H: [The doctor says:] 'Would he have come here on his own?' 'No.' Don't 
misunderstand me, there was nothing wrong with him mentally [ ... ] He said 
'no, no,' he says 'this is the trouble with a lot of these men,' he says 'they've 
lost a lot of their confidence.' And he said to me 'when he's in conversation 
does he turn and look to you quickly 'cos he can't get his words outT 'Yes,' I 
said, 'this is happening too.' Now maybe you could understand better than 
what I can but he said to me with the malnutrition it had affected part of the 
brain and this is why, as I was saying there was nothing wrong with him 
mentally at all there was just that he couldn't bring out that he wanted to at 
that particular time [ ... ] So this is why, I said to you, for although there's been 
all those years, you know, you can't erase it [the war] from your memory, you 
just couldn't do it, there's so much attached to it ... 
This little episode is pregnant with meanmg and significance. Above all it 
provides an explanation for Jonah's affliction but it does so in a particular way 
that allows Hannah simultaneously to achieve three things. The story refers to 
professional authority to establish that something was truly wrong with Jonah. It 
gives an explanation that at the same time characterises the illness as physical 
rather than mental. And it makes clear that this was an ailment suffered by all 
those who had suffered the treatment Jonah had, and not just a condition he 
suffered on his own: 'this is the trouble with a lot of these men', the doctor said. 
Altogether the doctor's verdict absolves Jonah of any blame for what happened, 
and of the shame that might be attached to suffering from a mental disturbance. 
Hannah's main concern may be to explain the character and nature of Jonah but in 
her activity she is constrained by the cultural expectations in which she lives (see 
Rosenwald and Ochberg 1992:2). Hannah's effort to establish that Jonah's illness 
was physical can be explained by reference to the fact that there is considerable 
stigma associated with mental illness in England. That, and Hannah's insistence 
that Jonah was not alone in his ailment, furthermore serve to affirm that Jonah 
was not to blame for what happened to him, something which is important 
because in England there is a sense in which people can be blamed for their own 
mental illnesses. Finally the importance of all this is emphasised by Hannah's 
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reference to the authority of the doctor. In doing so Hannah quotes the doctor 
directly, she reports his speech. Jane Hill and Judith Irvine (1993:6-7) point out 
that 'reported speech' is one 'of the principle ways in which utterances come to 
be seen as authoritative'. Hannah uses reported speech because in English culture 
she herself is in some ways too closely related to Jonah to be seen as an 
independent witness. He is her husband and this gives Hannah too much of a 
stake in the forming of his story. She needs to authenticate it with the evidence of 
other people. 
The complexity of the story of the meeting with the professor that Hannah tells is 
considerable. First of all, I must point out how this story refers to the earlier story 
of the lung stroke. While the visit to the tropical disease hospital precedes the 
episode of the lung stroke in historical time, by reversing the temporal order in the 
telling of the stories the professor's assertions serve to confrrm Hannah's own 
observations. The authenticity of that confrrmation is established further 
throughout Hannah's account. She starts by quoting, directly, the professor of 
tropical diseases and, then herself before she addresses me 'don't get me wrong 
.. .' In between, the, narrative slips, almost imperceptibly, from the past tense to 
the present; from 'he said' to 'he says' as Hannah enacts her conversations with 
the doctor. The habit of reporting what other people said in the present tense 
with 'he says', is a North Eastern, and possibly universally English, mannerism, 
but it is a mannerism that has an impact upon the character of the story that 
unfolds. Together with the practice of quoting, with its change of tone and the 
movements of hands, casting the events in the present gives them a more 
immediate quality: it is as if they are happening now in front of my eyes as Hannah 
enacts the drama. If the changes in Jonah were made visible by the story of his 
return, the nature and explanation for those changes is made visible through the 
very vivid quality of the story of the visit to the professor of tropical diseases. 
So Jonah had lost a lot of his confidence, and he had difficulties in 'getting his 
words out' and in remembering things people, like the doctor, told him. He had 
to rely on his wife a lot who would remember things for him, 'prompt him' and 
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act, in general as his mouthpiece when need decreed. Despite, or rather maybe 
because, of all this it is important to Hannah that Jonah retained his dignity. She 
makes this point in a story that again takes us back to the war. What had 
happened was that a week before Jonah actually died the doctor had declared that 
he was dying and asked Hannah to summon her children up North so that they 
could be by Jonah and Hannah's side. Hannah says: 
By the end of the week [Hannah is about to cry] Jonah was still with us and the 
doctor came in and he said [Hannah laughs] 'I apologise,' he says 'I didn't 
think your father would last as long as this' you know [ ... ] and he ... went for 
another week ... and the doctor said to '" to me after he says 'he had such a 
strong heart' which I can not understand after the dreadful treatment that he 
went through as a younger man [ ... ] and something I ... will never forget [ ... ] 
the doctor got all the family together and he said: 'He bore his pain with great 
dignity. ' 
The transformation of Jonah into a man of strong heart who bears his pain with 
great dignity is achieved precisely with reference to the War and the treatment 
that Jonah suffered then. The story with its moral is given extra weight by the 
fact that it is a doctor, and not Hannah herself, who provides the [mal verdict. 
The doctor, in contrast to Hannah, is an independent witness here, one without 
any stakes in the outcome. He can, in addition, dispense his verdict with the 
weight of professional authority precisely in matters such as these. 
In the story so far Hannah has not so much constructed a 'durable biography' 
(Walter 1996) of Jonah as established and explained his character. In being short 
on confidence, on not being able to bring his words out, Jonah falls somewhat 
short of what is expected of a man in the North East. He is not quite a man. But 
through her stories Hannah has managed to perform 'narrative repair' (the phrase 
is Michael Carrithers') on Jonah's character. The last story in particular serves to 
commemorate Jonah. It does so by showing that he was, after all, a man of 
valour and a man of value. 
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A little later in the interview Hannah talked about Jonah as he was dying. She 
says 'we were all here in the bedroom ... that was a terrible, terrible death, 
couldn't ... gasping for his breath you know ... and you just hug him 'everything 
will be OK' [she says in a soft voice as if she was talking to Jonah]'. I mention 
this because of what Hannah told me a little later. In August 1995 she went to 
celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the Victory over Japan. 'If only 
you'd seen them,' Hannah says - to me, although I got the distinct feeling that she 
was addressing Jonah - referring to Jonah's old comrades, 
all the ex -prisoners were marChing with the regular soldiers by their side and it 
was heartbreaking, some were gasping for their breath, some couldn't stand 
up straight, but they were determined that they were going to march and this 
was the spirit of all those men, they'd all the same spirit and I said to my son, I 
says 'this is a one off thing, because you'll never, ever, ever see this again.' It 
was a very sad occasion but an occasion to be proud of. 
The point here is the absent presence of Jonah in all this. This was a proud 
occasion because here were men of spirit who had sacrificed so much, even now 
in their ripe old age determined to march as before. Jonah was one of these men 
and Hannah was there because he had been such a man of spirit. At the same time 
it is a sad occasion because these men are, in a way, marching towards their 
graves, some of them couldn't stand up straight, some of them were gasping for 
their breath, just as Jonah gasped for his breath as he lay dying on his bed. 
Hannah is here 'placing the dead' (Bloch 1971) Jonah with the very people with 
whom he belongs: his comrades from the war, the people who suffered with him 
and with whom he suffered. 
On the very anniversary of the VJ day Hannah had a mass said. 
I said to our priest 'I'd like a mass said, not just for Jonah but for all the ex-
POW's' I said 'all' I said 'all those years have gone and maybe young people 
such as you can't understand that it's still with us because it made such a big 
effect on us, it had such an effect on our lives' . 
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The war had such a big effect, partly, because it came to defme Jonah's character. 
The plot of Hannah's story so far relates how the war experience stripped Jonah 
of his confidence but how it, simultaneously, allowed him to retain his dignity. If 
the war defmed Jonah's character it also defmed his relationship with Hannah. 
One aspect of that relationship was Hannah's determination to take care of Jonah 
and preserve his dignity. When describing the death scene Hannah says: 
But it wasn't easy to, to, to ... [Hannah is crying now] see him lying there and 
knowing that you couldn't do anything more for him, that, that was the awful 
part, you couldn't do anything more for him [ ... ] and afterwards I said to my 
daughter ... 'What else could I have done to try and relieve the terrible 
situation?' She says 'nothing, you've done everything possible.' 
Much later in the interview when Hannah is talking about the VJ anmversary 
referred to above she says: 
When I go down to church, he was a religious boy you know, and I go down 
and a mass is said for him at a particular time ... I'm still doing what I can 
because I said when he dies 'could I have done any more?' And for all he's 
died I still want to be doing, doing something. 
Hannah's determination to preserve Jonah's dignity is nicely demonstrated in the 
following when Hannah describes what happened immediately after Jonah died: 
And when they came from the ... funeral ... the men, well it was a young girl 
and a man, when they came that morning, [Hannah's voice changes as she 
enacts the role of herself]: 'oh dear, I wonder what they are going to do' [ ... ] 
my words: 'You are not putting my husband in a paper shroud,' and I thought 
about it, I felt that 'oh dear, you were so rude,' [I laugh]. 'Mrs Hannah, we 
don 't use paper shrouds' [her voice changes as she takes on the role of the 
younger female funeral attendant]. 'There's his shirt, there's his trousers all 
nicely pressed [Hannah's voice changes again as she takes on the role of 
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herself].' Then the next remark from me, where I got all this from I don't 
know: 'If it's good enough for the King of England it is good enough for my 
husband.' That was the most cheeky remark [Hannah laughs] but they've done 
that, they've done exactly what I wanted them and you know that helped, in a 
funny way... in a funny way I was thinking 'I've still kept his dignity about 
him, the dignity the doctor said he had and it's still there for him' and in a 
funny little way that thought gave me a wee bit of comfort [her voice is sad 
again now] do you know. 
What is clear from this extract is just how strong Hannah's desire to 'keep on 
doing' things for Jonah is, to preserve the dignity that the doctor ta1ked about. 
This takes us, once again, back to Jonah's experience in the war. It is an 
interesting aside here that Hannah's wish takes this particular form. It is often 
cited as evidence for the 'death as taboo thesis' that dead bodies are dressed up to 
hide the 'reality' of death. Clearly that is not what is on Hannah's mind. Her 
concern is that Jonah be well turned out, that his appearance be in accordance 
with his dignity. This is, I believe, telling of how people of Hannah and Jonah's 
generation in the area conceive of dignity and respectability and the link they see 
between that and their appearance. It is not simply, as some might want to have 
it, that people are being judged on fleeting appearances alone but, to Hannah and 
her contemporaries, appearance speaks of attitudes and inclinations, or character. 
I would like to point out too how the sheer importance of the whole matter is 
somehow captured in the very dramatic terms in which Hannah casts her 
narrative. Hannah's early anxious speculation 'oh dear, I wonder what they are 
going to do' is replaced by the surprisingly assertive 'you are not putting my 
husband in a paper shroud,' introducing right at the beginning of the narrative a 
dramatic tension surrounding the direction Hannah's interaction with the funeral 
attendants is going to take. Even the very word 'paper shroud' conjures up 
images of unmarked graves for the paupers from the poor houses, once the worst 
fate of all bar being sent for dissection at the hands of the anatomists (see 
Richardson 1989b). The tension is increased when the funeral attendant answers 
back somewhat sternly 'we don't use paper shrouds' and Hannah replies with a 
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s:imilarly assertive order 'there's his shirt~ there's his trousers all nicely pressed'. 
The narrative tension, for so far it is not clear what the conclusion of Hannah's 
interaction with the people from the funeral director's will be, is [mally eased 
when Hannah says laughing 'then the next remark from me, where I got all this 
from I don't know: 'If it's good enough for the King of England it is good 
enough for my husband.' That was the most cheeky remark'. Thus Hannah 
acknowledges what the listener may see as her overreaction, but that there was a 
point to it is confmned when she continues 'but they've done that, they've done 
exactly what I wanted them and you know that helped, in a funny way' indicating 
that there was after all a possibility that the people from the funeral director might 
have done sOlnething else. 
If Hannah and Jonah's relationship was marked by her desire to care for her 
husband there was also a determination to 'stay together.' Almost a year passed 
from the time Jonah was diagnosed as fatally ill till he died. During all that time 
Hannah cared for him. It wasn't easy, Hannah herself in her seventies and not in 
the best of health. Still, 
When he was ill I said 'there's no way he's going into hospital. No way.' Of 
course it was lung cancer and when he was ill he said to me 'if it gets too much 
[Hannah's voice becomes weak as if she herself is ill] let me go to hospital.' 
And I said 'no, we spent so long time apart when we were younger let us stay 
together till the very end this time.' It was difficult, wasn't easy at all. 
This emphasis on 'staying together' seems to provide a kind of a closure to the 
story of Hannah and Jonah's marriage. Desire and determination to 'stay 
together' now rectifies in a way the wrongs of the past when, so soon after they 
had married, the two were parted for so long. 
The fact that it was during and through that separation that Jonah suffered so 
much seems to lend further weight to Hannah's determination here but later on 
she establishes that the desire was mutual, that the wish to stay together was 
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Jonah's as much as hers. In another place in the interview, when talking about 
something quite different, Hannah said: 
my husband used to apparently go along the riverbanks as a little boy during 
his lunch break from school and he used to go what they call skinny dipping in 
the nude in the river [ ... ] anyway,. when he was ill and we knew he was dying 
and he said to me, you know, we had made our minds up we were going to 
both be cremated 1 said 'oh, yes definitely,' 'cos you put your bones down and 
before you know where you are they're digging it all up for car parks [Hannah 
laughs] you know, so 1 said 'fine, anyway, we have no one to look after graves 
so fine if that's what you want.' So he says [her voice changes tone as she 
assumes the role of her husband] 'well, 1 think 1 want my ashes put in the 
Wear,' he says 'you know where 1 used to go when 1 was a little boy,' 'cos he 
used to show me and this weeping willow is just a wee bit along from there on 
that picture [she points to a painting of the river Wear and Durham Cathedral 
hanging on her wall] and he said 'I want my ashes put in there,' 1 said 'oh, 
yeah, yeah,' 1 said 'OK, if that's what you want I'll do it for you.' Right. So 
little time went over [ ... ] and he said to me 'if my ashes go in the Wear, your 
ashes will have to go in the Wear as well you know, we can't be parted,' and 
he sat and you could see he was thinking about it deeply ... and he said 'but 
you can't swim,' [we both burst out laughing] see the silly things you, 'but you 
can't swim,' 1 said 'no, I can not swim Jonah,' 'ah, but,' he says, 'I would hold 
you up,' oh, ho, ho, how 1 didn't cry that day 1 don't know, so 1 said 'yeah, 
sure, sure you would, yeah, of course you would Jonah.' That went over again 
. .. and then up comes another thing, all connected with this, [again her voice 
changes as she says the following] 'you know I've been thinking,' 1 said, 1 
think 'oh, dear, what's he been thinking now?' 'If 1 have my ashes put in 
now,' 'yeah,' 'you'd have all those steps to walk down the riverbank' 1 said 
'yes, 1 would, wouldn't I' he says 'well you have difficulty walking down the 
steps, up and down,' 1 said 'I most certainly do,' he says 'right, forget it,' 1 
thought 'of all the things, of all the things to come out with, 1 mean for 
somebody who knows that they are dying must be, well their brain must be 
racing all over the place, mustn't it, must be. Anyway, there was a chap he 
died next door but one and we went to his funeral and he was cremated at 
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Durham Crematorium, so we were there and we knew we were at the chapel 
and we were looking out the window, 1 don't know if you have ever been up 
there, it is beautiful and you look all round you, the trees, the old trees behind 
you, oh it was beautiful there, this is, this is Durham, not the city, this is 
Durham in the Hills, we came back he said 'yeah,' he says 'that's where we 
are going to be,' 1 said 'well I'm in full agreement,' and that's how it ended in 
Durham Hills. 
So it was Jonah's wish no less than Hannah's that they would stay together but 
the above account shows Jonah in a new light in more ways than just this. Here 
he, in contrast to the story so far, is very much the active party and Hannah the 
passive one .. This line is further strengthened by another story. Hannah says: 
When he first died and 1 came home from Country House [a rest home run by 
the Catholic Church where Hannah went after Jonah died] and 1 thought 'I dare 
not tell anybody, they'll think I'm crazy.' 1 kept it to myself so much, 1 felt he 
was in that bed with me ... Jonah wasn't there but his presence, his full 
presence was there. And, you know, that went on for a little while. 1 said 
'you're not supposed to be here, you know, you're not on this earth now, 
you're not supposed to be here, you've got to go somewhere else,' and that 
night [Hannah starts crying] I was lying in bed ... and truly, it was as though 
his whole body came right over the top of me and he said 'you can't come yet, 
you've got to go through it' ... But there was no voice, there was no voice, it 
was just in my brain, but 1 wasn't thinking about that and I thought 'eh, 1 
haven't even thought anything like that.' It was as though it was coming 
through him and as 1 said his body was leaning, at first, his body was leaning 
right over me. 
Notice first how the roles are reversed here, how the characters of Hannah and 
Jonah have been changed. Before, Hannah was Jonah's spokesperson, she knew 
his mind, she would say what he couldn't articulate. Now it is Jonah who sees 
into the recesses of Hannah's mind, into places that are hidden to herself. Jonah 
can warn Hannah of the dangerous desires lurking in her mind, desires to join 
Jonah too soon, desires that Hannah herself is unaware of. Jonah lends his own 
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weight to the message and literally prevents Hannah from following him. After 
that, Hannah says, 'I just prayed that he'd just go away to what 1 call his heavenly 
home.' 1 could continue here by pointing out again how this story continues the 
biographical build-up of Jonah's character and the nature of his relationship with 
Hannah. 1 would, indeed, venture to postulate that this shorter narrative puts the 
[mal piece of Jonah's biographical puzzle in its place. A picture of Jonah has been 
presented, an explanation provided for the nature of his character and, now in the 
story of his return, a redemption offered through which Jonah can assume certain 
of the roles that Hannah customarily had to perform in their relationship, roles 
which Jonah was capable of performing himself before his war experience. 
There is one other place, apart from the account of their very first encounter, in 
the whole narrative where Hannah stresses Jonah's agency. Here Hannah is 
telling me about Jonah's stay in the Japanese prison camp. She says: 
but we knew that they were being treated very badly, we did know this, you 
know how things filtered through and I suppose you've heard about this 
railway, he was working on that you know and when he said he was down to 
five and a half stone and no energy really, but they all say that for every 
sleeper laid on that railway a life was taken [ ... ]he didn't tell me a lot of things 
when he came back, no, no, no, no, he wouldn't tell me 'cos it was too horrific 
and he knew I would get all suss [Hannah shakes herself as if there's cold 
water running down her spine], he didn't tell me everything, 1 heard more from 
his friends than 1 heard from him and he said 'the boys that died', you know on 
the railways, said well 'their bodies were just left on the side of the railways' 
said 'there wasn't a thing you could do about it' and he said 'the jungle just 
literally took over' you know and when he came home people used to say 'you 
were in the same regiment in the army' and that 'did you know my son?' 'Oh, 
yes, yes, oh, yes, yes. He's, he's buried, he's got a grave'. He says 'I daren't 
tell them where they are, 1 wouldn't dare tell them', he says 'there are 
headstones up there' and he says 'there's nobody up there' you know, just to 
try and help the people. 
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If Jonah's inability to get his words out was a mark of what had happened to him 
during the war his unw~gness to talk here is an act of heroism. He does not 
talk to protect Hannah and he does not tell the whole truth about what happened 
in Burma to help the people whose sons and fathers were lost there. If Hannah 
has previously carried out 'narrative repairs' on Jonah's character here her efforts 
seem to extend into what can be called 'social work' (this phrase too is Michael 
Carrithers', personal communication). She is, that is, attempting to redefme social 
relations and Jonah's standing in those relations. His silence wasn't always due to 
his inability to talk: sometimes it was a willing sacrifice to take on the burdens of 
other people. 
What would a bereavement counsellor have made of Hannah's story? He would 
have used his skills to help Hannah to focus on how she is feeling now - her 
loneliness, her sadness, her anger over what happened to Jonah, even her guilt, if 
such it is, over her inability to protect her husband. Walter, in contrast, would 
focus on how Hannah has through her account built a biography of Jonah that she 
can communicate to other people, a biography that endures. There is some 
evidence of this here. Hannah's account contains the story of a person, Jonah, but 
it also contains the story of a relationship: that between Jonah and Hannah. In 
this way it is also a story about Hannah herself and so if Hannah's account is a 
durable biography of Jonah it is a durable auto-biography of Hannah too. 
Even so, I think that we have to see Hannah's account as a story, as a narrative. 
Rather than building a durable biography of Jonah, although it does so to some 
extent, Hannah's account principally establishes and explains Jonah's character 
and it does so through emplotment, a notion not highlighted sufficiently when we 
speak of biography. This plot, furthermore, and the history of Hannah's 
relationship with Jonah that it contains, shape Hannah's experience of Jonah's 
death and her grief. In this we can see the extent of the intervention if a 
bereavement counsellor were to ask Hannah to abstract from her story her 
emotions now. We can see also, I believe, how Hannah's emotions are actualised 
in her stories. As Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990) argue, the emotions are part of 
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discourse and of stories in particular. That it is difficult to distinguish self from 
other is evident from Jacob's story to which I tum now. 
Jacob 
Jacob is seventy. He was born in a small mining village in the North East and he 
has lived there all his life. Jacob went to work in the mines as soon as he was old 
enough. He did courses with the Coal Board and advanced within the trade. 
Jacob worked in the mines for 32 years till they were closed down. Then he went 
to work in a factory. During that time he developed cancer of the colon but he 
'came through that OK'. Jacob worked in the factory for about ten years before 
he retired to look after his wife, Doreen, who had by then developed Parkinson's 
disease. Five years ago Doreen 'started having problems with her bowels.' It 
turned out to be cancer and she died about two years later. Now Jacob lives 
alone in a small bungalow in the village where he was born. That is where I meet 
him, our rendezvous having been organised by the hospice where Doreen spent 
some of her last days. I explain to Jacob, as best I can, what my research 
involves. He nods and starts telling me about his early life. I ask him if he has 
lived in his village all his life: 
Jacob: Yes, been here all my life [ ... ] I was married from here then, at the time 
houses were very short, we couldn't get a house anywhere so for a full year I 
lived at home and my wife lived at her work at the Agriculture College after we 
were married. Then we were fortunate to get a house, do you know Shilton 
[the name is fictional]? You know where the Garden Centre is? As you go 
along to the Hall, do you know the Hall? The fITst cottage there is Simone's 
cottage [the name is fictional] we got that cottage, that was in 1951, we were 
married in 1949, '50 to '51 we got that cottage and my wife used to, she was 
working at the school at the time and she used to go down to this house and 
helping the old lady you know to clean and things like that, it had a couple of 
trees, it wasn't the market garden then, it was more or less just like any small 
holding farm, some of the pear trees and that are still there that used to be there 
then and ah we lived there for ... over a year, well over a year, well at that time 
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I was travelling from there to here to work and working ah shift work you 
know I was working say I's working seven in the morning till four or half past 
four, three 0' clock in the afternoon till eleven at night, eleven at night till seven 
in the morning, so and then on the weekend when you ... you went to work on 
the weekend you had to be at work for six o'clock in the morning and as I say, 
you never knew when you were cOming home it may be five 0' clock on a 
Saturday afternoon or maybe seven o'clock on the Sunday night when you 
were finishing and as I say, we didn't have a lot of money I mean I was ... I'd 
have about ah ... how much can I say round about seven pound a week and that 
was for working every day and you also in those days if I went down the pit to 
work I got extra money for that you know you got, I think it was round about 
in decimal coinage it was about twelve and a half pence a day, that was a big 
advantage [we laugh] you, you got extra money but as I say you only had ah' 
my wife when I fITst got to know her she had ah ... how much was it, thirty, 
less than two pound per month wages, of course food was supplied and 
everything like that you know but she worked long hours I mean they had to be 
up fITst thing in the morning, lot of work had to be done before the students 
called in then she had to, she was in the dining room, she had to give the 
students the breakfast after that they would go and do so many dormitories 
then it was dinner time, after dinner they had work to do, then maybe they had 
an afternoon off once or twice in a week and ah ... that was a real hard job but 
she enjoyed the work she did and of course as I say we were living in Shilton 
and I was push, using bicycle to here and we got the chance of a house in 
Rowntree, here in Rowntree [Jacob's village. The name is fictional] so I've 
only lived away from the village for about ... a year and a half at most from 
here you know so we moved back, so of course we came back here, 1953 ... 
What are we to make of this narrative? Walter would point out how Jacob has 
here embarked upon a mission to construct a 'durable biography' even if that 
bio graphy is of himself as much as his wife. In a similar fashion, it has often been 
pointed out by both psychologists and anthropologists that people use stories to 
create a coherent sense of self. Roy Schafer, a psychoanalyst, argues that 'so-
called self-concepts, self-images, self-representations, or more generally the so-
called self may be considered to be a set of narrative strategies or story lines each 
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person follows in trying to develop an emotionally coherent account of his or her 
life' (1992:34; quoted in Capps and Dchs 1995:176). A bereavement counsellor, 
in contrast, would notice that Jacob's story is all about events in the past and not 
about how Jacob is feeling now at all. That in itself is interesting as the reason for 
my visit was the fact that Jacob had lost his wife. So, again, what is going on 
here? Before I attempt to answer that let us get back to Jacob. He continues 
immediately: 
Our son was born so that brings him up to forty [ ... ] three in October, the only 
son we had and he has two lads, two sons, one's nineteen and the other one's 
seventeen I believe something like that and of course [ ... ] he eventually went, 
he was serving his time as a motor mechanic [ ... ] and he finished his time [ ... ] 
and went to the factory to work as a setter on plastic moulding machines and 
then he got married and left home, he lived with us for a year, him and his wife 
until they got a house then of course he left, then I twenty, twenty, twenty five 
year ago, cOming up to twenty six year I was diagnosed as being diabetic so 
I'm on me injections then a few year later after that my wife developed 
Parkinson's disease and she suffered quite a bit with that and then, what 
happened after we coped with that '" I mean I still worked, I was working for 
the Coal Board at the time and I still worked then eventually the colliery that I 
was working at was at Powderburn [the name is fictional] [ ... ] they decided to 
close that one down, I did have the chance of a job over at '" the coast but [ ... ] 
I had done thirty two year in there and I said I'd had enough so I went to work 
at a factory at Eagleshill [the name is fictional] and then twelve year, is that 
right, twelve year on, I had a resection of the colon I had cancer in the bowels I 
had that and I got through that all right then I retired I took the chance that, we 
had a bit of a recession at the factory where I worked [ ... ] I said to the 
managing director that if anyone was to finish I'd finish fIrst, I was the oldest 
but I still had another about eight years to work and there was a lot of young 
people, there was only I think six of us worked there and there was young 
people with families and the managing director said to me 'you have the ... 
longest service in,' he said 'you will be last to be finished.' I knew the director 
well and so [ ... ] I went to meet him one day and I said to him 'you know the 
situation that I have at home that one day eventually I will have to finish work 
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to look after my wife.' So I think that was about a month after that I finished 
work, I retired [Jacob sniffles] and yeah I never regretted it. 
Jacob recounts his story in a near chronological order and his striving to get the 
order right is remarkable. He even asks himself 'and then, what happened after, 
we coped with that' as if he is sitting an exam in his own biography. Through this 
account a particular picture is emerging of Jacob and his wife. They appear as 
'decent, ordinary working-class people' as they would be described locally. They 
worked hard and looked after their own but did not hesitate to sacrifice their own 
well-being for that of others, for instance when Jacob demanded that he would be 
the fITst one to go from the factory, rather than the young people there with 
falnilies. We can indeed call Jacob's account 'durable biography' as Walter 
(1996) suggests but I want to stress again how both Jacob and his wife, Doreen, 
are implicated in this story; and also how the biography that Jacob builds is an 
achievement of characterisation and emplotment. This will become clearer as we 
carry on. 
The bereavement counsellor would point out that Jacob does not seem to engage 
with his story emotionally. It is indeed striking that Jacob manages to relate his 
story with such equanimity even as it descends into a seemingly endless tale of 
illness and lnisery. Yet, the distinction between story and emotion that 
bereavement counselling forges seems out of place here, for as Jacob's account 
continues and becomes even more minute in its detail he gradually becomes more 
emotionally involved. Jacob continues: 
Then shortly after that my wife started having problems with her bowels etc. 
she was taken in to hospital ... that was Easter weekend or just after and they 
performed [a medical operation whose technical terms I do not catch] then after 
she came out, she still had problems with her bowels etc. and the following 
year she had another operation ... and [ ... ] she'd been in hospital for a week 
and he did this emergency operation on a Saturday night and she got over that 
quite well and it wasn't until ... I went into the hospital on about ten days after 
on a Monday to pick her up to bring her home that they told me that there was 
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nothing more they could do for her, it was just a matter of time [ ... ] and 
fortunately she lived another six month and she died on November the 2nd, it 
will be five year on November the 2nd that she died, and so well we just came 
home and ... just got on with life as much as what we could we knew, we didn't 
know how long it would be but ... we're just hoping that they were wrong but 
they weren't and she just gradually deteriorated ... until... 
Jacob's attention to the seemingly most unimportant detail is again striking. 
SOlnehow it becomes important that the emergency operation was carried out on 
Saturday, and Saturday night at that, and that Jacob went to get Doreen on a 
Monday. Having in a rather straightforward fashion recounted Doreen's illness, 
her visits to the hospital, her operations and the doctor's verdict, Jacob's story 
gradually gathers steam. As the stories become more small-scale, as it were, 
Jacob becomes more emotionally involved. His voice which has been practically 
monotone till now starts to change with the tone of his story. Here Jacob 
continues from where we left off: 
There was a Friday morning [ ... ] she woke up, [ ... ] the nurses used to come in 
every day and see to her and talk to her and we had people from the Hospice 
were coming and [ ... ] the Macmillan nurses used to come in and stay with her 
during the night and she woke up on the morning, the Friday morning, and she 
said [he says grimly] 'just get the doctor' and I knew then when she 
complained that she was really ill and the doctor came about four, five times 
that day and just gave her injections of morphine and she died about half past 
one I think it was on the Saturday morning so .. , that was a real rough day that 
day for her and she wasn't practically conscious you know she was that day 
she was in that much pain but prior to that she'd been ... reasonably, I 
wouldn't say reasonably well but she was conscious and never complained of 
anything and [ ... ] I just went in the other room I mean the son and the 
daughter-in-law was here and the Macmillan nurse and the doctor was here, 
about I think round about eleven 0' clock, as I say it had been a nasty winter 
day raining uphills and [ ... ] I just went in the other room for ten minutes just to 
put me head down for ten minutes when .,. my son came in and just said 'dad, 
you're wanted' and I went in, she just died that second you know ... that was a 
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[he says his voice shaking a bit now for the fIrst time] relief that her suffering 
had ended. 
'It's half of you that dies' 
J aco b started the interview by setting out the course of events. As he went on, he 
began to express his feelings and here, in the account above, he has started to 
identify and elaborate a little bit upon his emotions. At the same time Jacob is 
beginning to weave him and his wife together more intimately than before. 'That 
was a real rough day that day for her' he says of his wife. Doreen was though 
practically unconscious and we can well see, I believe, that in fact the day was a 
'real rough day' for Jacob himself no less than for Doreen. The nature of the 
relationship between Jacob and Doreen becomes more prominent in the narrative 
as he continues and starts to ponder over his own reactions to Doreen's death. 
The nature of these ponderings are shaped by the plot that Jacob gives his story. 
Here he continues: 
You don't know how you feel [his voice shakes slightly] you're [he says 
slowly] not pleased that this has happened but you're, you're relieved that the 
suffering has ended '" because I mean we were married for ... forty, forty two 
and a half year and had been courting for about four year before that and I 
always say you know some people, in fact I was seeing a friend of mine, she 
lost her husband not quite a year ago and we were very good friends her 
husband and I and he just died like that, he just took heart attack and died and 
she was with him when he died, when it happened, they were out in the car 
when it happened and I was in seeing her on Saturday afternoon [ ... ] and we 
just had a bit of a talk and a natter and a big weep as we usually do and [ ... ] 
the modern, the modern age now-a-days they don't, marriages is not taken as 
deeply as what we did [ ... ] if you have an argument nine out of ten they just 
say that's the end of it and [ ... ] they part, it's too easy for them to part, 
divorce, even if there's any children there's nothing considered when in our 
days you got married and you were married for life and I always say that if ... 
in my situation and my friend's situation that ... when you' ve been married for 
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so many years that there's fifty per cent of you dies you know, you become, 
you become one and when one of you dies that's half, half of you' s gone and it 
takes a lot to adjust to it you know. 
In characterising his relationship with Doreen Jacob compares marriages as they 
now exist to marriages as they used to be. Now marriages are not 'taken as 
deeply' as they were. In what is quite a wild exaggeration, Jacob asserts that in 
nine out of ten cases when couples have arguments they divorce. This contrasts 
to the time when Jacob and Doreen got married when you actually 'married for 
life' In those cases 'there's fIfty per cent of you dies [ ... J you become one and 
when one of you dies that's [ ... J half ofyou's gone'. Still the relationship between 
Jacob and Doreen was not just special compared to modern relationships, as 
Jacob explains: 
My wife and I were never parted [ ... ] the only time [ ... ] we were parted [was] 
when I was working for the Coal Board I did go away for a week's course, 
different courses [ ... ] this was prior to being married [ ... J we had a big training 
scheme with all the new machines that were cOming into the industry, you had 
to go down to Sheffield to the big training centre to see all these machines and 
learn all about them and things like that and [ ... ] when it came to a weekend, 
the fIrst weekend you stayed down, the next weekend, well you were lost, I 
mean the younger people that weren't courting or anything like that they would 
go out to dances and ... and I just used to sit and do me homework and [ ... J so 
eventually I started to come back home on a weekend and [he starts laughing] 
other people laughed but I used to leave my wife, as I say we were courting 
then, at seven 0' clock at Durham station and ... I wouldn't get into Sheffield till 
half past ten but on the Monday morning I used to write a letter to my wife on 
the train [ ... ], as I got off the train I put the letter in a post-box and she had a 
letter on her, on her tray on the Monday [Tuesday] morning [we both laugh] as 
if I was still there but that's, I mean some people thought that was a bit sickly 
and things like that but we thought a lot of each other. 
Jacob is attempting to make sense of his own experience, of his reactions to 
Doreen's death by talking about their relationship. In a way he is also trying to 
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make sense of his relationship with Doreen by talking about his emotions now. 
'You don't know how you feel,' he said earlier on, 'you're not pleased [ ... ] but 
you're relieved that the suffering has ended.' In explaining his reactions J aco b, 
initially, makes reference to his long relationship with his wife: 'we were married 
for [ ... ] forty two and a half year and had been courting for about four year before 
that,' he says. Jacob contrasts the dedication of such a long lasting relationship 
with the current state of marriage where it's 'too easy for them to [ ... ] divorce, 
even if there's any children there's nothing considered'. In his days, Jacob 
continues 'you got married and you were married for life'. It is after such a long-
standing relationship that 'when one of you dies that's half, half of you' s gone'. 
But Jacob doesn't stop there. Having contrasted the situation of his 
contemporaries with the situation today, Jacob compares his and Doreen's 
relationship with that of their contemporaries. Jacob's account of his training 
with the Coal Board is all about his and Doreen's intense young love and his 
incredible devotion. Jacob's letter writing to his fiancee is contrasted to other 
people's preference for going dancing and his love and devotion is made to look 
all the more special because other people found it 'a bit sickly'. 
So far we have heard mostly of Jacob's love and devotion. As he continued Jacob 
made efforts to establish that the love and dedication was mutual. He says: 
And ... even when she knew that [ ... ] she was going to die [ ... ] her thoughts 
were still with me, she made sure that everything was all right, that after she 
died I'd be all right, I mean we bought a microwave and all sorts you know so 
that I wouldn't have to do work that I shouldn't have you know, [ ... ] to make 
sure that I looked after myself, her thoughts were still with me of course 
Jacob's concern here is to make clear the extent of Doreen's consideration for his 
well-being even as she herself was dying. There is a dangerous strait to be 
negotiated here, for while it is recognised in England that in loving relationships 
there must be some amount of exchange, of give and take, this must not be 
portrayed as too instrumental. These dangers are made evident when Jacob says 
'I mean we bought a microwave and all sorts you know so that I wouldn't have to 
234 
Old Stories Will Come Out 
do work that I shouldn't have'. It might appear that the 'shouldn't' could reveal 
Jacob and Doreen's relationship as based upon a strictly instrumental division of 
labour, and one, to boot, that is based upon the traditional roles of the sexes, but 
the whole point of the story does seem to be to stress the agreement between 
Jacob and Doreen over the buying of the microwave. I believe too that the 
'danger' is something that Jacob sees in me and other possible readers of the 
interview. People of Jacob's generation in the region, on the other hand, tend not 
make the distinction between relationships based on emotions and relationships 
based on duty, that younger people may make. For people of Jacob's generation, 
as his story makes clear, marriage may initially be based on mutual affection but 
that affection is only really realised by, and expressed through, the devotion and 
duty it brings into being between two people. Duty without love is simply 
obligation, but similarly affection without duty is only 'puppy love'. The point is 
in fact made by Jacob when he relates how he and Doreen made preparations 'to 
make sure that I looked after myself; her thoughts were still with me of course', 
where 'her thoughts' seem to cover both instrumental and affectionate matters. 
As Jacob continues he slowly turns his attention more closely to his reactions to 
Doreen's death. These he then compares to what he sees as others' way of 
copIng. 
I've had to get on with my life, [ ... J I go out quite a lot, nearly every day I'm 
out in the car somewhere [ ... ] even if I'm not intending going anywhere I just 
get up and go out in the car for an hour then come back home and ah ... it's 
hard for the fIrst ... really for over the fITst year it's really hard, [ ... ] I fully 
intend going away this year in November but '" there's something in my mind 
you know that worried us when I anticipated going away I thought, 'well I'll go 
at the end of October and the beginning of November,' because as I say I go to 
Malta every year, sometimes twice a year and [ ... ] when I was sorting [ ... ] 
when I was gonna go I realised that I would be away on the anniversary of her 
dying which really worried me and [I] thought 'well I have to do it some time' 
I've always stayed in England you know and I've always stayed at home that 
day I don't go out then, as I say I thought 'well you've got to do it for the fITst 
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time to go out that day' so ah the last time I was in hospital they wanted me 
instead of every six month they wanted me every four month or every five 
month I'm not sure which one it was and so that brings it to November so I 
can't go [he laughsJ so it's something that's come that's stopped us from dOing 
that you know, I didn't want to do it, I wanted in one sense to be able to do it 
and ah ... but there was something come and stop me from doing it, so I'll have 
to wait till maybe next year when I'll make an effort and maybe go out on that 
day but as I say you know it's ah, you don't know the reason why you know. 
There seems to be a tension in Jacob's mind here. On the one hand he would like 
to be able to go out and even leave the country on the day his wife died. On the 
other hand he fmds it very difficult. The difficulty seems to be Jacob's loyalty to 
his wife: to leave the house on the day that she died might seem to diminish his 
sorrow and so belittle their relationship. Still, Jacob is of course aware of other 
possibilities, that other people do things differently. He continues: 
you've got to adjust as you like to it, some people are different, [ ... J some 
people are coping, I don't know whether it's coping or, people are made 
different you know, they have different natures whatsoever, when my wife's 
sister died two year before my wife, that was in September that she'd died, she 
died about a week before her birthday I think it was and she would have been 
sixty, sixty two, same age as my wife, her husband was remarried within 
eighteen month [ ... J different people, I know I won't get married again you 
know I've been content with my life what I've had and no one will ever take 
her place it doesn't matter how much I live or how much money I have, I don't 
have a lot of money but, I'm not rich, I was rich in one way, I had a very good 
wife [ ... ] I accept that my wife's died, it was a relief when she did die, she was 
out of her suffering ... but '" how can I say ... you can't see the logic of it at 
times, you see so much evil and wickedness in the world but you can't 
understand why a person that was so good should have to die and then, as I 
was saying to someone the other day, I was pleased in one respect that my wife 
died before me because the illness that my wife had I don't how she would 
have coped if I'd died [ ... ] first and as I say I'm thankful in one sense that it 
happened that way which is maybe a bit [ ... ] selfish or [ ... ] I don't know. 
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Jacob appears to be pulled in two opposite directions here. On the one hand, he 
feels that he has to 'get on with his life' and do what he wants to do, but his 
inability to go away on the day of his wife's death stands as a stark reminder to 
him about his struggle to 'carryon'. Jacob clearly feels that he should be able to 
go; 'well I have to do it some time,' he says. At the same time Jacob is being 
pulled towards Doreen and their life together and he is clearly unwilling to sever 
some of the ties with her that he would have to sever in order to move on. In 
contrast, Jacob's sister-in-Iaw's husband is married within eighteen months of his 
wife's death.4 
In relating the story of his wife's death and his own subsequent reactions Jacob 
has established characters and outlined expectations within a social scene. The 
stories that he tells, that is, are attempts to build an interpretation of a social 
scene. So while Jacob's narrative acts seem to be just part of his individual 
thinking they are also social acts because they are attempts at establishing an 
argument, a justification, that explains his relationship with Doreen and his 
experiences after her death. This argument goes something like this: When we 
were married marriage meant something, it was for life. People were faithful and 
devoted to each other whereas now people divorce as soon as they have an 
argument. Simultaneously we had a particularly close marriage, we thought a lot 
of each other and were never parted even to the extent that other people found us 
'sickly'. I am aware of the possibility of re-marrying but because of the very close 
relationship I had with my wife, because of our mutual love and devotion, and 
because of the meaning of marriage when we actually married I will not marry 
agam. 
So, while we can talk about Jacob having established a 'durable biography' for his 
wife and himself, I think we need to tease out two dimensions unexplored by 
Walter. Firstly, Jacob's acts of narrative reasoning (Bruner 1986) are a means to 
clarify and justify the character of his relationship with his wife and of the nature 
4 This is somewhat reminiscent of Stroebe and Schut's (1995) notion of the 'dual process of 
grief' and may indicate the use of counselling strategies and language in everyday life. 
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of his reactions to her death. His narrative sets out who is who and what is what 
and orientates the characters involved, including Doreen, vis-a-vis each other so 
that their relationships and positions towards each other are made more apparent. 
In this Jacob's stories are, like Hannah's stories, an example of 'social work'. 
The 'durable biography' is not just a matter of personal adjustment to a loss but 
affects the social scene it addresses. At the same time we have to stress the 
creative character of Jacob's story telling. A 'durable biography' is not a history 
but a story -- in as far as that distinction is valid -- that is founded upon 
characterisation and emplotment. In particular it is important to note how Jacob's 
story is linked to a sense of the degeneration of the world. Not only is marriage 
not what it used to be but now -- as Jacob related later in the interview -- people 
have lost their sense of hard-work, and their greed has all but taken over; the 
community spirit that used to infuse places like Jacob's village is gone and has 
been replaced by general suspicion of other people; and where people used to help 
each other crime is now rampant. Against this, stand Jacob and Doreen, hard-
working, decent, ordinary working-class people, whose marriage was based on 
both love and devotion. This is a narrative effect, created through story, rather 
than simply a part of.a biography. 
Before I conclude with a remark about bereavement counselling allow me to 
return once more to Jacob's story. He says: 
every year gets that little bit easier, you can talk about it a lot better from like 
it was, [ ... ] it's something that you did each day, I mean, I still, occasionally 
when I come into the house and open the door, sometimes I'll say 'I'm back' 
because if I went down the street to get anything, down the shop and I opened 
the door and my wife was in bed, she would have been in bed you know, I'd 
just popped out for [ ... ] ten minutes, fIrst thing I'd do when I opened the door is 
I would say 'I'm back' and occasionally I've done that you know, it's part of 
your life that you've done [ ... ] I mean everything what I did for quite a while 
you know it was still, if you were cooking you'd maybe put that little bit extra 
you know, she didn't eat a lot but, did things like that you know it took a long 
time for you as we say here to sink in, to get down into your mind that she 
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wasn't there [ ... ] I come to her final date I still kept on for a while, [ ... ] it 
doesn't end there and then that moment, it lasts for quite a while you know the 
presence is still there for a long time '" things that you find brings things back 
to you, I mean the other day, the other week I was up in the 10ft [ ... ] I was 
looking for an engineering book and I [ ... ] found her fur coat and her sheep 
skin coat [ ... ] and there's in the bedroom there's a little corner unit and it's 
very rare I go in there, very rare, because I know for a fact her wedding dress 
and everything is still there, something that she kept and her head-dress is still 
and that's forty, forty seven years since I was married and [ ... ] there are some 
people they, they maybe think a lot about each other but they would live their 
separate lives, we didn't, we lived for, for each other, everything that we did 
was for each other I mean ... I worked hard, every wage that I got I gave to my 
wife and I never asked for [ ... ] anything but if I wanted anything it was there I 
mean if I wanted, if I wanted a car, if I wanted a motorcycle anything like that 
we got it, [ ... ] my life was for my wife and my wife's life was for me and as I 
say I don't know whether it's a good thing or it's a bad thing because when 
you live together for so long and you're together for so long ... when one of you 
dies that's harder for them, the persons that live their own lives you know 
more or less separate lives from their wives, I mean all right, they may have 
been happy in their own way of life but there's not so much of a wrench of 
parting, [ ... ] I mean my wife said to me when she knew that she was really ill 
[ ... ] we used to lie on the bed together and sit and talk about what was going to 
happen and things like that and she said to me one day, she said 'you can get 
married again if you wish' and I said 'no way' she said 'yes,' she said, 'you 
can but there is only one thing I want you to promise,' and I said 'what is 
that?' she said 'that when you die you'll come to me,' you know, I said 'that 
won't never happen because I won't marry again.' 
Bereavement counselling presents itself as being non-authoritative, it portrays the 
client as the expert and seeks to present itself as being non-interventionist. Yet, it 
seems to me that the focus on self-emotion-now that bereavement counselling 
would seek to bring could undermine Jacob's story and indeed that of Hannah 
too. For both Jacob and Hannah it does not seem to make sense to make a 
distmction between themselves and their partners. Jacob portrays the relationship 
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between himself and his wife as one of total dedication. He worked hard and 
gave all the money to his wife; she, dying, tells him that he can marry again if he 
wants but only if he promises to join her when he dies. Hannah, the reader may 
remember, acted as Jonah's mouthpiece, reading his mind and uttering what he 
couldn't say, until he died when, as he paid her one [mal visit, it was Jonah who 
saw into the back of Hannah's mind and articulated what she was not aware of 
herself. Jacob characterises his relationship with Doreen in a similar fashion. She 
could see into his mind, she knew his wishes so that whatever he wanted 'we got 
it' without him having to ask for it. Doreen and Jacob were truly part of each 
other. 
It also seems to undermine the integrity of Hannah and Jacob's narratives to 
attempt to separate their emotions from the rest of their stories. Hannah's 
emotions are inextricably bound up with the unfolding of the events that she 
relates. Her feelings are shaped by the very plot that she constructs around the 
war and Jonah's character. Jacob emphasises how he and Doreen were in fact one 
and how his emotions following her death are determined by the history of his 
deep relationship with his wife. This is the point that I shall pursue further in the 
following chapter, as I describe how stories are not simply reflective of people's 
experiences but constitutive of their social relationships with other people. The 
bereaved, I shall argue, use stories of the deceased to maintain relationships with 
absent kin and, even in some cases, the dead themselves. 
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Chapter 7 
Death is not the End. 
Narratives and the Continuation of Absent Relations 
Introduction 
Bereavelnent counsellors are trained and encouraged to focus upon self-emotion-
now, upon, that is, how their clients are feeling now. This was the simplified 
condensation of counselling training and teaching with which I concluded part II 
of this thesis. In chapter 6, I traced how the bereaved use stories to make sense 
of their experiences of grief, and of the lives and deaths of their dead ones and of 
their own lives. Narratives, I argued, are not simply psychological devices to 
achieve self-coherence. They are social devices to achieve understanding and 
acceptance from others, to realign and repair social relationships. This is my 
starting point in this chapter. Employing Deborah Tannen's (1989) notion of 
'involvement strategies' and Mikhail Mikhailovitch Bakhtin's (1981) idea of the 
dialo gical nature of language use, I intend to explore how the bereaved use 
stories, often stories about their dead ones, to establish and maintain social 
relationships with other people. I begin by exploring how the bereaved use 
involvement strategies to establish a relationship with me, the interviewer. I 
continue by showing how the bereaved use stories about their dead ones to 
maintain their relationships with a number of absent relatives. And [mally I 
consider how the bereaved use stories to continue and maintain their relationship 
with their dead ones. 
241 
Death is not the End 
I do this in order to pose two questions; to raise two general points. Bereavement 
counselling's emphasis upon self-emotion-now is predicated on, amongst other 
things, the assumption that the relationship between the deceased and the 
bereaved ends with death. On that assumption bereavement counselling seeks to 
address the emotions of the survivor rather than the relationship between the 
deceased and the survivor. This, as Piers Vitebsky (1993), has pointed out, 
makes for a particular understanding of grief. It invites the question: what is grief 
for the bereaved for whom their relationship with their dead is continued? I shall 
argue, it is a part of the story of their relationship with their dead and with other 
people. Which leads to the second point. Anthropologists have, as Simpson 
(1998 in press) reminds us, usually restricted their understanding of the social to 
actual relationships and observable interactions. The question of how people 
think about relationships, 'the realm of imagined relationships' (Simpson 1998 in 
press) has been left to psychologists interested in the 'self'. Yet, as Caughey 
(1984: 17; quoted in Simpson 1998) has argued, it may be a mistake to separate 
the 'inner' world of the self and the outer world of society. For the imagined 
world itself is populated by characters 'felt to be there' and 'which continually 
splice into the r~al world' (Hermans and Kempen 1993:71; quoted in Simpson 
1998). I shall argue that the narratives of the bereaved, related here, make it 
impossible to make the distinction between the 'inner' and the 'outer' worlds and 
that this, [mally, poses problems for the distinction between individual and society 
that has been predominant in the anthropology of death and that has lead to the 
almost total ignorance of grief in that literature. 
Making it count: Involvement strategies 
A striking feature of the interviews that I conducted was my interviewees' desire 
to set the record straight. They were not simply recounting their experiences but 
giving accounts of their experiences, of their lives and those of their dead ones. 
Understandably, then, my interviewees were concerned that what they were 
saying was understood and accepted. They were seeking to persuade me. But by 
what means do people seek to persuade each other? According to Deborah 
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Tannen (1989) they do so by using what she calls 'involvement strategies,' 
strategies that 'work to communicate meaning and to persuade by creating 
involvement' (1989:28). 
Tannen's (1989:9) general thesis is that involvement strategies 'shaped and 
elaborated in literary discourse, are spontaneous and pervasive in conversation 
because they reflect and create interpersonal involvement.' She follows John 
Gumperz's (1982:1) observation that involvement, conversational involvement, is 
the basis of all linguistic understanding. He argues that participating in 
conversations is not simply a matter of understanding passively. He suggests that 
one cannot understand the meaning of a given utterance without having a broad 
grasp of conversational coherence, 'where the utterance came from and where it 
is headed' (Tannen 1989:10). Involvement in this sense has to be achieved during 
conversations, it cannot be assumed to exist beforehand. What is at work here is 
an emphasis on the 'interactive nature of conversational interaction' in which 
'both speaking and listening include elements and traces of the other. Listening ... 
is an active not a passive enterprise, requiring interpretation comparable to that 
required in speaking, and speaking entails simultaneously projecting the act of 
listening' (Tannen 1989:12). Indeed the theoretical perspective to which Tannen 
subscribes is sometimes referred to as 'joint production' emphasising as it does 
the active role of the listener in the creation of the speaker's discourse, and the 
role of the speaker in listening. 'Not only', Tannen observes (1989:12) 'is the 
audience co-author, but the speaker is also a co-listener.' 
Tannen (1989: 17) makes a distinction between those involvement strategies that 
work on sound primarily and those that work on meaning primarily. The former 
include rhythm; patterns based on repetition and variation of the various 
constitutive elements of language, like phonemes, morphemes and words; and 
styles of speech. Tannen (1989:18) points out that a number of researchers have 
noted the 'astonishing rhythmic and iconic coordination ... when people interact 
face to face.' Filmed conversations have shown that a speaker's emphasis on a 
word goes together with bodily movements such as the waving of hands or the 
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blinking of an eye. When the speaker shares a cultural background with a listener 
the movements of the latter are also synchronised with the movements of the 
former. Tannen suggests that for people to take part in conversation they must 
share a rhythm. Joining conversations, she says, is like joining a line of dancers: 
one must know both where the dancers have been and where they are heading, 
and to bring one's feet into coordination with theirs one must fmd the pattern of 
their movements. Tannen adds that a shared rhythm is crucial for the outcome of 
conversations. The importance of repetition has often been emphasised by 
scholars of language. Harvey Sacks (1971), the cultural hero of conversation 
analysis, demonstrated frequently that people use repetition of sounds and words 
in a systematic way in spontaneous conversation. Sacks argued that the words 
people choose to use are 'sound coordinated with things in its environment' 
(Tannen 1989:20). 
Turning her attention to the involvement strategies that work on meaning, Tannen 
(1989:23) suggests that 'filling in unstated information' makes 'discourse effective 
because the more work readers or hearers do to supply meaning, the deeper their 
understanding and the greater their sense of involvement with both text and 
author.' Indirectness, or ellipsis, on part of the speaker is the frrst strategy of this 
category Tannen discusses. She refers to Lakoff's studies (1973; 1979) which 
established that conversationalists characteristically do not say exactly what they 
mean, or at least leave the meaning of their words underdetermined. Indirectness 
allows speakers two things: to save face if their contribution to the conversation is 
not well received, and 'to achieve the sense of rapport that comes from being 
understood without saying what one means' (Tannen 1989:23). In addition to 
this, indirectness requires the listener to add in the unstated information and thus 
contributes to the sense of involvement. 
J.D. Sapier (1977; in Tannen 1989:24) distinguishes between four types of tropes, 
or figures of speech that operate on meaning. These are metaphors, or speaking 
of one thing in terms of another; metonymy, speaking of a thing in terms of 
something associated with it; synecdoche, having a part stand for the whole; and 
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Irony, saying the opposite of what one means. Friedrich (1986:4; in Tannen 
1989:24) points out the pervasiveness of tropes in everyday conversations. He 
(1986:29; quoted in Tannen 1989:24) argues that even 'a single word in context 
involves a plurality of tropes.' Talking of therapy, Kathleen Ferrara (1994: 130) 
argues that the mutual effort required to create and sustain the meaning of tropes, 
and Inetaphors specifically, leads to the development of rapport between client 
and therapist. 
Another involvement strategy revolves around imagery and detail, or the 'setting 
of scenes' as Tannen (1989:29, 135) calls it. She argues that a major part of 
mutual participation in sensemaking is captured m 'setting scenes'. 
Understanding, she says, is derived from scenes 'because they are composed of 
people in relation to each other, doing things that are culturally and personally 
recognizable and meaningful' (1989:135). This is where imagery enters the 
picture because through images, created in part by detail, the hearer can imagine a 
scene. The use of 'reported speech', or 'constructed dialogue' is another 
involvement strategy which Tannen (1989:25-6) discusses. A number of linguists 
and anthropologists, (Chafe 1982; Hill and Irvine 1993; Labov 1972, Tannen 
1989, Basso 1995, Simpson 1998) have observed 'that conversational discourse 
frequently represents what others have said ('reported speech') as dialogue 
(,direct speech'). Tannen (1989:25) argues that this is because 'direct speech' is 
more vivid and more effective than indirect speech. Dialogue is more effective, 
she says, because 'the creation of voices' and 'the imagination of a scene in which 
characters speak in those voices ... occasion the imagination of alternative, 
distant, or familiar worlds' (1989:25-6). Because of that, Tannen (1989:26) adds, 
dialogue is an important source of emotion in discourse. 
Narrative is the [mal involvement strategy that Tannen (1989:27-8) discusses. 
Narrative is in fact a metastrategy in that it makes use of all the other strategies 
discussed above, imagery, detail and constructed dialogue (Tannen 1989:28). 
Tannen (1984) found in her own study of dinner-table conversations that those 
whose conversation styles she deemed highly involving told more stories than 
245 
Death is not the End 
those that she deemed less involving. Their stories were, in addition, more often 
about their own personal experiences and they more frequently expressed their 
feelings concerning the events related (Tannen 1989:28). Harold Rosen (1988) 
goes even further than that and argues that emotion and meaning in all discourse 
can in fact be traced to personal narratives. 
Involving you 
Allow me to return to Hannah, once again, and her story of her husband's life, 
illness and death. Here Jonah has been taken ill, diagnosed and sent home where 
Hannah cares for him. Hannah says: 
H: But I had such wonderful help from, from ... the medical service, the doctor 
aa: Ilumll 
H: Ilhell was marvellous, and the ... ah ... the nurse used to come in ... every 
morning ... because for a long, long time ... when Jonah was getting weaker 
and he couldn't ... [Hannah struggles with the words here] see to himself in the 
bath II .. .!I 
aa: II .. .!I yeah II .. .!I 
H: II .. .!I and I used to go and bath him and help him out 
aa: uhum 
H: ... 'cos there was ah, a morning ritual Ilyou know/! 
aa: Ilyeah, yeah! I 
H: till one day Brenda [not her real name] the district nurse was in and she said 
'you are going to bath him no more,' she said, 'you're in a dreadful state' 
aa:um 
H: you know, sure I was, I was getting very tired 
aa: yeah,yeah 
H: you'll accept it all, course you'll accept it, it's your husband 
aa: uhum 
H: and she says 'you'll bath him no more' and I thought 'oh grief, what's he 
gonna say about this?' [Hannah's voice is as if she's telling ajoke] 
aa: umm II[laughs]/! 
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H: //[laughs]// so I said to him [Hannah's voice is tinkling with laughter] 
'Brenda is bathing you this morning.' 'What?' I said [Hannah becomes a bit 
apologetic as she says the following] 'well, just to give me a little rest,' //you 
know/! 
aa: /!yeah// 
H: 'oh, well, all right' ... so she did bath him that morning 
aa: yeah, yeah 
H: and much, much later in the day 'do you know, I thought I would have 
objected to Brenda doing that to me' 
aa:um 
H: 'but,' he said, 'it was all right' 
aa:yeah 
H: //[laughs]/! 
aa: //[laughs]/! 
H: 'it was just all right'. So from then on this was the procedure 
The central import of Tannen's notion of involvement strategies is to ask how 
conversationalists involve each other in their discussions, thus creating meaning 
and bringing home their points. Here we can see how Hannah employs various 
strategies to involve me in her narrative. Hannah's story is replete with repetition 
of both words and phrases. Early on in the excerpt as Hannah describes the 
beginning of the involvement of Brenda, the district nurse, in her and Jonah's 
'morning ritual' she says 'because for a long, long time ... when Jonah was getting 
weaker and he couldn't ... see to himself in the bath'. Later on when Hannah 
fInishes this account with Jonah's satisfaction with Brenda's bathing she says 'and 
much, much later in the day [and so on]'. Here 'long, long' and then later 'much, 
much' both serve to give rhythm to their individual sentences but more than that 
they call to each other, as it were, with 'much, much' closing of the account that 
'long, long' started. It is noticeable, too, that Hannah addresses the interviewer 
quite often. 'You know' she says, her questions answered by my 'yeahs' and 
'uhums'. These are offered as evidences of my continued attention to Hannah's 
story. The intensity of that engagement can perhaps be gauged somewhat from 
the frequency with which our contributions overlap. 
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Hannah's story was, of course, accompanied by facial expressions and bodily 
lTIOVements of various descriptions. These were woven in with Hannah's words 
and work to increase my involvement in her story. Limitations of space do not 
allow me to give a full account of Hannah's gymnastics, but let me give the 
following brief description. For most of the time as she was talking Hannah 
would sit back in her arm-chair which was facing the sofa where I sat. There she 
would let her eyes wander around the room, sometimes staring into the distance 
while I looked constantly at her. When Hannah approached critical moments in 
her story, when she put emphasis on her words, quoted the speech of other people 
and so on, she would invariably lean forward a little bit and look at me directly so 
that our eyes met. This would prompt me to lean forward too as if to get closer 
to Hannah. In this way words and movements would come together to increase 
my involvement in Hannah's story (see Carrithers and Coleman n.d. for a 
discussion on this). 
In the above account Hannah does not provide a lot of imagery and detail. She 
does not set elaborate scenes. Plenty of that is, however, provided by Jacob when 
he describes the day his wife died. I have slightly edited the words he used: 
She woke up on the Friday morning and she said 'just get the doctor' and I 
knew then when she complained that she was really ill and the doctor came 
about four or five times that day and just gave her injections of morphine and 
she died about half past one I think it was on the Saturday morning so that was 
a real rough day for her and she wasn't practically conscious that day she was 
in that much pain [ ... ] I just went in the other room, I mean the son and the 
daughter-in-law was there, and the Macmillan nurse and the doctor was here 
about I think around eleven o'clock, as I say it had been a nasty winter day, 
raining uphills. 
The above account is engaging because it sets an elaborate and identifiable scene. 
Scene setting, according to Tannen, involves describing 'people in relation to each 
other, doing things that are culturally and personally reco gnizable and meaningful' 
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(Tannen 1989:135). Jacob's story, I might add, is all the more involving because 
the setting so neatly captures the mood appropriate to an occasion like this. 'A 
nasty winter day, raining uphills' seems to capture the emotional atmosphere in 
Jacob's house. 
The same setting of scenes is evident in the following account by Jo. To that is 
added the extensive use of 'reported speech' which works with imagery and detail 
to set a scene. Jo is a woman in her late thirties whose mother died some twenty 
years ago from a very sudden and unexpected heart attack. Jo has a university 
degree. She is single and does not have any children. Here is J 0' s account of her 
mother's death: 
I was gone to bed early and I was asleep and it was my dad and a friend of his 
who were actually there when she had what was the heart attack, I didn't see 
her have the heart attack and neither of them had the wits to do anything about 
it ... and my dad came up, he was sort of waking everybody up saying 
'something terrible has happened, something terrible has happened' [there is, 
understated of course, a hint of excited terror in her voice as she takes the role 
of her father] but neither ... nobody had the wits to call either the ambulance or 
the doctor and by the time I got downstairs it must have been ... you know like 
ten minutes and she was still alive then and she was sitting down and I 
couldn't, because I hadn't a clue what was going on and I said to my dad's 
friend if they'd phoned the ambulance and he said 'no' and I said then 'go and 
do it now' [there is some urgency in her voice] and ... ah he went off and 
phoned the ambulance and she, you know, at that point I got there just in time 
to catch her as she fell and she actually, technically died in my arms really ... 
and all that stuff about the death rattle is true, the last bit of air escaping from 
the lungs ... so yes it was very dramatic and then it seemed like ages for the 
ambulance to come but then I suppose it wasn't very long. 
10 uses reported speech in conjunction with imagery and detail to lend further 
weight to the already dramatic story of her mother's very sudden death. Early on, 
for example, we see her father run up the stairs and along the landing knocking on 
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every bedroom door shouting: 'something terrible has happened ... ' Later, Jo 
comes downstairs, takes charge of the situation and orders her father's friend to 
'go and do it now [phone the ambulance]" before she catches her mother as she 
falls and then dies in Jo's arms. 
During the interview Jo wondered if the very sudden nature of her mother's death 
did have 'an anaesthetic effect on us [the family] because it was such a shock that 
by the time that we got over the shock we were half way to accepting it'. 
Because of this, Jo 'felt that it ought to have been more debilitating than it 
actually was [ ... ] when somebody dies, when somebody close to you dies I mean 
it's, basically it's the worst thing that can happen [ ... ] I felt that I should have 
been completely flawed by it but so I felt I wasn't suffering as much as I should 
have done'. There was, though, one particular occasion when the effect of her 
mother's death became visible to Jo. She explains: 
I can remember one, not that long after, it was long enough after for other 
people to have forgotten about it but not for you to have forgotten about it ... 
and I was with a friend and I was gone, I was away from home, I had gone to 
visit I suppose I don't know, six months, I don't know, I can't remember and 
she said [Jo's voice changes and becomes louder] 'ah, there's a really good 
play on television tonight, I've seen it before, it's really brilliant, you should 
watch it' and we were watching it, it was me and my friend and her husband 
who I had known for a very, very long time and Sitting watching the play and at 
the end of the play somebody has a heart attack [she laughs] and my friend had 
completely you know it was long enough for her to have forgotten it but not, as 
the scene developed she suddenly said 'oh my God turn the television off,' 
[Jo's voice is very loud, it's almost a shout] and it suddenly sort of dawned on 
her what was happening and she shouted at her husband 'turn the television 
off [again Jo's voice is like she's shouting] and he said 'well huh, huh,' but of 
course it was too late by then ... I ... he turned the television off and apparently 
he looked and realised and he looked at me and apparently I had gone as white 
as a sheet, absolutely drained of all colour and I sat there and I said 'it's not 
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like that really' and of course they were all 'sorry, I didn't think' and I just said 
'well, it's gonna happen'. 
Both of these excerpts represent important passages from the interview with Jo 
and both are peppered with reported speech to a greater extent than the rest of 
her story. The same is true of my interview with Polly. Polly is in her late 
twenties. She is a student and lives in a small and affluent university town in the 
North East. About ten years ago Polly's father died after quite a long illness and 
Polly feels that she has never been affected by his death. Although Polly's 
relationship with her father was very good when she was young, after she became 
a teenager her father became very controlling and very difficult, and their 
relationship was very bad. In explaining how little she was affected by her 
father's death Polly says: 
I was, it seems quite a strange thing to do now, but I was going out with John 
[an ex-boyfriend] at that sort of time and [ ... ] he and I were very, very close so 
on the way back from the hospital my mum dropped me off at his, I mean I 
don't know why I didn't go back with the rest of them, I think I maybe ought 
to have done but I didn't and I went to his house and I think I probably cried 
for, I was crying and sort of upset for about half an hour and then just didn't 
again ever ... I remember [ ... ] some friends came 'round that night at John's 
and they came in and sat down and we said hello and made coffee and the 
usual things and then [ ... ] I said to them something on the lines of 'my dad's 
off playing the harp now' and all that sort of thing and they said 'why, has he 
joined an orchestra?' and I said [polly says laughing] 'no, he's dead' and then, 
to me it seemed like, I don't know, I bet, I don't know, I don't know what I was 
doing, I don't know whether I found it difficult to say and so made it into a 
joke but I don't remember feeling too distressed at the time and they were 
really quite sort of, they were quite shocked [ ... ] I don't think they understood 
how I could possibly say something like that under those circumstances and it 
kind of stayed like that ever since I mean, I never, it never really affected me at 
all. 
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Yet, in the other most dramatic part of the interview Polly explains what 
happened just before her father's death: 
he would still be trying to mow the lawn and all that sort of thing, he really 
shouldn't have been doing it so eventually I would sort of, I made him, I didn't 
make, couldn't make him, but I suggested that I might do it instead or 
something like that and tried to help out a bit [ ... J he was so pathetic compared 
to what he was before that I felt, I don't know, I felt sorry for him, and I would 
try and help him out and to start with he was quite sort of, he resisted it and 
then eventually he kind of sort of gave way and he would allow me to help him 
and I think it was a week before he actually did die and he was at home for the 
weekend and I think he actually, he called me 'Polly love' once and he hadn't, 
he hadn't said anything like that to me for years [ ... J I remember being a little 
bit affected by that at the time. 
Tannen (1989:25-6, 102-4) says of reported direct speech, or constructed 
dialogue as she calls it, that it is more involving than indirectly reporting the 
words of others. Dialogue is more involving because it helps us to imagine 'a 
scene in which characters speak in those voices', and because dialogue makes it 
easier to convey the emotional atmosphere of the story (1989:26). 10 and Polly's 
stories provide good illustrations. All of them are densely populated with detail 
and imagery that help to set a scene. They are also populated with characters 
who interact and these interactions are brought to life, given immediacy, by 10's 
talking for the characters and quoting them directly. She thus lends their words 
an emotional force that is much more direct and 'raw' than if she was simply to 
summarise their words. The difference is, to take an example, between 10 saying 
'my father said that something terrible had happened' and her actually saying: 'my 
dad came up, he was sort of waking everybody up saying 'something terrible has 
happened, something terrible has happened'.' 
If dialogue in this way seems more involving it is, according to Tannen, more 
persuasive as well. Indeed it is more persuasive because it is more involving. 
Quotations lend authority to accounts. They indicate that the events did in fact 
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happen, and they remove the storyteller as an interpreter from the scene (see 
Tannen 1989:105; see Hill and Irvine 1993). Along these lines Niko Bresnier 
(1993:161) relates how on Nukulaelae atoll there is a conflict between the 'need 
to communicate some affect in everyday communication and the local norms 
against communicating affect overtly.' Bresnier (1993: 161) argues that the 
conflict is resolved: 
through the simultaneous use, in reporting activities, of overt keys that are 
affectively neutral, and covert keys that are high in affective content. The 
strategic choice of keys in turn correlates with relative degrees of evidentiality: 
affect is communicated through keys which allow speakers to present 
themselves as minimally accountable for the content of their talk. 
Eileen Basso (1995), similarly, has discussed how the Kalapalo people of the 
Amazon similarly in their storytelling quote the words of their protagonists rather 
than speaking on their behalf. The effect is that the storytellers are not 
responsible for what they report. They step back and the listeners themselves are 
invited to make their own judgements. These judgements, moreover, should be 
directed at the protagonists rather than the storyteller (see Belaunde 1997). 
Through the use of reported speech a storyteller seeks, then, to present himself as 
an independent witness that can report impartially the actions and words of 
others. The constructed dialogue, that is, works to establish the storyteller's 
authority (see Geertz 1988; Foucault 1977a). Another example of this is 
Hannah's account of the VJ-anniversary gathering. Hannah says: 
H: and my husband used to talk a lot about his Captain Marcus [the name is 
fictional] and 1 said to one of the chaps was he there 
aa: uhum 
H: he said 'he's there' and he came, came over and sat and talked to me for 
about a half an hour and he had, his wife had died, so he said 'I know exactly 
what you've been through, you're all alone,' he said, and 1 think that when you 
talk to other people this will come through every time 
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aa: yeah 
Here Hannah uses reported speech to establish the point that those who have lost 
their spouses know what it is like, that you are 'all alone'. Hannah's prediction 
that this is what will come through when 1 talk to other people, is founded upon 
Captain Marcus' words; he is an independent witness. Throughout her account 
here Hannah plays upon points of view and perspectives to support her agenda. 
In the beginning our viewpoint is Hannah's viewpoint and she guides us fIrst to 
take a kind of panoramic view over the whole gathering, scanning it for Captain 
Marcus. Then the focus is sharpened and narrowed as Hannah addresses 'one of 
the chaps' asking him if the Captain is there. The focus is shifted again as the 
chap replies 'he is there' and our attention is channelled down to a very specific 
spot, the Captain himself. Again the focus is widened and we can see the Captain 
walk towards us and Hannah. Only then does our viewpoint change and we see 
Hannah and the Captain sitting side by side talking, a talk that leads to the 
conclusion 'I know exactly what you've been through, you're all alone', he said, 
and 1 think that when you talk to other people this will come through every time'. 
Hannah's play of perspectives, though, is more fundamentally a play on the 
relationship between Hannah and Captain Marcus. While Hannah went looking 
for the Captain, about whom her husband talked so much, it is he who came over 
'sat down and talked to me'. Altogether the account establishes Hannah's role as 
a listener and Captain Marcus' authority, with the effect that his words 'you're all 
alone' are given even more weight. 
Creating dramatic tension or suspense, is one of the ways a speaker involves a 
listener (see Burke 1945; Tannen 1989). Hannah tells a very powerful story 
about the time when she fIrst started to suspect that something quite serious was 
wrong with Jonah. She says: 
Jonah hadn't been well for a long time you know, and we had a little session 
once when as far as we were concerned everything was as normal ... we had 
gone to bed this evening and I was lying there and I could hear 'caugh, caugh,' 
hear this cough and he used to turn to me and then 'Hannah what's this?' And 
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1 [she says worryingly] said 'what, what, what's wrong?' He says 'there's 
blood in me handkerchief,' 1 said 'what, what have you done, have you cut 
your lip or bit your tongue or something?' 'No, no,' he says, 'I could feel this 
at the back of my throat and had to get rid of it.' 1 said [her voice heavy with 
apprehension] 'oh dear' you know, still we didn't know ... 
Hannah continued the interview by telling me of her and Jonah's subsequent visits 
to the doctors, their assurances that nothing too serious was wrong, Hannah's 
disbelief in these assurances and then, following a biopsy of Jonah's lungs, the 
fmal confrrmation of the nature of his illness. Here, though, all the anxiety that 
they must have been through is masterfully captured in a single short story whose 
dramatic tension engages the audience. The tension rests on a hint that something 
dangerous is lurking behind a facade that appears perfectly ordinary. Hannah's 
statement that 'once when as far as we were concerned everything was as normal' 
has an air of ominous foreboding. The tension is then piled up in Hannah's and 
Jonah's somewhat confused and anxious exchanges, and by their frequent 
repeating of words, until it climaxes in Hannah's exclamation 'oh dear' . 
All this is achieved through the careful setting of a scene by means of imagery and 
detail and constructed dialogue. The episode is set in a familiar setting, the 
conjugal bedroom, and it starts as a relatively straightforward history, related in 
the past tense as histories usually are. Midway through, though, there is a sudden, 
dramatic and decisive shift in tense when Jonah says 'Hannah what's this .. .' The 
following tale is told in three voices as Hannah quotes Jonah and herself in 
between her own commentary. Each quote, in addition, is masterfully full with 
the appropriate emotions of surprise, fear, and even a hint of wifely reprimand in 
'what have you done'. Suddenly it is as if the events that Hannah relates are 
happening before our very eyes. Hannah says 'he says' using the present tense to 
describe Jonah's actions in an act of what Karl Buhler (1934; quoted in Ochs and 
Capps 1996:25) calls 'transposition'. This, the shift to the present in conjunction 
with the quotations helps to make the account even more vivid and compelling. It 
lends the story a degree of immediacy, an experiential quality, which enables the 
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listeners to experience events in the same way as Hannah. 1 The story involves us 
as listeners and our understanding, and, acceptance of it is based on that 
in vol vement. 
Tannen's (1989) notion of 'involvement strategies' allows us to understand how 
stories involve listeners and how understanding is based on that involvement. 
This is the strength of 'involvement strategies', but it is also their weakness. For 
through imagery, detail and the use of reported speech, through the setting of 
scenes in a word, Tannen's involvement strategies involve us merely as listeners 
or as an audience. The image - to employ an involvement strategy myself - is that 
of the theatre, the cinema or the television with the action unfolding before the 
audience's eyes. That may be sufficient to explain how communicative effect is 
achieved but, in my opinion, it does not suffice to explain the effect of certain 
types of discourses, such as transformative discourses. 
I am here following Michael Carrithers and Simon Coleman (n.d.) who in 
analysing Susan Harding's (1987; see also Harding 1991) account of her meeting 
with the evangelical minister Reverend Cantrell, point out that Harding refers to 
evangelical witnessing as 'a dialo gue that reconstitutes its listeners', 'stripping 
them of their cultural assumptions' (1987:167), an encounter when 'language is 
intensified, focused, and virtually shot at the unwashed listener' (1987:169). 
Evangelical witnessing is 'transformative speech' that seeks to alter fundamentally 
the person it addresses.2 To capture this character of witnessing, Carrithers and 
Coleman propose an additional involvement strategy, 'intimate personal 
indexicality', and they argue that dialo gue, or reported speech, be considered as 
part of this more general strategy. In explaining intimate personal indexicality, 
Carrithers and Coleman point out that indexicality is 'that feature of talk which 
refers to local circumstances, people, and objects.' While all talk is in a sense 
indexical in so much as it refers to something, it is most often used to 'capture 
1 I am indebted to Rachel Baker for pointing this out to me. 
2 In contrast, as Carrithers and Coleman (n.d.) point out, we would call a 'factual' interview a 
communicative way of speaking; and when a minister marries two people his speech is 
performative, changing the state of social affairs. 
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matters near to the interlocutors' (Carrithers and Coleman n.d.). The indexicality 
is personal, Carrithers and Coleman continue, when stress is laid upon persons: 
'on people's doings, feelings and relationships'. The indexicality is intimate 'to 
both speaker and listener, because it represents the characters of the stories as 
being close to both, as standing in an intimate relation to them' (Carrithers and 
Coleman n.d.). 
I invoke the notion of intimate personal indexicality to make two points. While 
the stories of the bereaved that I have related are not transformative in the way 
that evangelical witnessing is, I still believe that they ask for - even demand - more 
involvement than Tannen's notion of involvement strategies can adequately 
explain. The bereaved do not only want to be understood, they want the listener 
to join them - if only momentarily - in their situation. That is why the stories I 
relate are so often full of intimate personal indexicality. This is strikingly evident 
in Hannah's story about the time when Jonah coughed up blood in his 
handkerchief. Here Hannah invites us to join her and her husband in the most 
intimate of circumstances, making our relationship with him almost as close as her 
own. There we become partners in a scene that is all about people's feelings, 
thoughts and actions, a scene that is, because of the story and the part it plays in 
it, close to both us and Hannah. 
The notion of intimate personal indexicality give me the opportunity to make 
another important point about Tannen's 'involvement strategies'. While they may 
allow us to understand involvement, Tannen's strategies, as far as I can see, 
explicate only the relationship between a speaker and a listener, an author and a 
reader, a performer and an audience. But this is to assume, wrongly I argue, that 
we are involved with each other on the basis of a single identity, in one role, as, 
for example, a speaker or a listener. People are often, if not always, involved with 
each other in a much more complex way. My relationship with Hannah was one 
of an interviewer and interviewee, exemplified by my explaining to her the nature 
of my research and my request to tape-record our conversation. Our relationship 
was also that of a relatively educated person with a somewhat less educated 
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person, as Hannah herself implied when she said that I might understand, even 
though she didn't, what the professor of tropical diseases meant when he said that 
the malnutrition might have affected Jonah's brain. We were also relating to each 
other as an older person and a younger person when, for example, Hannah 
mentioned that people, for whom the war was only a history, could not quite 
appreciate what it was like for those who lived through it. At the same time, our 
relationship was close enough for Hannah to follow her revelations of intimate 
detail with questions about my family life, and for me to tell her about my family 
circumstances. 
Regarding others: 'Remembering is a form of forgetting,3 
What is a social relationship? According to anthropological orthodoxy, social 
relationships are patterned and enduring, based upon observable habitual 
interactions and distinct from actual relationships between two living persons. In 
marking out the domain of social anthropology, Evans-Pritchard (1951) considers 
the case of a court of law. He argues that a social anthropologist should 
investigate the different roles that are found in a court: judge, plaintiffs, counsel, 
jury and so on; the relationships between these, the functions of each and the 
procedures that govern their interactions. From here the anthropologist moves on 
to consider the place of the court in the total system of the society of which it is a 
part. 
What an anthropologist does not consider, according to Evans-Pritchard, are the 
intentions of the individuals actually engaged in individual legal cases. But what 
sort of an understanding does it lead to if one separates in this way procedures 
from actual interactions, roles and intentions? How enlightening 
anthropolo gically is an account of court procedures without an account of the 
actual interactions of plaintiffs and court staff? It would seem fairly fundamental 
to consider the intentions of plaintiffs because determining these is a major part of 
3 The phrase is Milan Kundera's. 
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the actual legal process in many cases.4 Evans-Pritchard's demarcation is of 
course based upon Durkheim's assertion that 'society' is an independent sector of 
reality -- an assertion now questioned in anthropology, as 1 discussed in the 
introduction. Social relationships, many anthropologists would now have it, 
should not be separated or abstracted from their actual materialisations. All 
teacher-student relationships - to take an example - throughout the UK may have 
certain things in common irrespective of the actual people that are engaged in 
those relationships, but it does not follow that such relationships can fruitfully be 
studied, anthropologically, by abstracting them from actual examples. 
But should an anthropologist restrict his attention to observable relationships and 
interactions? Mead (1936) and Vygotsky (1962) have pointed out that what 
Goffman (1981) calls 'self-talk' characteristically takes the form of rehearsals 
which, they argue, are essential preludes to action in real situations, particularly 
when those are irregular or anomalous (I am following Simpson 1998). Simpson 
(1998; also 1994; 1997b; 1997c) has demonstrated powerfully how members of 
divorced families in England use narratives, memories of the past, and plans for 
the future to negotjate their relationships and interactions with each other and 
their identities in those relationships and interactions. Simpson (1998 in press) 
points out that in 'the context of post-divorce relationships, it is important that we 
are aware not only of the actual face-to-face dimensions of social life, but also of 
absent relationships which, in circumstances of conflict and limited 
communication, become highly significant: out of sight does not necessarily mean 
out of mind.' Peter Gow (1991) has similarly demonstrated that kinship - once 
the anthropolo gical example of social structure - IS for Amazonian people 
intimately linked to memory, in fact, memory IS ill a sense kinship itself. 
Commenting on Gow's thesis, Anne Christine Taylor (1996:206) points out: 
'Social relations, in this view, are the condensation and memory of the affective 
moods built up by daily interaction in nurturing, sharing and working. The 
personal mental image one has of others as kin is moulded by this web of feeling' . 
So, according to the view represented by Simpson and Gow - social relationships 
4 Michael Carrithers and David Zammitt have pointed this out to me. 
259 
Death is not the End 
are not restricted to face-to-face observable interactions. Rather we have to take 
into account the historically created subjectivities of those engaged in the 
relationships. 
This, in turn, has implications for our understanding of the individual. In leaving 
the self (see Simpson 1998 in press) to psychologists, anthropologists classically 
constructed social relationships as being external to the self, to the individual. 
Durkheim's (1933) famous conception of man as a double being: a social being 
inhabited by the collective conscience and a biological being ruled by instincts and 
selfIsh drives; allowed no traffic between the two. In arguing against the emphasis 
on the collective in Durkheim's conception of society, Carrithers (1992), Ingold 
(1986), Strathem (1988), and Gisli Palsson (1991) point out that if we understand 
the 'social' as a sphere of social relations and seek to move beyond the dichotomy 
between society and individual we need to see the individual as being 
fundamentally formed by the relations of which she is a part. If social 
relationships are predicated upon the subjectivities of the people who form them, 
subjectivities are based on the social relationships that inform them: 'the image of 
self ... is based on the attribution of others' images of it, [and] is necessarily 
suffused with the memory others have of you' (Taylor 1996:206). In order to 
explain this allow me now to introduce Samantha. 
Samantha 
Samantha is in her early forties and lives in a big house in a small and affluent 
town in the North East. Samantha is now married to her second husband and has 
a teenage daughter from her frrst marriage. When she was about six years old her 
father died very suddenly. This affected Samantha's mother badly and she 
neglected her and her younger brother and left them largely in the care of their 
older sister who treated Samantha very badly. This, anyway, is how Samantha 
sees it. But, according to Samantha, her brother and sister do not share her 
views. When Samantha was about eighteen her mother died after some illness 
during which Samantha did not visit her frequently. After her death Samantha left 
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and lost touch with her family. A few years ago her sister, having herself 
migrated to Africa, called Samantha up and attempted to re-establish relations 
between them. It surfaced that Samantha's sister was by that time terminally ill. 
All this has left Samantha with a powerful mixture of emotions; of anger, sadness 
and guilt, and in the interview, through a complex play of remembering and 
forgetting, she negotiates her relationship with her relatives, with her brother, her 
sister and her mother, in particular. Samantha's mother 
had a long, lingering death and it was horrible and I really didn't know and I 
didn't really cry much, as an adult I can look back and it is not really a big 
surprise, it was just too much and I just wanted to get away, it was just too 
depressing, I just wanted to get away and I don't think I felt particularly 
bereaved when my mother died and as I got older I missed not having parents 
and, this is going to sound dreadful mind, but I don't miss the parents I had 
[ ... ] and it took me a long time, [felt guilty about not visiting my mother as she 
was dying ... as I got older myself and I have had a child [ don't feel gUilty and 
I just look upon my mother as a person and I feel very sorry that she's died but 
I don't miss my mother, I don't miss that person. 
Samantha identifies a number of emotions that are directly involved in her 
relationships with other people. Her mother's death was 'just too much', it 'was 
just too depressing', and Samantha 'just wanted to get away'. And while 
Samantha did not feel 'bereaved' when her mother died and did not 'miss the 
parents she had' she 'missed not having parents'. Most importantly, Samantha 
'felt guilty about not visiting her mother' but as she got older and had a child 
herself she cloes not feel 'guilty' and can look upon her mother 'as a person'. 
Samantha's negotiation of her relationship with her mother is played out between 
her expectations of what should be the character of the relationship between a 
mother and her daughter and of her actual experience in the relationship with her 
lTIother. Samantha felt gUilty about not visiting her mother until she grew up, had 
a child herself and could see her mother as a 'person' (italics -aa.). 
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As she continues to build up the 'affective moods' that are her relationships with 
her family, Samantha continues to explain why she should not feel guilty about 
not visiting her mother. She explains: 
[lJ used to be a very sad person, I used to be depressed all the time, just went 
through life really depressed and I don It feel like that any more because I think. 
most people, I think ... I have heard that most people wish they had been 
adopted usually when they have done something wrong but I just wished I had 
been adopted because I absolutely hated the family, my mother really neglected 
us, me and my younger brother and ... partly because she had to go out to 
workS, partly because she was lazy and partly because she had just given up 
but she was quite old when we were born, my mother was about forty four and 
my father as well was in his late fifties and they had another older family and 
they were living with us my sister and her children who were not much younger 
than us, and she [Samantha's sister] was just very, very unhappy and she used 
to take it out on me and my mother did nothing to prevent it ... well I used to 
think it was terrible, terrible, I feel awful talking about her now she's dead, 
but she never washed our clothes, we were totally neglected, if it were now we 
would have been taken into care [ ... J but my sister used to beat me up, she's 
older, she was fourteen years older than I am and she used to take all her 
frustration out on me as a child, that was very difficult for me, it was really 
horrible, ... that makes me want to cry rather than the death of my parents even 
though I do feel bereft, I feel that I've got less than other people because I have 
no parents, because it's only me, there is only me to rely upon [ ... J I've had to 
go through ... ordinary grief because someone's died [ ... J whether you've got a 
good pain or a bad pain there is some kind of things for you to lean on and that 
was taken away like that, and then I had all these emotions of anger towards 
the live person because she wasn't a nice parent, I mean she did things I mean 
she wasn't bad, don't get me wrong I mean she had a hard, unhappy time, she 
was left with a seven year old and a two year old to take care of but in my 
mind now, as an adult, I think she had no right to bring me into the world and 
my brother into the world and she so old I mean she put us at risk by not 
thinking forward enough and she was so lazy and wouldn't do anything for us 
5 After Samantha's father died. 
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and I feel a little bit, I find it really hard to talk about it but that, and all the 
guilt I feel for not going to see her, she wasn't therefor me. 
Samantha's memory of her mother is of someone who totally neglected her and 
her brother, who did not prevent her older sister from beating Samantha up, who 
was lazy and who, although she was herself to some extent the victim of her 
circumstances, was not there for Samantha. The lack of care and love that 
Samantha thus remembers reflects her memories of the affections - or the lack of 
theln - others had for her and Samantha used to be 'depressed all the time'. 
Having a child, it seems, helped Samantha to rid herself of the guilt that she felt 
for not visiting her mother because that gave Samantha a better understanding of 
the give and take of the mother-daughter relationship. 
But if Samantha's relationship with her daughter has been affected by her 
relationship with her mother the converse is also true. Samantha explains: 
I worry about death, constantly, I think about it every day, my own, about my 
own death, I try to keep on going until my daughter is ready to take care of 
herself because I was never allowed that time, I was never allowed to become 
strong you know to cope with life, which is why I tend to not want to cope with 
it [ ... ] I think even if my parents had died but we had been happy and we'd 
been stable that would have been OK but because life, the life I had that was 
dreadful and I mean I never used to talk about it and then a relative once said 
to me kindly, she said 'you had the most dreadful childhood' [ ... ] I think she 
kind of opened a door up for me to go through [ ... ] but when I was young I was 
so depressed [ ... ] about everything, first of all my mother [ ... ] she was just 
cruel [ ... ] at the best of times she would just ignore us and we grew up in filth 
and squalor, but then she could also be cruel, it [ ... ] was such a trivial incident 
but it just sums up her cruelty, she was folding the bed cover and my doll, my 
favourite doll had got caught and she just slammed it and I was screaming 
[Samantha's voice assumes a high pitched screaming tone] 'no, no, my doll, 
my doll' and she just literally kept on slamming it until the doll was broken. 
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The affective moods surrounding Samantha's childhood and teenage years, the 
memory of which constitutes largely her relationship with her mother, colour 
Samantha's relationships with other members of her family now, her older sister 
and her younger brother in particular. Samantha explains how contact with the 
family 
only brings back memories for me, it's just painful [ ... ] the second time he [her 
younger brother] tracked me was that my sister had gone abroad, she'd gone to 
live in Africa and she was trying to find me and he tried to find me on her 
behalf and she actually made contact with me and she phoned me from Africa 
but she asked what I thought was an inappropriate question, she asked me did I 
love her and I actually said I found it a bit hard, just the years between us and 
in the end I went to see her and in the end it turned out that she was dying [ ... ] 
what really tore me up then was that they dragged me back into the misery 
that was that family and I just didn't want any part of it and they dragged me 
back into it only to have to go and die and she hadn't told me she was dying, 
she had just made contact 'oh, I love you, I love you, I miss you, I miss you, I 
want to move back, I want to come and live with you, I want to see your little 
girl' and I came back home [from meeting her sister who was back in the UK] 
[ ... ] and it was devastating because you're kind of over the family, if you 
really liked them or not, and then suddenly, because of all the memories it had 
brought back [ ... ] and I look back on my life and I know she shouldn't have 
strangled and beaten me when I was a child and so although I feel bereft ... it's 
not them I miss [Samantha cries] so I no longer have any contact with my 
brother, I can't [Samantha starts crying again and the tape is switched oft]. 
Samantha uses stories here to activate her memories of and emotions towards her 
family. She uses the activation of those to negotiate her relationship with her 
family, her sister and her brother in particular. Samantha's ambivalence towards 
her family is thus thrown into a stark relief. While she does not want to have 
anything to do with them she obviously cares about them too. She does not miss 
them, but she misses not having a family. She goes to see her sister while she 
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describes the meeting as being 'dragged' back into the family.6 There is in 
Samantha's account a relentless struggle of emotions: of sadness, anger and guilt. 
Here Samantha is again talking about her sister: 
Shall I tell you what really, really tore me apart when my sister died, before 
she died she got in touch with me and she gave me this long phone call, how 
much she loved me, how much she missed me, and then she sent me a letter [ ... ] 
she enclosed with this letter a photograph of two children that she had adopted, 
one was a little girl and the other a little boy [Samantha starts to cry] she had 
these two beautiful little children, lying on this beautifully made up bed, white 
laced and it was as if she was saying you know 'you had it good enough, look 
what I have done for them', the way she treated me, you know worse than an 
animal because you don't treat animals like that, and I was, I was in the 
kitchen and I opened the letter and I threw the photographs away, I was 
screaming, couldn't believe it, perhaps she thought she was saying 'look, I've 
made up for it now' but what it said to me was 'you had it good enough and I 
have got some proof and when she died, although I had all those resentments, I 
couldn't believe her, I couldn't believe that somebody would get in touch and 
come back into your life and then just be taken away like that [ ... ] I suppose 
what she was doing, knowing that she was dying, 'cos she knew, she was 
trying to make up and she was trying to show, you know 'I do love you, I'm 
sorry, look what I have done for these other children' but she stilllefi me. 
Samantha had earlier cast her mother variously as lazy, irresponsible, cruel and the 
victim of her own sad circumstances. Here too she has cast her sister as variously 
cruel, emotionally manipulative and the victim of her circumstances - the fact that 
she had been left with two young children - who in her illness, sought 
reconciliation with her younger sister. Samantha's relationship with the two is 
characterised by this variety too. On the one hand, she doesn't want anything to 
do with the family because of the cruelty with which they treated her and because 
6 In fact the story that Samantha constructs to express her ambivalence and to justify her 
decisions is a particularly powerful one. Its force stems to some extent from the fact that it 
resembles greatly stories frequently exchanged in English society. Indeed Samantha's story has 
a decidedly Surprise, Surprise character (I refer to the rather popular lTV show hosted by Cilla 
Black). Only Samantha adds to it a sinister, cynical twist with her refusal to fall into the arms 
of her sister and be seduced by her admissions of love. 
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the memories that any contact stirs are too painful. At the same time, Samantha 
bemoans the fact that her mother and her sister left her. Her mother did not allow 
Samantha the time to grow 'strong' so that she could 'cope with life'. And her 
sister, having 'dragged' Samantha back into the family then just goes away and 
dies. 
The story of these relationships colours Samantha's present relationships with 
other people too. Samantha is at pains to make sure that her relationship with her 
daughter is the opposite of her relationship with her mother. She fears death 
because she desperately wants to be there for her daughter until she has grown up 
enough to look after herself. Samantha's relationship with her brother is 
implicated in the plot too. Unlike her mother and her sister, Samantha's younger 
brother was not a perpetrator of any of the violence that characterised her 
childhood. Rather, like Samantha, he was a victim of the circumstances in which 
they grew up. Still, Samantha does not feel able to have contact with her brother. 
She explains: 
But because of. all the things that happened he grew up totally unable to cope 
with life at all and I met up with him a few months ago and his understanding, 
his memories are totally different from mine but he was only two when our 
father died and he can't remember the really horrible things and he still has 
photographs of our mother and talked about our mother, he used to sit on our 
mother's knees but he doesn't remember things as they were and we had this 
reunion and I tried to tell him but he doesn't wanna know, I tried to tell him 
about my sister and I tried to tell him how she beat me up, he didn't remember. 
Samantha's brother doesn't want to know, he can't remember 'the really horrible 
things' . He still has pictures of their mother, he has memories of sitting on his 
mother's knees. The fact that his memories are totally different from Samantha's 
and his inability or unwillingness to believe Samantha's stories about how badly 
they were in fact treated makes it impossible for Samantha to keep in contact with 
him. It is as if her brother's memories violate and deny Samantha's stories, her 
experiences, her past. Still, Samantha's accounts of events are not uniform and 
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singular. Rather, they are variable and heterogeneous. Her mother and her sister 
are, as I related above, variously lazy, irresponsible, cruel and the victims of their 
own situations. And Samantha's relationships with the two vary accordingly and 
so does Samantha's self in those relationships. So, sometimes Samantha's 
accounts would seem compatible with how Samantha's brother remembers things. 
Yet, Samantha will not have any contact with her brother. The reason is not that 
Samantha remembers and her brother has forgotten, but because they variously 
remember and have forgotten different things. 'Remembering is a form of 
forgetting' (Kundera 1995:128; quoted in Ochs and Capps 1996:21). 
Absent presence: the maintaining of social relationships 
I hope that through the interviews that I have used, there has come across a sense 
of how my interviewees frequently addressed and engaged a plethora of absent 
audiences to explain to these others the reasons and motives for their own actions 
and reactions. They also ruminated about the motives and reasons for others' 
actions and they developed plots whereby all these, the motives and actions of self 
and other, and the consequences that flow from them, could be brought together 
and evaluated. What the stories seem to reveal are complex patterns of human 
sociality, of interactions and relationships. 
Yet, these are stories that take place in the imagination of the storyteller and it 
might well be suggested that, as such, they reside well outside the reach of 
anthropology, whose turf has usually been restricted to actual social relationships 
and observable interactions. How people think about relationships, how they plan 
interactions with others, in what Simpson (1998 in press) calls 'the realm of 
imagined relationships' are questions that have been left largely to psychologists 
and psychoanalysts. Still, Caughey (1984: 17) has argued that it may be a mistake 
thus to split the world into the 'inner' world of the self and the 'outer' world of 
others. It may be a mistake, too, to view the former as essentially psychological 
in character and the latter as inherently social in nature, for the 'inner', imagined 
world itself is 'populated with characters "felt to be there" and which continually 
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splice into the real world (Hermans and Kempen 1993:71)' (Simpson 1998 in 
press). 
I have observed that anthropologists tend to study social relationships, more 
particularly they study the establishment and the maintenance of social 
relationships. They rarely study their endings (Bob Simpson, personal 
communication 1997). But if anthropologists were to study how social 
relationships are brought to an end what would they fmd? Somewhat 
paradoxically, I believe that an anthropology of endings would allow us to ask 
questions about the meaning of social relationships both generally and 
ethnographically. I think that the reason why endings have not been included 
within anthropolo gical studies of social relationships can be related to the 
somewhat instrumental view of social relationships that is prevalent in the West. 
According to this view, relationships end when they end and any aftershocks are 
understood to be purely psychological. That is certainly the case with 
bereavement counselling, according to which death is definitely the end of both 
the person that died and the relationship that the bereaved people may have had 
with the deceased. As I related before in this thesis, Worden (1991) poses it as 
one of the four tasks of mourning to withdraw emotional investment from the 
deceased and reinvest it in new relationships. In training, too, as I have described 
again and again, we would be encouraged and trained to focus upon self-emotion-
now, employing our skills to get the client to talk about how he feels now. What 
is left after death, as far as bereavement counselling is concerned, are the client's 
feelings and memories of the deceased. The relationship, as such, is over.7 Jean 
Richardson (1993: 25-6) in a popular book advising people how to deal with 
death encourages people to resist the temptation to erect shrines to the dead 
person. Dispose of the clothes as soon as possible, she advises, and don't try to 
maintain a relationship that no longer exists. 
Similarly, the Protestant Churches see death as the end of the relationship 
between the deceased and the bereaved. Jon Davies (1994) has pointed out how 
7 There are of course exceptions to this view in bereavement counselling (see Hunt 1998). 
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the current liturgy of the Church of England funeral service stresses the 'deadness 
of the dead'. After the Anglican funeral, in addition, there is no provision for 
follow up services to keep up the relationship between the deceased and the 
bereaved. 
This, Piers Vitebsky (1993) points out is far from universal. According to the 
Sora of India, for example, the living can continue a dialogue with the dead as 
long as they are remembered by the living. Because of this the experience of grief 
is for the Sora quite different from what it is here in the West. The Sora can 
continue to negotiate and repair their relationship with the dead and do not have 
to focus exclusively upon their own emotions as bereavement counselling would 
have it here. I mention all this here because I want to raise the possibility that the 
bereaved do maintain a relationship with their dead. I want to raise the question, 
too, of what this implies for their experience of grief. In doing this I want to 
show fIrst how 'polyphonic', as Bakhtin (1986, and 1981) would have it, the 
stories that I relate, are. They are not spoken with a singular authoritative voice, 
the voice of the storyteller, but are in essence interactive and relational in 
character. To illustrate my point I must return to the idea of 'reported speech' 
and Tannen's notion of 'constructed dialogue'. 
In describing and evaluating the vanous involvement strategies, Tannen 
(1989:101) suggests that the concept of 'reported speech' should be dismantled 
and laid to rest. Tannen argues that reported speech is not reported at all but is 
always a constructed dialogue. She points out that a lot of what appears in 
discourse as dialogue was indeed never spoken by anyone. Hannah, for example, 
would often cast her own thoughts and even sometimes those of others as spoken 
words. In addition to this, people often quote speech from so long ago that it is 
unlikely they can really remember accurately the words they quote. We can see 
this from 10's story about her visit to her friends fairly soon after her mother had 
died. 
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I can remember one, not that long after, it was long enough after for other 
people to have forgotten about it but not for you to have forgotten about it ... 
and I was with a friend and I was gone, I was away from home, I had gone to 
visit I suppose I don't know, six months, I don't know, I can't remember and 
she said [Jo's voice changes and becomes louder] 'ab, there's a really good 
play on television tOnight, I've seen it before, it's really brilliant, you should 
watch it' and we were watching it, it was me and my friend and her husband 
who I had known for a very, very long time and sitting watching the play and at 
the end of the play somebody has a heart attack [she laughs] and my friend had 
completely you know it was long enough for her to have forgotten it but not, as 
the scene developed she suddenly said 'oh my God turn the television off,' 
[Jo's voice is very loud, it's almost a shout] and it suddenly sort of dawned on 
her what was happening and she shouted at her husband 'tum the television 
off [again Jo's voice is like she's shouting] and he said 'well huh, huh,' but of 
course it was too late by then ... I ... he turned the television off and apparently 
he looked and realised and he looked at me and apparently I had gone as white 
as a sheet, absolutely drained of all colour and I sat there and I said 'it's not 
like that really' and of course they were all 'sorry, I didn't think' and I just said 
'well, it's gonnahappen'. 
Here Jo is reporting events that happened 20 years ago and it is doubtful, to put it 
mildly, if she can remember so clearly the exact words of everybody present. 
More fundamentally, though, Tannen argues that even if the reported speech was 
indeed spoken by the person to whom it is attributed, what is of primary 
importance is the current, reporting context. It is this context that determines the 
meaning of the quoted speech for even if speech is quoted correctly the present 
reporting context puts a new and a different slant upon the meaning of what was 
said. The speeches of Jo's friend and of her friend's husband here clearly serve to 
establish and reinforce the point that there was this one time that Jo reacted badly 
to her mother's death, a time far enough from the actual death of her mother for 
her friends to have forgotten about it, although she herself had not. Tannen 
emphasises that it is the reporters who are in charge of the story they tell and that 
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in constructing their stories they use quotations of direct speech at strategically 
important moments to enhance the involvement value of their accounts and the 
power of their stories. In this sense, she argues, 'reported speech' is in fact 
always 'constructed dialogue' and therefore the creation and responsibility of the 
speaker (Tannen 1989: 101). 
I tend to agree with Tannen. Indeed her argument has, as should be clear, 
inspired greatly the preceding analysis. I agree also with her assertion that when 
speech is quoted the reporting context is of primary importance. Still, I do want 
to resist Tannen's assertion that constructed dialogue is the creation and 
responsibility solely of the reporter. This I believe is to succumb to the Cartesian 
notion of individualism wherein the individual cannot be sure of anything except 
the contents of his own mind. Tannen's assertion, that is, tends to paint a picture 
of the reporter as too much in control over her utterances, as knowing her own 
mind too well. In fact, Tannen's assertion seems to rely upon the notion of the 
'maximising individual' (see Lukes 1973), the reporter who strategically uses 
constructed dialogue to enhance the impact of his words. I am not denying that 
this is an important feature of the use of reported speech, but I believe that 
Tannen's approach runs the risk of portraying conversational interactions as if 
their meaning, the impact of the context of reporting, could be fmalised and 
stabilised in accordance with the wishes and intentions of the reporter. This, it 
seems to me, goes against Tannen's reference to the authority of Bakhtin (Tannen 
1989: 100) and his conception of language as inherently dialogical. Indeed Tannen 
(1989:101) acknowledges that here she is at odds with Bakhtin, arguing that the 
difference lies in the fact that she is talking about actual conversations but he 
about literature, particularly that of Dostoyevsky. This is a strange argument 
seeing that Tannen's (1989: 1) central thesis is to show that involvement strategies 
associated with literature are also present in everyday conversations. In addition, 
here Tannen seems to rather miss the point of Bakhtin's (1981) notions of 
dialogue and the dialogic imagination. The import of Bakhtin's argument here is 
surely that of the inherently social nature and character of language and all 
language uses. When Bakhtin (1981 and 1986) sought to eliminate the distinction 
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between original and quoted utterances his point was surely not to emphasise the 
control of the reporter over his reports. Rather, the point is the opposite, the very 
social nature of language use. This is the import of Bakhtin's celebrated words 
that any utterance contains 'half-concealed or completely concealed words of 
others' (Bakhtin 1986:93; see Holt 1996:221). 
Now, I mention this not to make a point about linguistics, or indeed to save the 
concept 'reported speech'. My reasons are different, and they are partly 
ethno graphic and partly theoretical. I do believe that in the interviews I carried 
out I can fmd the voices of people that were not present and some of whom are 
dead. These voices 1 want to examine now using Bakhtin's (1981) notion of 
dialo gue and 'polyphony' in an attempt to illuminate how people maintain 
relationships with absent others. Let us then return to Samantha's story about the 
time when her older sister got back in touch. Samantha says: 
and she actually made contact with me and she phoned me from Africa but she 
asked what I thought was an inappropriate question, she asked me did I love 
her and I actually said I found it a bit hard, just the years between us and in the 
end I went to see her and in the end it turned out that she was dying [ ... J what 
really tore me up then was that they dragged me back into the misery that was 
that family and I just didn't want any part of it and they dragged me back into 
it only to have to go and die and she hadn't told me she was dying, she had just 
made contact 'oh, I love you, I love you, I miss you, I miss you, I want to 
move back, I want to come and live with you, I want to see your little girl' and 
I came back home [ ... J and it was devastating because you're kind of over the 
family, if you really liked them or not, and then suddenly, because of all the 
memories it had brought back ... 
What we see here is a massive battle of wills between Samantha on the one hand 
and her sister and the 'family' on the other. 'I actually said 1 found it a bit hard ... 
and in the end I went to see her', Samantha says, indicating how her own early 
reluctance to go gives way to a hesitant agreement to see her sister. There is a 
pull here beyond the actual interactions between Samantha and her sister, a pull 
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only strengthened afterwards 'because of all the memories it had brought back'. 
Even more to the point is how Samantha quotes her sister's speech. The general 
force of the story is towards Samantha's feeling that her sister had no right to get 
back in touch, that she did so for her own selftsh ends and only did Samantha a 
disservice by it all. Yet, Samantha does not offer any direct interpretation of her 
sister's words, as my interviewees often would when quoting someone. Rather 
her sister's lamentations and exclamations stand to some extent unchallenged, 
speaking to us and to Samantha from beyond the grave, part of Samantha's 
continued ambivalent relationship with her family. 
To take another example, here is Jacob, talking about the time when he went to 
pick Doreen up from the hospital having only just learnt that she was terminally 
ill. 
The day that she was told and the day that she was cOming out of hospital that 
she only had so long to live that I ... picked her up in the car and ah we came 
half the way home and that was at you know The Pheasant public house [the 
name is fictional], now she used to work there years ago, she used to be a 
waitress there, but there is a lay-by, in that lay-by, just before that and I 
stopped the car in there and we had a bit of a cry and a talk about what was 
going to happen and just at that moment at that time there was a lot of traffic 
went past, any way they were tearing along that road, she said 'looking at the 
way that they're driving there's gonna be a lot of them dead before I am,' and 
ah maybe that would be, but I don't know but after that she said that ... she 
wasn '( going to die that she, that she was going away on a holiday, a long 
holiday, and so we said yes, that what we would say and that eh eventually I 
would meet her again and [Jacob cries quietly] one day I will ... 
This is a powerful story. It is Doreen's words in particular that make the story so 
powerful and they do so partly because they are so unexpected, they do not seem 
to fit into the flow of the 'argument' as it were. Indeed, they do seem distinctly 
out of character, the character that is, that Jacob has built up for us of Doreen as a 
caring, loving wife. Here though, as revealed by her voice, through Jacob's voice, 
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on my tape, she appears to be full of anger, if not raw hate, and that towards a 
bunch of innocent, so to speak, and unsuspecting motorists. Doreen's quoted 
words do link in with what follows, her decision to say that 'she wasn't going to 
die' . At the same time Doreen's words stand without comment, multivocal as 
they are, inviting our different interpretations. 
Even Polly, whose relationship with her father seems nothing but over, recounts 
the following, as related before: 
He was so pathetic compared to what he was before that I felt, I don't know, I 
felt sorry for him, and I would try and help him out and to start with he was 
quite sort of, he resisted it and then eventually he kind of sort of gave way and 
he would allow me to help him and I think it was a week before he actually did 
die and he was at home for the weekend and I think he actually, he called me 
'Polly love' once and he hadn't, he hadn't said anything like that to me for 
years [ ... J I remember being a little bit affected by that at the time. 
Polly here, to some extent, relocates and realigns her relationship with her father. 
In a battle of wills, Polly gets her father to step down, as it were, and allow her to 
help him mow the lawn. People may remember that when Polly was young her 
father was 'very educational' and 'did all the fatherly things'. Here the 
relationship has to a degree been reversed and Polly does things' for her father. 
With that the relationship between Polly and her father does approach somewhat 
the closeness that it once had, a shift marked by Polly's father, for the frrst time in 
many years, calling her 'Polly love'. This memory now exists beside Polly's other 
memories of how 'difficult' her father could be. 
Finally take this example, the ghost story, from Hannah. She says: 
When he frrst died and I came home from Country House and I thought 'I dare 
not tell anybody, they'll think I'm crazy.' I kept it to myself so much, I felt he 
was in that bed with me ... Jonah wasn't there but his presence, his full 
presence was there. And, you know, that went on for a little while. I said 
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, , 
you re not supposed to be here, you know, you're not on this earth now, 
you're not supposed to be here, you've got to go somewhere else,' and that 
night [Hannah starts crying] I was lying in bed ... and truly, it was as though 
his whole body came right over the top of me and he said 'you can't come yet, 
you've got to go through it' ... But there was no voice, there was no voice it 
was just in my brain, but I wasn't thinking about that and I thought 'eh, I 
haven't even thought anything like that.' It was as though it was coming 
through him and as I said his body was leaning, at fITst, his body was leaning 
right over me ... 
What is noteworthy here is how Jonah has in death assumed the kind of agency he 
seemed to be lacking in life. Indeed the interactions that Hannah describes 
resemble much more the kind of interactions people have with their friends and 
relatives and neighbours on a daily basis than they do formulaic ghost stories. We 
have here the same confusion, the same guessing of motives and meanings that we 
encounter in everyday life. Indeed, Hannah herself is not entirely clear what it 
was exactly that Jonah was referring to. In this way his words, too, stand on their 
own, speak for themselves. While their meaning, as Hannah relates them, 
depends upon the reported context, it at the same time escapes Hannah's grasp 
and cannot be contained within her intentions as Tannen would have it. 
So we have, from the interviews with the bereaved, a sense of enduring 
relationships, even after death. Indeed many of my interviewees are still 
profoundly affected by their dead ones, in terms of what they can and can not do, 
how they think and who they are. What is more, this influence is not simply in the 
form of the weight of the past resting on their shoulders. This is an active 
relationship where the living actively and on a daily basis, more or less, attempt to 
gauge the opinions and intentions of their dead relatives. In his essay 'The Epic 
and the Novel' Bakhtin (in Bakhtin 1981) observes that people speak differently 
about the dead and the living. The difference corresponds roughly to that 
between the epic and the novel with the former spoken with one authoritative 
voice about a distant and unalterable past, and the other with many different 
voices in almost total cacophony about a time that is still within reach. What I 
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want to suggest is that the line of distinction does not necessarily lie at the 
boundary between life and death. My interviewees, I believe, not only talk about 
their dead but engage them in a conversation, a dialo gue. They still have, that is, 
a very interactive relationship with their dead ones. This points to the enduring 
and invasive nature of social relationships, their maintenance even after death, a 
nature that becomes apparent if we examine the landscape of what Simpson (in 
press) calls 'the realm of imagined relationships'. 
Allow me then, [mally, to comment upon the nature of social relationships both 
ethnographically and theoretically. Classically, anthropologists have focused upon 
social relationships as a patterned set of relationships that can be traced from 
observable, actual interactions, and can be abstracted from the individuals 
enmeshed in them to build a recognisable social structure. But, by so leaving the 
individuals outside the equation, anthropologists, and indeed sociologists with 
them, are incapable of conceiving of individual human beings as anything else than 
biolo gical organisms that enter social relationships pre-constituted by nature, in 
the way that Durkheim did in his dualistic conception of human beings (see 
Giddens 1979 and 1984; Gisli PaIsson 1991; Ingold 1986). Of course, if you 
think of the human being as a biological organism then there is not too much that 
you can say about their grief anthropologically. 
The way anthropology thinks about the individual is similar to how bereavement 
counselling tends to view the individual. He, or she, forms relationships but these 
fulfIl the individual's needs and can be severed when they can no longer fulfil 
those needs, for example when death brings them to an end. Social relationships, 
that is, are not seen to be constitutive of the individuals that enter them. They can 
be brought to an end, and indeed that is what should be done in the case of death 
for example. 
I believe that the material that I have related, the stories of the bereaved, show a 
somewhat different picture, a picture wherein the individual, the self, is the 
product of social relationships with other people, relationships that in turn are 
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always fluid and in negotiation and are, as such, partly residing in the 'realm of 
imagined relationships' . 
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I have in this thesis attempted to illuminate aspects of death, grief and 
bereavement counselling in the North East of England. I have attempted to say 
something about stories, knowledge, experience, emotions and power. Talking 
about these things I have had something to say about culture, social interactions 
and social relationships too. 
I began by placing the thesis in the context of the anthropology of death. In 
reviewing the literature in the anthropology of death, I sought inspiration from 
Bloch and Parry's (1982) argument that death can instigate actions that, through 
the mobilisation of cultural symbols, cement social organisation and legitimise the 
distribution of power and authority in society. At the same time I observed that 
anthropologists interested in death - Bloch and Parry included - have focused 
almost exclusively on the public rituals associated with death and have neglected 
the personal experiences that follow it. I suggested that this neglect was due to 
the Durkheimian dichotomy between society and the individual that anthropology 
has traditionally operated. I argued that anthropologists have to pay attention to 
grief and added that if we, like Block and Parry, want to understand how death 
may affect matters of social organisation and politics we have to pay attention to 
the experiences of the bereaved; we have to look at grief. 
In arguing so, I was placing my work in the context of the anthropology of 
emotion no less than in the anthropology of death. Seeking inspiration from the 
work of Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990), I argued that we had to dispense with the 
Western common sense view of the emotions which has informed a lot of the 
work in the anthropology of death, according to which our emotions are natural 
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reactions to external events, the same reactions whichever the society we belong 
to. Instead, I said, we have to relativise the emotions and embrace the possibility 
that people from different cultures have different emotional lives. But, again 
drawing on the work of Abu-Lughod and Lutz, I argued that we need to go 
further than relativising the emotions and attempt to contextualise them as well. 
In addition to describing the different emotional lives that different cultures allow, 
we need to ask about the conditions that make those lives possible. In 
congruence with Abu-Lughod and Lutz I argued that we should view the 
emotions as discourses in the Foucauldian sense - as a set of practices that creates 
the thing it speaks of. 
Yet, a focus on emotions as discourses can threaten to undermine an 
understanding of them as lived experience. Here, I argued that a focus on 
narratives, in conjunction with a focus on discourses, would allow us to talk about 
grief in a way that is simultaneously sociologically informed and sensitive to 
individual experiences. Along the way, and in order to do this, I argued too, we 
need to move truly beyond the individual-society dichotomy and see the 'social' 
not as the 'collective' but as relational. The fundamental picture that underlies the 
discussion, then, is one where isolated individuals do not stand against a collective 
totality, but where people relate and interact with each other to the extent that 
these relationships and interactions are constitutive of their very being. I argued 
that academics have to place themselves in this field of relationships and take 
seriously the prospect that their theories will influence the social reality of which 
they speak. 
On the basis of all this, I looked at the literature on death in England. For some 
time now it has been the view of academics that death is a taboo in England. 
While Walter (1994) has argued that death has recently undergone something of a 
revival, both theories presuppose that death is a natural event that instigates 
natural reactions that can be either culturally suppressed or celebrated. But if the 
anthropological literature on death shows anything, it shows that conceptions of 
death vary widely from culture to culture and that to conceive of death as a 
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natural event is not universal, and I argued that we have to look beyond the 
question of taboo, or not, and investigate the discourses through which death is 
constituted. In particular we have to look at how academic theories of death as 
taboo have now become the accepted wisdom in English media and society, and 
what consequences those theories have. The discourse on death as taboo, for 
example, links neatly with theories in bereavement counselling that emphasise 
people's needs to express their grief, a need that the death taboo does not allow 
them to meet in normal interactions with other people. In this way, theories of 
death as taboo serve to legitimate certain activities intended to alleviate the 
consequences of the taboo. 
To understand the place of death in British society today, I suggested that we 
follow Prior (1989) and employ Foucault's notion of modem govemmentality as 
an attempt to govern, and indeed improve, the 'population'. I referred to the 
work of Nikolas Rose (1989b) who shows how modem govemmentality tries to 
wield together individual happiness and the well-being of the nation. I pointed 
out how, because of this and the influence of Protestantism, death ceased to be 
the question about the spiritual salvation of the individual, that it had been in the 
Middle Ages, and became one about the causes and consequences of mortality. 
Amongst those consequences are of course the well-being of the bereaved. This I 
linked with the mission and history of Cruse Bereavement Care which is now an 
established charity that receives considerable fmancial contributions from the 
government and enjoys the support of people in the highest echelons of British 
society. 
I went on to discuss how Cruse understands and intervenes into death and grief. 
To Cruse, death is the end of the relationship between the bereaved and the 
deceased. What is left after death, as far as Cruse is concerned, are the emotions 
that the bereaved have towards the deceased. While Cruse understands grief to 
be a 'natural reaction to a natural event' and each individual experience of it to be 
unique, I attempted to show how the emotions are constituted through training 
and through discourses in Cruse. I pointed out that Cruse focuses on grief as a 
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separable entity that is knowable and how, on that basis, intervention into grief is 
made possible. Here, I believe, my material spoke of how grief and the associated 
emotions are not natural reactions but constituted through training and established 
as a focus on 'emotion-self-now'. 
I discussed how Cruse advocates an anti-expertise ethos about its work and 
suggested that the emphasis on the emotions as 'natural' supports Cruse's view of 
its work as politically neutral. Attempting to move beyond Cruse's self-
perception of its work, I nonetheless argued against most of the existing social 
scientific literature on counselling which sees it as suppressing and destroying the 
subjectivity of its clients. I remarked how the anthropological work of Hockey 
(1990) and Edgar (1997) has revealed counselling to be deeply creative and 
suggested that the way to understand the relationship between power and 
counselling is through Foucault's idea of modem forms of power as productive. I 
showed how, in bereavement counselling, skills are intended to encourage clients 
to explore themselves, express themselves, reconstitute their subjectivity. I 
described how, through that process, clients are expected to emerge as individuals 
capable of 'living with their loss' and ready to resume the productive lives that 
this society deems good and which their grief prevented them from continuing 
with. While the aims of bereavement counselling are phrased in terms of 
individual happiness, I argued, the interests of govemmentality are obvious. 
I then attempted to delineate how Cruse's understanding that death is the end of 
the relationship, and its focus on emotions as entities, differs from the experiences 
and understandings of the bereaved people who I interviewed. For many of the 
bereaved - as made clear through their narratives - the relationship with the 
deceased is on-going, and grief is for the bereaved a part of these relationships, as 
indeed are the narratives themselves. Narratives, I argued, are means by which 
the bereaved maintain their relationships with the dead. 
The narratives show too that the experiences of the bereaved are not individual in 
character, rather they are inherently social. The experiences of the bereaved, I 
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argued, are social, not in the sense of the 'social' as collective representations, a 
system of rights and obligations, or observable interactions. Rather, they are 
social in the sense of the 'social' as relationships between people that are 
simultaneously constitutive of their very being. Peter Gow (1990), in talking 
about the people of the Peruvian Amazon, has pointed out how social 
relationships are a history of moods and affects rather than parts of a system of 
rights and obligations. Simpson (1998 in press) has argued that we should not 
make a radical distinction between the realms of 'observable' and 'imagined' 
relationship. The latter, he argues, is no less social than the former. This, taken 
to gether, I concluded, is borne out by the narratives that I related and this is why 
we have to consider people's experiences when writing about putatively social 
phenomena, like anthropologists writing about death; only in this way can we 
understand how death has its political and social implications. 
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Cruse Bel-eavement Care- Branch Handbook First Edition. 
COUNSELLING FOR ,CRUSE 
GENERAL GUIDELINES 
I . Counselling can only be undeLtaken if a client has been bereaved by death and wishes to 
~",e counselled by a Cruse counsellor. For the purposes of counselling!. .., ' 
L.~-use has agreed. to define bereavement as the loss, by death, of a valuell ItLdll ve or 
fnend. In some lllstances, a much-loved pet could be considered to fall within this 
categorv. 
~ "" 
2. It is illlportant that effective couullunication is Illaiutained between counsellor. 
snpervisor, and refenal secretary, so that each is aware.of the CUtTent situation in the 
counselling process. -: : 
3. It is suggested that a new counsellor should undeltake work with only oue client during 
the initial phase of her probationary period. Ideally, the caseload should not exceed I1101'C 
than three clients at anyone tiIlle. 
4. Counselling appointluents Inay be held at the client's honle if tlus is 111utualiy convenient, 
in which case adequate security for visits should be observed. (Rejer to the safety 
guidelines ill Appel1di~ 4, page 25) 
j. The frequency of appointments with a client will VaL)r according to the level of SUppOlt 
neecieci. It will also depend on the atHOlInt of t:iIne the counsellor is able to allocate. One 
appointlncnt per week Inay be suitable aJ the ontset. although an ini.ti;tl ass('!ssment of 
each situation is clearly nnportant. 
6. It is recohunended that the duration of appointulents be lUlli ted to one hour, \vith the 
exception of the very first one, \vhich lnay well need to be longer. PUllctltality and 
reliabilitv are iLlll)oltant. and a client shonlci he advis('~cl as soon as l)()ssihl(~ ht~f()rehanr1 if 
",,' A 
an appointlnent has to be changed. 
7. Coullsellors ::u'e encouraged to contract a nUlnber of sessions with a client at the stmt of 
counselling - six sessions is suggested. Tlus helps to keep the work focussed and 
vvithin conllseltin g hmlllclat;(".s. A t tlw~ end of tlu". agn .. (~cl pel;od, thl~ work ~hOlll r1 I'll" 
reviewed, and a flUther ntunber of sessions contracted, if tins is necessary_ 
R. The effectiveness of a counselling session Inay be comproLlllsed by the presence of 
f:-nnilv members or fliends. If this is the case, the counsellor should stress that it is 
inlpo~'tant for. hitll to have ,3. private cons1.~ltaJ.i()n wilh t:h(~ d}.t~l)t; and tna~~. alh~l1\:l~i VI': 
alTangemenfs If necess,at"v. {A nl~l1tT~ll nWI~lln9. nlace can l1Sl1a] I:, he tll_ade (tl atlable at rh(~ 
o if needed~) , ~ • 
9. COlillsellors should maintain strict confidentiality in accordance with the guidelules in the 
('()nfirt'~nt;a1ity Policy, Appendix L page 11. Any difficulties should be discussed with 
10. 
I L. 
sunernsors . 
• 
Counsellors are forbidden to accept monetary re\vard .from clients .. It i,s reconlln~nded 
thal thev should advise clients they may make a donatlon to Cruse If they would hke to 
do so. (See the leUer ill AppelldL'C 11. page 35) 
Counsellors should be aware of National Cruse policy on social supp0l1 groups and the 
CUlTent situation within Cruse (See Appendix 3, page 23.) 'l1.ey lllay h(~ 
requested to attend a group, if the need arises. 
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cotmsellor ?oes not wish';'> to clainl expense~, she should none the less complete the 
expense clauu fOrIn as required, and record on the fOInl a donation of the relevant stun. (See Appendix 12, page 36.) .. 
13. Counsellors wi.ll. receive on-going training, and will peliodically be enCOllr:lgNI 1() 
evaluate the tTallung progranune and make suooestions about future tOI)ics or trat-l11'110 
needs. ..... ~~ • b 
14. Practising counsellors will be encouraoed to attend training courses for new volunteers ~inc.(~ 1h(~ir :lc.11ve p~r11c.ip:l11()n ic;: :In e~~elltial component of the experiential leanling tha't 
takes nlacc_ .. 
• 
15- A contract will be made between individual counsellors and the branch. (See Appendix 
5, page 28.) 
THE REFERRAL SYSTEIVI 
br~nch is clUTently in the process of working towards implemcntati on of the 
pr()c.edllre~ in. the new standard in Appendix 17, page 50 and outlined here. 
1_ Refenals usualiy come from potential clients thelnsei ves. However, if a refelTai comes 
from a third party, tIus nUlst be with the knowledge and consent of the client. 
2. There is one refelTal secretary who ulauages aU inconting referrals and enqUlnes, 
recording details on the Re!erralJellq1.liry fonn (see Appe/ldix 8. page 31). She cunently 
also has the responsibility of coordinating with supervisors in the allocation of refen-als. 
3. All referrals to . Cnlse llUISt be 111ade to the referral secretarv via the Cruse 
telephone nUlllber U1Z~7 610734. A ulessage can always be left on"the answering 
lnachille if she is not available. 
4. ,\Vhere possible, the refen-al secretary makes initial contact with a supervisor to discuss 
~vaiiahil ity of couusellors. She has the respousibility for allocating new clients in 
conjtUlctioll \\.;].th supervisors, and \Viii contact a counsellor to lllake the anangenlents and 
send thenl the details of the refelTai. These should be entered bv the counsellor on a 
" duplicate copy of the Referral/enquiry jOr/n. At the client's request, illfonnation should 
he given about the content, secmity, and the client's right of access to tins record, winch 
should not include details of the clietlt'8 nrQblem.8 or counselling, <I.nd whidl should he 
. .. 
kept secm-eiy filed and separate from any case notes. 
). The refen-al secretary keeps a copy of the Referral/enquiry jonn in a secured file. 
COUNSELLING PKACTICE 
1. The counsellor should Inake contact with the client within tlu'ee working days to an-ange 
the first contact. She should consider safety factors according to the guidelines in 
Appendix 4, page 25 before making an-angeillellt~ frw the fir~t llH'eting A t _th~ ini1-i:ll 
visit. the client should be given the leaflet Cruse is here 10 help and the I'vfTSSlOll and 
cOlljidelltialily statement (see .AppendL~: 10 page 34,) \vhich also has the dedicated Cluse 
tp.lenhone nUluber tlu'ough wInch the clIent can contact the counsellor. 
L .. 
2. Following the in.itial visit, the counsellor should contact the supervisor with details of the 
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4. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
initial conlTact. (See General Guidelines above. /late 2.) 
A record of contact time \vith clients should be kept in the Counsellor's Record Book. 
The cO~llls~llor should f~ll in the stq/~stics 0/ counsellillg !onn (see Appendix 9. page 33) 
a~l~llllaLnlalLl a record o~ ?ates of \'lSLtS and telephonecounseUing sessions 011 the reverse 
sl~e. ~f the fonn. TillS fonn should be cOlupleted and returned to the branch 
acLnunlstrator as soon as possible after 31 IVlarch so that rccords for the Branch can be 
cOlnpleted in tinle for the annual statistics renInl to the national office. 
Afler the initial six visits, the client should be given thc' Cliellt evaluation 0/ Cruse 
services letter. (See Appendix 11. page 35 j. 
Ali notes concerning an incli vidual client, kept as a lnelnory aid, and for lise in 
supervision, should be kept in a notebook retained by the counseUor. Such notes Inllst 
110t identify the client by llalne or address. They HUlSt be kept in a seClU'e and confidential 
place. On conlpletion of counseiiing, they should be kept for t\:vo years and then 
shredded, 
A cOlulseHor should il1fonn the refelTal secretary of the cOlnpletion of cOlll1seliing of any 
client. 
If, at a later stage, a fonner client refers herself back, directlv, to her fonner cOlulsellor. 
then she should-be instructed that she nUlst use the Cruse teiel;hone nl.unber to contact the 
l)~ff~n'::Il ~f'>r.n~t::ll\] ::Inc1 00 thl'()1Joh tiw· HOnll::ll 1"(:>f(:>I"::Ii Iwor.(·r1m'p Thi~ i~ to p.n~l1rp. hoth 
." 0 ,-' J. 
tb_3t an individl..ml (;01.1tl .. sdlt:n' d0t~~ !:~..Q1: h!.:lYI~ ~_n I~~~essl.ve \;\-:'o .... k lQ~v:l .. ~_l1..d. ~h!.l.t 3.(;cur:;!.t.(~ 
records tan. be 111(\ i Ilt(ll Iled bv the refen":Jl ~e~retarv-_ 
~ ~ 
ACCKEDITATION 
1. 
., 
..). 
4. 
Havino cOllloleted the basic training COlU'se or~allised bv the branch, and having been 
~ .I. _. --. '-' 
intervie\ved and accented for the role of cOlUlseiling \vithin the branch. a counsellor will 
~ ~ 
have the status. of 1)f0h3tlJ)1.1::1 nl C.("Ill n~(~ii or 
~ ~ 
A probational]' cOlUlseiior nlllst then fulfil the folio,"ving nitella, before being considered 
for accreditation: 
(a) Attend at least seven out of tell of the organised nlonthly on-going training sessions. 
(b) lTndertake at least twenty hours of supervision. -
(c) Record at least sixty hOlirs of cOlUlselling in the log book provided. 
Once a probationary counsellor has applied .for ac.c~-editation, .the training officer '~;ill 
alTange a uleering between herself. the superVisor, eltiler the chrullllan of the counse.llmg 
and il-ainillO subconunittce or the brmlch chainnan. an external assessor. ruld the 
probationary cOlUlsellor, who should bring h.is r?cord of tTai~ung with lUlU. The ~iln of 
the lneetino will be to establish the level of expenence and skill that the counsellor Llas to 
off(~r Thp.::-(ll1::1iitv ("If thl~ ~1:>I'vir.f' i~ ("If fllnt1!-lIlH:>llt::li im!",m1::1nr.l'" Tl("ltt"hp. Tlnmlwr o~ h("ll1r~ 
-'docked up~'. If after discu~sion, the group feels the. coull:e1l0f. needs m.ore tune to 
reach the S1.!lndru-d required. thCll a future d31e f01' r("(;("II.l.sldp.IJl.1:t0tl. \v11l1~(~ off(~rp.(i 
Once a cOlUlsellor has been accredited by the branch, he will receive a cel1ificate from 
Cruse House. 
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SUPER\'ISION 
1. The .. br,ulchof Cnlse has adopted the guidelines for supervision outlined in 
the Tral~llllg l-landbook for Cruse Branches and in the new standards for supervision 
recently Issued. (See Appel/eh)..: 18, page 54.) 
2. The refelTal secretary, and all counseilors will have a named supervisor. 
3. Supervision should take place at least once per nlonth. Individual arranoeLnents for 
supervision will be detenllined by the expelience of the counsellor and th~ ollLuber of 
clients she is clllTenliy seeing, alld will be made het·wP.t~n the c.01tn~(~lI01· :lnd ~Imervi~()r 
• 
4. Confidentiality should be observed in accordance \'lith the Confidentialitv PoJicv (see 
Appendix 1. page 11). In particular, dient 's names shouLd not be llsed in s~lpervis[OI~. 
4. A record of supervision should be kept in the Counsellor's Record Book. 
A contract between the counsellor and the supervisor \viH need to be established on the 
lines of the satnple contTact in Appendix 6, page 29. 
6. There ~v.ili be regular nleetings of supervisors, at least three per year, to lllonitor the 
supen'lslOll process. 
7. The ratio of supervisors to coullseliors should ideally not be less than one to four. 
COlUlsellors will be consulted about the provision of their supervisor. It is reconmlended 
that supervisors should \vork with different counsellors everv two to three vears to 
provide cOlUlsellors with a range of supervision expelience. '" '" 
8. There win be regular on-going training and peer support on a luonthly basis to \vhich all 
counsellors and supervisors are invited. 
9. If difficulties arise betv,leen a counsellor and supervisor, these should be addressed, in 
the fU'st instance. directlv between themsel yes. If difficulties cannot be resolved in this 
'" \vay, then the branch provides a lueans for these to be discussed with either the bnmc.h 
chairman or the chaimuul of the counseiiing subconmlittee. (Sep the cOIl/rac! ill 
Appe/1(hr. 5, page 28.) 
10. Supervisors wiIi be encolU'aged to attend trail~ng courses, as is de:lne~l approplia~e. 
Professional supervisors \vithin other work seHl~lgs, e .. g. tl~e Health ~erVlce a~d SOCIal 
Services. who offer their services to Cruse hut W110 cto not have expenence of 
counselling supervision, will need to al1encl appropliate courses. 
L 1. The quality and frequency of superv ision is the responsibii ity of the counselling 
subcOlruni ttee. 
12. A contract will be established between the branch and individual supervisors based, as is 
appropriate, on the salnple contract in Appendix 7, page 30. 
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Appendix 1 
CONFIDENTIl-\LI'TY POI~ICY 
Thc. Crusc c~llridcntiality policy has bccn amendcd in thc light of usagc, to clarify some 
s~Cl1ons and Hlcorporatc rccc:nt lcg~~l changes. A shortcncd version has becn dcveloped to 
cIrculate t~ branch workcrs pnor to signaturc. 
Both the sh~r~cncd version, and the fuB length docUlllent ~u'e reproduccd here. It is 
reconullendecl Blat branch workers llSC the shOltcned version as a \vorking docmllcnt. of \vhich 
they arc expected to have a good working kno\viedge, and lise thc flll(length doclUllent for 
reference as needed. 
A sample signature sheet is set out bcio\v. There is no need for those who ha\;e alreadv sigued 
to do so again. although they should be aware of the aUlencLtnents \\;hich have been tuade. ~-
Cruse Bereavement Care 
CONFIDENTIALITY POLICY 
I have recei\'ed a copy of Cruse Bereavelnent Care's Confidentiality Poiicy Document on 
..................................... (clate). 
-
I have read the document and understand its principles. I agree to abide by the policy in all nl)! 
work with Cruse. I understand that breach of the policy would be regarded as a very serious 
Inatter and that Cruse would revievil , in the light of any breach, the continuing of any 
voluuteering arrangement. with ltlC. 
Sigllecl: ............................................ ·························································· . 
Dated: ........................................................................................................ . 
CONFIDENTIALITY POLIC-Y-
Shortelled document based 011 the C:rus'e COll/idelltiality Policy 
1 INTRODl.iCTION 
1.1 TillS policy applies to ~Il Cruse workc~'s, paid or unpaid. The purposc of .confidentiality is 
to providc the clicnt wtth safety and pn vacy. 
1.2 Anv person or org~utisation who uses, or .approache~ Cru~e as a potentdiallrecipi~,ntl.of i,~s 
cOl~nselling. social Slipp0l1 group or debnefing serV1c~s, IS to be rcg~r c( as a c lent . 
The verv fact that an approach has heen. made to Cruse L~ .to bc tre~ted 1.11 COUfLdcllCC. Any 
personal information divulgcd by a rcfening agency or tlurd pa11y IS also to be regarded as 
confidential. 
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2 GENEI<'AL PRINCIPLES 
2.1 The lHld~ltaking of confidentiality is Inade by Cnlse Bereavement Care (the organisation) 
to the c!tent. Everv Cnlse worker has a resl)onsibilitv to adhere to this undet1akino 0:11 ~ r ~ 
behalf of Cruse Bereavement Care. 
2.2 (a) Cnlse workers will not reveal to any person outside the organisation, without 
the infonned and freely given consent of the client, any lllatter which would 
identify the client or any information about the client. 
(b) V\Tithil~ a Cruse branch, all reasonable steps should be taken to prevent the 
identification of the client. 
(c) ,\Vherever possi.b~e, Cn~se workers shol~lc~ not lU.ldertake cOlUlseUing or group 
\vork,: nor partlClpate In group sUper\'lSlOl1. wllen persons kno\vn to theln 
outside Cruse are being discussed. Therefore it is incumbent upon all cruse 
workers to declare any personal relationship with, or personal kIlo\vledge of. 
anv Cruse client. 
.. 
For guidance on divulging infonnatioll to third parties; on the death of a client; and 
between children and parents, please refer to the nlain confidentiality policy 
doclunent. 
3 EXCEPTIONS 
4 
4.1 
The following cirCUlllstances are exceptions to the principie of retaining confidentiality 
\\lithin Cruse: 
(a) "'\Then not revealing information would be breaking the law (see section 7 of the lJIatll 
docwnellt). 
(b) \Vl1en, after appropriate consideration, the cruse \vorker decides there is inuninent 
danger to the life of a client tlu"ough suicidallisk. 
(c) Wllen the Cruse worker cOllsiders there is danger or ilann likely to others by the 
client's actual or intended actions (see sections 3.2(b) and 4.7 of the main docUlnentj. 
There are further circlllllstances that engender strong concerns -and which should be 
discussed with a supervisor before any lllove is Inade to ~reak confidentiality, and then 
oulv after discussion with the client. These are: 
.. 
(a) nlental illness in the client 
(b) news of abuse of children 
(c) news of selious clinunal offences. 
The procedures for breaking confidentiality are set out tn section 3.1 of the malll 
document. 
OPEI~ATING PROCEDURES 
Cruse workers are responsible for explaining the ~ruse confidentiality policy to ~ll cli~nts 
at the first appropriate opportmuty. Such infonnatlOlllnay be conveyed orally or III \\'ntten 
form. 
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4.2 The sharing of information between Cruse workers should be on a "nced to know" basis. 
4.3 Except whc.re ~~bsolute1y ueccssary, the nanles of clients should not be used in discussions 
or conUlllUucahons between Cruse workers. -
4.4 Casual cOllversation about individual cases is to be avoided. 
4.5 If possible. clients should not be asked to state the nature of their enquiry in the presence 
of others. 
4.6 Those ~tt~nc~ng Crus~ therapeutic, cOl~lselLing: training. and social SUppOlt groups should 
bc r~mll~ctect not t~_,~h.scuss pel:sonal lllf?~'llla~!On about o~l~er group nlclnbers to people 
outsIde the group. llus should be a conditIOll tor nlembersiup of thc group. 
4.7 Please refer to the main doculnent for guidance concerning calling the police. 
5 
5.1 
5.2 
S.3 
SUPERVISION AND THE USE OF CA.8E lVIATERIAL 
As a general principle, supervisors HUlst not rcveal identifiable confidential lnaterial 
concenung the supervisee or their client to any other person without the express consent of 
aU parties concerned, except whcn the supervisor considers it necessary to prevent sel1011s 
emotional or physical damage to the client, the supervisee, or a third party_ 
Supervision should SUppOlt Cruse \vorkers in Inaintaining the principle of a confidential 
service to dients. As far as possible any breach of confidentiality will be a joint decisioll 
behveeu}vorker and supervisor. 
Cruse workers should not base illustrative lllaterial on actual cases uuless the idcntitv of 
the Cnlse client is certain to be obscured or the client has given free and infonuecl couS'ent. 
Cruse workers have an obligation to ensure that, \vhen pI:-esenting, tll::lt-ef;::Il1Jl ::Iny fnnn it 
stated in nuhlic that the (lbove condition has been complied \vith. 
~ 
5.4 Cruse counsellors wishing to present Cruse case luaterial at .external counselling com'ses 
must obtain w11tten consent frotn their client before conunenclng ,"vork. 
6 RECORDS 
Case records (name. address. clate of contact, nlUuber of visits etc) should be kept 
separately frOtH case notes which tnay record. deta~i~ a~out the client or the counselling 
sessions. and which Blust not carry Ineaus of IdentifIcatLOll. The case nlUnber should be 
the onlv link. 
"' 
Records, case notes, and legal requirements are covered in lllore detail in the IllaLll 
document. 
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1 INTRODUCTION. 
(All references in this policy to "Cruse worker" refer to both l)aid and voluntary 
workers.) -
This policy applI.cs t.o coullscilors, supervisors, ~onsultants to 
SU~~l\I"\'ISOrS, .1·C[CIT31. sC(Tctaries, sodal support ,vorkel"s, t.·aincl"s soeial 
actiVity WO!"~{CI"S, actministt"atol's, branch aciministratol"s, and anjr othc." 
person worlong on bchalf of Cruse. 
1.1 Thc purpose of conficientiaiitv 
~he y~llV?S.~ of ~on~i?el~tiality i~.-t~) provide the client with safety and privacy. The 
L Ollll(IClltl~ty ~nnclp1e IS one 01 tile cornerstones upon which Cruse is built. It also 
serves to mamtmn and encourage pubiic confidence in Cruse. 
1.2 \Vilo is it for? 
A perso.l: or org~~sation, who llses or approaches Cruse as a potential recipient of its 
counselhng, SOCIal support group, or debriefing services is to be rcoarded for this 
" ~... ..... '- b purpose as ~ c~lent", even tllougLl that pcrson or organisation does not, in thc evcnt. 
l)eCOLne a chent ttl the usual scnse of the word. The very fact th..1.t such. an approach has 
been made to Cruse is t.o be treated in confidence, as is anything revealed in the comose of 
preL1n:un~ry contact. Any person(~.inf?r~nation divulged by a refening agency or third 
party IS also to bc regarded as conficLentlal. 
2 GcN.I:~A<AL t'KINCIJ:'LES 
The undertaking of conficientiaiity IS made by Cruse J::Sereavemcnt Cal"e to 
tile ciient. Eve."y C."lISC workel" has a rcsponsibiiity to adhe.·c to this 
undertaking on behalf of CI"lISe Bereavcmcnt Cal"c. (For e.rceptiolls to General 
Prillcipies see jollmving sectioll 3.) 
2.1 The undertaking of confidentiaiity: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Cruse workers are bound by an undertaking of confidentiality to those seeking 
heip. Every Cruse workcr \viIi treat as confidential, personal infonnation about 
clients, whether obtained directly or indirectly or by inference. Such information 
includes name, address, bi_ographicai detail~; anc1 ()lhp.r c1p.~r.riplion~ of lht~ d i("'nt' ~ 
life and CirCll!llstances ,vhich might result in the clienl's identification. 
Cruse workers have a duty not to reveal to ~Uly person olltside the organisation 
without the infol111ed and freely given consent of the client; any lllatter which would 
identifv the client. 
'" 
In a Cruse branch, all reasonably practicable steps (tlu·ough training and instruction 
of persOlulCl and the provision of administrati ve alTangelnents) should be taken to 
maintain confidentiality. It is the duty of all Cruse workers to takc what steps they 
can to ensure tlus. 
It is inclunbent on all Cruse workers (if infonnation conles to their attcntio~l) to 
declare any personal relationship with, or personal knowled~e of, any Cruse che~lt. 
\\There possiblc, Cruse workers must not undcItake c.o~mselling or group work. WIth 
sllch a person, and shoul? lea.vc any group supen'lslon when pcrsons known to 
them outside Crusc are bCIng dlscusscd 
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2.2 
2.4 
3 
Thil"d parties 
Crus~ does not divulge infonnation about clients other than when required to do so as 
descnhed b.elow (see seCtion 7). However, if a person enquiling has been appointed 
legal. gl~ar(han of someone deemed to be incapable of Inanaging his own affairs, then 
certaIn Informatiolllnay be provided. Evidence of the appointlnent should be examined 
and a copy retained on file. The infonnation should be restlicted to reveal only whether 
or not the client is or was a user of Cruse services. .. 
Death of client 
Death does not end the undeltaking of cOltfidentiality. lnfonnation about deceased cltents 
can only be given to a person who has been appointed as an executor/personal 
re!)resentative of the deceased client's estate and then only if their are ovenidino leoal 01' 
.. ~ ~ 
ethical considerations. Evidence of such a transaction HUlst be retained Oll file.~· ~ 
Chiidl"en and parents 
The lUlde11aking of confidentiality will be owed to the child \vho is the client and not to 
the parents. Ul~der the Children Act 1989, the welfare of the child is paral110lUlt and tlus 
is detennined by cel1ain considerations laid do\vn in statute. Each child has a light of 
confidentiality. Ho\vever, counsellors are entitled to lllake a decision as to the level of 
confidentiality offered, based on the individual circUlllslances of the cluld, for example, 
a~e, lnatmitv, etc. 
o .. 
~XC~PTIONS 
The fo1l0wing circUlllstances are exceptions to the plinciple of retailung confidentiality 
\vithill Cruse: 
(a) \Vhen not revealing infonnation would be breaking the laVil (see section 7). 
(b) \:\!hen, after appropliate consideration, the Cruse \vorker decides there is ilIDlunent 
dallger to the life of a client tlu'ough suicidallisk. 
(c) \\i11en the Cruse worker considers there is danger or hmnllikely to others by the 
clienl's 
actlk1.l or intended actions (see aiso sections 3.2(b j and 4.7) .. 
3.1 ,Vhen bl"eaching confidence 
(a) vVhenever possible) consultation nUlst first take place with an expelienced Branch 
superVISOr. 
(b) ,\Vhenever possible, after discussi?n .wit.h the cli~nt 
(c) The disclostrre should be kept as huuted as pOSSIble. 
(d) A careful note of the circumstances should be Inade as pat1 of the case record. 
3.2 Exceptional circumstances 
There are further circumstances that engender strong COllcenlS, .and where, after discussion 
with a supervisor, confidentiality Inay have to be broken. These CIrcumstances are: 
(a) 
(b) 
\\'hen there are grounds for believing that. the c~ient is seliouslY.luentally ilL to .the 
degree that they are not able to lnake a rahanal Judgulent for therr nee~ for nlerl.ical 
heLp. Infonllation to this. eff~ct-. should be passed to a responsIble lnedical 
practitioner, preferable the client's l.JP. 
"Then a client, either adult or child, reveals physical, sexual, or emotional child 
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~buse. The duty to PTotect children ovenides the duty of confidentialitv where 
lcasonable grolllldsexist for suspecting abuse or neglect towards children. "' 
~~-use P?licy requires tl~at counsell?rs should seck the advice or their supervisor 
"'11h a VIew to contact bemg Inade wnh the local Social Services Depat1ulent. 
(c) \Vhel~ the clieI~t has I~ev~aled atly lllatter which the Cruse worker considers Illav 
conshtl~te a sen~lls cnnuual act (see sections 7.4 and 7.5). The matter should b"'e 
refeiTed to the DIrector of Cnlse or 1l0l11inated deputy. 
3 OP~RATING PROCEutJRES 
4.1 Informing ciicnts 
Cru~e workers ~'e responsibi~ for expia.ining Cluse confidentiality policy to ail clients at 
the fIrst appropnate OPp0l1lUllty. Such mfonnationluav be conveved oraliv or in lVIitten 
fOIU1. "' "' "' 
3.2 C."use wOI"kers~ access to infonnation on ciients 
4.3 
4.4 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
The shali~lg of infol:n~lion about clients should be on a "need to know'" basis, i.e. just 
that knowledge realUred to ensm-e: . 
~ . 
(a') adnunish'ativc efficiencv (b~) that Cruse workers hav"'e the kno\vledge necessat,l to fulfil their tasks 
(c) the legal protection of Ctl1se and its v70rkers "' 
(d) that supep'ision requireillellts are Illet 
(e) the conduct of reseal'ch projects approved by Cruse UK. 
The use of ciients' names 
bxcept where absoiuteiy necessary, the naines of clients shouid not be used 111 
discussions or COnllluuncations with Cruse \vorkers, 
Casuai conversation 
Casual conversation about individual cases is to be avoided. There is alwavs a real Iisk 
that a breach of confidence Inay OCClrr, hO\\lever muntended. '" 
Pl"ivacv 
If possible, clients should not be asked to state the nature of their enquiry in the presence 
of others. vVhere possible, aU sessions should be heid in plivacy. inciuding telephone 
enquilies between 3 client and a Cruse \vorker. An appropliate balance nUlst be struck 
between considel:ltions of cOlUlseilor and client safety, and client plivacy. All refenals to 
other appropriate services within Cruse or outside can only be made with the client's 
consent. (Please refer to the Er.ceptiol1s, section 3.) 
Sociai support! therapeutic, counsellin~, and tl"aini.ng groups ". . 
Those attending Cruse groups should be renllnded not to diSCUS.S personal lll~Onnahon 
about other group members with people outside the group. ThIS agreelnent IS to be a 
condition of group membership. 
Calling the police. . . . . 
There mav be rare occaSIOns when clIents behave In ways wLuch alatl11, dIstress, or 
tlu'eaten a·usc workers or other clients. It l11a), be possible to discuss tIns behaviour with 
the client or to exatuine the problenls that cause it, in the context of a nonnal session. If 
tllis is not possible, it lllay b~ neces~ary to call ~he polic~. Vlher~ver possible, a cl~ar 
\vanling should be given that if a parhcuiar behavlom' contlnues, or IS repeated, the polIce 
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5.1 
5.2 
,- " J.~ 
5.4 
6 
6.1 
6.2 
lnay be. called and given the client's nanle and address and the nature of the comnlaint. In thc~~ crrcLUn~tances there .is no br~ach of confide~llia~it)~ in calling the 'police ~d gi ring 
that lltlonnallon. F1I11her lltlonnallon about the chent s lllvolveinent with Cruse if oiven 
without the clie.nt's consent, would be a breach of confidence. "There pos~ibl~ the 
Cruse worker WIll consult with other Branch persolUlel before such action is t4lken. 
Other clients present should always be infonned so they can choose to leave before the 
police aI?ve if they so wish. ,Vllen the police anive, tl;e policy on confidentialitv UUISt 
be explatned, so that the police lUlclerstancl that Cruse will not give details of an\~ other 
clients \vho Inay have been present, without their expressed peniiission. ... 
SlJPERVISION AND THE USE OF CASE IVIATEKIAL 
S II pel·visio n 
As a general principie, supervisors lUUSt not reveal identifiable confidential lnateriai 
concenring the supervisee or their client to any other person without the express consent 
of all parties concenled, except: when the supervisor considers it necessary to prevent 
selious elnotional or physical danlage to the ciient, the supervisee, or a third party. 
Supervision should support Cruse workers in Illailltaining the plinciple of a confidential 
service to clients. As far as possible, any breach of confidentiality wiii be a joint decision 
bet\veen ,vorker and supervisor. 
Using cases for training purposes, externai presentations, or publication 
Cruse workers should not base illustrative InateIiai on actual cases unless the idelltitv of 
their clients (or others kIIO\Vn through branch work) is celtain to be obscured, 01:' the 
client has' given free and infolmed consent. Cruse workers have au obligation to ensure 
that, when presenting nIateIial in any fonn, it is stated publicly that the above condition 
has been cOlllplied with. 
Course material (fol· C.·use cOllnseliors attending external courses) 
In order to present Illaterial in college for sllpervisio~l, the client's wlitten consent nUlst. be 
obtained before the student: C0llll11enCeS counsellIng work. The counsellor reUI.tinS 
responsible for lllaintaining c<?nfidential~ty 01~ behalf of ~ruse. The cli~nt has the light to 
veto any at'eas of work or parllcular seSSIons tr0111 the college presentallon. 
RECORDS AND CASE NOTES 
Recol'ds 
,\Then contact is first Inade bv a client, SOine fonn of record will be statted. TIllS will 
show the name atId address of the client, the case ulIlnber, and the naine of the Cruse 
worker and when counselling conllnencecl (md tenninated. It Inay also contaill some 
other lnatlers such as the nanle of the client's doctor and date of bereaveinent. It should 
not include details of the client's probieins or the counselling. This re~onl, should be 
securelv filed, and kept: separately fr01n any case notes. A! th~ c.hent s request, 
infonn;tion should be given about the content, secmity, and the chent s I1ght of access to 
tlris record. 
Case notes . 
Case notes which record details about a client or an aCC?llllt ~f cO~lllsel.lin~ should not 
cont~lin the client's SUl11anle or address and should contain as htde IdentlfYIng matter as 
, 'bIe Case notes should be seen by no one other than the cOlUlsellor and tl~e POSSI . . d' . f . TIn tl t, .,. 
supervisor. Case notes should be kept In con l110ns 0 secunty. V\'llen le no es are III 
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6.3 
6.4 
6.4-
6.5 
6.6 
7 
the Cruse worker's custody:, he/she must be sure that they are 110t left where others Inay 
have a chancc to rcad theIH; the Crusc worker should keep thelH separatelv frOlH anv note ~bout the client's name or other identifying particulars. Case notes arc"the property of 
Cruse Bere(lVClHent Care. \Vhen the case is closed, thev should be kcpt bv the branch 
and slu'eddcd after two years. '" '" 
Use of case notcs 
Should evidence of work (other than for supervision) be required, new notes should be 
prepared. These should ensure the obscurity of the client unless free and informed 
consent has been given by the client. '" 
Break-ins 
If confidential records or case notes arc stolen. the theft must be repOlted to the police, 
branch cOlnmittee, regional office, and I-lead Office. The report to the police must stress 
the confidcntialnallue of the records and the ilupOlta.llCe of their being retlUued unread if 
they are found. \:\'here case records have not been stolen, but an intTuder nught have 
exanuned theIn, a sinlilar repOlt should be made to the branch lllanagelllent cOlllmittee. 
Access to t'ccords by third parties 
A rdative or a solicitor acting on a client's behalf Inav onlv have access to br~ulch records 
\vith the client's wlitten penlussion. which shouid b~ filed with the case record. Copies 
of any docluncnt supplied must be retaincd in the files. Requests for information should 
be Blade to the branch chairman, 
Data managelllent and the keeping of computerised records 
Infol1llatioll on computer is covered by the Data Protcction Act 1984. Tlils givcs the right 
to individuals to have a copy of ali details about thenl stored on COlllputer or word 
processor, the right to have inaccurate personal data erased or conected, and, vilhen 
appropriate, to seek redress for any damage causcd. Legal advice should be sought 
before infonnatioll is provided to 
anvone requcsting it. A chiid, if it fully understands the request it is lllaking, has the 
sa{ne lights as an adult to ask for information A parent does not autOluaticaUy have the 
right to a diller s records (see section 2'-+), 
Other icgai impiicatiol1s of .'ccord ~cep i Ilg~.. '" ~ 
Cnlsc workers ordered by a comt to procluce conlicLenttallnfonnatlOll, Inay find retusal 
could resuit in imprisomnent or other penalties bcing imposed for contempt of court. In 
tius situation leoal advice should be taken as soon as possible. The police have celtaln 
powers t? se'arch. for and sei~~ d~c~llnents w~th or \~it.l~out a \V~r~·aI~l. .T?e!'e is some 
degree ot protectlOn for confIdential r~c?rd~ Ul thc IJ?l1ce and. ~nnl1nal ~\'1de~lCe Act 
1984, thouoh tius protection is not unlmuted (see seC/lOll 7A (l»). If polIce ask to see 
such recorc~, legal advice should be sought before disclosure and the Director of Cruse 
informed. 
\Varrants to seize fiies 
The pol~ce have l?owers to ~eiz~ conficiel~!ial files. if they hav.e ob~ained ~. warr~lt (.calle~l : 
producl1on order) fr01n a clrclIltjucige. ubstructll1g the pollce flom taking theln 111 these 
circlullstances inay be an offence. 
LEGAl .. REQlJIREIVIENTS 
Cruse workers are required by G11se-Bereavcment C~u'e to work within the law. 
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7.1 Liabilitv 
Cruse Ber.cavem~nt care will take all reasonable steps to lnake workers aware of ClUTent 
law affechng th~ll'.work. Cruse could be liable for any negligent advice given to clients. 
A Cruse worker'S Ignorance of the la\\' is no defence against legal liability. 
7.2 Solicitors~ enquiries 
There is no legal obligati.on to .U1S\\'er a solicitor's enquiry or to luake a statcillcllt for the 
pm1Jose of legal proceedmgs, unless ordered to do so by a comt. 
7.3 l{cqU{'sts to attend COlll"t 
In generaL Cruse cOlUlseliors should not "oIuntalily appear in comt ,on behalf of clients. 
If they wish to, legal advice should be sought and the director of Cruse infonlle~~ 
-
There is no legal obligation to atteud court at the request of parties involved in a case, or 
at the request of their la\vyers, until a \Vitlless sunmlOllS, or subpoena is issued to require 
attendance to allS\Ver questions or produce docUlnents. Once in the witness box, there is 
a duty to answer questions honestly when instructed to do so bv the court, Refusal to 
answer will usually amount to couteulpt of COlut. Legal advice ~hould be sought about ( 
the iluplications of answeling questions. ... 
7.4 Poiice enq uiries 
7.5 
(a) Responsibilities 
(b) 
Cruse workers aloe, other than as set out below, lUlder no obligation in clillullallaw 
to disdose infonnation, confidential or otherwise, to the "'police or to another 
agencv, even when infOlmatiou relates to serious Climes such as murder. Refusal 
to'ans\,,;er police questiOllS is not an offence, although lying could be. In general 
tenns, the only circunlstances in wiuch the police can require an aIlSwer about a 
dient, and when refusal to aIlS\Ver \vould be an offence, relate to the prevention of 
telTOlislll. It is good practice to ask police persOlmel to clarify their legal light to an 
ans\\;er before oi ving one. ~ ~ 
The Prevention of TeiTorislll Act states that allVOne with infOlmation about acts of 
telTOlislll which Iuav bc of luaterial assistanC'e, who withhoids such infoflllation 
"without reasonable "'excuse", is guilty of an offence. "Reasonable excuse" would 
be detennined bv the COlutS. 
"' 
The Prevention of TelTOlisnl (Tclnporary Provisions) Act 1989 lnakes it all offence 
to fail to oi ve infonnation that nlav hell) to l)revent acts of teLTOlism cOIUlected with 
~ "' 
NOlthenl Ireiand or to apprehend a terrorist. 
Special statutes . ' . 
Thcre al"C some specialised statutes under \VlllCh the P?lice alld other officlals. l~lay 
require particular kinds of infolulation - statutes re.latIng, for exanlple, to dnVlug 
offences, social securitv, and the eillploynlent of children. If a Cruse \vorker were 
asked under one of thC'se statutes for infonnation about a client, refusal to aI1S\Ver 
would be an offence. The duty under such ~ statute prevails. in law over the 
lUldeltaking of confidentiality. In such cases, the branch cha\rmall should be 
infonned ar;d legal advice should be souglit. 
Disclosure of crimes . .' . . . 
If, dming the cow'se of ~Ul interview, a eli.ent begulS t~ give InfoflllatlOn ab.out cflL~nal 
acti vities, it is advisable to wanl the cll~nt of pOSSIble c?usequences, If, later I ~he 
counsellor were to be SUllllllollsed as a WItness. In such Cll'c~llllStances, leg~ advlce 
should be sought imnlediately and the director of Cruse (or nOmInated deputy) utlOlTIled 
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(see 3.2( c)). Cruse workers have different responsibilities in c~ises of child abuse and 
neglect. (See section 3.2(b ).) . 
7.6 P.·occdures in the event of police visits . 
Police officers visiting a bnulch seeking infonnation about clients sholllclnot be allowed 
into any .roon~ \~here ~onfidential records are kept, and should inllnediatc1y be told abollt 
the cOl~lc1ent1ahty policy as an explanation for not answering questions. No questions 
about c1tents should be answered. If the police persist in their enquilies. or allege that an 
offence is being cOllllllitted by the Cruse \\lorker refusing to answer questions, tIle matter 
should inunediateiy be referred to I-Iead Office. The reason for not giving access to 
rooms \vhere records are kept is that Section 19 (3) of the Police and Clinlinal Evidence 
Act 1984 (PACE) and, in Northern Ireland, Alticle 21 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence (Nl) Order 1989, give general powers to police officers, lawfully in any 
prenlises, to seize anything that they reasonabiy believe is evidence in relation to an 
offence under investigation, \vhich might otherwise be concealed, lost, altered, or 
destroved. 
"" 
7.9 l'O\ycrs of Sociai Secu.-ity inspectol's 
Social Secmity legislation - including the recent Cilild SUpp0l1 Act - gives wide powers 
to inspectors to Inake enquilies and to examine records. These powers. in theory. extend 
to the examination of case records. In fact, these powers have not yet been used in this 
way in Social Secm'ity investigations, and the Child Support Agency COnfilUlS that there 
is no intention to do so in their investigation procedm·es. In the very mllikely event that 
an inspector asks for access to case records, the Cruse worker should check that the 
inspector"s certificate specifies the branch and the prenuses cOiTectly, and contact Head 
Office for advice before allowing access. 
8 CONCLUSION 
Cruse believes that the above policy is necessary for the protection of the lights of clients and 
comlSellors. Ho\vever, it is not our \vish to advocate an excessively secret fonn of cOtUlselling 
and there Inav be times when there would be significant benefits in working with a child in a 
famiIv settin~ or encouraging a client to share infonnation with faIniiy llleinbers, friends, or 
v ~ ""- ""-
carers. 
App.·oved by Council Feb.·ua.·y 1994 
Amended IVlay 1995 
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Appendix 2 
POLIC1' ON CI-If\l{GING 
1. No charge is Blade to clients for counselling. 
2. /\il branch counsellors are voltmteers and do nol ch:u'ge for their services. Once selected 
as counseliors, they are trained and supervised free of charge by Cruse, and their 
expenses are Illet by the organisation. 
3. \\Then any Cruse group meets, charges may' be made to those attending to cover the 
expenses directly incurred by the group, e.g. rent and heating, :'Uld for refreslullents. 
4. Cruse ll1cets its expenditure, inciuding volunteers' expenses, acilninistration, salrules, 
and fees, frol11 gr~ulls, contracts, training COlU'se fees, anel flUld raising. Such 
arrangelnents may include charges to a flll1ding organisation for counselling services. 
Donations frol11 those counselled are \Ve1cOllled, pro\' ided it has been luade clear that 
such contTibutions are entirelv voiuntru"v. 
'" '" 
Approved by COllncii: .June 1995 
Impiementation vate: June 1995 
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Appendix 5 
CONTRACT BET\VEEN BR}\NCI-I AND COUNSELLOR 
TI-lli BRl-\NCI-I \\11LL: 
._,--
1. Consuit with you prior to placing you with a re[elTai. 
2. Provide you with access to publications relating to bereavement. 
3. Give you regular one to one supervision support to ciiscuss case\vork and, \vhere 
necessary, providc practical infonnation, e.g. about benefits. 
-L 
.). 
6. 
7. 
Help you finish in ~\ plmulcd lvay if you wish to stop counselling a client. 
Organise regular group sessions for counsellors which will give you an opportunity to 
discuss topics relating to Cruse counseliing. 
Provide reoular on-ooino tTainino sessions. t:'s ~ ~ ~ 
Reilnburse you for expenses incurred on Cruse business, e.g. telephone and travelling 
pXI' '''-l'sec;:: ~, )\::.1 ..,. 
(, 
8. Provide a lueans, through discussion with the chainuall of the counselling Subcollunittee, 
or the branch chainnan, for resolving any difficulties which nlay alise, which cannot be 
resol ved through supervision. 
TH~ Bl<ANCH EXPECTS THAT YOU \;;lILL: 
1 . Contact clients refelTed to you within three working days, by telephone or letter, to lllake 
the first appointnlent, and calTY an ID card to be produced on request. 
2. Notify' a client as soon as possible beforehand if you cannot visit at an alT3nged tilue. 
., 
~) . 
-L 
.). 
6. 
7. 
8. 
8. 
Respect each client" s light to confidentiality, ill accordance with the Cruse confidentiality 
policy doclUuent, which you \,rill be required to sign. 
Record ali sessions on the statistics of couJ/seiiillg form. 
Notify the refen-al secretary of conlpletion of counselling . 
Attend regular supervision sessions. 
f\ttenci at least seventy percent of on-going training sessions. 
\Vork within Cruse UK and branch policies and standards of counselling, so that your 
work will be covered by National Cruse inSllr~Ulce policy. (See Appendix IS, page 47.) 
Infonn the chailulan and the referral secretary if YOll resign, and hand in your 
identification badge and all records and case notes. 
Signed (Counsellor) 
Siglled (Chainnan) 
page 28 
Date: 
Date: 
( 
300 
Cruse Bereavement Care- Branch Handbook Fh-st Editiorl 
Appendix 6 
SAIVIPLE CONTRACT BET '''EEN SUPER" tSOR ANI) COUNSELLOR 
The sampie contTact between a supervisor and a counsellor is a personal agreement that will be 
worked out bet ween them at the first or seconclmeeting. It will include such points as: 
.I. 
'j 
.... 
" 
.:>. 
4. 
J. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
'V·e wiil llonnaiiv meet at X l)lace on .......................... dav at such and such a time . ~ ~ 
If ~Ul anangement needs to be changed, then X days notice wiilnonnally be given to the 
other person. 
The counseiior may COllt(~ct the supervisor at a given telephone number between 
. ....... anci.. ...... ilollrs in tiines of difficulty. 
\\!e wiii strive for opelllless between us, and any difficulties wLtlun the supen'lslon 
relationship or situation will be discussed between us in the first instance. 
\Ve agree that notes of what was agreed at our supervision sessions wiIi be kept by both 
of us, in accordance ''lith the Cruse confidyl,ltiality policy and the standard on records, 
and brought to each session. 
\Ve both agree to abide by the Cnlse standard on supervision. 
\-\'e wiii review the effectiveness of our sessions after the first three Inonths, and then 
ruUlllZllly thereafter. 
,,, e \ViIi I-ev,iew the supervision contract after Z lllonths. 
Signed 
(Counselior) 
Date: 
Signed 
(Supervisor) 
page 29 
Date: 
i ·.~···":7·:i!.';~: ::;'; ~"J :~!,( . 
Cruse Bereavement Care- Branch Handbook First Editior. 
Appendix 7 
S1-\IvIPLE CONTi<AC'T' BET\VEEN BRANCI-I AND SUPER\'ISOR 
THE BRANCI-I \VILL: 
1. Provid.e. a stlycture for the recruitment and training of supervisors and provide 
superVIsIOll of your supervision in line with the Cruse standard on supervisioll. 
2. I\1eet the expense of training, and of any travel incurred through your work for Cnlse. 
3. Insure you through the branch' s affiliation to Cruse ~JJ:(, so long as vall adhere to Cruse 
policies and guict'elines. (For details oj insurance coyer. see A.p;jeJ1di~" 15. page 47.) 
4. Ask you to supervise between one and four connseliors on a 1110nthly, one to one basis. 
in line with the branch's practice. 
c 
5. 1nfonn you when counsellors assigned to you unde11ake new cases. 
6. Provide a lneans, tlu'ough the counselling subconunittee, to resolve any difficulties which 
nlay arise between you and counsellors assigned to you. . 
TI-iE BRA1'JCI-i EXP~CTS THAT YOU \VILL: 
1. 
'} 
~. 
" ..). 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Adhere to the Cruse standard on supervision. 
Attend for supervision of yom' \vork as a supervisor, as an-anged for you by the branch. 
Attend on-going tTaining sessions arranged for vou bv the branch. 
_. _. _. "'- eI ., 
Establish a contract with counsellors assigned to you, to cover such matters as when you 
will be available to thelU, if necessary outside scheduled supervision tl111es. 
Fullv exercise vour responsibilities with regard to work undertaken by co UllSeilors . 
assi ~ned to vou," and act on them in accordance \vith the standard for supen'ision. 
b .. 
Infonn the counselling SUbCOlllluittee if a counseHor faiLs to attend for supervision. 
nlaking recollllllendation as to whether the counsellor should cease counselling for a·use. 
'\lork within the policies and guidelines set out by Cruse BereaVCluent Care. 
Signed 
(Supervisor) 
Date: 
Signed 
(Chainnan) 
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Appendix 8 : REFERRALIENQUIRY FORlVI 
Reference number..··· ............... : ...................... Dc,k of enquil)' ................. · .................................... . 
Name of enquirer.. ............................................. . 
. , .. , .................................................. -, .............. . 
j\ddress ....................................................................................................................................... . 
. . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. " " .................................................................... : ...... " ....................................... . 
Teiephone number (home).. .............................................. (work'.I ................................................ . 
Ti 111 es to con tact... ......... ....... ..................... .... ............................................................................ .. 
L ,Vital kind of enquiry'? general I nr"o. _~rd pany seif referral tel. COllllS. oni v 
'7' '1'-:' - ... -. _: •• -= t"iiC ellqll'li'el' "iical' (1:" 0··':' ,,-,.. roo:.') 
-. IlV'" II II dU III \.. .. ( U~~ • '" ................................................................ " ...... . 
GP hospital church school CAB rdati ve/friend 
Cruse HQ press! III edia Socicll services other unknown 
') 
. ., .. ~.". "" Acnon iah:en 10ilowmg caii ................................................................................................ .. 
•••••• •••• •••• ............................... •••••••••••••• •••••••••••• •••• •••••• ••••• 000.000 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
4. Enquiries on behalf of someone eisc: 
Relationship! invol vement wi th bereaved per~()n ..................................................................... . 
Request for:' cowlselling 
'-
inf o1"mationili terature group SUppOIt 
Date client confirms consent to the referral ......................................................................... .. 
5. Information about the bereaved person: 
I-Janic ................................................................................................................................... . 
Address ............................................................................................................................... . 
•••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••• 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••• 
Ttl ephone num ber(home) ............................................... .( \vork) ........................................ . 
Times to contact. ................................................................................................................. . 
D·"t-· l)t- b':'I·,:.a\J':'lll ':'Ilt . . .................................................................... . " v v '" . '" '" ....•................................. 
1 t- .-. P Naille and adc ress 0 Cr ............................................................... '" ..................................... . 
........ .......... .... .... .... . •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ............................................................................ . 
Tillles available for visiting ......................................................................... : ........................ . 
I .. ; . [s !)I'j vacv available? .............................. . .... Occ1uon ................... ·························· ................... .' 
6. . ( ................ " ........ " ............... . 1~lsl\: asscssmen ....................................................................... . 
7. I II t (1 to Date' ......................... . Refcl'ra a oca e ................................................................. .... ..... .
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8. infurmuliun reiating (0 the referral 
(n) ..... " .. "" . \IV nell allocaleo mlillcdiatcly 
Date of allocation 
••••• e .. a ............................................ ~ • • • • • • • • •• ••• • ...................................................... .. 
Date counsellor mak.es first contact with client 
......................................................... 
l-Iave the criteria for response times been metr ........................................................... . 
t b) VVhen (here is a wailing iisl 
Estimated waiting time ............................................................................... : ............... . 
Li terature sent to client 
- .................................................................................... 0 ••••••••••• • 
Date \vhen this infOl-Plation is sent to client.... .... .... .... .... .... ........ .... .... ......... .... ..... ... ..... ( 
Dates of subsequent contacts made \\lith client. .......................................................... . 
<,Or name of cOllnselior designated to do this) .................. , ................ '" ...................... . 
(c) \·Vhen the waiting linlc is O\,Cl' olle mOllth 
tRegional Officer and Cruse House require notification) 
Date \:<'!hen literature and National Help line number are sent to ciient. ....................... . 
~,... 
(d', Aiiocatiul1 clctaiis nftcr a wailing pcriod 
Date of allocation ....................................................................................................... . 
Date counsellor first contacts client. ........................................................................... . 
Length of waiting time ............................................................................................... . 
~ ~ 
~ c', Any other rclevant information (but see Confidentiality Policy section 6.1 ) 
(f'l I)ntc case is closed: .................................................................................................... . 
Datc rcfernti secrehu'Y is informed ..................................... ···· .... ·························· .... · 
(h) I 
. ... l)nle ense no cs snrCOOC(I ............................... ····························································· 
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Appendix 9 : STATISTICS OF COUNSELLING FORIVI 
Ph~llse record lillleS oj vL .. iJsltelepJwne sessions (Jverleuj jor the year elllling 31 March, 
Please semI this fortn tu the branch atiritinistrallll" in the s.a.c. provided a.s.~.p. ,L11er 31 MardI. Till: fllrtll will bl: 
destroyed aner the iull1rrtlatil1n has betn lransli:rred lu Iht branch annual slatislics return. 
I\j'atnc of counsellor. ............. , ....................................................................................... " ................... . 
Reference number of CliClll 
................................................................................................................... 
Pi{'{ls£' liu/iwle lite lIppropriate response to luch iJ.em clearly, 
1. How did the clicnt heat· ahout C.'lIsc? 
,GP hospitai church school CAB rda Ii v~/fri~lld 
Clllse HQ p r~~si rnc~d i a Social Services other unknO\Vll 
2, Is the clicnt uude.' is? "{es i No 
3. Total 110, of cOllllsciiing (incb.tdetelephone) scssions for the year ........................................... . 
4. If tile ciicll( is bC"cavcd or a ,Hwinc.", al"C thc."e child."cn undc." IS? .................................. . 
5. Is the clicnt: 
wldowiparlJle.r \vido weripm1ner parent \vhose. child has die.d 
sibling child whose parent has died Tllcnd 
adult bereaved of parem berem' ed by sui cide homosexl.l.::,l parmer 
'>-other 
6. Scx of thc client: male i female 
7 . Ethnic o.".glll of the ciicnt: 
African Cmibbean Indian Pakistani 
Other Asian European Other non-white Other 
8. Thc clicnes ."ciigion: 
Bl.ldcUlism Cluisllanit.y Judaism Hinduism Islam 
Ne\.v Faith Sikhism Agnosticism Other l--ione 
9. Is thc clicnt's fi.'s! language English? O"{ es / No 
1.0. If "No", please spccilY first iallgu."lgc .................................. ··········· ................................... . 
11.. Al,!c e."OOp of the clicnt: 
preschool plimary school secondalY school 
18-29 
30-39 40-59 60-74 
,5 plus 
12. Causc of thc bc.·cavemcnt: 
heart attack/stroke. cancer respiratory disease 
accident car accidelllother 
murder su..icidc~ AIDS other 
lUlkno\O\11 
page 33 
305 
Cruse Bereavement Care- Branch Handbook First Edition 
Appendix 16 
CRUSE BEREA'VEIVIENT CARE STANDARDS, 
POLICIES AND PI<OCEDURES 
lVliuiullUll standards were issued in 1987 as palt of the Training I-Iandbook for Cruse branches, 
and set out as CnlSe policy in 1992. CnlSc cOllllcil has recently restated its commitment that all 
branches should adhere to these standards and has set a deadline of Januarv 1996 for the 
. ilnplC1uentation of The l\1ininuun Standards of Counselling. .. 
To cOlllplelnellt these minimum standards, Cruse is now producing a new and more detaiicd 
standard for each aspect of its work or relating issues. They contain an introduction. a list of 
ai.lllS and objectives, a framework for their impienlentation, a list of tasks and how they should 
be can.1ed ont, and finaHy a deadiine for the standard t'O be ilnpienlented by local branches. 
The following standards have now been issued. They are reproduced here in full. 
Title Issue date Implelnentation date J:-'age 
Standard all referral procedm'es 11/94 1197 50 
Standard for supervision 6/95 10/97 54 
Standard for drop in centres 6195 9/98 59 
Standard for 12ereavelnent support groups 6i95 9/98 61 
Standard for friendship groups 6/95 9/98 64 
Coming in the near future: 
A cOlllplaiuts procedm'e 
Referred 10 ill the above standards alld preslIInabZy ill the pipe line somewhere: 
A health and safety policy 
A standard 011 record keeping 
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Appendix 17 
S1'ANDARD ON REFERRAL Pl{OCEDURES 
INTRODlJCTION 
For most potential Cruse users, their first contact \\lith the organisation is through the branch 
telephone l1lUnber. It is therefore vital that a dedicated number is available to nlcmbers of the 
public and that, as far as is practicable, the number does not chmlge. 
Often the caller to a Crnse branch is in distress. and it may take courage for that persoll to 
telephone for help, information or advice. So it is iluport::tnt that the person answering the 
branch telephone is, ~U1d SOlUlds, cming and sensitive. 
It is also necessary that the branch referral secretary is \Veil-trained and well-suppolted by the 
branch, and that the cOlUlseliing subconunittee recognises the particular stresses of that job. 
The branch should devise a svsterll which does not overburden an individual volunteer. 
'"' 
As well as having a good knowledge of the Cruse branch. its policies and services, the refenal ( 
secret(uv wiilneed to have access to infollnation about other agencies in related fields, so that 
enquirel:s Inay be directed there, if Crnse is not the appropliate agency. 
In addition to providing a systelll for ~uls\verillg incoming calls, the bnmch tuust enSlU'e that an 
appropriate response is made ,vithin an acceptable time. At the Saine tilne, the branch wiii ,vant 
to collect a basic aJllOllllt of illfonnation about callers, so that thev can be awm'e of chmlges and 
developnlents in the calls on the branch's services. Tiris same infonnalion, "rith due regard for 
confidentiality, can be used to compile local and lJK statistics. 
This standardcwiH help branches to provide a competent and reliable service which will ensure 
that bereaved people m'e not flUther distressed by an inefficient or insensitive response to their 
calls and that both the branch and Ct11se as a irK organisation, are held in high regru"d because 
, ....... --
of the quality of response to callers. 
AliVIS 
J. To estabiish (md tuaintain a strucnlre for ref eITa.ls. 
2. To ensure a high quaEty response to all refelTais within rul acceptable tillIe scale. 
OB.JECTIV~S 
1. To provide an appropriate approach for dealing wi til referrals throughout the 
organisation. 
2. To provide a mechanism against which performance in dealing with refelTals can be 
measured. 
STRUCTURE FOI< RJ~.JT£RRAL PROCEDUI<.E 
1. A refenal secretru'y or rota of referral secretaIies. 
2. A sci ecti all procedure ~Uld training programme for refen'al secretaJies. 
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3. Standard referral forrns. 
4. Dedicated telephone lille and answering machines. 
PROCESS FOl<' I<'EFERI<'AL PROCEDlJl<'E 
1 . Acceptanc(' and aiiocation of rel'elTals 
1.1 RefelTals to be taken bv a referral secretarv. 
"' "' 
1.2 Referrals to be allocated by a referral secretary or allocations secretalY. 
1.3 \\ihere applicable, the referrai secretary to pass on the referral to the allocations 
secretaty within two \vor.king days of the refenal being received. 
1.4 The IJerson Inaking the allocation to be weB infolllled about the counsellors eo 
- , ~, 
agreed case ioads, at'eae;; of expel1ise, etc., and with their supervisors. ~. 
2. Assessment of l·efclTais 
2.1 The refelTal secretary to be lIained in telephone assesslnent in order to discuss with 
the potential client ho\v best his/her needs Inay be Illet. 
2.2 The referral secretar:y to provide information about any possible alternative SOlU'ces 
of heip when the branch is tillable to nleet the needs of a palticular person. 
4> 
3 . SOUl"CeS of ."efelTal 
3.1 Self referrals are preferable. 
Third patty referrals to be accepted only with the free and informed consent of the 
the client. which is to be established bv a letter or a return caB to the client fr01n the 
"' refeual secretarv. 
"' 
The Cruse referrals poEcy as above to be nlade cleat· in branch publicity or liaison 
with other agencies. 
4. Ref('rrai fOl'IllS 
4.1 
4· 'j .~ 
4 ·, • .J 
4.4 
The standat'd fonn to be used for ail refelTals. 
The fOlln fo be ill duplicate, with the Oliginal being retained in a secured file by the 
referrals secretary and a copy sent to the cotUlsellor (see the standard on record 
keeping). 
The cOllllsell or' s supervisor to be notified of the allocation by the al1ocations 
secretarY. 
"' 
Oil completion of counselling. the counsellor to .rill in any missing information, 
sHch as: duration of cOIUlsellillg, nmuber of sessIOns etc. and retlu:n !he form t.o 
the referrals secretary. The referrals secretary to complete the statIstIcs analysIs 
and destToy the cOIUlsellor's copy. 
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5. Response time 
5.1 An initial. response frOl11 the allocations secretary to be made to the client within 
hvo workIng days. 
5.2 The cOllnsellor allocated is to make contact with the client within two workino days 
of receiving the refenal and arnmge an appointment. b ., 
5.3 If tlus contact canIlot be made witllin [i ve days of receiving the referral, the 
counsellor to infonn the refelTal secretary and record reasons. - ... 
5.4 The referral secretary to write to the client if they are still not availabie 011 the 
phone. :,-
5.5 ,'Then counsell.ing is required, but a counsellor is not available, a response to the 
effect that a cOlmsellor will be allocated as soon as possible. to be Blade within two 
working days. 
5.6 \Vhere it is necessary to maintain a wattmg list, an explanation and suitable 
literature to be sent to the client and an estilnate given of the waiting time. 
5_7 Persons on a waiting list should be contacted regulat'ly by the referral secretary, or 
a counsellor designated for the pUlpose. 
5.8 If the waiting list is over one month and the branch is unable to accept any lllore 
refenals, the NationallRegional Officer and Cruse House to be notified and any 
n.ew refelTals sent out suitable literatlu-e and given the National Heip line telephone 
nlllliber. 
5.9 \Vaitillg lists to be avoided if at all possible. 
6. Teiepilone 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
6.4 
6.5 
6.6 
Each branch to have a dedicated telephone number which is listed in the phone 
book. 
'Vhere the phone is at a plivate address, that address should not be publicised. 
The telephone to be located ill a suitable place, free frOlll distractions. 
The Iuessage 011 the answering lllachine to indicate when the phone wiIi be 
personally staffed and that Inessages froln i! will be proc~ssed daily. The ph?ne ~o 
be staffed for a llllUinlllIll of two hours tWICe a '\leek. (Preferably one seSSIon 111 
the evelung.) 
lvlessage to be taken off the lnachine daily (by remote control facility if nccessm'Y) 
atld theenquirer responded to within t,venty fOlU- hours. 
The telephone l1Ulnber of thc local Satu .. u·itans' Branch to be included on the 
answeling machine nlessage. 
7 . T.oaining and supervision for ."efcrral secretaries 
All referral secretaries to take part in t~e h~sic tTain!ng c.o~u·se (parts I & II) and 
7.1 have additional training in telephone skills, InfolmatIon gl"mg, and knowledgc of 
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7.2 
7.3 
7.4 
7.5 
other agencies. 
Refcnal secretmies to have tTaining in asseSSlllent skills. 
Rcfcrral secretarics are to havc 1110nthJy supcrvision "vith a llml1cd supervisor. 
(See the standard on supervision.) 
RefclTal secretmies to understand that, whilst recognising the need for SUpp0l1ive 
listening to sonIe callers and for sUpp0l1ing people on a waiting list, their flUlction 
does not involve counselling all callers. 
Refcrrai secretalies to be full lllclnDers of the cowlscllillg subconunittee and to 
present a rcport at cach llleeting on the l1lunDer and nature of cails. 
APPl-ovcd by COllncii: Novcmbe.- 1994 
I 111piem entation date: J anllary 1997 
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Appendix 18. 
s'rANDARD FOR SUl'ER'VISION 
INTRODlJCTION 
Supervis.ion is that 'procc~s through which counsellors are helped to explore all aspects of their 
counselhng work III order to ensure that the needs of their clients are beino Inet; that the 
counsellor's skills are being developed, and that counsellors are suppolted thro~gh phvsical. or 
enl0tional slTesscs incurred bv the work. .... "' 
"' 
AIlVI OF SlJPl~I{VISION 
The prinuu"y ftulction of cOlUlselling supervision in Cruse is to provide the llle:.UlS by which 
counsellors are accountable for the work that they do on behalf of Cruse. Clients approach 
Cruse for help, and Cruse relllains responsible for these clients. Supervision enables the 
organisation to nlonitor cOlulseiling work; to ensure that the work is being done to a 
sufficiently high standard, and that neither client not cOllllsellor are hanned by the relationship. 
OtlJECTIVES 011' SlJPERVISION 
1. To safeguard the client. 
2. To enSlU"e the quality of counseliing. 
-v" 
3. To provide a structure for the accountabjjity of the counsellor to Cruse. 
4. To provide regular space for counsellors to reflect upon the content and lJrocess or their 
work. 
5. To develop understanding and skills. 
6. To enable the cOlUlsellor to receive infollnation and another's perspective concenung 
their work. 
7. To validate and SUppOlt the cOlUlsellor, both as a person anel ~s a. worker, i~Tespecti\'e of 
origin, status, gender. sexual orientation, age, bebef, or contnbutIOn to SOCIety. 
~. ~ 
8. To ensure that the counsellor is not left to c~uTy difficulties, probiems, mld projections 
alone. 
9. To have space to explore and express personal clistTess, restinlltlation, transference and 
corulter transference. 
10. To plan and utilise personal LUld professional resources to the full. 
STRUCTURE OF SUPERVISION 
1. A counselling and training SubcOllunittee. 
2. A named supervisor for each counsellor. 
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4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
A fonun fOl~ supervisors to Ineet as a group. 
COlUlsellors' record book. 
Training conrse for supervisors. 
Training for cOlUlsellors in the use of supervision. 
COl~tracts between branch and supervisor, m1d supervisor and counsellor. (See samples 
111 Appendices j & 2. j _ 
One to one supervision. 
Group ~~lpe~visi.Oll: between. 2. and 4 cOll!l~el1ors meeting with one supervisor, who is 
l~esponslble tor t~le grOl.lp and allocates the hrne, ensm'ing that the counsellors present ail 
theIr cases at eacl1lneeung. 
l'l<OCcSS yOH Sl.T! .... El<VISION 
1 
1.1 
1 r; .~ 
2 
2.1 
'; 2 ~. 
2.4 
3 
3.1 
3.2 
., ., 
.J.J 
probationary cOllnseiio.·s 
.:-'\11 probational}, counsellors to have one to one, face to face supervision at ie::Lst 
1110nthlv . 
... 
Provision to be made at the initial phase and at times of particular difficulty for contact 
between counseliors and supervisors after each cOlUlSelling session. ... 
...;.. I, .~) 
Acc.·edited COLI nsciiors 
IVlonthly one to one, face to face supervision is the prefened option. ",There a branch 
cannot anange this, provision nlay be nlade for Inonthly group supervision, as in 9. 
above. 
,\Vhere counscllors are in group supervision, one to one, face to face supervision to 
relnain available, and be used at least three times per ycar. 
Accredited cOlUlsellors who are beginning to work with children must initially receive 
supervision after eac.~l session in order to detennine their suitability for this work. 
COllllselling supervisors to work with differel.lt. coullscll?rs every 2-3 years, in order to 
provide the cOllllsellors ,,·ith a range of superViSIon expenence. 
Contt"acts and ."ecol"ds 
Branches to establish a contTact with supervisors. (See Appendix 7, page 30.) 
COlUlsellors and supervisors to establish a wlinen contract covcling such areas as 
frequcncy and place of mectings, ag~nda fOl: Inectings, an~ar:tgements fqr contact .betwecn 
nleetings, and how records of nleCtlngs wIll be kept. 1111s contract to be reVIewed at 
least anllually. (See Appelldi"t 6, page 29.) 
The contract between counsellor and supervisor to contain au elemcnt of two way review 
and appraisal of the effcctiveness of supervision. 
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3.4 
3.5 
4 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
4.8 
4.9 
~e~ords o~ supervision sessions to reflect tl~e areas discuss~d in the sessions and any 
.. \ChOllS dccided on. 111cse records to be kept III accordance wIth the standard of records. 
Both cOlmsellor and supervisor to retain copies of such records. 
Tnlining and selection 
Training in the inlpOltance and plUvose of supervision to be part of the basic training 
course for all cOlmscllors. ~ 
All probationary c0ll!l~el1ors to he required to demonstrate an appreciation of the use of, 
and need for, superVIsIOn. 
All people recluited as supervisors to hal' C 150 hours of counselling expericnce as 
distinct from counsclling skills. ~,
AU supervisors to be cunentiy engaged in coullseiling. as distinct from counselling 
skills, and have expelience or receiving counselling supervision. ~ 
All prospective supervisors to have experience of counselling clients frOlll varied 
backgrounds and ages. including ciients who have been bereaved. ~ 
All prospective supervisors to be able to de.monstratea knowledge of relevant theOlies of 
cOlmselling. 
All prospective supervisors to be willing to leaIu about. and be open to, vaIious reievanl 
theoretical models of counselling and supervision. 
All prospective supenrisors to be able to offer all agreed commitnlent of tillle to 
snpen'ising for Guse. 
Extenlal supervisors invited to supervise for Cluse lo submit a c. v' to the satisfaction of 
the counselling and training subcommittee. 
~ .... 
4.10 Ali prospective supervisors to cOlnplete palt I of the Cruse cowlselling supervisors 
course, being of not less than 18 hours, before stalting to supervise. 
4.11 The cOlUlselling and training subcomnlittee nlay, after consultation with the regionall ( 
national officer, waive pmt I in individual cases, where external qualifications and 
expelience in counselling supervision have been gained. 
4.12 All prospecti ve supervisor~ t~ und~rtake induction training in!o. the work of Cnlse 
hereavelnent care, the orgamsatlOn ot the local branch, and the trmrung and management 
of Cruse cOlmseliors. 
4.13 All prospective supervisors to c~m:plcte a probationaIy-,year, during ~\'hich they. wiIi 
undeltake a fUIther 18 hours tTaImng (part II of the Cruse counsclImg ~up~rvlsors 
course). after the probationary ye~u' has been successfully cOIllpleted, accreditatIon nlay . 
be given by Cruse. 
4.14 V\There supervisors are undeltaking group supervision, they are required to have training 
and experience in group work skills. . : 
4.15 Where supervisors are sU'pervi~ing c~lU1seI1ors \yorking .with chilfdren,kthey are required 
to havc training and expenence In the Issues relatmg to this area 0 wor~. 
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5 Commitment and sanctions 
5.1 Branches to fund training as in 4.6 and 4.7 above. 
5. 2 Brancl~es to provide counselling supervisors with supervision of thcir own supervision 
work, 1Il addil-ioll to, a.nd separate from, supervision of their counselling. 
5.3 Supervisors to offer the branch a mininuU11 of two hours per Illonth for supervision of 
counsellors. . 
5.4 Supervisors to remain practising counseHors, not llccessatily within Cruse, but with 
sufficient focus on bei·eaVell1ent. 
-5.5 \\There a supervisor has coucenlS about the ability of a counseHor to work effectivcl)', for 
whatever reasons, these concerns to be addressed, in the first place, in supervision. 
5.6 If it is not possible to resolve the issue in this way, the supervisor to rep0l1 to the 
chainnan of the~counselling and training subcommittee, who should take the matter up 
with the counsellor. 
5.7 The counsellor to be kept fully infonned about such reporting. 
5.8 ,\There a c01ll1seilor is dissatisfied with her supervisor, for whatever reason, the same 
procedlu'es as in 5.5 to 5.7 to be followed. 
5.9 ,,\There the counsellillg and training subcoillInittee is unhappy with the quaiil)' and 
process -'of supervision, the issu.es t.o be ~iscusse~ \\lith the. supervis?f, and, if .necessary, 
the Blatter to be repolted to tIle branc.ll COlllllllttee, whIch has the authonty to take 
appropliate action with the individual(s) concerned. 
Appl"oved by Councii: June 1995 
Impiementation date October" 1997 
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Appendix 19 
Sl~ANDARDS FOR 
Dl{Op-IN CENTRES, BEREA\TEMENT SUPPOI{rr GH.OUPS 
A.ND FRIENDSI-IIP Gl<OUPS 
INTRODlTCTION 
Cruse branches have used V(uions names to desclibe the groups that they have operated: drop-
in centTes, social groups, or social SUppOlt groups. Groups that have perf OJmed similar tasks 
in diffeJ~ent branches nlight have different names. Paradoxicaiiy, groups pCl10nning very 
different fUllctions in other branches might use the satne name 1. 
In addition to this, 1110St branches had only one group, whatever it was cailed, and expelience 
has shown that, ,vhere a group is effective in meeting the needs on one section of bereaved 
people, that it is at the expense of other users. In other words, a group 1110st effectively meets 
the needs of bereaved people when the ratlge of users catered for is not too diverse. 
To llleet the needs of a wide range of bereaved people, a Cruse branch wiH ideally need a 
variety of different kinds of group. \\There a branch C,ll only provide one group, this should 
be a bereaveluent SUppOlt group, in order to meet the needs of fragile, recently bereaved 
people. These people, rightly, have priOlity ,,,hen a branch is allocating its resources. 
The three statldards following need to be read together in order to understand how the range of 
services offereCl llleets the requirements in the mission statement for social support. 
(Note: the document outlining the principles underlying social support provision is in the policy 
documelll ill Appemhr 3. all page 23.) 
1 Please note that th\? names used to desai.be groups in these standards may not equate ,·"ith similar, current, 
orpl'~vious usag~. 
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Appendix 20 
STl-\NDARu FOR DROP-IN CENTRES 
INTRODlJCTION 
The effe~tive~l~ss of a. branch of Cnlse il~ ser.v~n~ .the needs of the bereaved people in the 
cOlnnlluuty will depend to SOlue extent on the Vlsllnhty and ease of access of its services. It is 
not c<:>1upulsory for a branch to provide a drop-in centre. However, if a branch believes a 
dro'p~Ill centre wo~ld. be of benef~t .to its cli~nts, t~le following pages indicate the standard 
WhICh 111USt be apphed to the establtslunenl am1 nllllung of a drop-in centre. 
The drop-in centre is a means by which lllembers of the public C,ill find out more about Cluse 
services - corulselling, social support groups. ieaOets and literature, training cow'ses - and how 
to access thenl. 
Those using the drop-in centre wiiI be people ,vanting to 11lake contact with Cruse because of 
their own bereaveillent, as well as fliends, relatives, and colleagues of bereaved people seeking 
guidance in how they can offer support to a bereaved person. \Vhile some peopie Inay 
needhvish to use the drop-in centre on more than one occasion, it does not operate as a regular 
social venue. 
The drop-in centre Iuakes use of Cruse services 1110re visible and Iuore avaiiabie, either in a 
conununity where there is already a Cruse presence, or where a branch ,,,ishes to provide 
outreach into a conlluunity on a regular but not continual basis. A cOlupmison nught be with a 
nl0bile library'syisits to a nlrai village. 
The tenu drop-ill celltre has been used b'v Cluse to descIibe a wide vmietv of services. Here 
the tenn is specific to an outTeach of the l~efeITal and help line systenl: it is I;Ot intended to offer 
Op'p0l1lUUti~S for nlu.mal social SllPpOl~ on an 011-g0i~lg basis .. A caller go.es to a Cluse drOl?-in 
centre for urtoflllatlOn, support, and to access other serVIces offered by Cruse or other 
appropliate agencies. 
Tlus standard is intended to SUpp0l1 bnmches in operating drop-in centres in a way wluch is 
safe for staff, and wIuch enabies the services offered by the branch to be better known and 
more wideiv availabie in the conmlUlutv. 
r ~ 
1.1 To provide infonnalioll about Cruse and the services offered by the bnmch ~md other 
appropriate agencies. 
1. 2 To assist a caller in deciding, if Cruse is the appropliate agency, how to initiate help, or 
how to assist the branch as a volunteer. 
1.3 To fruther Cruse's comnutment to conllllluuty outreach. 
j .4 To provide an OppOrtUluty for the assessment of the needs of the client. 
2 OBJECTIVES 
2.1 To provide a "shop window" for personal callers, either for themselves or for a bereaved 
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2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
3 
t1~ird ~)~11y, ~Y providil~g infonnation in branch and national literanu'e, or by illfonnal 
diSCUSSlOll wIth a drop-In ' centre worker. 
,~~provid~ ,~n ,~pp~11unity for potenti~l us:rs, enquiring via the telephone refenal ~~stcm"to dlSClISS. thclr needs Inorc fully 111 allinfonnal, face to facc nleeting. 
10 enal)lc p~tellt~al volunteers or potential Friends of Cruse nlembers to take their first 
step towards helpmg the branch. 
To enablc an immediate asseSSOlent of the needs of a client: by an accredited Cruse 
cOllllsellor. 
STI<VCTOl<.E 
3.1 A cOllllseHing and training subconunittee. 
..... .... 
3. 2 Acconlnlod~tion with, easy acce~s, facilities for tea and coffee, and a pli vate area for 
personal callers to talk to drop-In centre workers or cOllllsellors to canv out a client 
assessment. "' 
" " .J • .J 
"4 :J. 
" ,-
.J . .) 
" 6 :J. 
4 
4.1 
4.2 
4 " / .. ')
4.4 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
4.8 
Publicity material for the drop-in centre. 
A teaIH of workers. led bv a coordinator. 
., 
Local and national a'use literdture . 
Access toa telephone for einergencies. 
PROC~SS 
The drop-in centre to operate on regular days and tiines at a stated venue of venues. 
Callers to be Illet on ani val, offered tea or coffee, and given the opportunity to talk 
and/or pick up appropliate literatlu·e. 
Staff to inc1ude an accredited cOlUlselior, trained in asseSSlnent skills, and support staff 
with appropliate kIlovi11edge and good intell)ersonal skills. 
Support staff to attend a Cruse "lTnderstanding Bereavement" course and receive written 
instructions (Uld training on working at the drop-in centre. 
The drop-in coordinator to be a Iueluber of the counselling and training subconunittee. 
Records to be kept on the SaIne basis as those required for telephone enquilies. 
The cOlLllselling and training subconunittee to train and provide supervisors to enSlU'e that 
drop-in workcl:-s are supported and that the needs of the client are being nlet. 
Conditions at drop-in centres to COlllply with a'use's I-Iealth and Safety Policy. 
App.·ovcd by Council: Junc 1995 
Implcmcntation datc: Scptcm bCI" 1998 
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Appendix 21 
S'rAND1-\n.D FOR BEREA ,I ElVIENT SUPPORT GROUPS 
INTRODUCTION 
Cruse bereavelllent support groups f0l111 an integral PaIt of the work of a branch. 
The role of a bereavement SUppOIt group is to provide a safe enviromnenl in which someone 
who.has b~onle i~olated as the result of a berea\'ement Cllil find a SUpp0l1ive group in which to 
regan1 SOCIal confIdence and competence, nlake ne,,, friends, and so begin to nlake the first 
steps back into the wider cOllmHmity.: It is not intended to be a long-tellll group. 
It also enables those who have been bereaved to offer SUppOlt and help to those nlore recentlv 
bereaved within a fraIlleWork which ,,~il prevent excessive denlands being made on thenl. .. 
In order that the bereavement support group can do tiris, it needs to be an appropriate group for 
"fragile", glieving people to nlake that first step. The focus of the group nlust therefore be on 
the needs of new patticipants. 
It is ilnpOltatlt that bnmches give a high pIiOlity to the establisilluent of bereavelnent groups in 
order to nleet tile needs of these bereaved people. and that bereaveluent support groups (along 
with one to one counselling) are recognised as a basic service which ail Cruse bratlches sl1ive 
to offer. 
The follo,ving standard sets out the machinery for establishing and llllllnug an effective 
bereaveluent SUPP0l1" group in a branch. and ensuling that it continues to meet the needs of 
bereaved people. 
1 AIIVIS 
1.1 To assist bereaved people to regain social confidence atld competence. 
1.2 To equip people to address isolation and loneliness caused by bereavelnent. 
1.3 To enable bereaved people to use their expelience to SUppOlt and help others. 
2 OBJECTIVES 
') "1 ~. 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
To provide a safe ellvin.Hlll~enl in wInch .bereaved people can find emotionai 
support by the sharing of feehngs and expenence. 
To encourage group users to provide nlutllal support, ~specially for those who 
have joined the group nlore recently and/or are at present In greatest need. 
To provide a. window. into a range of activities in the local COIllll1Ulnty which group 
users lnay WIsh to enJoy. 
T encom"aoe oroup users to share existino hobbies, skills and interests with each ot~ler and to~facilitate their orgaInsation of~ocial activities outside the bereaVClnent 
SUpp0l1 group llleetings. 
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2.5 
2.6 
To provide education and infonnation on practical issues of concen1 to the users. 
T? en~ure that. group users are aware that the .aiIU of the bereaveIllcnt sUpp0l1 
glOUp IS. to ~SlSt users to progress through theIr bereavelnent and re-establish a 
plll])OSe III hfe. 
3 STRUCTURE 
3.1 A bereaveluent SUppOlt group subCOnlluiltee. 
3.2 A bereavement support group chairman who will be a n1elnber of the branch 
Inrumgement COlllluittee. _ 
3.3 Bereavelllellt suppo11 group coordinators for each group, who will be 111enlbers of 
the bereaveUlent sUpp0l1 group subconunittee. 
3.4 ACCollullociation, preferabiy "neutraf', i.e. iibrary, conllumuty centre, rather than (: 
hospital, church, private hOlue, etc. 
3.5 \\/11tlen infonnation for potentiai (and actual) users, setting out the aims, 
objectives, and ethos of the group, as wellas contact numbers. ~. 
3.6 \Vl1tten guidelines for bereavenlent support group workers. 
3.7 A trailung progranune for bereavenlent sUpp0l1 group workers. 
3.8 A llleans of recording attendance. 
A llleans of evaluation for those who have left the group - a client satisfaction and 
evaluation system . 
.. 
3.10 InfOIlllatioll on the range of branch services availabie. 
3.11 Infonnation about a range of conllllunitv services and activities. 
-- .. 
4 PROCESS 
4.1 
4.2 
4 " . .,:)
4.4 
Newcomers to join the group only through the branch refeITal s),'sten1, the 
recOlumendatiOll of their counselior, or of the group coordinator, so that their 
suitability for the group can be detenluned before the fIrst visit. 
Users to be oiven, on their first visit, w11tten infonnation on the aims, objectives, 
and ethos of the group, ,mel that the group is a transition group to be verbally 
reinf arced. 
Group workers to have allen.ded ~Ul "U~lderstru1Cling !3ereav~nlent". course, provide 
references, attend a selectIOn Internew, and satlsfactonly complete a group 
workers com·se. 
The counselling and training subconullittee to train and provide supervisors to 
ensure that the group coordinators and group workers are supported and that the 
needs of the clients are being Illet. 
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4.5 Groups to have a nriniUltUll of two trained group workers present at each Ineeting. 
4.6 Groups to Ineet at least twice a n10nt11. 
4.7 The group coordinators' course to follow the guidelines issued bv Cruse UK 
training committee and the draft course progranune to be appr~\'ed by the 
RegionaiiNationalOfficer. 
4.8 The group to assign specific roles to the group workers to ensure that enough 
workers are available to Illeet new users and to integrate theln into the group. 
4.9 . The group coordinator to decide, in consultation with the il.ldi\'idll~l l.onc(~merl; 
how and when it is appropliate for them to move on. 
4.10 The group coordinator to ensure that records of attendance and all other 
administrative work is canied out. 
4.11 Group users leaving the group to be given a Friends oj Cruse leaflet and asked to 
complete the satisfaction questioilllaire. 
Approved by COllncii: June 1995 
Impiementation date: Septembel" 1998 
\ 
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Appendix 22 
STANDAl{D FOl{ FRIENDSI-IIP GROUPS 
INTl<ODUCTION 
A Cruse f~·iendship group pro\'ides a means by which people can SUpp0l1 the work of the 
branch and at the same titne lllaintalll social contact with those they havc met at bereavement 
SllppOlt groups. Others Inay have received cOlUlselling from the bl,\'nch, but may wish to join a 
group which ailcviates the iong tcnll effects of bercavenlenl on their livcs, sllch as isolatiol1 and 
loneliness. 
In addition to sociai contact and social activities, the i'tiendship group would assist in fund 
raising activities organised by the branch 1:<11ends of Cruse, and would offer positive help to the 
branch in both SUppOit of bereaved people and promotion of Cru~e work. 
In tlus way, those attending a fIielldship group will be benefiting fron1 the social contact, but 
wiIi also be conttibuting to the activities and future weU being of the branch and those it serves 
in the COm111mutv. 
'" 
1 A IiVIS 
1.1 To provide an 0pp0l1unity for people who have been helped by Cruse to SUpp0l1 the 
work of the branch. 
1.2 To assist in the prOlllotion of the ,,'ork of the branch in the conllllmuty. 
i.3 To assist the work of the branch l'liends of Crusc. 
2 OHJ~CTIVES 
2.1 
3 
3.1 
"'l ') J .... 
, "'l 
J.J 
"'l4 J. 
3.5 
To provide opp0l1unities for former. bel~eavenlent s~lpport group n1em~ers, and those 
who have received counselling, to malntam contact '''1th each other and wtth the branch. 
To oroaluse fund raising ~ctivities, in order to ensure sufficient funds are available to 
b ....... . . ~ •.. 
cover the cost of the grolll]" s SOClal actn'Illes. 
STRlTCTUR~ 
A Cruse flienciship group subcOlnnlitlee. 
A Cruse fliendship group chainnan. 
A Cruse fliendship group membership secretary. 
'\Vlitten infonnation for Cruse fliendship group 1nelubers. 
"B lllletin" and branch newsletter. 
32.l 
Clouse Bereavemellt Care- Br eh Handbook l"irst Edition 
4 
4.1 
4.2 
4 " .J 
4.4 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
4.8 
4.9 
PROCESS 
An illfonnation leanet containing the ailns and objectives of the group to be given to all 
llleinhers. 
In.fo~lnatioll ab.ollt Cruse fliendship groups to be gi\'en in the br~U1ch newsletter and 
,vItlun conllsel1mg arId bereavenlent support group evaluation fonlls. 
The Cruse fliendship group chainnan to be elected at the bnulch AGh.1 and to be member 
of the branch managenlent cotl1mittee. 
The Cruse friendship group.lllelubership subscrj.ption to be calculated to include the cost 
of : : 
(a) branch newsletter 
(b) bulielin 
(c) adnliuislTation 
(d) national capitation. 
The Cruse fliendship group to raise sufficient funds to be financially self supporting; 
these funds to be banked into the branch account and ail legitituate expenses to be 
reilublused by the branch treaSlu·er. 
Bulletin and branch newsletter to be disnibuted to aU luernbers. 
The fliendsilip group to cooperate with the branch .f<liellds of Cruse in assisting, as 
required, with any Fliends of Cruse fund raising activities for the branch. 
The fliendsllip group to cooperate with the branch nlanagement committee to ~.llppOt"t tht~ 
work of the branch by assisting ,,,ith the pronlotion of Cruse in the COnll11lunty and the 
SUppOlt of bereaved people. 
Access to the nlelubership of the ftiendship group to be: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
foUowing luemberslllp of the bereaveluellt SUppOlt group and in consultation with 
the bereaveillent support group coordinator. 
followino one to one coullsellino and with the reconunendation of the individual's b b 
counsellor, 
direct from the conUlllullty, but having been first assessed by a branch counsellor. 
App.oovcd by Councii: June 1995 
Implementation date: Septembe.o 1998 
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